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Abstract
In 1944, the government of newly liberated Greece faced a crisis of staggering 
proportions, with a devastated economy and a currency undermined by rampant 
hyperinflation. Anxious to preserve Greece as a friendly 'outpost in South-Eastern 
Europe', the British provided advisors to help overcome the crisis. Whatever the 
political motives of the British, their economic advice was largely orthodox and 
sound, enshrining the only measures likely to provide a long-term solution to the 
problem of inflation. Nevertheless, successive governments in Athens managed to 
avoid acting on the advice in the hope that massive amounts of Allied aid would 
eliminate the need for painful policies, and preferring to adopt palliative measures 
which allowed wealthy Greeks to protect their assets while the underlying 
problems remained unaddressed.
Exasperated by their lack of success, the British withdrew in early 1947, to be 
replaced by the Americans. The mixed success of the American advisors over the 
subsequent year merely confirmed the extensive problems which had earlier 
thwarted the British efforts. The thesis demonstrates how the inertia of successive 
Greek governments led to the prolongation of the economic crisis. It also shows 
how the attitudes of the Greek political establishment during 1944-47 - with 
endless squabbling, an obsessive anti-Communism, a relentlessly laissez faire 
approach to the economy, a cavalier lack of concern towards chronic balance of 
payments and budget deficits, a reliance on foreign capital coupled with a 
resentment of any conditions foreign aid might entail - were all firmly established 
within Greek political culture prior to World War II.
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INTRODUCTION
In October 1944, the National Unity Government of newly liberated Greece faced 
an inflationary crisis of a magnitude sufficient to tax the competence of any 
government. Although it could count on a large degree of assistance and advice 
from its Allies, much depended on its own actions and its determination to restore 
economic normality as a prerequisite to recovery. Nevertheless, success was 
meagre, and by the time the British pulled out in the spring of 1947, economic 
stability remained elusive despite all the aid and advice. In the Greek case political 
factors played a crucial role in shaping the attempts to stabilise the drachma and 
create a basis for long-term recovery, offering an excellent example that although 
hyperinflation and stabilisation are essentially economic issues, political realities 
need to be appreciated in order to understand the particular course that both 
processes can take.
This thesis does not attempt to offer a definitive account of Greek history 
between 1944 and 1947, but seeks to contribute to a better understanding of this 
complex and troubled period by concentrating on Anglo-Greek interaction on 
economic matters. A vast body of literature has already dealt with the Greek crisis, 
most of which has concentrated solely on political developments. Such works, 
frequently reflecting the political stance of their authors, have usually sought to 
explain the course of events in terms of political motives and actions alone, with 
little emphasis on the dynamics of economic problems. Economic issues have thus 
tended to be pushed into the background. This thesis is a work of political history 
combining elements of economic history and international relations, and seeks to 
highlight economic issues by addressing four major questions. Firstly, it places the 
developments of 1944-47, particularly the hyperinflation and the failed stabilisation 
attempts, within the proper context of Greek economic history, as yet another 
episode of destitution and foreign tutelage in an underdeveloped country with 
chronic budgetary and balance of payments deficits. Secondly, it analyses the 
interplay of economic and political factors which aggravated and prolonged the 
crisis: the extensive polarisation of Greek society, and the weakness timidity and 
ineptitude of the country's governments. Thirdly, it assesses British involvement in 
the episode: the quality of measures recommended to the Greeks, the constraints 
facing British advisors in the country, and the reasons for the ultimate failure of 
British intervention. Fourthly, it seeks to contrast and compare the two periods of 
western tutelage of Greece: the British during 1944-47 and the American during 
1947-48. The thesis aims to address these questions in a dispassionate manner, by
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treating economic issues on their own merit rather than as moral choices dictated by 
any particular political outlook.
The Structure of the Thesis
Chapter one introduces concepts crucial for the assessment of the performance of 
the key players in the Greek economic crisis. A brief description of the causes and 
features of hyperinflation together with a summery of the measures normally used 
to restore currency stability offers a yardstick with which to judge the effectiveness 
of Greek government actions and the foreign advice proffered. To make sense of 
the underlying themes of British advice, the chapter concludes with a section on the 
British wartime experience of economic management at home and elsewhere.
Chapter two seeks to identify the long-term trends and attitudes and 
developments which were to influence the course of events after liberation, 
especially the broad patterns of Greek economic and political life prior to 1944. 
Many of the decisive features of 194447 had their roots in past experience. The 
chapter also describes the factors influencing British attitudes towards Greece, and 
the methods the British employed to achieve a changing set of objectives, with 
special reference to the political and financial dilemmas involved.
Chapter three describes the events following the end of the Nazi occupation. 
Despite a euphoric reception from the public, the new government in Athens was 
soon overwhelmed by the sheer scale of the crisis, and the British were forced to 
take a much more involved approach to economic issues. The chapter concentrates 
on the policy choices and performance of successive post-liberation governments, 
and the implementation and outcome of the first stabilisation scheme of November 
1944.
Chapter four deals with the course of the so-called 'Varvaressos Experiment'. 
Professor Kyriakos Varvaressos, the governor of the Bank of Greece, had spent 
the war in London and was well versed with the British approach to inflation. The 
British were thus keen to see him given a chance to direct the Greek government's 
efforts to restore economic stability after the disappointing showing of the first 
months following liberation. After lengthy pressure from the British, Varvaressos 
entered the government and immediately launched a series of reforms containing 
several orthodox anti-inflationary measures. Within months, widespread hostility 
to the package left Varvaressos completely isolated, and few of his reforms 
survived his resignation.
Chapter five describes the gradual British realisation that a more comprehensive 
approach was called for, a process culminating in the London Agreement of 
January 1946, which created the framework for Anglo-Greek interaction until the 
British pulled out in the spring 1947. The problems encountered by two institutions
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arising out of the Agreement - the British Economic Mission and the Currency 
Committee - underlined the weakness of the entire British involvement in Greece: 
the lack of resources to tackle problems or encourage cooperation, and the lack of 
powers to enforce compliance with British advice.
Chapter six deals with the American stance towards Greece. The British 
consistently sought American backing for their Greek policy, while Greek officials 
were anxious to secure extensive financial assistance from Washington. In both 
cases, the Americans were reluctant to become more actively involved. This 
position changed radically once Washington became convinced of the threat of 
Communist expansionism. From the summer of 1947, the Americans took over the 
British role in Greece, and immediately encountered the same problems which had 
thwarted the British for so long. Despite material resources and powers far beyond 
those of their British predecessors, American advisors were to find that stability 
was to remain elusive.
As each chapter contains its own lengthy conclusions in which many points are 
explored in depth, the concluding chapter merely gathers together the main lessons 
of the Greek economic crisis of 1944-47.
A Note on Sources
The subject is examined principally in the light of British and American archival 
sources. The originality of the thesis lies in the focus rather than the deployment of 
large amounts of new information. Many of the British official documents utilised, 
particularly those of the Foreign Office, have already been used extensively by 
historians primarily concerned with the political aspects of the Anglo-Greek 
relations. Nevertheless, the thesis has also used a huge number of Foreign Office 
papers hitherto ignored by the majority of previous researchers together with 
Treasury, Cabinet and War Office documents in the Public Record Office at Kew, 
the Bank of England Archive, internal Labour party records held in the National 
Museum of Labour History in Manchester, and the private papers of several 
leading British politicians and officials. In the United States, considerable use was 
made of State Department records deposited in the National Archives and Records 
Administration in Washington DC. These have been supplemented by published 
collections of US diplomatic papers. Use has also been made of doctoral 
dissertations written by American participants in the events after 1944 - Gardner 
Patterson and Charles Coombs. Both have been almost entirely ignored by 
previous researchers. For records held in Greece, the thesis has been one of the 
first to consult the Varvaressos Archive at the Bank of Greece. Unfortunately, 
some crucial records remain closed to researchers. Despite repeated attempts, the 
author was unable to gain access to the minutes of the Currency Committee at the
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Bank of Greece. The author was also able to contact surviving participants, 
including Dr Rena Zafiriou, onetime assistant to Varvaressos, and Mr David 
Kessler, former member of the British Economic Mission in Greece. Both 
provided useful comments. In addition to the primary sources, the thesis has 
utilised a huge amount of secondary literature on the Greek crisis, and several 
historical and theoretical works on the causes, course and control of hyperinflation.
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1 HYPERINFLATION AND STABILISATION
One of the main problems facing the National Unity Government after liberation 
was the dramatic depreciation of the drachma. Whereas the note circulation had 
averaged 7.6bn drachmae during the period September 1,1938 - August 31, 1939, 
by November 10, 1944, it had increased 826308303 times and reached a figure 
of6,280 quadrillion drachmae (table 1.11.1 In order to appreciate the gravity of the 
crisis, it is necessary to understand the concept of hyperinflation, while the 
preoccupations of the British economic and financial advisors can be explained 
only with reference to the anti-inflationary policies of the British at home and 
abroad. The first section of this chapter therefore offers a brief theoretical 
description and historical survey of hyperinflation and stabilisation. The second 
section describes the British wartime experience of combating inflation at home and 
in the Middle East.
Table 1.1 Note Circulation, 1939-1948
End of Month Drachmae
September 1939 10,639,233,700
December 1940 15369,024,800
June 1941 24,075,484,400
January 1942 53,013,793350
June 109,845,947,100
December 335,081365,550
May 1943 622,774,636,000
September 1,301,726,501,150
January 1944 3,989,646,308,000
April 16,838,986,498,000
June 61,133,096,791,000
August 552,851,854,046,000
September 7,305,500,000,000,000
October 694,570,820,000,000,000
10 November 1944 6,279,943,102,000,000,000
11 November 1944 (a) 125,598,800
January 1945 5,062,242,480
May 25,761,526,739
September 46,980,097365
December 101,301,240,663
February 1946 218,645,650,500
April 363,533,714,600
August 495,850,438350
July 1947 691,952,772,250
March 1948 888,160,171,000
Source: Cleveland and Delivanis, op.cit., 1949, Statistical Appendix.
(a) After currency reform 1 new drachma=50,000,000,000 old drachmae
1 W.C. Cleveland and D. Delivanis, Greek Monetary Developments 1939-1948: A Case Study 
of the Consequences of World War II for the Monetary System of a Small Nation. 
Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Publications, 1949, p. 100.
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1.1 Inflation, Hyperinflation and Stabilisation
In basic terms, inflation is a fall in the value of money, which occurs when 
purchasing power persistently runs ahead of the output of goods and services 
available to the public, resulting in a spiral of price and wage rises. In cost-push 
inflation, rising wages are the main influence, while in the demand-pull variety, a 
decrease in the availability of consumer goods is the chief cause. While a modest 
degree of 'creeping' inflation has been the norm for most countries in recent times, 
there have been several occurrences of 'runaway' or 'galloping' inflation, 
otherwise known as hyperinflation, where the fall in the value of money has 
reached extreme proportions. Hyperinflation is a severely disruptive phenomenon, 
creating chaos and uncertainty in everyday life, and impoverishing those with 
savings or fixed incomes.
A single definition of hyperinflation, expressed in terms of the rate of price 
rises, has never been agreed by economists, but Cagan's classic yardstick of 50% 
per month remains the most widely accepted. Other definitions involving annual 
rates of 1000% would eliminate all but one example in history, although a recent 
survey by Capie suggests the term 'very rapid inflation' be used to cover any case 
where prices rise by 100% in any single year.2 The most famous cases of 
hyperinflation occurred after the two world wars, with Poland, Germany, Austria, 
Hungary and Russia between 1919 and 1925, and Greece, China and Hungary in 
the 1940s. It was the second Hungarian case which produced the highest rate of 
inflation ever recorded, with prices rising by 3X1025 between July 1945 and 
August 1946. Capie's definition allows the inclusion of three pre-twentieth century 
cases: the United States during the War of Independence, Revolutionary France 
and the Confederacy during the American Civil War. Hyperinflation is not a solely 
historical phenomenon, as the number of cases continues to grow, with new 
occurrences in Latin America and elsewhere.3
Capie's historical survey shows that despite problems with the availability of 
statistical data, it is readily apparent that two features were common to all cases: the 
enormous growth of the money supply in the form of an unbacked paper currency, 
and persistent and substantial budget deficits. The two are clearly interrelated: the 
governments concerned had sought to overcome a shortfall in revenue by printing 
money. Moreover, a qualitative approach rinds that major political or social unrest 
was present in all but one of the historical examples, while even in the recent
2 F.H. Capie, 'Conditions in which Very Rapid Inflation Has Appeared', in F.H. Capie (ed.), 
Major Inflations in History. Aldershot: Elgar, 1991, p.4.
3 Ibid., pp.9-27, 35-50.
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occurrences hyperinflation usually developed in countries with social unrest or at 
least relatively weak government.4
Even if political and social instability have invariably accompanied rapid 
inflation, they cannot be regarded as sufficient causes in themselves. As Capie 
points out, neither social unrest nor even revolution have automatically led to rapid 
inflation. After 1918, Czechoslovakia and Latvia faced problems similar to those 
which accompanied hyperinflation elsewhere in Europe, but were able to prevent 
serious disruption by the implementation of strict fiscal policies.5 The absence of 
decisive action to restrain inflationary tendencies seems to be crucial - 
hyperinflation usually follows when disruptive factors are allowed to run 
unchecked for 'quite a while' without appropriate countermeasures.6
***
Whatever the implications of the qualitative similarities between past occurrences of 
hyperinflation, the invariable presence of large budget deficits and rapid growth of 
the money supply makes it clear what the priorities of any stabilisation package 
should be. Thus although stabilisation schemes have often contained a wide range 
of measures, the restriction of monetary growth - the abandonment of money 
creation - is crucial if hyperinflation is to be overcome. This is far from 
straightforward, as the monetary expansion which fuels hyperinflation is itself a 
consequence of the government's dependence on new issues of paper money, and 
the revenue involved may be difficult to replace. In such circumstances, only a 
considerable effort to reduce budget deficits can remove the necessity for further 
recourse to the printing press. This would normally require increases in tax and 
other revenues, as well as stricter controls over expenditure. Neither may be easy 
to achieve, particularly if the government is faced with urgent expenditure needs or 
if the taxation system is inefficient.
Dombusch etal stress the need for a thorough reform of the taxation system 
aimed at creating a broad tax base with moderate rates, and emphasise that the law 
must be enforced. Moreover, tax rates need to be fully indexed to inflation, so that 
the value of tax revenue is not eroded during the inevitable lags in collection. They 
cite the example of Mexico, where fiscal stability was restored following the careful 
auditing of higher income groups.7 Another important consideration is whether the 
government possesses the political will to impose strict fiscal policies. It is clear
4 Ibid., pp.36, 44.
5 Ibid., p. 16.
6 R. Dornbusch, F. Sturzenegger and H. Wolf, 'Extreme Inflation: Dynamics and 
Stabilisation', Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2, 1990, p.3.
7 Ibid., pp. 11, 56.
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that any 'government that is unwilling to balance the budget is hardly likely to do 
so '.8 One possible restraint on money creation is the presence of a central bank 
with the powers to refuse limitless loans to the government. Nevertheless, such an 
institution can be circumvented. Evasions of central bank restrictions can often take 
bizarre forms, such as the Polish case in 1925 when the Treasury continued to 
create money by exercising its right to mint coins.9 As the Greek case will 
demonstrate, discipline is non-existent when the central bank does not act 
independently.
Table 1.2 Summary of Stabilisation Measures
Measures Importance/Conditions for success
Budget reforms
Crucial
Political will to reduce budget deficits 
Improvements to taxation system 
Restraint over expenditure 
examples:
(G) budget balanced after a few months 
(PI) temporary improvement 
(P2) surplus achieved 
(A) deficitreduced
Central bank
Power and willingness to refuse money creation 
examples:
(G, P2, A) restrictions on new issues to government
(PI) restrictions on new issues but Treasury still allowed to mint coins
Foreign loans
Useful but not essential 
examples:
(G) Dawes loan in 1924 
(PI) loan granted
(P2, A) loans accompanied by foreign supervision
New currency
Symbolic but not essential 
examples:
(G, PI) new currency issued 
(A) new currency issued later 
(P2) new currency not issued
Price controls
Controversial - importance under question 
Popular compliance or proper enforcement 
Efficient administration 
Control over supply and distribution 
examples: no controls imposed
Wage controls
Controversial - importance under question 
Popular compliance
examples: no controls imposed
Summarised from Dombusch and Fischer, op.cit., 1986, p.41, table 17.
Key: (G) = Germany 1923 (PI) = Poland 1924 (unsuccessful)
(A) = Austria 1922 (P2) = Poland 1926/27
Several other measures to end hyperinflation have proved useful but not 
essential. These include the provision of foreign loans either to underwrite budget
8 Ibid., p.55.
9 R. Dornbusch and S. Fischer, 'Stopping Hyperinflations Past and Present', 
Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv, 122, 1986, p.20.
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deficits until public finances can be restored to equilibrium, or to prevent a 
depletion of foreign currency reserves. Such external support can play the 
important role of lending credibility to the stabilisation package. The creation of a 
new means of exchange to replace the former discredited currency can provide the 
psychological advantage of a new start, and gives the government control over the 
size of the initial post-stabilisation money stock, but may have symbolic value only 
if other problems remain unaddressed.
More controversial measures include controls over prices and wages. Efficient 
price controls could suppress inflation during periods of commodity shortages, 
while wage ceilings could prevent excessive pay demands from adding to pressure 
on prices. Controls over prices have been attacked as a device merely postponing 
rather than overcoming inflation, requiring a vast bureaucracy to implement and 
likely to encourage evasion and the growth of a black market10 Nevertheless, such 
controls can be effective if properly administered against a backdrop of popular 
support for the government's actions, as demonstrated by the British and American 
experience during World War II.11 It has been emphasised that all such control 
measures are not a solution in themselves, but would have to supplement the main 
tasks of monetary restraint and fiscal reform.12
Apart from individual measures, all stabilisation schemes are ultimately 
dependent on 'credibility', the ability to convince the public that the government is 
totally committed to ending the conditions causing or prolonging hyperinflation, 
and that all necessary steps will be taken to achieve that goal. As already stated, 
foreign support or the symbolic introduction of a new currency can play an 
important role in this, but the creation of sufficient popular optimism will largely 
depend on the prevailing political circumstances.
Successful stabilisations in the past have contained varying permutations of the 
above features. Almost every successful stabilisation saw substantial reductions or 
the elimination of budget deficits. In most cases, legal restrictions on new note 
issues, enforced by either a central bank or an external authority, were a significant 
factor in imposing the necessary discipline on governments. Actual or promised 
foreign loans were a feature of all the pre-1939 episodes, though they were not 
always necessary. Loans were usually linked with an element of foreign 
supervision. Apart from the famous German case of 1923, currency reform was
10 H. Rockoff, Price and Wage Controls in Four Wartime Periods', Journal of Economic 
History, XLI(2), 1981, p.382.
11 For a summary, see J. Butterworth, The Theory of Price Control and Black Markets. 
Avebury: Aldershot, 1994, pp. 11-16.
12 H. Rockoff, Drastic Measures: A History of Wage and Price Controls in the United States. 
Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1984, p.246.
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rarely employed. Neither price nor wage controls were a part of the pre-war 
packages, but were attempted during several stabilisations in the 1980s.13
1.2 The British Experience at Home and Abroad
The effectiveness of the British approach to managing scarcity and controlling 
inflation during World War II is generally acknowledged. The British experience, 
not only at home but also through international institutions such as the Middle East 
Supply Centre (MESC), is worth recounting in greater detail, as it provided a 
ready-made set of potential remedies once British officials were faced with the 
daunting task of proposing solutions for the Greek economic crisis of 1944-47.
The sole priority for Britain was to win the war by fully mobilising its resources 
for military purposes: by absorbing a large proportion of the population into the 
armed forces or war-related industries, and by restricting the output of consumer 
goods in order to concentrate on armament production. As Milward points out, 
warfare and inflation have been inseparable in modem history. The British case 
was no exception, with policies creating two ideal preconditions for inflation: rising 
money incomes due to both the expansion of the labour force and the lengthening 
of hours of work, and the reduction of the quantity of purchasable goods.14
These dangers had not been sufficiently dealt with during World War I, 
resulting in an unprecedented degree of inflation (roughly 100% between July 1914 
and 1918) which lasted until 1920. The price rises contributed to extensive labour 
unrest, disrupting industrial production and raising social tensions.15 With Nazi 
Germany posing a far greater threat after 1939, it was clear that all the problems of 
the previous war would be vastly magnified during the current conflict, and that far 
more extensive action was required from the government. The initial response was 
fairly leisurely. An Excess Profits Tax, designed to capture 60% of the increased 
profits of armament manufacturers, was introduced soon after the declaration of 
war, but income tax was left unchanged until the budget of April 1940. Although 
this raised the rate of the Excess Profits Tax to 100%, and the standard rate of 
income tax from 27.5% to 42.5%, yields from direct taxes still increased more 
slowly than those of indirect taxes until 1941.16
13 Dombusch and Fischer, op.cit., 1986, pp.40-44; T. J. Sargent, The Ends of Four Big 
Inflations', in R.E. Hall (ed.), Inflation: Causes and Effects. Chicago: The University of 
Chicago Press, 1982, passim.
14 P. Howlett, The Wartime Economy, 1939-1945', in R. Floud and D. McCloskey (eds.), The 
Economic History of Britain since 1700. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1994, Volume 3:1939- 
1992, pp.6, 10-11; A. S. Milward, War, Economy and Society 1939-1945. Berkeley, 1977, 
p. 105.
15 P. Dewey, War and Progress: Britain 1914-1945. London: Longman, 1997, pp.31, 40-41.
16 Ibid., pp.284-285.
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The turning point came in 1941, with the adoption of the Keynesian concepts of 
national income accounting and the twin pronged attack on inflation. In the 
previous year, Keynes had underlined the inevitability of an 'inflationary gap' 
between aggregate demand and aggregate supply in an economy mobilised for war 
production. Without government intervention, this gap would only be closed by an 
inflationary rise in prices. Hitherto, the Treasury had been unable to solve this 
problem, preoccupied as it was with the notion of 'what the tax-payer could bear'. 
Instead, Keynes suggested that the Treasury should calculate national income and 
the level of revenue the government required in order to close the inflationary gap. 
Excess demand would have to be absorbed by extra taxation and forced savings. 
Keynes went to work in the Treasury in the summer of 1940, and his ideas were 
adopted in the budget of April 1941.17
This was the first budget to offer a survey of the economy rather than a simple 
balance sheet of government finances. It was also the first to be conceived in 
national income terms, and employed two sets of measures to counter the twin 
causes of the inflationary gap. Increased taxation and forced savings were used to 
combat demand-pull inflation, while cost of living subsidies were introduced to 
reduce the likelihood of cost-push inflation. Forced savings were achieved mainly 
by the restriction of various investment opportunities and the creation of sufficient 
attractive government bonds. At the same time, all forms of taxation were 
increased. The standard rate of income tax was raised to 50%, while personal 
allowances were reduced. Surtax for the highest earners was raised to a huge 19s. 
6d. in the pound or 97.5%. Purchase tax was also expanded as a means of further 
restricting consumption. Along with new forms and levels of taxation, the tax 
gathering machinery was also improved considerably. In September 1943, the Pay 
As You Earn (PAYE) scheme was introduced, greatly simplifying the collection of 
income tax.18
The new approach produced impressive results. Income tax yields more than 
trebled by the end of the war, while the Excess Profits Tax delivered an average 
£450m per annum between 1943-45. Accordingly, direct taxes as a proportion of 
ordinaiy revenue increased from 52% in 1939 to nearly 63% in 1945, and financed 
55% of the government's enormous wartime expenditure. This reduced the need to 
create huge levels of internal and external debt, and virtually eliminated the dangers
17 J.M. Keynes, How to Pay for the War: A Radical Plan for the Chancellor of the Exchequer. 
London: Macmillan, 1940, passim-, Howlett, op.cit., 1994, pp. 14-15.
18 Howlett, op.cit., 1994, pp.15-16.; G.C. Peden, British Economic and Social Policy: Lloyd 
George to Margaret Thatcher. Oxford: Philip Allan, 1985, p. 134.
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of money creation to pay for the war. In fact, only 2.7% of government spending 
was financed by resorting to the printing press.19
The Immediate inflationary threat was also reduced - or rather replaced by 
disguised inflation - thanks to an extensive programme of subsidies affecting 
foodstuffs, rent, fuel and certain services. Some temporary food subsidies had 
been introduced in December 1939, but it was the 1941 budget which advocated 
the widespread use of subsidies to stabilise the cost of living by controlling the 
prices of key commodities in the official basket. This measure proved expensive, 
with costs rising from £47m in 1939 to £302m in 1945, - but it produced the 
desired effect. While the admittedly imperfect Board of Trade cost of living index 
rose from 100 in 1938 to 128 by 1941, it remained stable thereafter, rising to only 
130 in 1945. Although the more reliable wholesale price index showed an increase 
of 67% in the same period, demonstrating that the threat of cost-push inflation had 
been merely deferred rather than overcome, the problem had at least been 
minimised for the duration of the war.20
While many prices were held down by means of subsidies, physical controls 
were also employed for this purpose. As early as November 1939, the Price of 
Goods Act froze prices of certain household goods and items of clothing. During 
the same period, the Rent and Mortgage Interest Restrictions Act froze rents at pre­
war levels for all properties below a specified rateable value. The next major 
legislation came with the 1941 Goods and Services (Price Control) Act, containing 
provisions to restrict price rises. Unlike subsidies, which did not directly affect 
returns to sellers, formal price controls required enforcement and compliance. The 
former was applied by price regulation committees, and strengthened by the threat 
of punishment (up to three months imprisonment for a first offence) for non- 
compliance.21 The effectiveness of price controls was bolstered by command over 
supply and distribution, demonstrated by an elaborate though efficient rationing 
system, which came to embrace a large range of goods. Some authors assert that it 
was the rationing system which allowed the whole control package to work so 
well22 Shortly after the war, one study suggested that popular compliance or the 
'will to co-operate' was the main determinant of success,23 but subsequent
19 Howlett, op.cit., 1994, pp. 16-17; Dewey, op.cit., 1997, pp.284-286.
20 Dewey, op.cit., 1997, pp.286-287; Howlett, op.cit., 1994, p. 17; F.H. Capie and G.E. Wood, 
The Anatomy of a Wartime Inflation: Britain, 1939-1945' in G.T. Mills and H. Rockoff 
(eds.), The Sinews of War: Essays on the Economic History of World War II. Ames: Iowa 
State UP, 1993, p.31.
21 Capie and Wood, op.cit., 1993, p. 31.
22 Ibid., p.35.
23 L. Robbins, The Economic Problem in Peace and War. London: Macmillan, 1947, p.45.
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historians point to the complete integration of control measures, amounting to a 
considerable degree of regimentation of the entire economy, as the crucial factor.24
Apart from control measures enacted at home, the British also assumed a large 
degree of control over the coordination of commodity supply and demand for other 
countries. The most notable of the formal arrangements was the MESC, established 
in the spring of 1941. This was a response to the closure of the Mediterranean 
following the entry of Italy into the war. As early as November 1940, reduced 
imports and considerable purchases of local goods by British forces led to severe 
shortages of civilian commodities in Egypt, creating the threat of economic chaos, 
inflation and ultimate civil unrest. With the entire region likely to face similar 
problems, the strategic implications were enormous. The British thus expanded 
their responsibility for Egypt into a collaborative programme overseeing 
procurement and shipping allocations for the whole eastern Mediterranean and the 
Middle East. At different periods, the MESC covered a range of territories of 
varying status, including British colonies, dependencies and mandates, Allies such 
as Yugoslavia and Greece and independent neutrals such as Turkey and Iran.25
The main task of the MESC was to minimise the risk of catastrophic food 
shortages arising from the curtailing of peacetime trade. With all supplies from 
outside the region having to be diverted around the Cape, pressures on scarce 
shipping ensured that food imports would fall far below pre-war levels. In 
addition, the demands of the armed forces further reduced the quantity of goods 
available for civilian purposes. To avert famine, the MESC promoted the 
reorganisation of agriculture throughout the region to increase food production, 
encouraged greater reliance on inter-regional trade, and coordinated import 
programmes and the maintenance and allocation of reserve stocks.26
Apart from the strategic planning involved with such an undertaking, the 
implementation of the MESC programmes entailed the application of a series of 
practical control measures over the supply and distribution of foodstuffs. Food was 
collected directly from producers and passed on to consumers via rationing 
schemes, with both the purchase and sale taking place at fixed prices. Although
24 G. Mills and H. Rockoff, 'Compliance with Price Controls in the United States and the 
United Kingdom during World War II1, Journal of Economic History, XLVII(l), 1987, 
pp.212-213.
25 E.M.H. Uoyd, Food and Inflation in the Middle East 1940-45. Stanford, CA: Stanford UP, 
1956, pp.3, 74-75. For more on the MESC, see P. W.T. Kingston, Britain and the Politics of 
Modernization in the Middle East, 1945-1958. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1996; M.W. 
Wilmington, The Middle East Supply Center. A Reappraisal1, The Middle East Journal, 6(2), 
1952:144-166.
26 Lloyd, op.cit., 1956, pp.76-82.
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statistics on the degree of reduced consumption are patchy, no serious famine 
occurred in the region, but occasional bread riots did take place in Persia and Syria. 
Infant mortality statistics for Egypt, Cyprus and Palestine demonstrate that apart 
from a major crisis in 1942, figures for 1941-45 were below the pre-war average, 
suggesting that the MESC's management of food and agriculture was clearly 
successful in helping to prevent a potential disaster.27
Although the MESC had initially been concerned with achieving sufficient levels 
of military and civilian supplies, it soon became involved in the combating of 
inflation, the inevitable consequence of commodity shortages combined with high 
levels of military expenditure. As table 13 shows prices had risen by at least 50% 
above pre-war levels by the end of 1941. The only countries to escape inflation 
were those without paper money - Saudi Arabia, Ethiopia and Yemen.
Table 1.3 Wholesale Prices and Money Supply in the Middle East, 1941-44 (1939=100)
Wholesale Prices Money in Circulation 
1941 1944 1941 1944
Egypt 150 273 183 452
Sudan 149 202 169 231
Palestine 184 297 153 496
Cyprus 266 473 165 468
Syria/Lebanon 361 812 183 733
Persia 143 500 192 468
Source: Lloyd, op.cit., 1956, pp. 179-187.
The British response was to organise a series of conferences to agree to a 
package of measures to combat inflation. These included the familiar policies 
already implemented in Britain - rationing, price controls and tax increases. All 
were applied to varying degrees, depending partly on the individual circumstance 
of each country and partly on the efficiency of the respective administrations.28 The 
British felt generally satisfied with the results achieved. As table 1.3 demonstrates, 
between 1941 and 1944 not one of the countries concerned experienced an 
uncontrollable degree of inflation. In Egypt, Sudan and Palestine wholesale prices 
kept well below corresponding increases in money circulation, and did not run too 
far ahead in the other three countries.
A final measure to combat inflation, recounted here in some detail because of the 
later British experience in Greece, was the sale of gold to the public. This was 
intended to mop up surplus purchasing power, thus reducing the pressure on 
scarce commodities, to acquire local currency for military expenditure, thereby 
slowing down the growth of circulation, and bringing down the price of gold 
throughout the region in the hope of generating a fall in the prices of other goods.
27 Ibid., pp.76-82, 321-329.
28 Ibid., pp.218-244.
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The move was not undertaken without considerable resistance, particularly from 
within the Bank of England. Some officials felt that the sale of gold would 
undermine confidence in local paper currencies and even sterling, and that if 
governments in the Middle East demanded payments in gold for all purposes, the 
gold reserves of the sterling area would soon prove inadequate. Others feared no 
such repercussions, believing that gold sales were unlikely to have any significant 
effect on prices. During 1943-44, some 1.2 million ounces (equivalent to 5.1m 
gold sovereigns) worth about £17m were sold. The British felt the measure to have 
been a success, contributing to a slowing down in the rate of inflation of all the 
countries concerned. They believed that the amount sold was little more than 10% 
of the total gold already in private hands throughout the region, and that there had 
been no undermining of local currencies.29
* * *
The British experience of combating inflation at home and abroad was reasonably 
successful given the difficult circumstances. At home, the combination of financial 
and physical controls went a long way towards allowing Britain to survive a 
ruinous war without severe inflation or large-scale social unrest provoked by 
commodity shortages. Even in the Middle East, British efforts enabled the 
maintenance of a degree of normality. With many measures remaining in force 
throughout most of 1944-47, and with the success of others fresh in the memory, it 
was hardly surprising that British authorities should view the Greek economic and 
financial crisis largely through the prism of their own experience, and promote 
similar policies as appropriate solutions to the country's problems.
29 Ibid., pp.208-217.
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2 POLITICAL - ECONOMIC BACKGROUND
To explain the phenomenon of Greek hyperinflation, it is sufficient to recount the 
developments of 1941-44, when Greece was occupied by the Axis powers. At 
liberation, the returning Greek government inherited an economic disaster arising 
out of deliberate exploitation and mismanagement. However, a full explanation of 
the protracted return to normality requires an understanding of many features of 
Greek economic and political life from the nineteenth century onwards. The first 
section of this chapter seeks to identify the long-term trends, attitudes and 
developments which were to influence the course of events after liberation. The 
second section concentrates specifically on the period after 1941, with particular 
emphasis on the economic, political and psychological legacy of the occupation. 
The third section describes the factors influencing British attitudes towards Greece, 
and the methods the British employed to achieve a changing set of objectives, with 
special reference to the political and economic dilemmas involved. The aim is not to 
produce an exhaustive study of any of the topics considered, but to throw light on 
the Greek response to the economic crisis of 1944-47.
2.1 Economic and Political Trends up to World War 11
The Nature of Greek Politics
In 1844, after barely a decade of independence, Greece adopted the institutions of 
parliamentary democracy. Twenty years later universal male suffrage was 
introduced. Despite the early adoption of a western style parliament, political life 
conspicuously failed to evolve along western lines during the subsequent century. 
Greek politics owed far more to rivalries between competing networks of personal 
allegiances than to disagreements over ideas, with the acquisition of power as an 
end in itself rather than as a means to pursue policies. While such relationships 
were commonplace in pre-modem states, they proved sufficiently adaptable in 
Greece to endure long after they were superseded by broad based mass politics in 
western Europe. Instead of parties in the modem sense, the country possessed 
fluid configurations of coteries centred around notable individuals, held together by 
patronage rather than by any common cause. The absence of non-clientelistic 
parties allowed considerable scope for political horse-trading between individuals, 
cliques and vested interests. With frequent shifts of allegiance and no party 
discipline, most governments were unstable and relatively short-lived. The need 
both to dispense and secure patronage proved an obstacle to the formulation of 
coherent policies, by consuming a considerable portion of both the time and the
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energies of participants in the political game. Patronage politics ensured a system 
unresponsive to important changes both within and outside the country.
In a political world largely devoid of debates over issues only two questions 
aroused any degree of passion. The first of these was the ’Great Idea' (Megali 
Idea), which became virtually the dominant ideology of the newly emergent state. 
This advocated the creation of a ’Greater Greece' embracing the whole nation. At 
first, the 'Great Idea' was directed entirely towards the Ottoman Empire, and 
mutual distrust often erupted into open warfare. As the empire declined, the 
emergence of rival nationalisms with their own irredentist aspirations led to bloody 
struggles between the successor states. Although the preoccupation with the 'Great 
Idea' yielded some concrete results in that Greece expanded from its original area 
of 48,000 km2 to 127,000 km2 by 1922, most of the territorial acquisitions were 
more the result of Great Power bargaining at conference tables than to any feats of 
arms by the Greeks themselves. The ’Great Idea' had many unfortunate 
consequences in that it diverted attention away from pressing internal issues, and 
absorbed an inordinate proportion of the country's material and financial resources. 
Moreover, the intensification of local rivalries opened the door to Great Power 
intrigues within the region. A 'Greater Greece' seemed close to fulfilment in 1920 
with the territorial gains confirmed by the Treaty of Sevres, but collapsed in ruins 
two years later when a resurgent Turkey ejected Greek forces from the disputed 
areas. Although the military defeat, known thereafter as the Katastrofi, was a 
profound shock which burdened Greece with over a million refugees from Asia 
Minor, it also allowed the country to refocus on long neglected domestic issues.
Apart from the 'Great Idea', the most burning issue within Greek political life 
was the question of the powers of the monarchy. In 1864, resistance to the 
extension of royal power led to the deposition of the Bavarian King Otho. 
Thereafter, the matter lost its urgency but resurfaced with vengeance during World 
War I, leading to the 'National Schism' (Ethnikos Dichasmos) which was to 
poison Greek politics for decades to come. In 1914, conflicting views between 
prime minister Eleftherios Venizelos and king Constantine I over the choice of 
military alliances split the country and led to virtual civil war, culminating in the 
exile of the king. The republican victory was short-lived, as electoral defeat in 1920 
led to the restoration of the monarchy. With the bitterness aroused by the schism 
proving ever more divisive, the republicans took advantage of the shock of 1922 to 
seize power once again. Two years later, the king was deposed and a republic was 
proclaimed.
As with the 'Great Idea', the schism was to prove a dangerous and futile 
distraction obscuring all other issues. The role of the king succeeded in dividing the 
Greek political establishment into two hostile camps, centred around the Liberal
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and the Populist parties. Despite the intensity of the mutual hatred, the policy 
differences were far less fundamental than the depth of the division would suggest. 
Although the Liberals were largely republican, moderate and advocates of 
modernisation, while the Populists were broadly royalist, and generally right-wing, 
the dividing line was far from clear. Neither grouping could be said to derive from 
any coherent ideological position. The fluidity of the schism allowed ample scope 
for opportunism, notably on the part of several army officers able to switch sides 
as the occasion demanded. Despite the futility of the endless debates over the 
constitutional issue, the matter was never allowed to drop. Following political 
deadlock after 1932, a series of unsuccessful republican coups led to a counter 
coup from royalist army officers who suppressed the republic and restored the king 
yet again.
Thus by the mid-1930s, Greek politics had become trapped in a pointless cycle 
of recriminations and counter-recriminations from ageing personalities increasingly 
out of touch with the demands posed by a changing world and a changing society. 
When several of the old protagonists passed away within months of each other, it 
seemed possible that a younger generation of politicians might lay aside the old 
quarrels in order to tackle more pressing problems. Given the growing 
disillusionment with traditional parties and democratic forms, and the apparent 
success of totalitarian regimes elsewhere in Europe, more radical solutions began to 
gain appeal.
The experience of the Greek Communist party (KKE) largely mirrored that of its 
counterparts in eastern and south-eastern Europe. Originally formed as a socialist 
party in 1918, it affiliated with the Comintern and accepted the Leninist 
programme. Comintern direction inevitably led to factionalism and internal 
squabbles, from which the party did not recover until the early 1930s. Despite 
official persecution, the KKE benefited from social unrest to win 5% of the vote at 
the general election of September 1932, and 6% at that of January 1936. It also 
performed credibly at the municipal elections of February 1934. Highly centralised, 
well organised and intolerant of internal debate, the Communists were qualitatively 
different from any other party in Greece, and seemed to pose a formidable new 
challenge to traditional Greek politics. Although Communist support was relatively 
small and KKE membership reached only 15,000 at its height in 1936, anti- 
Communism became a major feature of inter-war Greek politics, and was espoused 
by both main parties. In 1927, royalist politicians castigated the Liberal government 
for its complacency towards the Left The Liberals responded by launching a series 
of oppressive anti-Communist measures, culminating in the so-called Idionymon 
law of 1929. This outlawed public meetings held by Communists or other 
'subversive elements', and even criminalised the discussion of Communist ideas.
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The bill was supplemented by additional measures increasing the powers of the 
police and allowing suspects to be sent into exile without trial. By 1932, over
11,000 arrests had been made under the Idionymon, with over 2,000 convictions. 
Throughout this period, the Communist threat was a convenient scapegoat for 
traditional politicians who were able to blame social unrest on Communist agitation 
rather than the shortcomings of government policies.1
Anti-Communism served as the main pretext for the last major development in 
pre-war Greek politics - the imposition of the Metaxas dictatorship in August 1936. 
Metaxas suspended parliament and declared himself to be above party factionalism, 
and his regime announced its intention of establishing a corporatist state modelled 
on fascist and quasi-fascist regimes elsewhere in Europe. More authoritarian than 
radical, it sought to transform Greece through a combination of incessant rhetoric 
and increased oppression, but it was unable to solve any of the country's 
underlying problems. The dictatorship proved to be short-lived, being swept away 
by the German invasion of 1941, but lasted long enough to create a fresh legacy of 
bitterness and alienation.
Greece passed under Nazi occupation after a turbulent decade which saw the 
final bankruptcy of its parliamentary system, the discrediting of its political elites 
and an unpleasant experiment in authoritarian rule. During the subsequent vacuum, 
old divisions began to resurface, but with one important addition: the arrival of the 
Communists as a major force. It was to be this confrontation between the vigorous 
resistance movement controlled by the KKE and the remnants of the traditional 
parties which was to play a decisive role in shaping later events.
The Hydrocephalous State
A direct consequence of the nature of Greek politics was the emergence of a 
hydrocephalous state. As elsewhere in the Balkans, the machinery of the Greek 
state expanded far more rapidly than its actual functions. By the later nineteenth 
century, the proportion of civil servants to total population was seven times higher 
in Greece than in Britain.2 Unlike the industrialised western democracies, where 
such expansion was a response to the growing needs of an increasingly complex 
and dynamic society, the growth of the Greek state owed little to economic or 
social factors. It provided few services, and offered its citizens very little. Its
1 D.H. Close, The Origins of the Greek Civil War. London: Longman, 1995, pp. 15-27; M. 
Mazower, 'Policing the Anti-Communist State in Greece, 1922-1974', in M. Mazower (ed.), 
The Policing of Politics in the Twentieth Century. Providence: Berghahn Books, 1997, 
pp. 137-141.
2 N.P. Mouzelis, Modem Greece: Facets of Underdevelopment. London: Macmillan, 1978, 
p. 17; N.P. Mouzelis, Politics in the Semi-Periphery: Early Parliamentarism and Late 
Industrialisation in the Balkans and Latin America. London: Macmillan, 1986, p. 11.
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overmanning was not so much a response to any legitimate need, but a result of the 
widespread practice of granting employment as a form of political patronage.
Patronage politics concentrated decision-making in the hands of a small number 
of individuals. Ministers were far more important than their ministries. They 
enjoyed the right to appoint senior officials and exercised power from above. In the 
absence of permanent administrative heads of departments, continuity of policy 
was difficult to achieve, particularly during times of political instability, when 
ministers could succeed each other with monotonous regularity. The presence of 
political appointees ensured that ministers had little access to impartial advice. In a 
system where power was rarely delegated, ministers personally handled all matters 
down to the most trivial, and spent much of their time besieged by crowds of 
suppliants. Such practices were hardly conducive to the devising of coherent 
policies. The overcentralisation of the system ensured that its inertia was 
transmitted to the provinces. All meaningful decisions were taken in Athens, where 
all senior appointments were made. Local government was rudimentary, with its 
tasks limited to the provision of the most basic public amenities. This stifled 
initiative throughout the country, as few officials were willing to take action or 
assume any responsibility without prior instructions from the central authorities.3
For the politicians, control over the civil service was not only a source of 
power, but also an important channel of patronage. In a largely rural economy 
where the state was a major employer, jobs within the civil service were highly 
prized. The disposing of posts as a form of patronage had serious consequences, 
both in terms of efficiency and quality of intake. Although minimum levels of 
education were a condition of entry, there was little apparent reward for honesty 
and hard work. In the lower grades, promotion was virtually automatic after the 
completion of specified periods of service. In the higher grades, both appointments 
and promotions were dependent on personal connections rather than aptitude. 
Practically all officials enjoyed total security of tenure. As British observers later 
noted, civil servants were 'rarely dismissed for anything short of murder1. Even if 
purged for political reasons, they could invariably return to work if the political 
merry-go-round swung back in their favour. Thus any individual joining the ranks 
of the civil service was virtually guaranteed employment until retirement and a 
generous pension thereafter. In the circumstances, it seems hardly surprising that
3 H.R. Gallagher, 'Administrative Reorganisation in the Greek Crisis', Public Administration 
Review, VIII(4), 1948:250-258; W.G. Colman, 'Civil Service Reform in Greece', Public 
Personnel Review, 10(2), 1949:86-93; FO371/67101 R2377, Interim Report of the British 
Economic Mission to Greece, 31.1.1947, pp.8-19; DSR 868.50/4-347, Tentative Report of 
the American Economic Mission to Greece, 1.4.1947, Chapter 4.
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the civil service never developed a strong sense of professional pride or adequate 
standards.4
Some belated attempts to address the shortcomings of the machinery of the state 
were made by the Metaxas dictatorship. By introducing training for several 
branches of the public services and by strengthening discipline, the regime 
improved both the morale and the efficiency of the bureaucracy.5 Nevertheless, the 
problems of the civil service were too deep-seated to be overcome within such a 
short period. In any case, both efficiency and morale were soon to collapse 
completely during the Axis occupation, with grave consequences after liberation.
Greek Economic Development, 1830-1940
At independence, Greece possessed a backward agriculture and little manufacturing 
industry. Although Greek merchants had long established a predominant position 
in the regional trade of the Balkans and the eastern Mediterranean, few of them 
lived in the new state. Even those who did rarely invested their healthy profits in 
other sectors. Greek economic history thus combines painfully slow growth in 
agriculture and industry, occurring almost in isolation from the country's main area 
of comparative advantage.6
Agriculture remained the predominant sector within the Greek economy until 
well into the twentieth century. Prior to the acquisition of Thessaly and Macedonia, 
the main crops cultivated were olives, citrus fruits, grapes, and currants. With the 
addition of the fertile northern plains, Greece gained a considerable area suitable for 
the cultivation of wheat and tobacco. The primary sector, however, was never able 
to overcome backwardness, escape overreliance on a limited range of crops, or 
generate any impetus for growth elsewhere in the economy. In many areas, peasant 
fanning relied exclusively on traditional methods and rarely rose above subsistence 
level. Geography and climate were partly to blame for this state of affairs. Most of 
the land was barren, and fertile soil was always in short supply. As late as 1929, 
only 18% of the total area was under cultivation.7 Any stimulus to modernise was 
further stifled by the large number of small family freeholds. Despite the high
4 Ibid.
5 D.H. Close, The Character o f the Metaxas Dictatorship: An International Perspective. 
London: Centre of Contemporary Greek Studies, King's College London, Occasional Paper 3, 
1990, p. 13.
6 I. Pepelasis Minoglou, Political Factors Shaping the Role of Foreign Finance: The Case of 
Greece, 1832-1932', in J. Harris, J. Hunter and C.M. Lewis (eds.), The New Institutional 
Economics and Third World Development. London: Routledge, 1995, p.252.
7 This compared with contemporary figures of 39% for Bulgaria, 49% for Rumania and 63% 
for Hungary; Royal Institute of International Affairs, South-Eastern Europe: A Political and 
Economic Survey. London: Oxford UP, 1939, p. 158.
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degree of urbanisation, transport difficulties severely limited peasant access to most 
urban markets, which found it easier to trade with other coastal areas in the eastern 
Mediterranean than with their own hinterland. Furthermore, interest rates ranging 
from 20-24% on mortgages and 36-50% on personal loans, ensured high 
indebtedness and discouraged investment.8
Nevertheless, several opportunities were to materialise for Greek farmers. The 
first came with the expansion of European demand for currants during the second 
half of the nineteenth century. As early as 1821, 6,000 tonnes of currants were 
exported, mainly to Britain. With the acquisition of new markets in France, Italy 
and elsewhere on the continent, exports rose to 43,000 tonnes in 1861 and to
81,000 tonnes in 1871. A further stimulus was created by the French philloxera 
epidemic, which pushed world prices to unprecedented heights. By 1890-94, 
average currant output in Greece reached 163,000 tonnes, of which 98% was 
exported. Profits, however, were invested not in better methods, but in an 
expansion of the area under cultivation. By 1900, over a quarter of all cultivated 
land was given over to currants, involving a third of the agricultural labour force. 
Unfortunately, the boom proved to be transient. As French production gradually 
recovered, world prices returned to previous levels and annual Greek exports fell 
by an average 27% during 1905-14. Despite the drop in revenue, producers were 
reluctant to switch to other crops, and total output remained steady until World War 
I. Growing poverty in the currant producing regions ushered in a wave of 
emigration to the New World. The government intervened by buying up surplus 
currants for alcohol production, and by setting up a special bank to provide 
subsidised credit to growers. Before long, even this proved inadequate, and the 
government was forced to accept currants in lieu of land taxes. Although prices 
rose again during World War I, and British demand increased briefly after 1918, 
the trend was clearly unfavourable. Following the onset of another crisis in the 
mid-1920s, the government responded by establishing a new entity to subsidise 
and administer production, the Autonomous Currant Organisation (ACO). For a 
while, this provided a degree of stability, but by the end of the decade the ACO 
faced bankruptcy. A more far-sighted approach to the long-term decline of currant 
production was obviously necessary but never materialised.9
As prospects for currant growers declined, a new export opportunity opened up 
in the 1920s. Tobacco had long been a speciality of the areas acquired after the
8 L.S. Stavrianos, The Balkans since 1453. New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1958, 
pp.296-298.
9 M. Mazower, Greece and the Inter-War Economic Crisis. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991a, 
pp.81-86; Stavrianos, 1958, op.cit., pp.298, 477-478; A.F. Freris, The Greek Economy in 
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Balkan wars. With international demand buoyant after World War I, Greek 
producers responded accordingly, and average harvests during 1923-26 doubled 
those of 1919-22. As with currants, profits were invested in the expansion of the 
area under cultivation. By 1926, nearly 10% of agricultural land was given over to 
tobacco, which accounted for half of total export earnings. Such rich pickings 
could not last indefinitely. Exports became heavily dependent on the German 
market and suffered once German demand began to decline after 1926. However, 
Greek producers continued to expand output with the cultivated area doubling 
between 1926 and 1929. Unsurprisingly, tobacco prices fell by 45% during these 
years. Although some areas subsequently switched to other crops, it was clear that 
tobacco was encountering the same major difficulties which had long confronted 
currant growers, and was unlikely to provide a long-term solution to the severe 
structural problems of Greek agriculture.10
With both export staples in trouble, attention became increasingly focused on the 
need to diversify, with a particular emphasis on cereal cultivation. Greece had 
always been heavily dependent on wheat imports, a fact painfully borne out by the 
Allied blockade during World War I. The resulting hardship led to calls for the 
promotion of domestic grain production. This was finally translated into 
government action in 1927, with the introduction of tariff protection and legislation 
to oblige mill-owners to process a stipulated percentage of domestically produced 
wheat. In the following year, state intervention was enhanced by creating an 
organisation (KEPES) at the Ministry of Agriculture specifically to protect the 
interests of cereal producers. Some obvious progress was achieved. During 1933- 
37, the average cultivated area given over to wheat had risen by 43% over the 
average for 1928-32. Yields per hectare also rose by 46%, partly due to the use of 
new, more productive strains, and as a result harvests increased by 109% during 
this period. To a smaller extent, cotton cultivation was another beneficiary of the 
state sponsored autarky drive. With the imposition of tariffs on raw cotton imports, 
the cultivated area given over to cotton doubled between 1928-32 and 1933-37. By 
1937, the cotton crop was five times higher than the average for 1929-31. The 
growth in output satisfied an increasing percentage of home demand, despite the 
considerable expansion of the textile industry during the same period.11
The early industrial development of Greece reflected the country's position as a 
backward agricultural economy with limited natural resources. Manufacturing 
gained little benefit from the prosperity of the country's merchants, as the clear
10 Mazower, op.cit., 1991a, pp.86-88.
11 Mazower, op.cit., 1991a, pp.88-91, 239, 243, 251, 253; Royal Institute of International 
Affairs, op.cit., 1939, pp. 156, 159-160.
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preference for short-term gains from trade led to a reluctance to invest in industry. 
This hesitancy was shared by the banking sector, dominated by the National Bank 
of Greece (NBG), which rarely went beyond short-term loans to finance trade. As 
late as the nineteenth century, banks were involved with no more than a dozen 
industrial firms.12 In such circumstances, industrial development was slow. 
Manufacturing remained traditional in methods and organisation, usually involving 
the small-scale processing of domestically produced crops such as olive oil and 
grapes. Other industries had been swept away by technological change occurring 
elsewhere. The handicraft production of cotton thread collapsed in the face of 
British competition, while the once vigorous ship-building industry went into 
prolonged decline with the gradual transition to steamships. The decades prior to 
World War I saw the first flows of foreign capital into mining ventures, together 
with the emergence of a native group of successful industrialists promoting large- 
scale production of a range of commodities including cement, soap and artificial 
fertilisers. Although the proprietors of such enterprises became an increasingly 
influential group, large modem plants remained the exception in a sector dominated 
by traditional artisanal producers.13
During the quarter of a century after 1914, industry at last became firmly 
established within Greece, although confined to the areas around Athens and 
Thessaloniki. World War I proved largely beneficial to firms geared towards 
military demand, particularly textile producers. However, the real spurt came in the 
1920s, when the average annual growth of manufacturing was estimated at 6.8%. 
This was the result of several factors. The influx of refugees following the Asia 
Minor disaster created a huge pool of cheap labour. Tax concessions and tariff 
increases in 1926 also provided a large stimulus to further growth, as did the credit 
policies of the NBG, which had finally shed its inhibitions towards investing in 
industry. The industrial labour force, which stood at 154,633 in 1920, reached 
278,855 in 1930. Nevertheless, such expansion did not amount to economic 
development in the fuller sense. Manufacturing remained limited to light industries 
geared almost entirely to domestic consumption, enjoying a measure of protection 
behind tariff walls. Moreover, the growth years of the 1920s saw no great
12 M. Dritsas, 'Bank-Industry Relations in Inter-war Greece: The Case of the National Bank of 
Greece', in P.L. Cottrell, H. Lindgren and A. Teichova (eds.), European Industry and Banking 
between the Wars: A Review of Bank Industry Relations. Leicester: Leicester UP, 1992, 
pp.203-217; M. Mazower, 'Banking and Economic Development in Interwar Greece', in H. 
James, H. Lindgren and A. Teichova (eds.), The Role of Banks in the Intewar Economy. 
Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1991b, pp.206-231.
13 Mazower, op.cit., 1991a, pp.53-55; Stavrianos, op.cit., 1958, pp.298-299; G. Harlaftis, A 
History of Greek-Owned Shipping: The Making of an International Tramp Fleet, 1830 to the 
Present Day. London: Routledge, 1996, pp. 115-117.
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structural changes within industry, which continued to consist of a handful of large 
enterprises coexisting with a mass of tiny firms. In 1930, 42% of the total labour 
force were employed by firms with five workers or less. By contrast, only 39% 
were employed by firms of twenty-five workers or more. As the average ratio of 
workers per firm had actually fallen during the decade, it appears that it was the 
explosion of small firms which had made the major contribution to recent growth, 
rather than large-scale modem enterprises.14
Individual industries continued to flourish during the 1930s, largely in response 
to the government's autarky drive. The emphasis on import substitution, 
encouraged by import quotas and higher tariffs enabled producers to expand output 
for the domestic market. For many manufacturers, however, the enjoyment of a 
virtual monopoly allowed healthy profits without the need for continuous 
investment to stave off foreign competition. Within such a hothouse atmosphere, 
several industries (notably cotton, textiles and chemicals) proved immensely 
profitable. Unsurprisingly, this had adverse effects. Official reluctance to release 
foreign exchange for capital goods imports acted as a further disincentive to the 
replacement of capital stock. Yet within their protected markets, manufacturers 
continued to reap handsome profits from increasingly obsolete equipment. A 1936 
survey of the cotton industry suggested that over a third of the machinery was in 
need of immediate replacement. The trend away from competition towards 
monopolies was encouraged by the operations of the NBG, which heavily 
favoured large firms and actively promoted the take-over of weaker companies and 
the establishment of cartels. The ever decreasing emphasis on competitiveness 
boded ill for the future. With firms able to abuse monopoly power to the detriment 
of the rest of the economy, it was clear that much of Greek industry would simply 
be swept away if tariffs were reduced.15
The only sector which attained and maintained international significance and 
competitiveness was shipping. As early as 1838, the merchant fleet possessed over 
a thousand sailing ships of 30 net tons or more, and by 1870, it had a net tonnage 
of 268,000. Following a period of decline caused by the rise of the steamship, the 
fleet recovered towards the end of the nineteenth century, thanks mainly to 
purchases of second-hand vessels. By 1902, steamship tonnage (181,000) 
exceeded that of sailing ships (176,000) for the first time. In 1914, the fleet had 
grown to 592,000 NRT, with sailing ships being gradually phased out. Although 
World War I saw substantial losses (147 ships of 366,000 GRT), huge profits
14 Mazower, op.cit., 1991a, pp.55-57, 91-95; Dritsas, op.cit., 1992, pp.203-217; Mazower, 
op.cit., 1991b, pp.206-231.
t5 Mazower, op.cit., 1991a, pp.210-224, 250-256; Dritsas, op.cit., 1992, pp.203-217; 
Mazower, op.cit., 1991b, pp.206-231.
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were made from the higher freight charges which were to continue until the end of 
1920. The fleet grew throughout the interwar period, to 1.9m GRT in 1937, 
making it the ninth largest in the world. In its specialty, dry cargo tramps, its 
tonnage was second only to that of Britain.16
By the onset of World War II, the long-term problems of the Greek economy 
were still far from resolved. Agriculture remained too fixated on export staples of 
which one was in terminal decline and the other dangerously overreliant on German 
demand. The productivity gains in wheat were the only positive trend, as for the 
first time the efforts of growers were partly directed at improving the quality of 
cultivation rather than the simple expansion of cultivated area. Nevertheless, 
agriculture was still backward, and offered little stimulus to other sectors of the 
economy. Industry similarly made little advance, despite the expansion of the 
interwar years, which was more the result of the availability of cheap labour and 
tariff protection than any real improvement in productivity or technology. This 
offered a poor basis for future growth. The profitability of the merchant marine, 
Greece's one international success, was also potentially counterproductive in that it 
diverted investment away from agriculture and industry. Given the prevailing 
backwardness, the Greek economy was hardly able to stand up to the trials it was 
to face after 1940.
The Laissez Faire State
Few of the positive developments within the Greek economy owed much to the 
intervention of a state which was rarely able to escape from an obsession with 
politics, be it internal squabbles or the 'Great Idea'. The preoccupation with the 
past glories of classical Greece or Byzantium obscured any vision of the future, 
and few governments appreciated the need to create a climate conducive to 
economic development. Two examples of this confused thinking were highlighted 
by Pepelasis. The first was the failure to provide an education system tailored to the 
needs of the modem world. As late as 1938, vocational education was neglected in 
favour of classical subjects. In that year, only 0.6% of secondary school pupils 
received any form of practical instruction. Technical education was consistently 
regarded as inferior and enjoyed little state support. Even in agriculture, less than 
1% of new entrants into farming received any vocational training. The second 
major failure was the adoption of a legal system combining diverse elements such 
as modem French and medieval Byzantine law, which co-existed with regional 
legal codes already in operation. The resulting legal mosaic created endless
16 Harlaftis, op.cit., 1996, pp. 108-109, 187-194, 365.
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uncertainties, particularly in commercial transactions, and hindered the 
development of more advanced forms of business organisation.17
As late as 1922, little was done to protect local manufacturing.18 Greece entered 
the twentieth century with a laissez faire tradition never seriously challenged by its 
political establishment. Even if attention was refocused after the military defeat in 
Asia Minor, there was confusion as to the best way forward. Governments sought 
and obtained foreign loans to finance public works, aimed chiefly at land 
reclamation and infrastructural improvements. At the same time, much official 
thinking was less enthusiastic towards some aspects of modernity. Although the 
decade witnessed an unprecedented degree of industrial expansion, partly due to a 
favourable tariff regime, politicians from both sides of the schism seemed to doubt 
the desirability of further industrialisation in Greece. In 1927, the finance minister 
announced his complete indifference to industry, which he claimed was depriving 
the state of customs revenue by reducing the volume of imports. Others warned 
that industry was a dangerous distraction, and that the long-term solutions to the 
country's economic problems were to be found in a development of commerce and 
the resumption of emigration.19
Such views, firmly rooted within a pre-industrial past, seemed even more out of 
touch following the arrival of the world-wide slump. Until hopes of securing 
further foreign capital were dashed, Greek politicians failed to appreciate the 
seriousness of the situation. After 1928, the government had expanded its public 
works programme, and remained confident of obtaining further loans from abroad. 
These hopes evaporated with the onset of the international financial crisis. 
Following costly but unsuccessful attempts to remain on the gold standard, the 
government was forced to devalue the drachma and ultimately to default on its 
foreign debts in 1932. No longer able to turn to foreign capital, Greece was for the 
first time thrown entirely on to its own resources. In response to the new situation, 
some degree of state economic direction was adopted, though this fell far short of a 
decisive break with laissez faire. The immediate reaction was to impose controls 
over imports in order to stem the outflow of foreign exchange. Quotas were 
announced for a wide range of goods, later to be replaced by a licensing system. 
However, the main thrust of official policy was directed towards an autarky drive 
intended to reduce Greece's vulnerability to developments elsewhere. Greece was 
hardly unique in espousing autarky, which had temporarily gained widespread
17 A.A. Pepelasis, The Image of the Past and Economic Backwardness', Human Organization, 
17(4), 1958-59, pp.20-25.
18 X. Xctx r^jicocrri ,^ H rrjpcaa Zekijvr): H Biofirjxccvta ovqv EkkryviKrj Oitcovofua, 1830- 
1940. A dTjva: QejxeXio, 1993, pp.265-279.
19 Mazower, op.cit., 1991a, pp.94-99, 258.
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support throughout Europe after 1918 and revived after the collapse in international 
trade. What was characteristic of the Greek case was the ambivalence and lack of 
clarity with which the aim was pursued. There was no clear sense of priority as to 
how the savings resulting from the suspension of debt repayments ought to be 
spent, and despite endless debates, no comprehensive economic plan was 
produced.20
Even when proposals were mooted, a major constraint on government actions 
was the need to placate powerful vested interests opposed to any measure which 
could affect their position. The arguments of interest groups, although couched in 
terms of liberalism and anti-bolshevism, were more about self-interest than 
principles. In 1932, a plan to impose state control over certain imports was 
abandoned following protests from importers. An attempt to resurrect the plan in 
the following year foundered for the same reason. Merchants attacked the measure 
as amounting to a 'sovietisation of the market'. Similar accusations of 
'unprecedented bolshevism' were voiced by industrialists in 1935, in response to a 
government proposal to curb excess profits. Within a year, textile producers, who 
enjoyed the highest profits of all, were calling for higher tariffs to discourage 
French 'dumping' in Greek markets, and complaining about the state's indifference 
to industrial problems. Clashes between and within interest groups were common: 
industrialists and importers invariably disagreed about tariffs and import policies, 
grain merchants and growers could unite to oppose the activities of KEPES, and 
industrialists could complain about the restrictive credit policies of the commercial 
banks, while uniting among themselves to restrict competition. Such jealous 
guarding of privileged positions was not limited to manufacturing. The commercial 
banks led by the NBG resented the establishment of a central bank - the Bank of
Greece - in 1928, not only refusing at first to recognise its authority but also
deliberately undermining its actions. The power of vested interests to place severe 
limitations on both the effectiveness and the actions of other groups within the 
economy was a problem which was never satisfactorily resolved.21
The results of the autarky drive were mixed. In agriculture, higher yields per 
hectare were achieved, but almost nothing was done to raise general soil fertility or 
to improve the cultivation of any other crop. For manufacturing, the outcome was 
even more limited. With increased tariff protection creating a hothouse atmosphere, 
firms were able to increase profits without investing in productivity improvements. 
The true cost of the policy was bome by consumers forced to pay higher prices for 
monopoly products. The cautious flirtation with etatisme had produced deeply
20 Ibid., Chapters 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, passim.
21 Ibid., Chapters 3, 4, 5, 6, 8, 9, passim.
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unsatisfactory compromises rather than meaningful solutions to Greece's 
underlying problems.
The emphasis on the role of the state increased dramatically with the coming of 
the Metaxas dictatorship. The regime's avowed aim of creating a corporate state 
underlined the need to generate prosperity by encouraging agriculture, by launching 
a programme of public works and by laying the foundations of a welfare system. A 
start was made on several fronts, but the achievements were far less impressive 
than the rhetoric suggested. Some of the measures owed much to previous 
governments, while others existed mainly on paper. Although international 
developments prematurely terminated its initiatives, the regime already displayed a 
marked tendency to 'mistake word for deed'.22
The overall contribution of the Greek state to economic development was thus 
hardly inspiring. Most politicians remained wedded to laissez faire attitudes which 
were becoming increasingly inadequate to deal with the complex needs of a modem 
economy, particularly within the changing international climate. Few had any long­
term vision regarding the future, and many preferred to look back to a pre­
industrial past. In 1936, the British ambassador Sydney Waterlow noted the 
extreme difficulty of combining a 'managed economy' with a political system 
'inherited from the age of laissez faire' and warned that the problem might prove 
'insoluble'.23 Even when governments did act, political motives usually dictated 
policies of doubtful economic utility, such as the extensive support for currant 
growers in the face of a collapse in international demand, or the tariff protection for 
owners of immediately profitable but technologically stagnant factories. Laissez 
faire was supplanted as the prevailing doctrine only in the last years before World 
War II, with the imposition of a quasi-fascist regime. But the last experiment was 
too short-lived to generate any fundamental changes in attitudes.
The Insolvent State
Ever since Greece became independent, both its budget and balance of payments 
were almost always on shaky foundations. In both cases, the lack-lustre 
performance of the economy was largely to blame. However, the problems were 
also complicated by the general attitudes of the political establishment, in that few 
governments were ever seriously concerned with the pursuit of policies of sound 
finance. The chronic deficits inevitably perpetuated dependence on foreign capital.
22 Close, op.cit., 1990, p.5; J.V. Kofas, Authoritarianism in Greece: The Metaxas Regime. 
New York: East European Monographs, Boulder, 1983, pp.64-76.
23 F0371/20389 R2033, Waterlow to Eden, 1.3.1936.
37
As table 2.1 indicates, the balance of commodity trade was always 
unfavourable. Greece was unable to escape from an overdependence on a narrow 
range of export staples. The substantial profits from the currant and tobacco booms 
failed to stimulate diversification. Even as late as 1938, it is clear that little had been 
done to promote a more sophisticated range of exports. In that year, tobacco still 
accounted for 50.4% of all exports by value, while currants and raisins contributed 
14.4%. By contrast, industry's major export earner was textiles and fibres with a 
share of 1.4%. Thus Greece's prime export goods were semi-luxuries for high- 
income markets such as Germany, the United States and Britain.24 The high 
elasticity of demand for such products left Greece particularly vulnerable to any 
disruption of the international environment.
Table 2.1 Value of Exports as Percentage of Imports
Period %
1861-1865 52.0
1866-1870 53.5
1871-1875 65.2
1876-1880 60.0
1881-1885 62.3
1886-1890 78.7
1891-1895 74.6
1896-1900 69.3
1901-1905 62.6
1906-1910 80.0
1911-1913 80.1
1923-1930 48.5
1931-1938 60.9
Source: Mazower, op.cit., 1991a, p.312; M. Jackson and 
J. Lampe, Balkan Economic History 1550-1950. 
Bloomington, IN: Indiana UP, 1982, p. 165.
The single positive feature of the Greek balance of payments in the inter-war 
period was the steady growth in invisible earnings. This was the result of the 
increasing size and success of the merchant fleet, and the gradual rise of Greece as 
an international tourist destination. A further source of revenue was emigrant 
remittances, largely a welcome by-product of the wave of emigration prior to 1914. 
In 1939, invisible earnings totalled over $31m ($ 17.1m from remittances, $8.7m 
from shipping and $5.5m from tourism), amounting to 26% of all receipts.25
Given the chronic balance of payments deficits, a modicum of stability was 
achieved only through periodical inflows of foreign capital in the form of loans or 
direct investment. The availability of such funds allowed occasional respite, but 
any interruption of fhe flow created immediate problems as will be seen below.
24 Foreign Trade in Greece, London: UNRRA, Operational Analysis Papers, No. 14,1946, pp.4- 
5.
25 Ibid., p.6.
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When debts needed to be serviced or repaid, the usual response was either to seek 
further loans or to default. The modest improvement of the balance of payments 
position achieved by the end of 1930s (with total receipts of $119.3m almost able 
to offset payments of $ 120.4m)26 had been the result of the short-term expediency 
of the self-proclaimed debt moratorium and the associated autarky drive. This 
simply alienated foreign lenders without creating any significant basis for Greece to 
overcome its balance of payments problems using its own resources. The onset of 
World War II thus found Greece in a vulnerable position and ensured that whatever 
the outcome, its bargaining power with the rest of the world would be weak.
Reliance upon foreign capital was also a consequence of the attitudes of 
successive Greek governments towards public finances. As table 2.2 indicates, 
throughout the period, budgets were chronically in deficit. Expenditure consistently 
exceeded revenue from taxation. Sizeable increases in expenditure, invariably for 
military purposes, were usually met by foreign loans, or by the use of inflation as a 
financing instrument, in other words by printing money. The latter practice led to 
frequent suspensions of drachma convertibility, although the desire to return to a 
fixed-rate regime, seen as a means of facilitating access to international capital 
markets, dictated some prudence after such episodes.27
Given the recurring problems of financing increases in public spending, the 
lethargic approach to revenue collection displayed by most Greek governments 
seems somewhat puzzling. Direct taxes on land and property were assessed 
according to ad hoc criteria rather than the property-owner's ability to pay. Little 
was done either to standardise rates or to raise the efficiency of tax collection. As 
table 2.3 indicates, in a surprising contrast with trends in industrialised countries, 
especially Britain, the Greek government's reliance on direct taxation declined 
steadily between 1833 and 1914. Pepelasis Minoglou interprets this as a 
consequence of the prevailing social contract whereby the Greek state sought 
'political stability and social cohesion' rather than the maximisation of revenue and 
economic efficiency. In practical terms, this meant the undertaxation of both the 
rich and the peasantry. The latter, engaged mainly in subsistence farming and baiter 
trade, were relatively unaffected by indirect taxes. Although the rich were subject to 
an inheritance tax from 1898, the first form of income tax was not introduced until 
1910. Even then, evasion was commonplace.28
26 Ibid., p.6.
27 S. Lazaretou, 'Monetary and Fiscal Policies in Greece: 1833-1914', Journal of European 
Economic History, 22(2), 1993:285-311; S. Lazaretou, 'Government Spending, Monetary 
Policies, and Exchange Rate Regime Switches: The Drachma in the Gold Standard Period', 
Explorations in Economic History, 32(1), 1995:28-50.
28 Lazaretou, op.cit., 1995, pp.31-32; Pepelasis Minoglou, op.cit., 1995, pp.262-263.
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The established pattern did not alter dramatically with the growth of wartime 
expenditure after 1914. The government was forced to increase its indebtedness 
both at home and abroad, but the extra spending was financed mainly by the use of 
the printing press. Although some attempts were made to increase direct taxation, 
particularly by capturing a share of the 'exceptional profits' of industries such as 
shipping, the immediate returns were not spectacular. The most radical move came 
in 1922, when the government authorised a forced loan to help cover the spiralling 
deficits. Despite the political upheavals of the period between the defeat in Asia 
Minor and the Italian invasion in 1940, the tax structure saw no fundamental 
adjustments towards a greater reliance on direct taxation. After 1922, the republican 
government introduced new taxes on export earnings and property and raised 
import duties. Further tariff increases followed in subsequent years, particularly in 
1926 and in the early 1930s. A second forced loan was carried out in 1926. Even 
the coming of the Metaxas dictatorship brought little change. Thus during the entire 
interwar period, Greece underwent a shift similar to that of the nineteenth century, 
and entirely contrary to that occurring elsewhere. As table 2.3 indicates, direct 
taxes, which had comprised 21% of total tax revenue in 1915-19, saw their share 
slide during subsequent decades, falling to 17.6% in 1920-27, and to 16.6% in 
1928-36.29
Table 2.2 Government Expenditure as Percentage of Total Tax Revenues
Period %
1833-1847 144.6
1848 118.3
1849-1868 124.0
1869-1870 126.1
1871-1876 109.5
1877-1884 163.1
1885 206.8
1886-1897 135.8
1898-1909 119.3
i9KM914 166.7
1915-1919 223.6
1920-1927 168.8
1928-1936 118.1
Source: Lazaretou, op.cit., 1995, p31; Lazaretou, op.cit., 1996, p.650.
Greece had thus survived more than a century of independent existence with a 
tax structure unable to satisfy the needs of a modem state. The perennial difficulties 
of fulfilling even current obligations left successive governments overdependent on 
foreign capital when seeking to invest in public works, or - more often - to ride out
29 s. Lazaretou, 'Macroeconomic Policies and Nominal Exchange Rate Regimes: Greece in the 
Interwar Period', Journal of European Economic History, 25(3), 1996:647-670; Mazower, 
op.cit., 1991a, pp.56, 60-65, 90, 96, 207, 212; Harlaftis, op.cit., 1996, pp. 185-186.
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periods of crisis. The only satisfactory long-term solution was to overhaul the 
entire taxation system. The failure to create a proper machinery to assess and collect 
direct taxes proved costly on several occasions. By undertaxing potential windfalls, 
such as the huge profits earned from currants, tobacco, shipping or most of 
industry in the 1930s, governments deprived themselves of much needed revenue 
and were obliged to fall back on less reliable methods such as loans from abroad, 
or unpopular measures such as forced loans and tariff increases. The introduction 
of a modem taxation system as practised in more advanced economies would have 
given Greek governments far more room to manoeuvre. Chronic insolvency had a 
destabilising effect on domestic politics, and increased the inevitable danger of 
foreign interference.
Table 2.3 Direct Tax as Percentage erf Total Tax Revenues
Period %
1833-1840 57.89
1841-1850 52.58
1851-1860 48.54
1861-1870 39.36
1871-1880 30.66
1881-1890 20.52
1891-1900 19.04
1901-1910 17.18
1911-1914 17.44
1915-1919 21.00
1920-1927 ’ 17.60
1928-1936 16.60
Source: Lazaretou, op.cit., 1993, p.31; Lazaretou, op.cit., 1996, 
p.650.
The Price of Insolvency
The economic problems outlined above had an adverse effect on Greece's external 
relations, particularly its special relationship with Britain, France and Russia. The 
excessive reliance on foreign capital and the poor subsequent record on debt 
repayment made for a centuiy of uncomfortable interaction between the Greek state 
and its foreign creditors. Many of the conflicts could have been avoided had the 
sums been put to efficient use. Unfortunately, foreign loans were often used to 
cover current deficits rather than to lay the basis for future prosperity. The cycle 
usually began with reckless spending, problems with repayment and servicing, 
culminating in ultimate default. On some occasions, the unilateral suspension of 
debt obligations was allowed to pass unpunished, but on others it led to a 
significant loss of economic sovereignty and political face.30
30 For a detailed treatment of the subject see, J.V. Kofas, Financial Relations of Greece and the 
Great Powers, 1832-1862. New York: East European Monographs, Columbia UP, 1981; 
J.A. Levandis, The Greek Foreign Debt and the Great Powers, 1821-1898. New York: 
Columbia UP, 1944.
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This cycle had begun even before Greece achieved independence. As early as 
1821, the financial plight of the insurgent government forced it to seek loans from 
abroad. Following unsuccessful attempts to negotiate loans in Spain and various 
Italian and German states, the Greeks turned their attention to London. In 1824, 
£800,000 was secured on usurious terms. Unfortunately, the money was not used 
for its intended purpose, being largely squandered in factional fighting. Similar 
misuse befell a second loan of £ l.lm  raised in London in 1825. Independence 
failed to bring financial stability, and in 1832 an international loan worth 60m 
francs (£2.4m), guaranteed by the three protecting Powers (Britain, France and 
Russia) was contracted with the banking house of the Rothschilds Brothers in 
Paris. The loan coincided with the imposition of Prince Otho, and largely helped to 
finance the expenses of the new monarch, as did further loans from Bavaria in 
1835 and 1836 31
As early as the 1830s, the Greek government failed to pay any interest charges 
on their loans, and only sporadic payments were made thereafter. By the mid- 
1840s, the failure to meet debt obligations soon aroused the anger of the three 
guaranteeing Powers, especially Britain. Negotiations dragged on fruitlessly, 
leading to several heated incidents including a British blockade of the port of 
Piraeus in 1850 and partial Anglo-French occupation during the Crimean War. 
Following Greek complaints of inability to pay, an International Financial 
Commission of Inquiry was set up in 1857 to investigate Greece's public finances, 
and to suggest reform measures to be adopted by the government in Athens. 
Foreign interference in Greek affairs continued to escalate, and by 1862 it was 
being suggested that the Powers should assume control over the country's customs 
revenue in order to liquidate the debt. The move was postponed only because of the 
political unrest which deposed king Otho later in the year. A compromise was 
finally reached in 1864, by which one third of the customs revenues of the port of 
Syra were put aside for debt repayment.32
The 1864 agreement brought a partial resolution to the debt crisis. By the end of 
the 1870s, however, developments both within Greece and in Paris ushered in a 
new wave of borrowing. The Athens government sought funds in order to cope 
with rising military expenditure and to undertake a public works programme. 
Meanwhile, the international unwillingness to consider any further loans to Greece 
was changed in 1879, when French political motives proved decisive in allpwing 
the flotation of new loans on the Bourse. With the reopening of European credit 
markets, the following twelve years witnessed an ’orgy of directionless
31 Kofas, o p .c i t 1981, Chapters 1, 2; Levandis, op.cit., 1944, Chapters 1, 2.
32 Kofas, op.cit., 1981, Chapters 2,4; Levandis, o p .c i t 1944, Chapters 1, 2.
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borrowing'.33 The Greek government received a net total of 459m francs, but the 
sums were 'hastily contracted and aimlessly applied'. There was no subsequent 
explosion of productive investment. Only 1% to 8% of the sums was used to 
finance railway construction. Instead, military expenditure absorbed at least a 
quarter of the total, with the servicing of the previous loans taking up most of the 
residue. Belated attempts to improve government finances by increasing taxes and 
imposing spending cuts proved largely abortive. By the early 1890s, debt servicing 
was swallowing up a third of public revenue. In 1893, when the raising of further 
loans proved impossible, the government defaulted once more.34
At first, the foreign response was muted. Despite protests from investors, no 
serious action was taken against the Greeks, who doggedly refused to grant any 
concessions to the creditors. Negotiations dragged on fruitlessly for four years, 
until Greece initiated a disastrous war with Turkey over Crete. With the Sultan's 
armies advancing unhindered, the Athens government was able to secure foreign 
pressure to impose an armistice only by agreeing to hand over control of certain 
revenues to an International Financial Commission (IFC). Under the supervision of 
this body, receipts from the Piraeus customs, state monopolies, and stamp and 
tobacco duties were to be diverted into a sinking fund to pay off outstanding debts. 
The agreement also placed restrictions on government actions on internal 
borrowing and the size of note circulation.35
The interwar period witnessed a repetition of the previous pattern. At first, 
foreign capital flows were unavailable as a result of the failure to achieve a 
settlement of Greek war debts to Britain and the United States, which remained 
unresolved until 1927. However, a £ 12.3m loan sponsored by the League of 
Nations was granted in 1924 to help assimilate the refugees from Asia Minor. This 
soon proved insufficient and before long further credits were being sought. In early 
1928 another loan worth £9m was approved in London, to be repaid out of IFC 
revenues. In total, loans with a nominal value of £38m were contracted during 
1924-31. In addition, direct foreign investment began to flow into Greece after 
192436
33 R.E. Cameron, France and the Economic Development of Europe 1800-1914: Conquests of 
Peace and Seeds of War. Princeton, NJ: Princeton UP, 1961, pp.496-497.
34 Levandis, op.cit., 1944, Chapter 3; Pepelasis, op.cit., 1958-59, p.26.
35 Levandis, op.cit., 1944, Chapters 3, 4; H. Feis, Europe the World's Banker 1870-1914: An 
Account of European Foreign Investment and the Connection of World Finance with 
Diplomacy before the War. Clifton: Augustus M. Kelley, 1974, pp.289-291.
36 A. Orde, British Policy and European Reconstruction after the First World War. Cambridge: 
Cambridge UP, 1990, pp.284-288, 297-298; Mazower, op.cit., 1991a, pp. 102-104, 106; 
G.J. Andreopoulos, The International Financial Commission and Anglo-Greek Relations 
(1928-1933)', Historical Journal, 31(2), 1988, p.343.
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This new wave of borrowing soon generated problems identical to those which 
had proved so troublesome ever since the 1820s. By 1930, 36% of government 
expenditure was being allocated to the servicing of public debt (both internal and 
external), a percentage exceeded only by Britain and Belgium.37 Such a burden 
could not be sustained indefinitely. In 1932, the Athens government sought to 
reschedule repayment, and when the talks dragged on it took the unilateral decision 
to impose a debt moratorium. Occasional interest payments were made thereafter, 
particularly after the establishment of the Metaxas dictatorship, but Greece entered 
World War II in a state of default. Although some temporary relief had been 
achieved, the country was no nearer to resolving its chronic reliance on foreign 
capital to paper over deficiencies in the balance of payments.38
Thus the pattern of foreign loans and insolvency was set within decades after 
independence and was to recur all too often in the future. If the initial loans were 
essential to win the war of secession, subsequent loans served merely to finance 
the extravagant expansion of the machinery of state and from time to time to pursue 
hostilities against the Turks. From the very beginning, little attention was paid to 
the need to put borrowed money to the best possible use, with insufficient 
emphasis on the need to create a basis for future economic prosperity. Having once 
defaulted, the Greek negotiators did not help matters by maintaining an inflexible 
stance with the representatives of the Powers. In the long-run, Greece's failure to 
honour international agreements to which it had been a signatory increased the 
likelihood of foreign meddling in the country's affairs.
For their part, Britain, France and Russia were hardly blameless. While the 
early loans had been extended on understandably stiff terms, several British 
individuals had been guilty of misappropriating parts of the funds. Moreover, by 
imposing Otho on the Greeks, the Powers bore much responsibility for subsequent 
developments. Once Greece defaulted, each of the Powers sought to gain influence 
within the country at the expense of the others 39 It would be naive to assume that 
each was not motivated as much by political self-interest as by a determination to 
recover the sums advanced. In any case, the pressure put on Greece was only 
moderately successful, in that a compromise took two decades to achieve.
The imposition of the IFC created considerable resentment within Greece, but 
the arrangement was far from unique. In fact, it was fairly typical of relations 
between defaulting and creditor states at that time. The Greek experience was
37 G. Politakis, Greek Policies o f Recovery and Reconstruction, 1944-1952. Oxford: St. 
Catherine's College, Unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, 1990, pp.23-25.
38 Mazower, op.cit., 1991a, pp. 189-198.
39 Kofas, op.cit., 1981, Chapter 1.
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largely mirrored by that of its Balkan neighbours. In 1895, Serbia avoided 
bankruptcy only by handing over the management of certain revenues to an 
international financial commission representing foreign bondholders. In 1902, 
Bulgaria staved off financial disaster by accepting a control commissioner 
appointed by the Banque de Paris et des Pays Bas with the co-operation of the 
French government. As with Greece, both countries had borrowed heavily on 
international markets, and invested more in military than productive purposes. 
Existing borrowing patterns were simply resumed once new credits became 
available with the establishment of external supervision.40
Unwelcome as these arrangements were, economic mismanagement could have 
led to far more embarrassing consequences. Despite the irksome aspects of foreign 
interference, the Balkan countries were spared the earlier fate of Egypt, where 
catastrophic financial ineptitude and subsequent bankruptcy resulted in a virtual 
loss of independence, with real power passing to the British consul-general in 
1883. As a result of British administration, Egyptian finances improved 
considerably over the following three decades, allowing both extensive investment 
in infrastructure and a reduction of individual tax burdens, thereby raising the 
general standard of living.41 Such progress resulted from sound financial 
management achieved only by politically drastic arrangements, which would have 
proved unacceptable to the Balkan states. To a certain extent, the Balkan 
governments may well have had some justification in seeing themselves as paitial 
victims of Great Power rivalry, which could both impose unsuitable borders and 
exacerbate regional tensions. Nevertheless, it is also fair to say that chronic 
financial ineptitude and a blatant disregard for sound economic principles played a 
major part in the crises, thus leading to the imposition of foreign supervision.
The IFC was designed solely to protect the interests of Greece's foreign 
creditors, and ensured that the latter fared reasonably well in comparison with 
others who had invested in the Balkans. However, despite the hostility of both 
government and public opinion in Greece, the agreement was not without some 
benefit for the country's economy. Revenues collected by the IFC increased 
gradually up to 1914, allowing an initial reduction of the foreign debt burden, and 
reopened access to international capital markets. If the benefits to the Greek 
economy fell far short of what they could have been, this was not the fault of the 
foreign representatives. The increases in revenue derived almost entirely from the 
management of the Piraeus customs, while little was achieved in augmenting
40 Cameron, op.cit., 1961, pp.500-501; Feis, op.cit., 1974, Chapter 12.
41 J. Foreman-Peck, A History of the World Economy: International Economic Relations since 
1850. New York: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1995, p. 132.
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receipts from the other sources. Despite its formal powers, the IFC found itself 
unable to transform 'established ways and practices', and frequently complained 
that its suggestions for reforms had been largely ignored. Government resentment 
of the institution often necessitated extra pressure from the Powers. In any case, 
potential gains were more than neutralised by the huge cost of the two Balkan Wars 
(400m drachmae).42 Greece's ability to withstand such outlays had derived mainly 
from the unprecedented degree of financial stability and the renewed access to 
credit, both consequences of the IFC's presence. Foreign capital had thus allowed 
the country to pursue military adventures to the detriment of its economic 
development
During the interwar period, most elements of the familiar cycle were repeated. 
Sizeable amounts of foreign capital were absorbed after 1924. As with the IFC, the 
conditions imposed by foreign lenders made a positive contribution to long-term 
Greek stability. At the insistence of the League of Nations, the loans were made 
conditional upon the creation of a central bank - the Bank of Greece. Although 
many within Greece resented the imposition, the new institution performed a useful 
role during the subsequent crisis.43 The loans of the 1920s had been contracted on 
the implicit assumption that the flows would never cease. Once it became clear that 
no more loans would be forthcoming, the cost of servicing and repaying previous 
debts became excessive. While the IFC continued to exercise some influence, both 
it and the international community as a whole were powerless to take any 
meaningful action once the Greeks chose to default again in 1932. The suspension 
of payments allowed a degree of temporary relief without solving the perennial 
problem of budget and balance of payments deficits and the consequent 
overreliance on foreign capital. In such circumstances, defiance was clearly 
counterproductive. Had history not taken the course it did in the late 1930s, some 
eventual accommodation with the foreign creditors would have been inevitable. 
However, the actual course of events ensured that within a short space of time, 
Greece would become more than ever dependent on foreign help, albeit in 
circumstances no one could have envisaged.
2.2 The Legacy of the War 
Occupation and Inflation
Although the human and material losses suffered by Greece during the occupation 
have never been ascertained with satisfactory accuracy, they were undeniably 
massive. Approximately 520,000 people perished. Both agricultural and industrial
42 Feis, op.cit., 1974, pp.291-292; Mazower, op.cit., 1991a, pp.60-65.
43 Mazower, op.cit., 1991a, pp.104-106; Mazower, op.cit., 1991b, pp.215-226.
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output declined dramatically, while the Greek merchant fleet, once fundamental to 
the country’s balance of payments, lost 1.3m GRT, 72% of its total tonnage. The 
transport infrastructure, inadequate even before the war, suffered further as a result 
of the almost total destruction of locomotives and rolling stock, road and rail 
bridges and tunnels, together with damage to ports and canals.44
Several factors contributed to the extent of the losses. Even before the abortive 
Italian invasion of October 1940, the disruption of world trade patterns had a 
particularly ruinous effect on the Greek balance of payments. The Axis occupation 
and the resulting Allied blockade separated Greece from important international 
markets, leading to the loss of both export revenue and food imports. This created 
serious problems for a country which normally imported over a third of staple 
foodstuffs, and led to catastrophic food shortages. Moreover, by forcing Greece to 
pay not only for its military occupation, but also the expenses of strategic projects 
in the eastern Mediterranean, the Axis ensured that an already underdeveloped 
country with little current revenue was obliged to transfer a considerable portion of 
its national wealth to support the Nazi war effort. As Ritter shows, German policy 
towards Greece was primarily designed to finance Wehrmacht operations from 
local resources, and followed three distinct phases; a) initial detachment, leaving 
the Italians to shoulder the main burden of the country's problems; b) direct 
intervention in conjunction with Italy in October 1942, when the drachma faced 
collapse just as the military situation in the Mediterranean began to swing against 
the Axis; and c) the assumption of total control over the Greek economy following 
the Italian withdrawal, in a desperate attempt to prevent civil unrest from erupting 
into widespread partisan warfare 45
The immediate result of the military defeat in April 1941 was partition among the 
Axis powers. Apart from the north eastern provinces absorbed by Bulgaria, the 
Wehrmacht retained only areas of particular military importance, with the rest 
placed under Italian administration. After the fall of Mussolini, the Germans 
assumed direct control over the Italian zone. The relative fortunes of the various 
zones were mixed: while the Bulgarians ruthlessly exploited the areas under their 
control, Italian occupation was relatively benign. The partition had two serious 
consequences. Firstly, the creation of new boundaries cut across long-established 
internal trade patterns, further disrupting economic life. Secondly, the isolation of
44 G. Patterson, The Financial Experiences of Greece from Liberation to the Truman Doctrine 
(October1944-March 1947). Harvard University, Unpublished PhD Thesis, 1948, Chapter 1; 
Harlaftis, op.cit., 1996, pp.226-227.
4  ^ H. Ritter, 'German Policy in Occupied Greece and its Economic Impact, 1941-1944', in 
F.X.J. Homer and L.D. Wilcox (eds.)., Germany and Europe in the Era of the Two World 
Wars. Charlottesville: UP of Virginia, 1986, pp.173-174.
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the main agricultural areas of Macedonia and Thrace (producing around 30% of the 
country's grain output)46 from the major centres of population, together with the 
elimination of food imports, led to severe scarcities in the other zones, culminating 
in widespread starvation during the first winter of the occupation. Although the 
final death toll from hunger has never been ascertained with any accuracy, it was 
estimated that food shortages claimed 300,(XX) lives between 1941 and 1944 47 
The death toll would have been considerably higher had the Red Cross not 
sponsored a huge relief effort from the summer of 1942 onwards. This prevented a 
recurrence of the starvation of 1941-42, but throughout the occupation, hunger and 
malnutrition remained a permanent feature of Greek life.
Apart from individual tragedies, the chronic scarcity of goods had disastrous 
implications for economic and social stability, as it coincided with the inevitable 
problem of wartime budget deficits. The two factors came together to produce 
runaway inflation, which assumed terrifying proportions by the end of the 
occupation. The finances of the puppet regime were destroyed by a combination of 
massive expenditure increases accompanied by a collapse of revenue. As indicated 
earlier, from the very beginning, Greece was forced to pay for its own 
occupation.48 Although the exact sums involved cannot be calculated with any 
precision, they were undoubtedly huge: in 1941-42, the levy was estimated as the 
equivalent of 113.7% of the country's national income 49 The second major burden 
on public finances was the trebling of the state payroll between 1941 and 1944, as 
the government was forced to take on the financing of both local authorities and 
numerous public institutions which had gone bankrupt50
In the face of such demands, the puppet regime was able to deploy only meagre 
resources. As the gold reserves of the Bank of Greece had followed the 
government into exile, and the tax collecting machinery had been severely damaged 
by both the disruption of normal economic life and deliberate evasion, budget 
deficits rose to horrific levels: from only 4% in 1938-39, to 71% in 1941-42, to 
82% in 1942-43, and to 94% in 1943-44.51 The puppet regime had little choice but
46 G. Etmektsoglou-Koehn, Axis Expoitation of Wartime Greece, 1941-1943. Unpublished 
PhD Thesis, Emory University, 1995, p.409.
47 M. Mazower, Inside Hitler's Greece: The Experience of Occupation 1941-44. New Haven and 
London: Yale UP, 1993, p.41.
48 For a detailed treatment of Greece's contribution to the Axis war effort, see Etmektsoglou- 
Koehn, op.cit., 1995, pp.464-563.
49 Ibid., p.466
50 F0371/48334 R14106, Economic and Financial Developments in Greece November 1944- 
June 1945, C.A. Coombs, 1.8.1945, pp.4-5.
51 Patterson, op.cit., 1948, p. 13.
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to fall into the dangerous habit of printing drachmae to meet its current expenditure. 
As table 1.1 demonstrates, the note circulation grew alarmingly, with the rate of 
increase accelerating wildly as the war progressed.
The consequences were soon apparent. With a continuous flood o f new 
banknotes during a time of chronic scarcity, the value of the drachma plunged as 
note circulation rocketed out of control. As the drachma depreciated, the public 
rapidly lost confidence in paper currency. W hile the poorest sections of society 
often resorted to barter, sizeable transactions were settled in gold sovereigns, the 
only stable means of exchange and store o f value. The drachma-sovereign rate of 
exchange is shown in table 2.4. The so-called sovereign rate became the most 
reliable barometer not only of inflation, but also o f public confidence in the 
economy and the government, a role it would retain long after Greece was 
liberated.
Table 2.4 The Sovereign Rate
Month Drachmae
September 1939 1,075
December 1940 1,063
June 1941 7,400
June 1942 58,830
December 151,720
May 1943 239,625
September 419,120
January 1944 3,112,000
April 35,700,000
June 126,260,870
July 364,230,769
August 2,390,846,153
September 18,528,000,000
October 2,583,111,000,000
November (a) 43,166,600,000,000
Source: Cleveland and Delivanis, op.cit., 1949, Statistical 
Appendix, pp. 175-195.
(a) Average of rates for first ten days
One o f the main causes of price rises was the growing scarcity of food. In the 
beginning of the occupation, the puppet regime introduced a rationing scheme, and 
price ceilings, and attempted to control the collection and distribution of agricultural 
produce. The efforts were severely undermined by Greek farmers, who had been 
antagonised by Axis looting in 1941, and failed to respond to government demands 
to deliver crops at prices lower than those of the free market. Most produce was 
either hoarded or sold on to the black market. Despite emotional appeals to farmers 
and the introduction of taxes in kind, actual deliveries fell fat short of requirements. 
As a result, the rationing programme was never honoured in full. Meat and dairy 
products disappeared within months, and only bread remained available in any
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meaningful quantities. With so little food available through official rationing 
schemes, pressure on black market supplies pushed prices far beyond the means of 
the average citizen. Throughout the occupation prices moved faster than the 
sovereign rate, as all price ceilings failed with the exception of the moratorium on 
rents. Spiralling prices led to inevitable pressure on wages, which were frequently 
readjusted and supplemented with additional food allowances and payments in kind 
for certain groups of workers. By the end of the occupation, wages were revalued 
every five days, but real wages had fallen to an estimated 6% of their pre-war 
levels by July 1944.52
At first, the Germans did little to alleviate the growing economic chaos, apart 
from agreeing to receive the Red Cross relief shipments. No major action was 
taken until the first crisis of the drachma in the summer of 1942, when an Axis 
economic mission under Hermann Neubacher was sent to Athens in an attempt to 
solve Greece's economic predicament. Neubacher was motivated solely by a desire 
to preserve social and political stability by rescuing the drachma as a means of 
exchange rather than promoting broader economic recovery, and his measures 
failed to address the root causes of the crisis. He reduced the occupation levy, and 
abolished rationing and price controls. A credit squeeze was imposed in an attempt 
to compel speculators to part with hoarded stocks. Plans were also announced that 
substantial quantities of foodstuffs would be imported from elsewhere in the 
Balkans as well as manufactured commodities from Germany. The combination of 
measures was initially successful. Hoarded goods flooded the markets, leading to 
price decreases of up to 80% for some commodities, while wages and prices kept 
in balance for over four months.53
The respite was short-lived. Within months, the course of the war forced the 
Germans to give increasing priority to the transport of military supplies and 
personnel rather than consumer goods. By the spring of 1943, the occupation levy 
was increased again. Following a rise in partisan activity, the growing economic 
chaos threatened to erupt into widespread civil unrest. Neubacher attempted to 
relieve upward pressure on the drachma by a policy of controlled gold sales. A 
million gold sovereigns were sold after November 1943. Once again, this proved 
effective for a limited period, briefly reducing the sovereign rate and slowing down 
inflation, but could only delay rather than prevent the total collapse of the economy.
52 Etmektsoglou-Koehn, op.cit., 1995, pp.408-426; WO204/3562, The Greek Hyperinflation 
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By May 1944, with the German military position deteriorating rapidly, inflation 
spiralled out of control.54 Thereafter, with the onset of hyperinflation, the drachma 
rapidly lost touch with reality. In October 1944, the Germans withdrew from 
Greece, leaving behind them a disaster of their own making. The colossal task of 
overcoming years of deliberate exploitation and mismanagement was left to the 
returning Greek government and its Allies.
♦ ♦ ♦
The psychological legacy of the occupation was as serious as the physical damage 
inflicted on the country. The chronic scarcity and the subsequent inflation had a 
devastating effect on social cohesion, as it was clearly perceived that the suffering 
had not been distributed equitably. Shortages created almost universal 
impoverishment, as the cost of a normal diet soared beyond the reach of the 
majority of the population, particularly in the urban centres. As Thomadakis 
demonstrates, recourse to the black market was hardly feasible for ordinary wage 
earners. In most cases, it required the liquidation of tangible wealth in the form of 
personal property, from household possessions to real estate. It would be 
simplistic to assume that the privations were borne equally, and that the occupiers 
were the sole beneficiaries. While contact with the black market was a painful but 
unavoidable necessity for survival, it was also a source of considerable gains for a 
minority, as the liquidation of wealth meant its effective transfer from buyers to 
sellers of food.55 Thus alongside the general misery, vast fortunes were made from 
the black market. A contemporary observer remarked that many Greeks had ’got 
rich on the blood of their brothers'56 As Mazower notes, access to goods and 
power offered unique opportunities for enrichment. Popular perceptions helped 
create the myth that a new class of war profiteers had emerged, displacing the old 
dlites. The brisk trade in urban housing and rural holdings - over 350,000 urban 
properties and rural estates were sold during the occupation57 - indicates that even 
formerly prosperous individuals were not immune to the general impoverishment. 
However, although the topic has not been fully researched, it is likely that the true 
picture was much more complex. While many individuals undeniably joined the
54 Ritter, op.cit., 1986, pp.170-173; Ritter, op.cti., 1969, pp.134-136. Drachma obtained from 
gold sales furnished between 16% and 72% of the Werhmacht's monthly expenditures during 
this period; Etmektsoglou-Koehn, op.cit., 1995, p.544.
55 S. Thomadakis, 'Black Markets, Inflation, and Force in the Economy of Occupied Greece1, in 
J.O. Iatrides (ed.), Greece in the 1940s: A Nation in Crisis. Hanover and London: UP of New 
England, 1981, pp.71-75.
56 Quoted in Mazower, op.cit., 1993, p.60; Etmektsoglou-Koehn, op.cit., 1995, p.423.
57 C. Hadziiossif, 'Economic Stabilisation and Political Unrest: Greece 1944-1947', in L. 
Baerentzen;J.O. Iatrides; O.L. Smith (eds.), Studies in the History o f the Greek Civil War 
1945-1949. Copenhagen: Museum Tusculanum Press, 1987, pp.32-33.
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ranks of the rich before liberation, many of the pre-war Elites were equally 
successful in maintaining or even increasing their wealth by using their connections 
to exploit the new realities.58 The black market proved socially divisive, and the 
resulting legacy of bitterness would continue to haunt Greece long after liberation.
To a large degree, the massive redistribution of wealth within Greece was 
reinforced by the deliberate policy of using gold sales as the sole weapon in a futile 
effort to arrest inflation. This allowed those who profited from the occupation to 
protect their assets, as belief in the sovereign remained unshaken. The increased 
possibility of investing in gold was also an unfortunate consequence of the similar 
British practice of using gold coins to finance the various resistance movements. 
By such means, over two million sovereigns entered Greece, double the amount 
sold by the German occupiers.59 The easy availability of gold strengthened its role 
as the only reliable form of tender and store of value. This contrasted sharply with 
the demise of the drachma. Hyperinflation destroyed confidence in paper money, 
creating a distrust which even the liberation could not eradicate. With the total 
ascendancy of the gold mentality, subsequent efforts to establish confidence in a 
new drachma bore little fruit for several years.
* * *
Another consequence of the occupation with serious implications for the post­
liberation period was the effect on the size and quality of the state administration. 
With successive puppet governments offering employment and pensions as a form 
of welfare, the state payroll grew alarmingly. Thus by November 1944, the 
number of state employees and pensioners had grown to 72,000 and 117,000 
respectively (the corresponding figures for 1938-39 were 53,000 and 87,000). The 
government also assumed responsibility for thousands of individuals from 
bankrupt institutions and enterprises who would otherwise have been reduced to 
starvation, thereby adding 80,000 employees and 55,000 pensioners to the state 
payroll. The total number of individuals directly supported by the state thus rose 
from 141,000 before the war to 324,000 by the liberation.60 As will be seen, the 
implications for public finances were to prove terrifying.
While the civil service grew in numbers, its quality was further undermined. 
Little attention was paid to qualifications or competence. Furthermore, the 
hardships of everyday life rapidly eroded both the morale and the efficiency of the
58 Mazower, op.cit., 1993, pp.53-64.
59 C.A. Coombs, Financial Policy in Greece during 1947-48. Harvard University, Unpublished 
PhD Thesis, 1953, p. 181.
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bureaucracy. Of all wage earners, civil servants were among the hardest hit by 
inflation. The fight to maintain a minimum standard of living inevitably involved a 
neglect of official duties and all too often a recourse to corruption. Matters were not 
helped by the inevitable accusations of collaboration and the active harassment by 
resistance forces.61
As a result, the state of the Greek civil service after liberation was worse than at 
any time during the past. Given the huge numbers on the government payroll, most 
employees had nothing to do, and turned up only to collect their wages. For those 
who had something to do, work practices were less than strenuous. As late as July 
1947, the average working week was 25 hours. This allowed several bad practices 
picked up during the occupation period to flourish unhindered. Thus many 
employees used all means to boost their meagre wages, including doing other jobs 
during office hours, and abusing overtime and other sources of special payments. 
One particularly lucrative activity was participation in specially constituted 
committees. As each attendance was paid, there was little incentive to swift 
decision-making, as action could always be postponed until the next session. Even 
worse, the catastrophic overmanning within departments was further compounded 
by the reappearance of traditional patterns of political patronage after liberation. In 
each of the numerous governments, ministers gave jobs to associates and 
supporters. As dismissals were still rare apart from the occasional purge for 
political reasons, the numbers continued to swell.62 As will be seen, the problems 
of the civil service were to have a decisive bearing on the course of the struggle 
against inflation after 1944,
Political Developments, 1941-1947
While the economy moved ever more rapidly towards complete breakdown, 
political developments both within and outside Greece ensured that those 
responsible for the restoration of economic stability after liberation would have to 
contend with a new set of difficulties. The weakening of the traditional parties, the 
resumption of the old constitutional squabbles and above all the new challenge of 
the organised Left - all occurring under the watchful eye of the British - came to 
monopolise the attention of Greek politicians after 1944, diverting energies away 
from the crucial search for economic normality.
The swift collapse of Greek and British resistance in the face of the German 
onslaught in April 1941 marked the abrupt end of the dictatorship founded by 
Metaxas. Within weeks, the king and government, together with remnants of the
61 TE/AKB/B5, Memorandum on the Greek Economic Situation, K. Varvaressos, 2.8.1946, 
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armed forces were forced to pass into exile in Egypt, then to London in September 
1941 and back to Cairo in early 1944. The govemment-in-exile was headed by 
Emmanuel Tsouderos, a former governor of the Bank of Greece rather than a 
career politician, who remained in the post until the spring of 1944. In the 
beginning, the government contained a large number of survivors from the Metaxas 
regime, and could hardly claim to enjoy a substantial following within Greece. 
Eventually, after British pressure to disassociate itself from the dictatorship, the 
government dismissed ministers who had served under Metaxas, announced the 
restoration of the civil liberties suspended in 1936, and coopted several 
representatives of the traditional parties who had been able to escape from occupied 
Greece.
At first, the Tsouderos government concentrated its efforts on the pursuit of 
territorial claims, but increasingly focused its attention on the long-running 
controversy over the future of the monarchy. Old antagonisms had been revived by 
the king's dubious actions in helping to establish the Metaxas dictatorship, and few 
Greek politicians of any hue were enthusiastic about the king returning after 
liberation without some form of prior referendum. Stronger action was prevented 
by British insistence on supporting the king, although they eventually agreed to the 
referendum proposal.
In the meantime, developments within Greece itself led to a new polarisation of 
political opinion far more fundamental than those resulting from the schism. The 
hardships endured under the occupation and the emergence of a strong resistance 
movement inevitably radicalised the population, which led to a strengthening of the 
Left, centred around the KKE. The traditional parties, bereft of proper 
organisational structures, and discredited by their acquiescence in the Metaxas 
regime, proved utterly unable to mobilise popular support The highly disciplined 
Communists, with long experience of clandestine activity behind them, were able 
to create a genuine mass movement. Active resistance was undertaken almost solely 
by EAM and its military wing ELAS, in which the Communists were joined by 
representatives of the moderate Left and Centre. Although EAM was controlled by 
the KKE, it drew support from most sections of society and many of its rank and 
file were not committed Communists.
The huge success of EAM in harnessing the popular mood frightened not only 
the German occupiers, but also the traditional parties, the govemment-in-exile and 
the British. Its establishment of an alternative government (PEEA) in the mountains 
was a direct challenge not only to the Germans, but also to the authority and 
legitimacy of the govemment-in-exile. The traditional parties belatedly attempted to 
create an alternative resistance movement with limited results. The largest grouping 
(EDES) failed either to achieve wider significance or to entice individuals away
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from EAM. The uneasy relationship between EDES and ELAS eventually 
deteriorated into a virtual civil war, particularly after negotiations to broker a wider 
coalition agreement ended in failure in the autumn of 1943. The most vigorous 
response to EAM-ELAS came with the creation of the SS-sponsored Security 
Battalions, consisting of anti-Communist Greek collaborators, who fought 
alongside the SS in major anti-ELAS operations marked by extreme brutality on 
both sides.
Tsouderos resigned following a pro-republican mutiny within the exiled Greek 
armed forces and was succeeded briefly by Sophocles Venizelos, who was himself 
replaced by George Papandreou in April 1944. During the next month, an effective 
compromise was achieved with EAM, which accepted minority participation in the 
so-called National Unity Government, and agreed to place its forces under the 
coalition's control. The uneasy alliance was reached partly as a result of pressure 
from the British, who despatched troops to convey the Papandreou government to 
Athens after the German withdrawal in October 1944.
The compromise proved short-lived. The plans to absorb all military formations 
into a unified national army - thus effectively disarming ELAS and EDES - 
exacerbated tensions between the coalition partners. In early December 1944, less 
than seven weeks after liberation, the fragile unity collapsed when police opened 
fire on an EAM sponsored demonstration. EAM withdrew from the government, 
and ELAS forces launched an attack against several police stations in Athens. The 
fighting escalated into a virtual civil war in the capital, ending with the total defeat 
of ELAS following the deployment of British troops backed by armour and air 
support. An uneasy peace was brokered by the British in February 1945. Under 
the terms of the so-called Varkiza Agreement, ELAS was to be disarmed but an 
amnesty was extended to its members. All civil liberties were to be restored and 
enforced, while the civil service and security organs were to be purged of 
supporters of the Metaxas dictatorship and wartime collaborators. The agreement 
set the agenda for future political developments, by stipulating that parliamentary 
elections and a referendum on the future of the monarchy were to be held as soon 
possible. The temporary status of the king had already been settled back in 
December 1944, when Archbishop Damaskinos, the head of the Greek Orthodox 
Church, was appointed as regent.
The events of December 1944 had a tremendous impact on subsequent political 
developments and attitudes. The Left was not only severely weakened as a result of 
its military setback, but the brutality of its methods led to a considerable loss of 
popular support. The main beneficiaries were the royalist Right, who needed no 
excuse to resume their own vendetta against the Communists and their 
sympathisers. The Varkiza Agreement's emphasis on civil liberties and the fair
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treatment of political opponents was never likely to be respected given the 
resurgence of the extreme Right. The Greek political establishment was able to 
subvert the spirit of Varkiza by using its provisions to further weaken the Left In a 
return to the traditional practice of purging opponents, EAM supporters were 
removed from the civil service, security forces and universities. The increasing 
confidence and ferocity of the Right allowed wartime collaborators to be exonerated 
as fighters against Communism rather than pro-Nazi traitors. Former members of 
the Security Battalions were recruited into the police and military, and former 
supporters of the puppet governments gained political office. As Papastratis claims, 
the Greek record of prosecuting collaborators was ’lamentable'. Although 18,000 
individual charges had been made by mid-1945, the vast majority were never 
brought to justice. The reluctance of successive governments in Athens to punish 
collaborators contrasted strikingly with the trend elsewhere in Europe. The leniency 
shown towards those who had cooperated with the Nazis was not extended to the 
Left At the end of 1945, nearly 49,000 EAM supporters had been imprisoned, and 
over 1,200 had been murdered by the National Guard or unofficial paramilitary 
units. This so-called 'White Terror' enjoyed the support of much of the Greek 
political establishment, and continued despite the protests of the embarrassed 
British.63
All this was happening at a time when power was theoretically being exercised 
not by the Right but by the republican Centre. British insistence on steering a 
middle course ensured a succession of cabinets run by a mixture of moderates, 
often not career politicians. Each cabinet proved fragile and succeeded one another 
with monotonous rapidity. General Nikolaos Plastiras who replaced Papandreou in 
January 1945 was soon followed by Admiral Petros Voulgaris in April. Voulgaris' 
resignation in October 1945 created a prolonged political crisis, during which the 
regent himself assumed the premiership for a brief period. A government under 
Panayotis Kannelopoulos collapsed within weeks leading to the appointment of 
Themistoklis Sophoulis in November 1945, who remained in office until the first 
post-war elections in March 1946. As the frequent change of governments 
indicates, the coalitions of moderates wielded little real power. Although 
implacably opposed to EAM, they were also opposed to the restoration of the 
monarchy. However, throughout 1945-46 they not only found themselves
63 Mazower, op.cit., 1997, pp. 129-150; M. Mazower, The Cold War and the Appropriation of 
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War. Copenhagen: Museum Tusculanum Press, pp.46-47.
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ipowerless to restrain the right-wing terror, but also allowed the political agenda to 
pass firmly to the royalist Right.
The ascendancy of the Right was confirmed by the first post-war elections. 
Helped by the strategic blunder of the left-wing parties which abstained, the 
Populists won an overwhelming victory. The royalist triumph was complete in 
September 1946, when the referendum on the future of the monarchy produced a 
majority in favour of the king's return. With the Right now secure in power, the 
brutality of the anti-Communist struggle was given official blessing. With the 
escalation of both the White Terror and armed resistance from the Communists, the 
country drifted inexorably towards civil war.
In 1944 Greece emerged from the most tragic episode in its history. The Axis 
occupation had left an indelible mark on the national psyche. Before long, many 
came to believe that the country had escaped from one brutal totalitarian empire 
only to be threatened with absorption into another. This increased the political 
polarisation and encouraged extremism, which led eventually to civil war rather 
than reconciliation. Despite the apparent gravity of the new challenges, a ruthless 
anti-Communist tradition had long existed within both major strands of Greek 
politics. The polarisation between Left and Right was a new form of schism 
marked by an unprecedented degree of brutality. From the point of view of the 
economic crisis, the challenge was to pursue the restoration of stability as the first 
priority, leaving political divisions to be shelved until the country had recovered. 
Such an approach found few enthusiasts within Greece.
The International Relief Effort
The rigours Greece endured during the Axis occupation also gave rise to another 
phenomenon: the common belief that the country had played a vital role in the war 
and that its sufferings had been far greater than those borne by any other 
participant Such arguments were usually supported by reference to expressions of 
international admiration for Greece's courageous stand against the Italians in 1940- 
41 and the Germans thereafter. By claiming that the Greek army's heroic resistance 
had disrupted the timetable for Operation Barbarossa, which ultimately led to the 
Axis' defeat, the proponents of this line of thinking could present Greece as the de 
facto saviour of the free world.64
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Such claims or beliefs only added to Greece's difficulty in addressing its post­
war problems. Greek politicians became excessively inward looking, by 
continuously emphasising Greece's losses to the exclusion of any other 
consideration. Once Greece was liberated, its politicians showed little interest in the 
subsequent course of the war, and little appreciation of the continuing problems 
elsewhere. Equally damaging was the expectation that if reparations could not 
cover the full cost of Greek reconstruction, the western Allies would be morally 
obliged to foot the bill. While the latter fully acknowledged that Greece had the 
right to expect both compensation and international support, they deplored the 
implication that the 'world owed Greece a living', in other words that the country 
would not have to mobilise its own resources in the task of recovery.65 This 
fundamental divergence of attitudes was to prove harmful during the prolonged 
economic crisis of 1944-47.
Greek hopes for favourable treatment from the Allies were largely successful, as 
the country became a major beneficiary of the post-war international relief effort, 
and received large amounts of additional aid from the British and American 
governments. Greece had already been unique in receiving a considerable quantity 
of supplies while still under occupation. In late 1941, the growing realisation of the 
extent of hunger within Greece led to calls for the provision of relief supplies. This 
required the consent not only of the occupying forces, but also of the British, who 
had to agree to a temporary relaxation of their blockade of the Greek coast This 
proved far from straightforward. The British saw the feeding of occupied Europe 
as the responsibility of the occupiers themselves and were reluctant to allow the 
Axis to escape their obligations. Such attitudes attracted fierce resentment, and in 
the face of escalating pressure from various quarters, the Foreign Office devised a 
plan by which food could be shipped to Greece from Turkey. Up to 19,000 tons of 
foodstuffs were supplied up to August 1942,66 before the scheme was dropped 
owing to growing shortages in Turkey. The amounts were in any case small 
compared to Greece's needs, and achieved little. More substantial shipments 
became possible only with the initiative of the Canadian government, which
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promised a monthly quota of 15,000 tons of wheat. Originally meant to form the 
basis of an international relief pool after liberation, the whole amount was made 
available to Greece for immediate use. In addition, the American government 
donated large quantities of pulses, powdered milk and medical supplies. The goods 
were shipped in Swedish vessels, and distributed under the aegis of Red Cross 
officials from Sweden and Switzerland. Despite considerable difficulties - several 
vessels were sunk either by mines or by aircraft from both sides - 611,000 tons of 
supplies were delivered up to March 1945. Although neither the total costs nor the 
full value of the deliveries have been calculated, the scheme had cost about $41m 
up to the end of March 1944.67
Despite the immediate importance of this effort for the population of occupied 
Greece, most attention was focused on the far greater task of post-war 
reconstruction. The first attempt to quantify the likely needs of liberated countries 
came with the creation of the Inter-Allied Bureau of Post-War Requirements in late 
1941. This British sponsored organisation was in no position to furnish anything 
like the sums demanded, and soon lost significance once the United States entered 
the war. The Americans set up their own body - the Foreign Economic 
Administration (FEA) - to deal with such issues, but with the growing 
understanding of the enormity of the task, a special agency was established under 
the auspices of the United Nations in 1943. This was the United Nations Relief and 
Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA), which was to coordinate the international 
relief effort until its winding down at the end of 1946. Its Erst major task was to 
ascertain the likely needs of each recipient country. Inevitably, this led to lengthy 
exchanges, as each recipient country sought to obtain recognition for the largest 
possible claim. For the Greek side, negotiations were conducted by professor 
Kyriakos Varvaressos, governor of the Bank of Greece, who succeeded in 
winning the acceptance of the Greek government's estimates in the face of mistrust 
from the Americans and the British, who regarded them as suspiciously high. Two 
major points of disagreement emerged. The Americans, who bore almost sole 
responsibility for financing UNRRA, were adamant that relief shipments would 
have to reflect the logistical possibilities of supply rather than actual demand. A 
second point arose from American concern that each recipient country should make 
the most efficient use of its own resources rather than rely solely on UNRRA aid. 
With the preservation of its gold and foreign exchange reserves, Greece was in a 
uniquely privileged position compared to other occupied countries. Initially, 
UNRRA wished to offer relief supplies free of charge only to countries not in 
possession of foreign exchange, requiring that the rest should at least offer part
67 Kazamias, op.cit., 1992, pp.293-307; Etmektsoglou-Koehn, op.cit., 1995, pp.445-456.
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payment. Varvaressos argued that given the exceptional degree of destruction in 
Greece, the foreign reserves would be essential to supplement reconstruction in 
areas not covered by UNRRA. His argument was accepted in late 1944, and 
Greece was released from the obligation to pay for relief supplies.68
Table 2.5 Major Recipients of UNRRA Aid
Country Total ($m) % of UNRRA total
China 517.8 18.03
Poland 477.9 16.64
__  Italy............. 418.2 14.56
Yugoslavia 415.6 14.47
Greece (a) 351.0 12.23
Czechoslavakia 261.3 9.10
Ukraine 188.2 6.55
Source: O. Woodbridge et a l, The History of the United Nations 
Relief and Rehabilitation Administration. New York: Columbia 
UP. 1950, Vol.HI, p.428 (table 15).
(a) Including the Dodecanese Islands
Table 2.6 Major Components of UNRRA Aid to Greece (a)
Heading Value ($m) % of UNRRA total
Food 181.5 14.75
Grain Products 80.5
Dairy Products 30.3
Meat Products 12.2
Clothing, Textiles & Footwear 33.7 8.04
Finished clothing 10.0
Raw Wool 5.0
Raw Cotton 4.2
Agricultural Rehabilitation 43.4 13.54
Livestock 9.6
Machinery & Tools 6.3
Seeds 5.9
Industrial Rehabilitation 38.6 5.7
Fuels 8.7
Source: Woodbridge, op.cit., 1950, Vol.II, pp.450-453 (tables 37, 38, 
39, 40); pp.462-465 (tables 49, 50, 51, 52); Vol. HI, p.428 (table 15).
(a) Including the Dodecanese Islands --
Until UNRRA commenced operations in Greece in April, 1945, the relief effort 
was carried out under the Military Liaison (ML) programme, financed by the 
American, Canadian and British governments and executed by British forces. 
Under the ML Programme, goods worth a total $27,7m were shipped to Greece, 
including 336,000 tons of food, several thousand tons of industrial raw materials 
and agricultural seeds, together with a thousand vehicles and medical supplies. In 
addition, ML undertook repair work on bridges and public utilities and distributed
68 Politakis, opjcit., 1990, pp.68-80; TE/AKB/B/1, H Apaoig |xou eig xr|v Aioikrfaiv trig 
Tpara£ris Tr|g EXXafog, K. Bapftapeoog, 1953, pp. 14-21.
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huge quantities of footwear and clothing donated by the Red Cross. All items under 
ML were also furnished free of charge.69
Greece was one of the biggest beneficiaries of UNRRA's activities. As table 2.5 
shows, Greece (including the Dodecanese islands, formally incorporated in 1948) 
received goods worth $351m, equivalent to 12.2% of the entire UNRRA 
programme. The shipments included 1,056,000 tons of grain and grain products,
106.000 tons of dairy products, 57,000 tons of sugar, 177,000 tons of fertiliser,
51.000 tons of livestock, 520,000 tons of fuel and lubricants, 76,500 tons of raw 
materials, and 12,700 tons of farm machinery and tools. This compared very 
favourably with the totals for other countries, partly reflecting Greece's position as 
a net importer of food. Greece, with much the smallest population of any of the 
major recipients of UNRRA aid, it received a greater value of food than either 
China or the Ukraine.70
The American and British governments also provided various forms of 
assistance. The British waived the £46m 1940-41 war loan, financed the Greek 
armed forces, which cost about £30m during 1944-47 alone, and extended a series 
of credits, of which the most important was the £10m stabilisation loan of January 
1946. From the United States, Greece received credits worth $115m during the 
same period: the Export-Import Bank loan of $25m, $45m for the purchase of 
American surplus war material in Europe, and another $45m to finance the 
acquisition of 100 Liberty ships to replace Greek merchant shipping lost during the 
war. In addition, various organisations in the United States and Britain raised over 
$13m for relief purposes in Greece.71
In addition to the assistance it was receiving from the Allies, Greece had 
expected to secure huge sums in compensation from the former occupying 
countries. In late 1945, Greek representatives at the Paris Conference on 
Reparations submitted claims amounting to $15.7bn at 1938 prices. Under various 
settlements, Greece was eventually awarded $2.7m from Germany, $105m from 
Italy, and $45m from Bulgaria, all to be paid in kind. The size of the awards 
caused considerable resentment within Greece, where it was felt that the extent of 
the war-time losses had not been acknowledged, and that Greek interests had been
69 Patterson, op.cit., 1948, pp. 157-158; F0371/48333 R12094, Report on Economic 
Conditions in Greece, 31.5.1945, pp.30-31.
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sacrificed to those of the former Axis powers.72 Such beliefs were to persist for 
decades.73
Apart from the reparations issue, however, Greece was relatively fortunate in 
obtaining international assistance on favourable terms. It received a much more 
generous share of UNRRA supplies than many far larger countries, while Allied 
governments were also providing various forms of subsidy and credit. In addition, 
Greece had its war-time debts waived, and was able to receive relief supplies free 
of charge, despite its retention of its pre-war gold and foreign exchange reserves. 
In per capita terms, it obtained more international aid than Britain - and in the Greek 
case almost the entire sum was in the form of grants, in stark contrast to what 
Britain had received 74 Nevertheless, as subsequent chapters will demonstrate, the 
foreign assistance was to prove much less decisive than the donors had hoped. 
Greek politicians persistently complained about the inadequacy of Allied assistance, 
and pressed for further credits and concessions, resisting all calls to mobilise their 
own resources for reconstruction. Much of the aid was put to poor use or even 
wasted, and did little more than allow successive governments in Athens to avoid 
uncomfortable decisions, unnecessarily prolonging ultimate economic recovery.
2.3 Aspects of British Involvement in Greece, 1940-1947
Prior to the mid- 1930s British interests in Greece had been negligible, and owed as 
much to economic as to political considerations. This was to change with the 
escalation of international tension following Mussolini's invasion of Abyssinia. 
For Britain, Greece had little significance in itself, but its geographical location in 
the eastern Mediterranean was important for Imperial communications and defence. 
Anxious to preserve this outpost, the British strove to re-establish a democratic and 
economically solvent Greece which would remain friendly to British interests, and 
safe from the encroachment of the Soviet Union and its allies. To this end, they 
were prepared not only to offer a large degree of moral support and some practical 
assistance, but also to interfere in Greek political life, first by promoting the king, 
and then by seeking to build up a strong Centre in order to neutralise the Far Left. 
As both internal divisions and the economic crisis became more acute, the British 
agonised over the measures necessary to secure their aims, fearing the need to 
assume an almost colonial degree of responsibility to ensure stability. This
72 Patterson, op.cit., 1948, pp.629-631; I. Aajxniprj, 'Ai EjravopOxoaeig eig Tag 2uvftT)Kag', 
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escalation of involvement became increasingly problematic as Britain lurched 
towards its own economic crisis, and by early 1947 London decided to scale down 
an effort which had yielded so few tangible results.
A Vital Imperial Problem
From the Greek point of view, the link with Britain had been of vital importance 
ever since independence. Britain was both Greece's main creditor and the principal 
guarantor of the country's territorial integrity. However, the view from London 
was very different. The British relationship with Greece was the result of two 
interrelated factors: Britain's role as a leading member of the Concert of Europe, 
anxious to prevent any major shift in the balance of power, and its economic 
predominance which made it the world's biggest capital market. The intervention of 
the Great Powers, which helped secure Greek independence and led to the 
guarantee of 1832, was mainly motivated by the desire to prevent Greece from 
falling under the domination of any single power. In essence, the guarantee (which 
was not formally abolished until 1923) was similar to that extended to Belgium 
later in the decade. British concern over Greece was closely correlated to Great 
Power rivalry in the region, and became a major consideration only when events 
threatened to upset the balance of power in the Balkans or the eastern 
Mediterranean.
For Britain, Greece was neither an important market for industrial exports nor a 
significant source of raw materials, and remained a minor trading partner. 
However, Britain's role as the world's banker and pivot of the international 
economy created a long standing interest in Greece because of the latter's frequent 
refusal to honour its foreign debts. As recounted in the previous section, Britain 
was always in the forefront of international efforts to secure a satisfactory 
settlement, playing a major role in the confrontation after 1843, the setting up of the 
IFC and during the interwar loan negotiations.
Thus British involvement in Greek affairs derived from neither philanthropy nor 
even from any great affection for a country which a senior Foreign Office official 
could dismiss as 'backward, extravagant and irresponsible'.75 As another official 
bluntly reminded his colleagues, the British were helping the Greeks solely out of 
'self-interest'.76 For the British, it was the geographical proximity to the eastern 
Mediterranean and the Middle East which gave Greece special importance, and 
were anxious to prevent it from coming under the domination of any third party. 
While the financial aspect gradually lost significance, the political dimensions
75 F0371/58678 R3496, Minute by McNeil, 29.3.1946.
76 F0371/48452 R20925, Lascelles to Hayter, 11.11.1945.
63
assumed unprecedented importance following the international crisis arising out of 
Mussolini's invasion of Abyssinia. For Whitehall, the sole motive was to 
strengthen its ties with potential allies in the Mediterranean to counter the growing 
threat from Fascist Italy. Greece was thus merely one card in a larger British game 
varying between appeasement and containment of Italy. This vacillation of policy 
towards Mussolini, together with the perceived impossibility of resisting any land 
attack on Greece discouraged the British from seeking any formal alliance with 
Athens. Once a more sinister threat - that from Hitler's Germany - emerged in early 
1941, British attention focused on using Greece to build a wider Balkan coalition to 
resist Nazi expansion. The failure of such plans left Greece as Britain's 'last card' 
in the region, an outcome which London had never intended, and one that spelt 
doom for British influence in south-eastern Europe for the foreseeable future.77
Following the swift defeat by the Wehrmacht, British policy concentrated on 
maintaining close links with those Greek institutions which had successfully fled 
the country, and ensuring that British influence would be restored once the Axis 
powers were defeated. To that end, the king and the government were transferred 
to exile in the British-controlled Middle East, while the armed forces served under 
British High Command. Initially, the international aspect of Anglo-Greek relations 
became less important than the problem of the growing political polarisation 
between the Greeks themselves, particularly the increasing importance of EAM- 
ELAS. The seriousness of the internal divisions within Greece was readily 
apparent once it became obvious that the Soviet Union - the natural ally of the 
Communist-led Left - would inevitably become a major player in south-eastern 
Europe following its successes against the Wehrmacht. By May 1944, it was clear 
that the restoration of Greece as a 'British sphere of influence' also necessitated the 
prevention of 'Russian domination' of the country. A series of meetings with 
Soviet officials sought to obtain Moscow's recognition of British predominance in 
post-liberation Greece, a task given greater urgency by the Red Army’s occupation 
of Bulgaria. The aim was finally achieved in October 1944, when without the 
knowledge of the Greeks, Churchill and Stalin signed the notorious percentages 
agreement, amounting to a partition of the Balkans into respective spheres of 
influence.78
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Shortly afterwards the British acted to safeguard what they came to regard as 
their 'outpost in South-Eastern Europe'.79 They established a physical presence in 
Greece soon after the German withdrawal, in the form of an expeditionaiy force of
10,000 troops sent in with the National Unity Government in order to forestall any 
attempt to establish a Communist regime.80 Although the War Office spoke of the 
assumption that an entiy into Greece would be 'solely for the purpose of relief,81 
it is hard to believe that other considerations played no part Even if the presence of 
a disciplined military contingent was necessary for the efficient distribution of relief 
supplies, its commander Lt-General Ronald Scobie was formally accorded the right 
to 'exercise supreme responsibility and authority' not only in the war zone, but also 
in the event of any 'serious state of disorder'.82 With the widening of the chasm 
between the Communists and other groupings after liberation, the possibility that 
the expeditionary force would be called upon to fight grew increasingly likely. This 
did indeed happen in December 1944, when British troops engaged in bitter clashes 
with ELAS guerrillas in Athens. By the end of January 1945, the British presence 
in Greece totalled over 75,000 men.83
Before long, the suspicion that Stalin was no longer intending to honour his part 
of the bargain created the prospect of a far more serious conflict. Although the 
British doubted whether the Soviets were willing to 'risk an open clash', it was 
taken for granted that Moscow would 'take advantage’ of any weakening of 
Britain's influence in Greece, possibly by sponsoring aggressive moves by its 
Balkan satellites, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria. Any such developments would 
inevitably undermine Turkey, with serious implications for the entire Middle East. 
London was convinced that its military presence was the only factor preventing 
such a disaster. To help deter the Communist threat, the British , who had steadily 
been withdrawing their own forces, undertook to build up a 100,000 strong Greek 
army.84 The key role of the remaining British military presence was even more 
keenly felt in Athens, where ambassador Sir Reginald Leeper predicted that the
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country would fall under the 'bondage of the Kremlin' if such support was 
withdrawn. Increasingly, the British came to see the 'Greek problem’ as primarily 
one of 'Anglo-Russian relations'.85 As the international political climate continued 
to deteriorate, it was the growing fears of Soviet expansionism, coupled with 
London's obvious inability to counter the Communist threat alone, which finally 
brought in the Americans as a serious player in Greek affairs.
The 'Choice of Evils'
The British desire to restore their influence in post-liberation Greece inevitably led 
to a considerable degree of interference in the country's internal affairs. This had 
not been necessary before World War II. While the British had played no part in 
the creation of the Metaxas dictatorship and felt no particular affection for it, they 
could be reasonably pleased with a regime which was essentially pro-British, and 
accordingly lent their support.86
As the war progressed, the direction in which Greek society was moving under 
Axis occupation presented particular problems for British long-term aims. With the 
radicalisation of the populace and the rapid growth of the organised Left, it became 
increasingly obvious that the institutions in exile - the monarch and the discredited 
remnants of the old regime - could not easily return after liberation without some 
degree of social friction. For the British, slow to understand the nature and extent 
of the changes within Greece, and supremely convinced of their own correct 
appreciation of the situation, most of 1943-44 was taken up with the burning issues 
of the future of the king and the composition of the first post-liberation 
government.
Even before World War II, the Anglophile George II had been the cornerstone 
of British attention in Greece, a view reinforced by Churchill, both a close friend of 
the king and an admirer of constitutional monarchy as the ideal form of 
government. Thus in Whitehall, the restoration of the king as the 'indisputable 
guardian' of the 'British connection' seemed the most obvious avenue to restore 
British influence in post-war Greece.87 Such thinking, based on the assumption 
that the majority of Greeks genuinely desired the king's return after liberation, 
undoubtedly involved either a 'gross misinterpretation' of the facts or a 'serious
85 F0371/48276 R13082, Leeper to Sargent, 2.8.1945 (Enclosure: Note by Sir R. Leeper on 
the Present Situation in Greece, 2.8.1945); F0371/58678 R3496, Leeper to Sargent, 
27.2.1946; F0371/58680 R4219, Athens to FO, Telegram no.59, 1.3.1946.
86 Koliopoulos, op.cit., 1977, pp.295-296.
87 T. Sfikas, 'People at the Top Can Do These Things, which Others Can't Do: Winston 
Churchill and the Greeks, 1940-45', Journal of Contemporary History, 26, 1991, pp.311- 
312.
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self-deception'.88 The British stubbornly stuck to their original policy despite 
hostility from republican politicians and representatives of the resistance within 
Greece. Not until the summer of 1944 was it widely accepted that the king should 
remain abroad until a new plebiscite could be staged.89
The British genuinely believed that the post-liberation Greek government should 
be more representative, and that the old dictatorship should not be restored. 
However, officials in Whitehall failed to foresee the rapid rise of the organised Left 
under EAM, and eventually became worried that the movement might seize power 
after the German withdrawal. At first, they hoped that EAM could be weakened by 
enticing away its more moderate elements. By the spring of 1944, it was clear that 
this was unlikely to succeed, and a new approach sought to embrace EAM in a 
coalition government. The organisation could thus be partly neutralised if it 
accepted, or ostracised and isolated if it refused.90
The desire to prevent a Communist take-over remained paramount in British 
thinking long after liberation. Thus the various moves against EAM have 
dominated the attention of later historians, who have sought to present the British 
as largely responsible for both the civil war and the coming to power of the 
Right91 The reality was much more complex. In 1945, in a discussion concerning 
the future of the monarchy, a senior embassy official bemoaned the fact that the 
British were faced by a 'choice of evils'92 This statement could be applied to most 
of the dilemmas confronting the British in their dealings with Greek politics during 
1944-47. Whitehall's determination to ensure a friendly government in Athens free 
from Communist domination was never synonymous with uncritical support for 
the Right. By the end of 1944, the Labour partners in the coalition could hardly be 
unaware of the strength of grassroots feeling condemning the apparent suppression 
of the Left in favour of the reactionary Right. Calls to the Labour party to prevent a 
right-wing domination of Greece continued to flood in throughout the whole 
crisis.93 Leeper needed no such urgings. Bemoaning the impotence of the Centre
88 Papastratis, op.cit., 1984, p.91.
89 For exhaustive studies of British thinking on this matter, see Papastratis, op.cit., 1984, 
Chapters 2,5; Alexander, op.cit., 1982, Chapter L
90 Papastratis, op.cit., 1984, pp. 219-224.
91 For an expansion of this view, see especially T. Sfikas, The British Labour Government and 
the Greek Civil War 1945-1949: the Imperialism of 'Non-Intervention'. Keele: Rybum 
Publishing, Keele UP, 1994.
92 FG371/48277 R14008, Caccia to Sargent, 14.8.1945.
93 For several such appeals from constituency parties and trade union branches, see National 
Museum of Labour History, Manchester Labour Party Archives, International Department, 
Correspondence on Greece Boxes 2,3.
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as Greece’s 'great weakness', he consistently sought to build up a Third Force' - a 
moderate Centre - in the hope that a gradual return to economic normality would 
steer a radicalised population away from political extremism.94 Increasingly fearing 
the Right as much as they did the Left, the British endeavoured to prevent Greece 
from turning either 'Communist, or Fascist'.95
To this end, Leeper was instrumental in propping up a series of ineffectual 
provisional governments dominated by republicans and moderates, anxious that 
some stability be achieved before the all important elections and plebiscite on the 
future of the monarchy. He claimed that everything possible had been done to stop 
public opinion 'swinging too far to the Right',96 and the British even 
acknowledged that they had lost much right-wing support by demonstrating they 
had not fought a 'left-wing terrorist dictatorship' simply to hand over power to the 
'opposite extreme'.97 However, they were aware that their efforts to bolster the 
Centre had been a failure.98 In such circumstances, the main beneficiaries of 
British intervention were the parties of the Right. Following their electoral victory 
of March 1946, Whitehall was forced to extend support to a grouping which was 
certainly not to their taste. Nevertheless, they were hardly in a position to withdraw 
their backing from a government with a popular mandate, even when the new 
regime embarked upon distinctly undemocratic and unconstitutional measures 
against its left-wing opponents.
Even if the British frequently demonstrated an apparent short-sightedness, it 
would be unfair to accord them sole responsibility for the outcome of developments 
in Athens. Despite their substantial influence in the country's internal affairs, it is 
rather naive to assume that they were automatically in a position to impose their will 
on specific issues. There is no doubt that by the time Greece was liberated, the 
British held 'exceptional power' in a country that was little more than a 'British 
protectorate', with Leeper behaving more like a 'colonial governor1 than a normal 
diplomat.99 However, the British ability to dictate the course of events should not 
be overstated. While Leeper could wield considerable influence over the
94 Sir R. Leeper, When Greek Meets Greek. London: Chatto and Windus, 1950, p.209; 
Alexander, op.cit., 1982, p.64; N. Clive, 'British Policy Alternatives in Greece', in L. 
Baerentzen, J.O. Iatrides, O.L. Smith (eds.), Studies in the History of the Greek Civil War 
1945-1949. Copenhagen: Museum Tusculanum Press, 1987, p.214.
95 F0371/58804 R14062, Norton to Bevin, 12.9.1946.
96 F0371/58677 R3338, Leeper to Bevin, 22.2.1946.
97 FO371/58680 R4219, Athens to FO, Telegram no.59, 1.3.1946 (Enclosure: Political 
Summary 1945, p.6).
98 FRUS, Vol.VII, 1946. Rankin to the Secretary of State, 28.2.1946, p. 116.
99 Clive, op.cit., 1987, pp. 213-214.
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composition of cabinets, and could invariably prevail upon individual ministers to 
agree in principle to various measures, it was a vastly different matter when it came 
to persuading the Greeks either to implement unpopular policies or to abandon 
favoured policies. This will be demonstrated time and time again in the narrative on 
economic developments between 1944-47, and was also valid for most of the 
major political issues during the period. As an example, far from acquiescing in the 
White Terror, the British protested with depressing regularity without any success 
in changing the policy.100
A final recurring feature of British policy in Greece was the reluctance to accept 
the fact that the extent of the country's political polarisation minimised receptivity to 
orthodox economic advice. The British consistently believed that the solution of the 
economic crisis had to take priority over political differences and felt certain that the 
public could be galvanised by a resolute government stance. They frequently 
criticised successive ministers for neglecting the propaganda and publicity aspects 
of the fight against inflation. In May 1945, Leeper believed that it was enough for 
the government to 'explain the facts plainly to the public',101 and reminded 
Admiral Voulgaris of the mobilising effect of Churchill's 'blood and sweat and 
tears' speech.102 Later that autumn, another British official was surprised that the 
Varvaressos programme should be attracting such hostility, precisely when the 
country should 'so obviously be pulling together1.103 Nevertheless, from the 
Greek perspective, nothing was so obvious, as comparisons with war-time Britain 
were of doubtful validity. A 'blood and sweat and tears' speech might well have 
galvanised public opinion in the autumn of 1940, when the nation stood united in 
the face of a single external threat. It was clearly inadequate in 1945, when the 
removal of the occupying forces had left a country tom by internal divisions. 
Severe political polarisation, aggravated by the experience of the occupation, had 
left little consensus as to Greece's future.
Perhaps the real failure of British involvement in Greece was that despite 
apparently holding all the keys to an acceptable solution, the outcome proved so 
unsatisfactory. It was an unfortunate consequence of internal Greek politics that the 
natural supporters of an anti-Communist policy - the Right and the Centre - proved 
such unattractive allies. The Centre, which the British cultivated so assiduously,
100 A recent study has shown that the British Police Mission genuinely sought to create an 
impartial demilitarised and depoliticized police force, but was ineffective in the face of 
interference from successive ministers and the extremist anti-Communist stance of the 
leadership of the Greek security services; Mazower, op.cit., 1997, pp. 143-146.
101 T236/1044, Athens to FO, Telegram no.1242, 25.5.1945.
102 FG371/48330 R7924, Athens to FO, Telegram no. 1108, 4.5.1945.
103 FOS71/48336 R17044, EAC(45) 7th Meeting, 25.8.1945.
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lacked both credibility and vision, while the Right demonstrated timidity, small- 
mindedness and a ruthlessness matching that of the Communists. That the British 
should have sought to neutralise the Far Left - first as an alien, undemocratic force, 
and later as a potential agent of a Soviet take-over - should not come as a surprise, 
but perhaps the real tragedy was that earlier developments in Greek politics - which 
the British had done nothing to oppose - had left so few of the country's 
progressive elements committed to genuine democracy.
British insistence on promoting their own view of the future Greece invariably 
contained a great deal of arrogance, but if the only apparent alternative was a 
Greece in the Soviet orbit, then the eventual outcome - unsatisfactory as it was - 
probably justified the effort. With hindsight, the likelihood that the country would 
fall into the Communist bloc seems debatable, but it was genuinely felt at the time. 
The experience of the Soviet satellites after 1945 suggests that almost anything was 
preferable to the fate of the so-called 'peoples' democracies'. Whether British 
determination to maintain a sphere of influence in the world of the Atlantic Charter 
and the newly created United Nations smacks of a certain hypocrisy is beyond the 
scope of this work, but it would be disingenuous to single out the British as the 
chief villain of the post-war worid.
As already noted, the Anglo-Greek connection throughout this period typified 
the unequal relations between a major power with global interests and a minor state 
preoccupied with its own more limited considerations. The relationship was 
permeated with frequent misunderstandings, usually resulting from a Greek failure 
to comprehend the wider nature of British interests, with an according 
overestimation of the importance London placed on Greece. The British were 
invariably guilty of failing to keep their Greek clients informed of the exact nature 
of their aims and actions. The secret percentages agreement was only the most 
blatant example of a tendency to take major decisions without the knowledge of 
those most concerned. The British approach was both well-meaning and essentially 
selfish, being based on the assumption that a parliamentary democracy and close 
links with Britain were in the country's best interests. Nevertheless, it was also 
marked by a dismal failure to perceive the true nature of political developments 
within Greece, and an arrogant belief in the righteousness of its actions.
* * *
Despite the determination to retain a Greece friendly to imperial interests, the 
British were never keen to assume a wider degree of formal responsibility for the 
country. This had been a problem even before World War II, when Metaxas had 
sought a concrete alliance, in contrast with the close but informal collaboration 
which the British had preferred. The unwillingness to commit scarce land forces to
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an essentially indefensible territory reduced the real value of any help which the 
British could offer. The policy remained in force after the outbreak of war and the 
Italian invasion, and was reversed only after it became clear that the Germans were 
preparing to attack Greece. Even then, the policy shift derived from the hope to 
cement a common Balkan front against the Axis threat rather than a desire to save 
Greece alone.104 The British refusal to enter into any wider formal commitment 
continued during the occupation, when a Greek request for a post-war political 
alliance was turned down as 'premature'. Instead, the British opted for a standard 
military agreement on the lines of those already signed with the other governments 
in exile.105
The issue became more complicated after liberation, as the British sponsored 
governments in Athens were clearly unable to restore economic stability. This 
undermined Whitehall's political aims and exacerbated the Communist threat from 
both within and without. Initially hopeful that Greece would recover quickly, the 
British were not only unable to free themselves from financial obligations taken on 
for the duration of the war, but also became drawn ever deeper into the country's 
internal affairs. Both problems caused considerable unease within Whitehall: the 
former proved particularly costly at a time when Britain's own balance of payments 
situation approached disaster, while the latter generated fears that the British would 
have to assume extensive responsibility for a situation they felt they could do little 
to change.
The 'Clear Conflict': Security vs. Finance
Even before the defeat of Germany, London sought to disengage from its 1942 
undertaking to equip and maintain the Greek armed forces. In practical terms, the 
military agreement had obliged Britain to pay for these forces for as long as they 
remained under British High Command. However, political and economic 
considerations within Greece were to prolong the commitment far beyond the scope 
of the original treaty. As early as January 1945, Leeper had complained of the 
'anomaly' that the British were still paying for repatriated units, which were now 
rightly the responsibility of the Athens government.106 At first, beset with 
economic problems, the latter sought a loan to enable Greece to assume the
104Koliopoulos, op.cit., 1977, pp. 296-300.
105 II, nooiotcrcpaTTig, AutfaojiaxiKa napacncrjvici xr|g YjiaypcuJrrjg rrjg HxpcmamKTig 2up<f>omag 
Bpexawiag-EXXaSag crxig 9 Mapxiou 1942, Mvrjpcov, 7, 1978-1979:174-182; Papastratis, 
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burden.107 However, Whitehall rejected both the continuation of subventions and 
the prospect of a loan, and the Greeks were duly informed.108 Despite the finality 
of this statement, nothing came out of this. The extent of the British commitment 
was brought up again in early May, when the Treasury sought clarification of many 
aspects of what had become an extremely confused issue.109 Following 
consultations with the Foreign and War Offices, it was decided that London should 
complete the initial equipping of a new Greek army, up to 100,000 strong, but that 
the Athens government should assume the costs of subsequent maintenance from 
the beginning of June. This was endorsed by the Cabinet, although the date on 
which payments would cease was left open.110
At this point, final decisions were complicated by the intervention of the British 
embassy in Athens, which warned of the likely internal and regional consequences 
of any withdrawal of funding. Harold Caccia, who took charge of the Embassy 
during Leeper's stay in London, feared that the Greeks could not readily afford to 
finance their own armed forces, and that it was politically inopportune to force 
them to do so at a time when Varvaressos was staging a 'desperate fight' to save 
the economy.111 Sir Quintin Hill, Leeper's financial adviser, added that the request 
would be akin to asking the government to commit financial and political suicide, 
and would send potentially disastrous signals to the country's northern 
neighbours.112 Still reeling from the sudden termination of Lend-Lease, Whitehall 
was adamant that the funding had to cease, but conceded that the Greeks should be 
given an indication of this decision rather than be simply presented with a date.113 
However, after the resignation of Varvaressos in early September, the Foreign 
Office admitted it would be impossible to press the Greeks on the matter given the 
likelihood of total political and economic collapse in Athens. Even so, the need to 
take action was still clear, while the Foreign Office suggested that the payments
107 F0371/48326 R1719, Athens to FO, Telegram no. 18 Remac, 22.1.1945.
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should stop at the end of the year, the Treasury warned that the British should lose 
no time in ridding themselves of the 'burden'.114
By late October, it was obvious that things could not be put off any longer. 
Overruling warnings from Leeper, the British duly informed the Greeks that the 
subventions would cease as of January 1, 1946.115 The response was predictable. 
Professor Grigorios Kasimatis, the minister of finance, warned that the news 
would have an 'exceptionally unpleasant' effect on public opinion, while both the 
regent and Tsouderos, the minister of coordination, felt that the burden would be 
impossible to bear.116 The latter complained of the 'irreparable' damage which 
would result from the decision, and stressed that the additional expenses would 
bankrupt the country, given the already huge demands of balancing the budget and 
reconstruction.117
With the arrival of 1946, the deadline was quietly forgotten, and the subventions 
continued without a break. Tsouderos was informed that the British were not 
prepared to foot the whole bill for 1946, but was given vague promises that some 
assistance would be forthcoming.118 The concessions inevitably reawakened 
conflicting views on the whole issue, with added urgency arising from the 
seriousness of Britain's own balance of payments crisis. By this time, the 
Chancellor was issuing dire warnings to minimise the difficulties by avoiding all 
non-essential outlays abroad, while Treasury officials predicted an imminent 
plunge in the British standard of living unless the Foreign Office halted its 'political 
overseas expenditure'.119
Such gloomy forecasts cut little ice with the Chiefs of Staff, for whom the 
answer was clear: given the strategic importance of Greece, a necessary defence 
effort had to be maintained, and as the Greeks could not afford this the British had
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no choice but to keep up their payments.120 While not disagreeing with the 
strategic priorities, both the Foreign Office and the Treasury felt little enthusiasm 
for such recommendations. They pointed out that Whitehall was itself unable to 
afford the sums involved, and that as the maintenance of a 100,000 strong 
establishment was clearly beyond everybody's means, a force half that size would 
surely be more appropriate.121 Unsurprisingly, the Chiefs of Staff were 
unimpressed. They dismissed the proposed reductions, which they claimed would 
destroy both the operational effectiveness and the deterrence value of the Greek 
armed forces. Moreover, they stressed that the overall savings from such a move 
would be more illusory than real, as British troops would have to prolong their stay 
in the country if the Greek army was not brought up to the necessary strength.122
Such discussions typify the fundamental British dilemma: the choice between 
security and financial considerations.123 Unless the British paid for a substantial 
Greek force, they would have to retain their own military presence in the country, 
which would not only prove equally expensive, but would also complicate 
negotiations over a general Balkan settlement. Given the continuing uncertainties, 
London could do little more than propose a review of the situation after the 
elections.124 Within weeks, it was being suggested that the review should take 
place at the end of the summer.125 By now, it was apparent that the British felt 
unable to resolve the 'clear conflict' between their 'strategic requirements' in 
Greece and the 'financial aspect' of the commitment126 However, it was equally 
obvious that the Greeks were facing their own dilemma: the choice between 
'having an army' and 'economic ruin'.127 A decision was finally prompted by the 
repeated urgings of the British representatives in Athens, who warned that the 
Greeks were clearly unable to pay for anything more than a token force.128 In such
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121 FQ371/58673 R1992, Minute by Laskey, 11.2.1946; Minute by Williams, 13.2.1946; 
FG371/58673 R1992, Waley to Hayter, 14.2.1946; F0371/58673 R1992, Hayter to Waley, 
20.2.1946; FQ371/58673 R1992, Sargent to Hollis, 20.2.1946.
122 F0371/58679 R3861, Stapleton to Sargent, 11.3.1946.
123 F0371/58681 R4711, Minute by Hayter, 14.3.1946.
124 FQ371/58683 R5167, D.O. (46) 43, 25.3.1946.
125 FQ371/58688 R6515, Waley to Warner, 23.4.1946.
126 F0371/58688 R6515, Warner to Waley, 30.4.1946.
127 F0371/58766 R4847, Tsouderos to Sargent, 15.3.1946.
128 F0371/58766 R6356, Norton to Sargent, 15.4.1946; F0371/58766 R6356, Summary of 
Comments on M. Tsouderos' Letter to Sir Orme Sargent of 15th March; F0371/58766 
R7246, Norton to Sargent, 8.5.1946; F0371/58729 R7947, Athens to FO, Telegram 
no.1201, 27.5.1946.
74
circumstances, Whitehall eventually agreed to prolong its payments until the end of 
March 1947.129
The 'Second Egypt1
Given the British dismay over the prolongation of temporary war-time 
commitments, it is hardly surprising that the prospect of assuming additional 
responsibilities in Greece seemed particularly unattractive to many Whitehall 
officials. Such anxieties lay behind the rejection of an early ML proposal to attach 
British advisers to various ministries in Athens.130 However, by the spring of 
1945, following the signing of the Varkiza agreement, London decided to expand 
British involvement by creating new bodies to help consolidate government 
authority. These were advisory missions designed to reorganise the armed forces 
and security services.131 Thus, despite the disbanding of the ML, which was to be 
superseded by UNRRA in April 1945, most of its non-relief functions and much of 
its personnel were transferred to the British embassy.
While the temporary necessity for a large Allied establishment had seemed 
acceptable in the transitional period after liberation, the maintenance of a sizeable 
British presence after the handover to the civilians caused substantial doubts within 
the Treasury. Its officials worried that the British commitment appeared to have 
escalated rather than diminished, and bemoaned the fact that Whitehall had chosen 
to become 'involved up to the hilt'. They felt that given the open-ended nature of 
the new arrangement, there was no clearly defined limit of British liability. 
Moreover, they observed that the potential price of failure was continuing to rise: 
while inflation was increasing the cost of maintaining British forces in the country, 
the growing possibility of civil unrest would inevitably involve additional troops 
and expenditure. They feared that if the situation collapsed Britain would certainly 
be blamed, and would probably be expected to play a major role in financing Greek 
reconstruction.132
It was not only the size of the new establishment which generated disquiet 
within Treasury circles. The exact functions and powers were issues requiring 
clearer definition. Officials questioned the wisdom of maintaining advisers without 
obtaining any assurance that their counsel would be heeded by the Greeks, and
129 CAB 128/5, Cabinet 54 (46), 3.6.1946; FQ371/58814 R11052, D.O. (46) 91, 22.7.1946.
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warned that Britain might find itself held responsible for any failure to solve the 
crisis, while having no real power to enforce the implementation of appropriate 
measures. It was felt that London had to make a definite choice: either to scale 
down the commitment to Athens or to become more effectively involved. Without 
real power to act, it was likely the British would end up with 'all the blame and the 
bills' if the situation could not be saved.133
The anxieties were temporarily allayed during the summer of 1945, when it 
seemed that Varvaressos would be able to restore stability. However, once such 
hopes evaporated, calls for a further escalation of British involvement were 
renewed. In September, Leeper felt that action to end the crisis was 'beyond the 
capacities' of the government, and suggested that in co-operation with UNRRA, 
the British should consider a 'much closer' degree of 'control' over the 'Greek 
economic administration'. In addition, he proposed that a special mission be sent to 
help reorganise the country's civil service. This met with a frosty response in 
Whitehall, which had consistently shied away from such calls to take on additional 
responsibilities. In recent months, the Foreign Office had been reluctant to accede 
to requests that the military and police missions should assume executive powers. 
The latest suggestion from Leeper seemed to go even further, causing officials to 
warn of the dangers of moving down a 'slippery slope', as this would inevitably 
end in 'turning Greece into a second Egypt'. Amid fears that the British would be 
'saddled with the blame' for the 'shortcomings’ of the Greeks, Leeper's ideas were 
rejected.134
Such misgivings were soon overtaken by events, as the Greek economy 
deteriorated rapidly during the following months. The growing likelihood of total 
economic collapse, threatening to neutralise all British efforts to maintain political 
stability, soon overrode the fear of the 'slippery slope'. The British launched a 
series of broader initiatives culminating in the London Agreement of January 1946, 
which amounted to a degree of control over several aspects of Greek economic life. 
Inevitably, this involved a greater responsibility for the country’s future. Thus 
within months of dismissing suggestions for a moderate degree of supervision in 
conjunction with an international agency, the British single-handedly took on an 
even more extensive commitment. Such a solution, almost approaching a 'second 
Egypt’, was the price London had to pay in order to secure the kind of Greece 
which accorded with wider British interests. It had become clear that the price
133 Ibid.
134 Alexander, op.cit., 1982, pp.92, 119-121; T236/1046, Athens to FO, Telegram no. 1959, 
25.9.1945; F0371/48282 R16628, Athens to FO, Telegram no. 1982, 28.9.1945; 
F0371/48282 R16720, Minute by Hayter, 3.10.1945; F0371/48282 R16628, FO to 
Athens, Telegram no.2071, 10.10.1945.
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would spiral still further unless the venture was successful, while the political costs 
of failure would have been inordinately higher in terms of lost prestige.135
Nevertheless, this policy shift was not embraced with equal enthusiasm by all 
sections of the British establishment. Officials at the Treasury and the Bank of 
England clung tenaciously to the orthodox anti-inflation line, dismissing any other 
consideration as secondary. The initiatives which led to the London Agreement 
came from the politicians and the diplomats, rather than the economists. The 
decision to widen the British commitment came firmly from Ernest Bevin, secretary 
of state for foreign affairs, and his department. With Greece sliding towards 
disaster, Foreign Office officials became exasperated by the Treasury emphasis on 
budgetary measures. Leeper warned London not to take a 'narrow financial view' 
of what was essentially a political matter and poured scorn on the idea that a 
'bankrupt state' could be 'braced into becoming solvent'.136 By this time, even 
some Treasury representatives were coming around to such views, with one 
eminent expert criticising the constant strictures on budget austerity as akin to 
'telling a beggar [...] to live within his income'.137 However, most financial 
experts were unwilling parties to the packages which resulted from the Bevin 
initiative. Horrified by any suggestion that balancing the budget could be anything 
but top priority, they were unconvinced that any other solution could be successful, 
and felt that financially unsound measures had been dictated by the wider agenda of 
the politicians.138 The most notable example occurred in early 1946 when the size 
of the British loan to back the latest stabilisation plan was doubled as a result of 
Foreign Office pressure. The only purpose of this move, which cost the Exchequer 
£5m, was to make the London Agreement more palatable to the Greeks. With 
wider interests at stake, Foreign Office considerations were allowed to override the 
cautious orthodoxy of the Treasury.139
The arrangements which resulted from the London Agreement marked the high 
point of British involvement in Greece. As in the summer of 1945, optimism that
135 FO371/58720 R531, Athens to FO, Telegram no.75, 10.1.1946. Other possibilities mooted 
at the time included the incorporation of Greece into either the Empire or the 
Commonwealth. Even Leeper seriously recommended the granting of 'Dominion status' as 
the most satisfactory guarantee of Greek independence and stability. Unsurprisingly, such 
suggestions met with a frigid response from Foreign Office officials; F0371/58678 R3496, 
Leeper to Sargent, 27.2.1946; F0371/58678 R3496, Minute by Hayter, 8.3.1946; 
F0371/58678 R3496, Minute by Warner, 11.3.1946; F0371/58678 R3496, Minute by 
McNeil, 29.3.1946.
136 F0371/48289 R21543, Athens to FO, Telegram no.2573, 27.12.1945; FO371/58720 R531, 
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137 T236/1048, The Greek Currency Problem, F. Leith-Ross, 11.12.1945.
138 T236/1049, Minute by Eady, 10.1.1946.
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solutions might still be attainable temporarily quietened fears about the extent of the 
commitment. However, when the relative ineffectiveness of British efforts became 
fully apparent, dissenting voices were raised once again. In August 1946, the head 
of the British Economic Mission (BEM) - the main institution arising out of the 
London Agreement - complained that the body he chaired had not only achieved 
little so far, but would be unlikely to achieve anything in the future unless it 
assumed yet more extensive powers and responsibilities. Refusing even to consider 
such a possibility, he recommended instead a winding down of British 
involvement. Although the Foreign Office dismissed the suggestions as 
unsatisfactory and 'extremely defeatist', it also rejected the opposite view: as both 
the Americans and international agencies were beginning to show an interest in 
Greek affairs, there was no longer a need to contemplate any further escalation of 
the British role.140
The internal disagreements over the extent of the commitment to Greece 
highlight the torturous course of British attempts to deal with the country's 
problems. While London never lost sight of the desirability of retaining its 'outpost 
in South-Eastern Europe', there was little consensus as to how this was to be 
achieved. Instead of a single monolithic stance, Whitehall adopted a whole series of 
policies reflecting both the differing preoccupations of its departments and its latest 
perceptions of the Greek situation. Thus, an essentially consistent strategy was 
accompanied by frequent and substantial shifts in tactics. These changes in 
emphasis, invariably responding to developments within Greece, created much 
friction not only between various ministries, but also between the civilians and the 
military. While the war lasted, alternative viewpoints were understandably 
subordinated to the overriding aim of achieving victory. However, different 
perspectives soon resurfaced to generate endless complications for British decision­
makers. Inevitably, the concerns of some British agents were often divergent from 
- and even contradictory to - those of their colleagues in other departments. 
Whereas the Foreign Office naturally saw matters in the grandest of terms, 
emphasising international relations and Britain's place in the world, British 
representatives in Athens had to be exceptionally sensitive to the most minute of 
changes in the Greek psychological climate. The Treasury was primarily concerned 
with demands on the public purse and the need for sound fiscal policies, while the 
Chiefs of Staff were preoccupied with the practicalities of maintaining a force 
capable of deterring Communist aggression. Unsurprisingly, each agency's 
preoccupation with its own remit led to suggestions which were anathema to
140 FO371/58803 R13630, The Future of the British Economic Mission to Greece, Lt-General 
Clark, 30.8.1946; FO371/58803 R13630, Minute by Williams, 20.9.1946; FO371/58803 
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officials elsewhere in Whitehall. The two examples mentioned above - the Foreign 
Office insistence on sacrificing £5m as a psychological gesture to Greek public 
opinion, and the joint Treasury/Foreign Office initiative to save money by halving 
the Greek army must have provoked sighs of exasperation amongst those 
responsible for the prosecution of sound fiscal and defence policies.
It would be an oversimplification to claim that all policy disagreements within 
Whitehall arose from the 'clear conflict' between the need to maintain Britain's 
international standing and its growing economic inability to keep up its world-wide 
commitments. After all, although the Foreign Office and the Treasury squabbled 
frequently on these issues, they readily moved close to a common front against the 
Chiefs of Staff. Nevertheless, as the financial restraints became more acute, they 
played an increasingly central role in the heated debates over the need to withdraw 
from Greece. Before the severity of the post-war balance of payments crisis was 
understood, the Foreign Office still thought of Britain as a world power and acted 
accordingly. However, it rapidly became increasingly difficult to justify extensive 
British involvement in Greece given the depressing combination of economic 
difficulties at home, the apparent futility of efforts undertaken so far, and 
continuing uncertainty over the American commitment to the prevention of 
Communist expansion within Europe.
The Decision to Withdraw Aid
To understand the growing British misgivings over foreign commitments, it is 
necessary to appreciate the country's precarious economic situation after 1945. 
Britain had emerged from the war impoverished and close to bankruptcy, as the 
cumulative balance of payments deficits since 1939 had created unprecedented 
levels of debt. Exports had dwindled to a third of pre-war levels as industry 
switched to war production, while invisible earnings, which had once financed 
35% of imports, had also suffered following the loss of half of the country's 
merchant fleet and the sale of over a quarter of overseas investments. Despite the 
Lend-Lease and other arrangements, a total wartime balance of payments shortfall 
of £10bn had left international debts worth over £3.5bn by the end of 1945. This 
was the largest external debt in history, far in excess of anything incurred by any 
other belligerent, and dwarfed the gold and dollar reserves worth a mere 
£600m.141
141 Sir A. Caimcross, 'Reconversion, 1945-51', in N.F.R. Crafts and N.W.C. Woodward (eds.), 
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To make matters worse, there was little hope for any rapid improvement in the 
immediate post-war period. Until industry could be reorientated to peacetime 
production, exports would remain insufficient to prevent further balance of 
payments deficits. Coupled with the diminished returns from invisibles, and the 
need to service the huge external debt, it was predicted that exports would have to 
rise by 15% over pre-war levels, while maintaining strict controls over imports, to 
close the gap. This was not likely to occur for at least three years, by which time 
the balance of payments would have deteriorated by a further £1.25bn. Even this 
gloomy prediction contained several optimistic assumptions.142
The wartime mobilisation of resources, which had led to such levels of 
indebtedness, had only been possible thanks to the availability of Lend-Lease from 
the United States. Britain had relied on earlier assurances that such support would 
continue through the crucial post-war period, but the abrupt termination of Lend- 
Lease in August 1945 left the British economy in an extremely vulnerable position. 
Given the desperate urgency to obtain dollars to pay for vital imports from North 
America, breathing space was secured only by recourse to a new American loan 
worth $3.75bn, topped by a further $1.25bn lent by Canada. The loan had been 
conditional on making sterling fully convertible in mid-1947, three years earlier 
than the British had expected. The brief episode of convertibility had disastrous 
effects on Britain's foreign reserves, and only the first receipts of Marshall Aid in 
1948 stemmed the drain. Despite an impressive recovery, the country's external 
position did not approach normality until 1951, and continued to suffer occasional 
crises thereafter.143
Such were the considerations that dominated the Treasury and the Chancellor. 
Hugh Dalton had been the main opponent of the extension of military subsidies to 
Greece and was insistent that Britain was in no position to maintain a high level of 
foreign commitments. However, political considerations still carried much weight. 
In December 1946, the Chiefs of Staff re-emphasised Britain's strategic interests in 
Greece, but stated that American help was 'essential' to defeat the guerrillas. 
Thereafter, the decision as to future actions in Greece became inextricably linked 
with the question of Washington's future intentions. The subsequent negotiations 
between British and American representatives will be described more fully in 
chapter 6, but disagreements within the cabinet continued to confuse the British 
stance. In late January, Dalton had demanded that Greece be abandoned, but no- 
one in the Foreign Office appeared to share this view. In mid-February following 
further pressure from Dalton, Bevin was apparently won over. On February 21 the
142 Caimcross, op.cit., 1991, pp.26-27; Pollard, op.cit., 1992, pp. 193-194.
143 Caimcross, op.cit., 1991, pp.27-32; Pollard, op.cit., 1992, pp. 193-199.
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Americans were informed (hat the British could not extend their commitment 
beyond the end of March. This decision was not revoked, and apart from interim 
payments worth £6m the British commitment was scaled down rapidly. Within 
months, the British role in Greece was passed to the Americans.144
The sudden volte-face of the British withdrawal has been interpreted in many 
ways. Some have suspected that Bevin used the Greek issue to force the hand of 
the Americans and thus launch the cold war, but this cannot be proved, and is in 
any case beyond the scope of this thesis. As Frazier points out, much remains 
unclear as to the exact reasons for the decision to withdraw, and the relative weight 
of political, strategic and economic factors is impossible to assess.145 The 
decisions of February 1947 brought an abrupt end to a policy in which the British 
had invested large sums of money and immense amounts of time. The escalating 
cost of the British involvement in Greece, coupled with the disappointing results 
the policy had yielded, must have suggested that little improvement could be 
expected, and must have given weight to Attlee's remark that Greece was not 
'worth the candle'.146
144 Frazier, op.cit., 1991, Chapter 8.
145 Ibid., p. 132.
146 FO800/475/ME/46/22, Attlee to Bevin, 1.12.1946.
3 'DELAY AND INDECISION'
The legacy of occupation ensured that the returning National Unity Government 
would face a monumental task of restoring political, economic and social stability 
to a devastated, deeply divided and thoroughly demoralised country. Before 
reconstruction could begin, the Papandreou government would have to confront the 
immediate breakdown resulting from the complete collapse of the currency, by 
breaking the vicious circle of the seemingly unstoppable upward spiral of prices. 
However, with the immediate necessity of maintaining a substantial section of the 
population, and with only limited possibilities of collecting tax revenue, it could 
hardly avoid further accelerating the disintegration of the drachma before any 
positive measures could bear fruit. This chapter considers the policy choices and 
performance of successive post-liberation governments, and the outcome of the 
first British sponsored stabilisation plan.
3.1 Pre-liberation Planning
As 1944 progressed, two points became increasingly obvious: firstly, with the tide 
of war moving rapidly against the Germans, most if not all of Greece would soon 
be liberated by Allied forces; secondly, realisation of this fact was tempered by the 
knowledge that the Greek economy was sliding ever deeper into chaos as a result 
of the occupation. It was thus imperative that some degree of economic planning 
took place before liberation, so that effective measures could be enacted as soon as 
the government returned. Understandably preoccupied with conducting the war, 
and determined to avoid direct interference in economic matters, the British were 
concerned with only the most practical issues which were to follow in the wake of 
liberation, while details of the policies to promote the country's recovery were to be 
left to the Greeks themselves.1
As early as March 1944, Professor Varvaressos, the governor of the Bank of 
Greece, had pointed out the necessity for a coordinated approach to the difficulties 
which had to be faced upon liberation. He emphasised the need to ensure adequate 
supplies of foodstuffs to maintain an impoverished population, and the necessity of 
establishing an immediate exchange rate for the drachma, so that relief supplies 
could be priced appropriately. Above all, he stressed the need for government 
controls, not only over imported goods but also over domestically produced 
commodities.2 Although these views were communicated to Tsouderos, their sense 
of urgency was apparently not shared by others in Cairo, and the govemment-in-
1 T160/1265/18217/014/1, Key to Rugman, 30.6.1944.
2 TE/AKB/A3-(B), Varvaressos to Tsouderos, 17.3.1944.
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exile failed to take the initiative on matters of economic planning. In such 
circumstances, it was British concerns which set the agenda for the subsequent 
policy discussions between the two sides. These hinged upon three essential 
issues: the immediate post-liberation exchange rate of the drachma, the means of 
payment to be used by Allied forces after entering Greece, and prices to be charged 
for relief supplies.3
Initially, the setting of a new exchange rate seemed a relatively straightforward 
matter of agreeing a specific number. However, the growing crisis of the drachma 
ruled out simplistic solutions. With both prices and note circulation spiralling out of 
control, not only was it impossible to predict an appropriate rate for the drachma, 
but it also became increasingly difficult even to establish a formula to calculate the 
rate. In March 1944, Varvaressos suggested that the pre-war parity should be 
multiplied by a factor corresponding to the rise in note circulation, and adjusted to 
take account of both the smaller quantity of goods and services available in the 
country, and changes in world prices.4 Before long, it was clear that such 
calculations, based on data from late 1943, were no longer appropriate. As it 
became obvious that inflation was spiralling even faster than the rise in note 
circulation, the original formula would have left the drachma seriously overvalued. 
To compensate, Varvaressos felt that an upward adjustment of 50% in favour of 
the pound would be necessary.5 However, as the pace of inflation continued to 
accelerate, even this was considered inadequate, and within a week Varvaressos 
was suggesting that the rate needed to be adjusted upwards by 100%.6
At this point, Professor Alexandras Svolos, the minister of finance, expressed 
agreement in principle with Varvaressos, and declared that the new exchange rate 
would be fixed 24 hours after liberation, when the full extent of inflation would be 
known. He warned that as prices were likely to fall immediately upon liberation, 
some way had to be devised to minimise speculative gains, and that general 
monetary policy guidelines should be announced publicly as soon as possible.7 In 
response, Varvaressos suggested the abandonment of his original formula for 
establishing a new exchange rate and recommended instead that two major issues 
should be considered. The first question was as much social as economic: he 
believed that the drachma should be devalued sufficiently to rule out instant profits
3 Patterson, op.cit., 1948, pp. 14-24; T160/1265/18217/014/1, Key to Rugman, 30.6.1944.
4 WO204/3561, The Immediate Economic Problems in Greece at the Time of Liberation and 
the Means for their Solution, K. Varvaressos, March 1944.
5 TE/AKB/d>ll/A3(B), Varvaressos to Svolos, Telegram no.95, 29.8.1944.
6 TE/AKB/4>11/A3(B), Varvaressos to Svolos, Telegram no.?, 5.9.1944.
7 TE/AKB/4>11/A3(B), Svolos to Varvaressos, Telegram no.18141, 5.9.1944.
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from speculation, but not so drastically as to price imported goods out of the reach 
of ordinary wage earners. The second question involved deciding which value of 
the note circulation would provide an adequate supply of means of payment. Given 
the severe curtailment of economic activity, Varvaressos recommended that the note 
circulation be set at either 25% or 40% of its pre-war value, suggesting the lower 
figure as more appropriate as a way of taxing immediate gains from speculation. 
The new rate of exchange would be fixed to reflect whichever of the levels was 
chosen. He argued that if the government pursued suitable policies, note circulation 
could be increased in line with the expansion of the economy without generating 
inflation.8
In reply, Svolos claimed that such measures would still not prevent huge instant 
gains by speculators taking advantage of the massive readjustment of the exchange 
rate. He therefore proposed either setting note circulation at half the lower level 
suggested by Varvaressos or an immediate 50% reduction of the nominal value of 
the drachma as a means of taxing such profits. He also recommended that the state 
of the Athens stock market be taken into account, when making a final decision.9 
Varvaressos dismissed all these suggestions as inappropriate. He claimed that an 
automatic reduction of the value of the currency was entirely unnecessary in 
addition to devaluation, while setting note circulation at too low a level would have 
an adverse effect on the purchasing power of urban wage earners. Moreover, he 
pointed out that the fluctuations of the Athens stock market, being essentially 
speculative in nature, should not be used as the basis for any decisions. He 
stressed that there were no simple solutions to the maldistribution of wealth, and 
that a much more general economic policy had to be devised, and that important 
decisions needed to be taken soon.10
While these exchanges were taking place, continued Allied anxiety had led to the 
commissioning of an UNRRA report to consider the issue. Unaware of the 
amendments and provisos added by Varvaressos over the previous month, the 
report criticised his original formula as likely to overvalue the drachma, and pointed 
out that an alternative formula based on wage increases would produce a much 
lower rate.11 Allied observers believed that this was far more realistic, but there is
8 TE/AKB/<1>11/A3(B), Varvaressos to Svolos, Telegram no. 106, 9.9.1944.
9 TEM.KB/4) 13/A3(B), Svolos to Varvaressos, Telegram no.77, 12.9.1944.
10 TE/AKBM>13/A3(B), Varvaressos to Svolos, Telegram no. 116, 15.9.1944.
11 W0204/8608, The Drachma Exchange Rate, C. Coombs, 30.9.1944.
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no apparent evidence that the suggestions were passed on to the Greek 
government.12
In any case, both the Varvaressos/Svolos debate and the Allied deliberations in 
Cairo were rendered irrelevant by the government's decision to adopt the views of 
Professor Xenophon Zolotas, one of the leading economists at the University of 
Athens before the war. Starting from different interpretations of the crisis, Zolotas 
proposed contrasting solutions to the problem of the exchange rate. He predicted 
that the promise of significant quantities of relief supplies would have immediate 
effects after liberation, including the dishoarding of commodities, a substantial fall 
in prices, and a move away from the gold sovereign. He warned that in such 
circumstances, fixing note circulation at too low a level would lead to serious 
deflation and liquidity shortages. Instead, he suggested that note circulation should 
be increased, primarily via such means as the purchase of sovereigns and new 
issues to central and local government. He proposed that no immediate action 
should be taken on setting a new external value for the drachma, which should not 
be fixed for several weeks. For the time being, temporary parities could be devised 
for each issue of drachmae to the Allied forces stationed in Greece, but the 
establishment of a 'natural' rate of exchange would be left to the market. Zolotas 
claimed that speculation would be substantially minimised if the Bank of Greece 
endeavoured to take full advantage of the move away from gold by purchasing as 
many sovereigns as possible. He envisaged that up to a million sovereigns could be 
acquired by the Bank during the initial period after liberation.13
Varvaressos was dismayed by the suggestion to leave the exchange rate to 
market forces. He dismissed the idea as entirely 'repugnant', and predicted grave 
implications for the post-war economy. He believed that the inevitable outcome 
would be further speculation, and warned that Greece would require rigorous 
control of both foreign exchange and trade, and the prevention of capital exports.14 
However, the views of Varvaressos did not prevail. Distrusted by the cabinet, 
ostensibly for having originally accepted his post during the Metaxas dictatorship, 
Varvaressos was snubbed by the appointment of Zolotas as co-governor of the 
Bank of Greece.15 Whether the decision was based on policy or personal reasons
12 DSR, 868.51/10-1044, MacVeagh to the Secretary of State, (Enclosures: Three Memoranda 
Concerning Rate of Exchange to Be Fixed in Greece after Liberation), 10.10.1944.
13 TE/AKB/013/A3(B), Em tod No(iio(iaxiKov ZrjrrNAaxog, S. Zotaurac;, 22.9.1944.
14 TE/AKB/013/A3(B), Varvaressos to Svolos, Telegram no.129, 5.10.1944.
15 DSR, 868.51/9-3044, MacVeagh to the Secretary of State, 30.9.1944 (Enclosure: 
Memorandum Regarding Inflationary Developments in Occupied Greece, H.A. Hill, 
30.9.1944); TE/AKB/B/1, Papandreou to Varvaressos, Telegram no. 19443, 6.10.1944.
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remains unclear but it amounted to a practical endorsement of Zolotas' views. 
Varvaressos promptly resigned from the governorship of the Bank.16
The issue of means of payment of the Allied forces after entering Greece was 
not finally decided until the date before liberation. Given the virtual worthlessness 
of the drachma, the British were determined to introduce the so-called British 
Military Authority (BMA) note as a stopgap until local currency could be made 
available at a definite rate of exchange. The govemment-in-exile was worried about 
the psychological effect of such a currency, and was particularly anxious to secure 
sterling credits to the equivalent value of the notes issued. It thus delayed a decision 
on accepting the BMA note, agreeing only after the British threatened a unilateral 
fixing of the exchange rate. Further delays arose from British plans to circulate 
BMA notes in Yugoslavia and Albania, fuelling Greek fears that their country 
might be obliged to finance Allied military expenditure elsewhere in the Balkans. 
This was resolved only when London agreed to redeem all BMA notes presented to 
the Bank of Greece.17 The final agreement stipulated that the BMA note was an 
emergency measure to be employed until the Bank could provide a stable currency 
in sufficient quantities. The exchange rate was to be set 24 hours after liberation. 
Once a stable currency was available, the notes would be withdrawn and redeemed 
in the form of sterling credits.18
The third major issue - the pricing of relief supplies - was not settled prior to 
liberation. Although the British had recognised that the decisions had to be made on 
the spot, they were concerned that prices would have to bear some relation to 
landed costs. Once again, this would require definite decisions on the rate of 
exchange. Despite the intention of the govemment-in-exile to use the sale of relief 
supplies as an important source of revenue, it admitted that it possessed 'no clear 
method' to reconcile the prices of such goods with local wage rates.19 Up until 
liberation, no-one on the Greek side produced any initiatives on this subject.20
16 TE/AKB/B/l, Varvaressos to Papandreou, Telegram no.510,9.10.1944.
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Thus by the time the country was liberated, no major policies had been 
formulated to address the formidable economic problems. Such debates as had 
arisen had resulted from British insistence on clarifying practical issues. Only 
Varvaressos had responded by consistently stressing the need for a comprehensive 
set of policies, but his views were not adopted in Cairo, and he himself was 
sidelined in the weeks prior to liberation. Thus instead of a definite programme, the 
Papandreou government possessed only a vague collection of ideas by Zolotas 
which said little about specific measures to be taken. Even worse, these ideas 
appeared to be based on highly optimistic assumptions, including the rapid 
balancing of the budget, a stampede away from the sovereign, and a substantial 
inflow of relief supplies. Almost immediately this optimism proved to be hollow.
3.2 The Stabilisation Plan of November 1944
The National Unity Government arrived in Athens on October 18, and soon proved 
powerless in the face of the economic crisis. Relief supplies were delayed by the 
need to repair port facilities, and fresh drachmae had to be printed to maintain 
services and pay wages long before any tax revenue could be collected. The 
seriousness of the situation was compounded by the government's complete lack of 
preparation. Contrary to expectations, liberation failed to restore confidence in the 
drachma, and the rush to sell sovereigns never materialised. The currency 
continued to plummet, but the government delayed any decision on setting a new 
exchange rate. Within days, ministers came to stress large-scale foreign aid as the 
only feasible solution. At first, requests for Allied help were linked to specific 
difficulties arising from inflation. Zolotas pressed ML for increased relief supplies 
to provide a crucial source of revenue. Svolos, pointing out that the payment of 
foodstuffs in lieu of wages could minimise the use of the printing press, asked for 
a one-off doubling of ML monthly shipments, together with additional financial 
assistance and transport facilities. Before long, the government and the Bank of 
Greece became convinced that inflation as expressed by the sovereign rate could be 
stabilised only by official gold sales. Zolotas, who had recently predicted a huge 
inflow of gold into the vaults of the Bank of Greece, was forced to ask ML for
200,000 sovereigns, to be paid out of Greek bullion reserves held abroad. In 
addition, he pressed ML to use BMA notes as payment for labour.21
The British response was mixed. ML supported the request for sovereigns, and 
called for an immediate Allied announcement of substantial financial assistance for
21 F0371/43724 R17640, Greekaid to WO, Telegram no.FI-1, 20.10.1944; FQ371/43724 
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Greece. ML was also in favour of increasing relief supplies, but refused to 
consider a one-off doubling of shipments, fearing that such levels could neither be 
maintained nor distributed effectively. Leeper echoed the government's call for 
additional external aid, and requested that a Treasury expert be sent to Athens, 
stressing that a collapse of public security was imminent unless a rapid solution 
was forthcoming.22 Outside Greece, British responses were far less favourable. 
Both Harold Macmillan, Minister Resident at the Allied Headquarters in Caserta, 
and General Sir Henry Maitland Wilson, Supreme Allied Commander in the 
Mediterranean (SACMED), were opposed to gold sales and suggested that large 
amounts of BMA notes should be given to the government for use as a temporary 
currency until a stabilisation plan was implemented.23 Officials at the Treasury and 
the Bank of England were equally unenthusiastic about the request for gold. Sir 
David Waley felt certain that the sale of gold coins would not restore confidence in 
the drachma, and the situation would ultimately deteriorate even further. Cameron 
Fromanteel Cobbold scathingly dismissed gold sales as a 'stupid plan' which 
would render the later use of a paper currency even more difficult. Nevertheless, 
Whitehall approved the release o f200,000 sovereigns, but warned the Greeks that 
they had to solve their own financial problems. However, another 250,000 were 
despatched within days following further pleas from Athens.24
Despite the unwilling concession on the gold issue, the British remained deeply 
opposed to all the other requests. They were adamant that relief shipments could 
not be increased, and neither ML nor London was willing to sanction the use of 
BMA notes beyond the minimum requirements of the British forces. Nevertheless, 
ML was forced to relent after Piraeus dock labourers refused to accept drachmae as 
back payment for unloading relief supplies. This brought a lukewarm response 
from Whitehall. Despite claims that the BMA notes seemed the most practical 
alternative to the drachma, the British were afraid they would soon lose all value if 
large numbers were brought into use. London remained convinced that internal 
measures - such as heavy taxation, price controls and rationing - had to form a 
solution rather than financial and material assistance from abroad. However, the 
British were still determined that suggestions would be offered only if specifically 
requested by Athens, and that major initiatives should come from the Greeks
22 Ibid.
23 F 0371/43724 R17640, Caserta to FO, Telegram no.583, 21.10.1944; F0371/43724 
R17836, Wilson to WO, 22.10.1944; F0371/43724 R17001, AFHQ to WO, Telegram 
no.F42200, 22.10.1944.
24 F0371/43724 R17640, Minute by Laskey, 21.10.1944; BoE OV8Q/21, Minute by Cobbold, 
23.10.1944; F0371/43724 R17640, WO to Greekaid, Telegram no.86968, 21.10.1944; 
F0371/43724 R17836, Key to Wilson, 4.11.1944.
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themselves. In the absence of any such indications, they turned to Varvaressos, 
hoping he would devise a suitable plan to deal with the crisis.25
Table 3.1 Government Payments and Receipts
Period Payments Receipts
14 October 1944 4,953,000,000,000,000 2,000,000,000,000
16 10,808,000,000,000,000 2,000,000,000,000
17 11,174,000,000,000,000 58,000,000,000,000
19 39,300,000,000,000,000 21,000,000,000,000
20 25,939,000,000,000,000 20,000,000,000,000
21 9,302,000,000,000,000 1,000,000,000,000
23 59,567,000,000,000,000 11,000,000,000,000
24 61,141,000,000,000,000 17,000,000,000,000
25 40,976,000,000,000,000 661,000,000,000,000
27 152,595,000,000,000,000 58,000,000,000,000
30 90,111,000,000,000,000 23,000,000,000,000
31 197,983,000,000,000,000 675,000,000,000,000
1 November 1944 192,893,000,000,000,000 55,000,000,000,000
2 292,690,000,000,000,000 29,000,000,000,000
3 497,201,000,000,000,000 227,000,000,000,000
4 685,617,000,000,000,000 359,000,000,000,000
6 663,181,000,000,000,000 473,000,000,000,000
7 463,181,000,000,000,000 6,770,000,000,000,000
8 420,156,000,000,000,000 71,000,000,000,000
9 1,449,525,000,000,000,000 1,355,000,000,000,000
10 450,338,000,000,000,000 6,982,000,000,000,000
11 411,431,000,000,000,000 6,199,000,000,000,000
Source: Patterson, op.cit., 1948, p.27.
Varvaressos, excluded from decision-making since resigning his post, was 
openly critical of the government's inaction. Blaming the continuing depreciation of 
the drachma on the failure to fix a new exchange rate immediately after liberation, 
he urged this should be done as soon as possible. He also called for controls over 
prices of essential goods, action to suppress speculation, and closer attention to the 
distribution of relief supplies. In addition, he stressed the need for public 
declarations of Allied support, and urged that the international relief effort should 
be substantially increased.26
The Treasury was enthusiastic about the Varvaressos proposals, and its officials 
even suggested that the continuing crisis of the drachma was largely the result of
25 F0371/43724 R17640, Minute by Laskey, 21.10.1944; F0371/43724 R17044, FO to 
Athens, Telegram no.5, 23.10.1944; WO204/3562, Memorandum of a Meeting at the UK 
Treasury, 24.10.1944; BoE OV80/21, Note on Meeting at the Treasury (24.10.1944) - Greek 
Currency Situation, Minute by Cobbold, 26.10.1944; BoE OV80/21, Catto to the 
Chancellor of the Exchequer, 26.10.1944; F0371/43726 R21396, MLHQ (G), Progress 
Report No.l, 15.10.1944-10.11.1944.
26 F0371/43724 R17391, The Solution of the Present Monetary Crisis in Greece, K. 
Varvaressos, 25.10.1944; BoE OV80/21, Note on Meeting at the Treasury (25.10.1944) to 
Discuss Greek Currency Situation with Varvaressos, Minute by Lithiby, 26.10.1944; 
TE/AKB/3>13/A3(B), Varvaressos to Svolos, Telegram no. 140, 26.10.1944.
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the government’s refusal to follow his advice. Nevertheless, the British were aware 
that given his exclusion from power, it would be difficult to press the issue. 
Although the proposals were discussed at the embassy in Athens, it appears they 
were never formally presented to the government.27 By the end of October, it was 
obvious that the Papandreou government had neither adopted nor formulated any 
economic policy, and seemed totally incapable of restoring monetary stability, 
preferring to resort to the printing press and to rely on the prospect of foreign help. 
The prime minister, who had refused to accept the resignation of Varvaressos,28 
instructed him to seek credits and relief supplies from any quarter.29 Despite his 
resentment that his advice had been ignored, Varvaressos offered to represent the 
country's interests abroad,30 but pointed out that the policy vacuum was 
aggravating the crisis and warned that foreign credits would be of little use unless 
backed up by the measures he had repeatedly advocated.31
In the meantime, inflation accelerated faster than ever. The government printed 
huge quantities of currency to overcome the virtual absence of revenue in the initial 
period. As table 3.1 indicates, up to November 11, the budget deficit exceeded 
99%. Unsurprisingly, note circulation rocketed from 160 quadrillion by the time of 
liberation to 725 quadrillion by the end of October and to 6,100 quadrillion on 
November 10. Correspondingly, the sovereign rate rose from 2,000 billion on 
October 19 to 106,000 billion on November 10. To underline the grim absurdity of 
the situation, the government was soon faced with an acute shortage of banknote 
paper.32
In such circumstances, the British were forced to abandon their avowed policy 
of non-interference, and an advisory body was set up to offer assistance on 
economic, financial and relief issues.33 Alarmed by what he had seen during his
27 F0371/43724 R17044, Minute by Laskey, 23.10.1944; F0371/43724 R17044, FO to 
Athens, Telegram no.5, 23.10.1944; F0371/43724 R17391, Fraser to Taylor, 26.10.1944; 
BoE OV80/21, Waley to ?, 29.10.1944; Patterson, op.cit., 1948, p.37.
28 TE/AKB/B/1, Papandreou to Varvaressos, Telegram no.19886,12.10.1944.
29 TE/AKB/<I>11/A3(B), Papandreou to Varvaressos, Telegram no.20892,26.10.1944.
30 TE/AKB/B/1, Varvaressos to Papandreou, Telegram no.7088, 14.10.1944.
31 TE/AKB/^> 11/A3(B), Varvaressos to Papandreou, Telegram no. 144,28.10.1944.
32 Patterson, op.cit., 1948, pp.27-28, 32.
33 This was the Economic and Supply Committee (ESC) set up on October 29, 1944 under the 
chairmanship of Lt-General Scobie; W0204/8760, Meeting Held at the British Embassy 6 
p.m., 29.10.1944; F0371/43724 R17391, Minute by Laskey, 30.10.1944; F0371/43726 
R21396, MLHQ(G), Progress Report No.l, 15.10.1944-10.11.1944. The ESC contained 
mainly British but also some American personnel, including Gardner Patterson who was to 
play an influential role in later developments. Patterson was a brilliant young economist who 
had previously acted as the US Treasury representative in London; Patterson, op.cit., 1948, 
pp.39-40.
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visit to Athens, Anthony Eden, the secretary of state for foreign affairs, warned 
Churchill that anarchy would ensue unless significant measures were undertaken 
immediately. He stressed the need to increase relief shipments and to supply 
additional means of transport to distribute foodstuffs, and also suggested the 
despatch of certain luxury goods to provide revenue. Moreover, he requested that 
the Treasury send a financial expert to advise both the government and the British 
authorities in Athens. Whilst agreeing that heavy taxation and internal loans was the 
most appropriate long-term policy, he pointed out the obvious irrelevance of such a 
policy at a time when the government was able neither to impose taxation nor raise 
internal loans.34
In the meantime, the Greeks had asked the British to supply a further 500,000 
sovereigns. Waley, the Treasury expert following Eden's appeal, was 
unenthusiastic, and warned that intervention in the gold market without a clear 
strategy would do little to prevent financial disaster. Instead, he urged the 
government to devise a comprehensive stabilisation plan as quickly as possible, 
and promised that the request would be considered if such a plan was produced 
before his return to London. The British assured the Greeks that they were doing 
everything possible to increase supplies of food and raw materials, particularly 
cotton. Although the government had hoped to defer stabilisation until the arrival of 
substantial relief shipments, Waley's stance persuaded them to undertake 
immediate measures, to be launched on November 10. Given this change of heart, 
Waley recommended that the gold be released, and 250,000 sovereigns were duly 
despatched during the first week of November. In a similar spirit, Macmillan 
pressed London to write off the 1940 war debt, warning that if the government 
collapsed, the British would lose not only their money but also much political 
credibility.35
In response to Waley's urgings, a broad outline of a stabilisation scheme - 
including the introduction of a new currency - was formulated by Zolotas at the 
Bank of Greece. He emphasised that the scheme could be successful only if huge 
quantities of goods were imported immediately. A second precondition was a 
'comparative equilibrium' of the budget, which would be achieved by such 
measures as the introduction of taxes on war profits and luxury items, the sale of 
imported goods at market prices, and the dismissal of surplus employees. With the 
budget balanced, the government would not be obliged to undermine the new
34 F0371/43724 R17302, Athens to FO, Telegram no.25, 26.10.1944.
35 F0371/43724 R17611, Athens to FO, Telegram no.90, 31.10.1944; F0371/43724 R17612, 
Athens to FO, Telegram no.97, 31.10.1944; F0371/43724 R17612, FO to Athens, 
Telegram no.75, 1.11.1944; F0371/43724 R17842, Athens to FO, Telegram no. 127,
3.11.1944.
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drachma by printing money to finance its current deficits. In Zolotas' opinion, a 
final precondition of success would be full convertibility into sterling, which would 
be sold freely until stability had been achieved, after which restrictions would be 
imposed. He claimed that the sterling link alone could create sufficient confidence 
in the new currency, and argued that the state's foreign reserves, worth £43m, 
could well afford the probable loss of up to £2m. He envisaged that the sale of 
foreign exchange would eliminate demand for gold. Although he claimed that it 
was unacceptable for the Bank of Greece to conduct gold transactions, he argued 
that sovereigns should be offered to the public as an additional safety-valve during 
the initial period. He believed that there was little to fear from such a move, as the 
entire note circulation in Greece was worth less than 100,000 sovereigns, but 
argued that a reserve of half a million would be necessary to regulate the market. 
He repeated his earlier claim that the restoration of normality would provoke a rush 
to sell gold back to the Bank. Zolotas added that once prices had been stabilised, 
wages would no longer need to be pegged to the cost of living. He recommended 
that the old drachma would remain in use until the new currency gained widespread 
acceptance, and that the government should deliberately refrain from establishing 
an official conversion rate between the two, leaving the task to market forces. The 
government would continue to issue old drachmae to cover its budget deficit, but 
would not be allowed to print new drachmae in the same way.36
Table 3.2 Estimated Revenue and Expenditure, 1944-45 (in pounds sterling)
Revenue (12 months) £ Expenditure (12 months) £
Food 22,565,000 State Employees 21,420,000
Other supplies from ML or UNRRA 18,000,000 Pensions 8,910,000
Taxes 15,000,000 Administration 14300,000
Armed Forces 2,620,000
Dole and Subsidies 8,750,000
Total 55,565,000 Total 56,000,000
Source: Patterson, op.cit., 1948, p.47.
The following days saw lengthy discussions over details of the stabilisation 
plan, the first post-liberation budget, and the government's wage and price 
policies.37 The main point of disagreement was whether the new currency was to 
be convertible into sterling as advocated by Zolotas or into BMA notes only. The
36 WO204/8765, The Conditions and the Realisation of Currency Stabilisation, X. Zolotas, 
1.11.1944. See also S. ZoXamxg, H IloXiriKr) Trig Tpcuzetyig rrjg EMadog. A<hjva: 
IIcuia^ Ticrris, 1945.
37 For details, see F0371/43725 R19108, Minutes of the First Meeting Held at the Bank of 
Greece on Saturday, 4.11.1944; FG371/43725 R19108, Minutes of the Second Meeting Held 
at the Bank of Greece on Monday, 6.11.1944; F0371/43725 R19113, Minutes of the Third 
Meeting Held at the Bank of Greece on Tuesday, 7.11.1944; F0371/43725 R19113, Minutes 
of the Fourth Meeting Held at the Bank of Greece on Wednesday, 8.11.1944. See also 
Patterson, op.cit., 1948, pp.44-64. .
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British, fearing a flight from the drachma, preferred the latter option, despite 
concerns that the BMA note itself might suffer as a result from its association with 
the new currency. Following a warning from Waley that the plan had little chance 
of success without BMA-drachma convertibility, Whitehall concurred, with the 
proviso that BMA notes would be redeemable for drachma only, and that gold sales 
be suspended as soon as the new currency was introduced.38 A hastily drawn up 
stabilisation plan was formally agreed on November 10, to come into effect the 
next day. The new drachma was to be fully convertible into BMA notes at the rate 
of 600 to the pound, while the old drachma would temporarily remain in 
circulation, at the rate of 50bn to one new drachma. Existing drachma assets and 
obligations were not revalorised, and were thus effectively wiped out. Government 
loans from the Bank of Greece were to continue subject to strict limits.39 To ensure 
adequate supplies of currency, the British agreed to provide £3m of BMA notes.40
Initial public reaction seemed quietly favourable as the sovereign rate remained 
fairly stable, with little immediate demand for BMA notes. A competent Allied 
observer saw the prospects as encouraging, despite the obvious difficulties which 
lay ahead 41 Similarly, Waley felt confident that the plan would succeed if the 
government honoured all its commitments.42 However, several related issues still 
awaited a satisfactory solution. Detailed discussions on budgetary reforms did not 
proceed smoothly, despite declarations of ministerial determination to enact drastic 
measures such as heavy taxes on war profits. A set of estimates was drawn up, 
only to be dismissed by the British as too basic and completely inadequate. Within 
days, a revised version anticipated an almost perfectly balanced budget. As table 
3.2 indicates, this assumed that taxes would provide 27% of revenue, with the rest 
deriving from the sale of relief supplies, while 80% of planned expenditure was to 
cover current expenses, including salaries, pensions, and administration. The 
British conceded that the revised budget was probably the best that could be 
expected in the circumstances, but expressed serious reservations. They were 
unhappy about the size of the government payroll and pensions list, and warned 
against the assumption that income from relief supplies could be treated as ordinary
38 F0371/43724 R17841, Athens to FO, Telegram no. 125, 3.11.1944; F0371/43724 R17924, 
Athens to FO, Telegram no. 136, 5.11.1944; F0371/43724 R17929, Athens to FO, 
Telegram no. 138, 5.11.1944; CAB65/44, War Cabinet Conclusions 146(44), 6.11.1944; 
BoE OV80/22, Minute by Cobbold, 6.11.1944; F0371/43724 R18740, FO to Athens, 
Telegram no. 123, 6.11.1944.
39 FQ371/43725 R19951, Law No. 18, Government Gazette, 9.11.1944.
40 FQ371/43724 R18201, Athens to FO, Telegram no.173, 8.11.1944; F0371/43725 R19115, 
Leeper to Papandreou/Papandreou to Leeper, 10.11.1944.
41 WO204/3564, Greek Currency Stabilisation, F.A. Southard, Jr., 14.11.1944.
42 FQ371/43725 R18538, The Stabilisation of Greek Currency, Sir D. Waley, 14.11.1944.
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revenue without the prior approval of the donor agencies. They insisted that the 
situation could be improved only by the immediate enactment of such measures as 
the imposition of strict limits on public sector salaries and military expenditure, the 
sale of relief supplies at prices sufficiently high to yield a reasonable revenue, huge 
increases of all indirect taxes and the introduction of heavy taxation on war profits 
and luxury goods.43
With budgetary issues still unresolved, a further disagreement arose as 
government proposals for new wage rates provoked immediate opposition from the 
British, who regarded them as 'dangerously high'. Highlighting the close 
connection between wages and food prices, Papandreou resisted British pressure 
by making the acceptance of lower wages conditional upon assurances of increased 
relief supplies. In turn, the British made the promise of food shipments conditional 
upon an official announcement that wages and the price of imported rations would 
be fixed at appropriate levels. Despite further pledges to do so, continued 
government inaction led the British to issue an ultimatum withdrawing the offer of 
additional supplies unless agreement was reached 44 This brought an immediate 
response from the Greek side, and new levels of wages and ration prices were 
agreed on November 30 45
The growing frustration of the British, which had led to the unprecedented tone 
expressed in the ultimatum, took place against the background of mounting 
tension, as it became painfully clear that the currency reform had not brought 
lasting success. After a few days of relative stability, the sovereign rate began to 
rise again. While little was done to increase receipts either from taxation or the sale 
of imported supplies, government spending spiralled rapidly, resulting in a budget 
deficit of almost 94% during the three weeks after the stabilisation attempt. In the 
same period, note circulation increased by 900% (table 33), while free market 
prices of essential consumer goods rose more than 50%.46
By now, even Zolotas was openly critical of the government for its failure to 
create any of the conditions necessary for the stabilisation to succeed. He claimed
43 FG371/43724 R18738, Athens to FO, Telegram no. 165, 8.11.1944; F0371/43724 R18738, 
Athens to FO, Telegram no. 166, 8.11.1944; F0371/43725 R18796, Athens to FO, 
Telegram no.4 Saving, 9.11.1944.
44 F0371/43725 R18652, Athens to FO, Telegram no.238, 15.11.1944; F0371/43725 
R18662, Athens to FO, Telegram no.249, 16.11.1944; FQ371/43726 R21873, Leeper to 
Eden, 6.12.1944 (Enclosures: Scobie to Papandreou, 20.11.1944; Papandreou to Scobie, 
22.11.1944); F0371/43725 R19528, Athens to FO, Telegram no.9 Remac, 28.11.1944.
45 FD371/43725 R19833, Athens to FO, Telegam no. 14 Remac, 1.12.1944; W0204/8760, 
Meeting of Nov. 30, 1944 to Fix Wages and Prices, 1.12.1944; F0371/43725 R19811, 
Athens to FO, Telegram no. 15 Remac, 1.12.1944.
46 Patterson, op.cit., 1948, pp.66-67, 73, 80-82.
94
that nothing had been done to establish confidence in either the currency or the 
government's management of the economy, while official statements had only 
fuelled public anxiety and uncertainty. He was particularly scathing of the lack of 
action on public finance. Promises on increased taxation had not been kept, 
imported supplies were being sold at ridiculously low prices, no checks had been 
introduced to ensure that only genuine indigents were receiving free food rations, 
and the pruning of the state bureaucracy had made little progress. By losing much 
potential revenue and failing to check expenditure, the government was still 
compelled to use the printing press to finance its daily operations. In such 
circumstances, the currency reform had scant hope of success. Zolotas claimed that 
gold sales alone had prevented a total collapse, but added that this policy could not 
by itself save the drachma unless swift action was taken on all the other issues.47
Table 3.3 Note Circulation (in millions of drachmae)
Period Drachmae (a)
10 November 1944 121
11 152
13 210
14 247
15 416
16 479
17 519
18 588
20 679
21 755
22 829
23 894
24“ 967
25 1,012
27 1,169
28 1,237
29 1,268
30 1,362
1 December 1944 1,523
Source: Patterson, op.cit., 1948, p.70.
(a) The figure for November 10 is expressed in terms 
of new drachmae, as reported by the Bank of 
Greece.
As Zolotas had indicated, the sale of gold was the only policy actively promoted 
in support of the stabilisation plan. This move, which had not been envisaged by 
the plan, was taken without prior consultation with the British. On November 21, 
the National Bank of Greece (not to be confused with the central bank) was 
authorised to conduct gold transactions on the state's behalf. Various mechanical
47 FQ371/43725 R18418, Athens to FO, Telegram no.8 Remac, 27.11.1944; WO204/8765, 
On the Evolution of the Monetary Question, X. Zolotas, 24.11.1944. See also S. ZoWcag, 
H  IJoXixiKr] rrjg TpcmeZflg rr\g EkXafiog. AOTjva: ncuca£noT]g, 1945.
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means were employed to inconvenience purchasers and thus reduce the volume of 
sales. Nevertheless, over 11 working days, net sales of sovereigns totalled over 
44,000. Contrary to Zolotas' expectation, this did nothing to stem the new tide of 
price rises, and the Bank of England was asked to provide another 250,000 
sovereigns. The request was turned down on the grounds that the policy was 
merely reinforcing the public distrust of the paper currency. In such circumstances, 
fears that the country's gold reserves would soon be exhausted led to the 
suspension of the policy on December 2.48
Thus by the beginning of December, the stabilisation plan was already virtually 
moribund, but any prospect of a return to normality was destroyed by the outbreak 
of fighting in Athens. This caused considerable destruction, and forced the 
suspension of all relief operations, not only aggravating material hardship but also 
depriving the state of urgently needed revenue. The political situation forced 
concern over immediate economic issues into the background. As ministers seemed 
still unable to propose 'anything plausible’ on such matters, British observers 
became increasingly alarmed by the way the problems were 'not being faced' and 
suggested that it was now up to London to take the initiative in formulating 
constructive policies.49 Although this call for wider responsibility was eventually 
rejected,50 the British authorities in Athens took their own initiative in defining a 
set of measures they expected the Greek government to undertake once order was 
re-established in the capital. They were particularly concerned that the wage levels 
agreed in November should be adhered to once relief deliveries were 
recommenced, and looked for a much more vigorous approach to the budget. 
While recognising this could not be balanced in the near future, they demanded that 
the government should at least furnish 'realistic' estimates, and should take 
decisive action on curbing expenditure and raising additional revenue. Moreover, 
they insisted that fixed prices be set not only for relief foodstuffs, but also for a 
wide range of domestically produced goods and services including fuel, tram fares, 
rents, electricity, and basic items of clothing.51
48 FQ371/43725 R18963, Athens to FO, Telegram no.2 Remac, 21.11.1944; F0371/43725 
R19607, Athens to FO, Telegram no.378, 28.11.1944; F0371/43725 R19687, Athens to 
FO, Telegram no.12 Remac, 30.11.1944; F0371/43725 R19607, FO to Athens, Telegram 
no.327, 1.12.1944; Patterson, op.cit., 1948, pp.80-82; TE/AKB/B/2, Varvaressos to Maben,
29.9.1945, p. 12
49 WO904/8611, Tait Smith to Rugman, 17.11.1944; F0371/43726 R21510, Athens to FO, 
Telegram no.26 Remac, 21.12.1944.
50 F0371/43726 R21496, FO to Athens, Telegram no.248, 23.1.1945.
51 W0204/8760, Paper No. ESC(44) No.2, C-in-C's Policy Following the Withdrawal of 
ELAS Forces from the Athens Area, 24.12.1944; F0371/43726 R21946, Caserta to FO, 
Telegram no.970, 27.12.1944.
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3,3 The 'Easy Way Out'
In the event, the above recommendations were not passed on to the Papandreou 
government as the latter collapsed before the fighting had ceased. A new 
government under General Plastiras took office on January 4, and the British 
immediately presented their summary of economic priorities to Georgios Sideris, 
the new minister of finance, who also held the potentially conflicting post of the 
minister of labour.52 Disappointed by the performance of the previous government, 
they sought a more vigorous stance from General Plastiras. Despite pressure from 
the British, Sideris displayed little enthusiasm for either their recommendations or 
their suggestion that Varvaressos be re-appointed to the governorship at the Bank 
of Greece, vacated by the dismissal of Zolotas.53 Although Varvaressos was 
indeed reinstated shortly afterwards, there was little progress on other issues. 
While Sideris assured Allied advisors he would maintain the wage levels agreed in 
November until the end of January, he refused to commit himself beyond that point 
without commitments on the extent of ML imports to be provided in the near 
future.54 However, within days the government made several concessions on state 
salaries, and seemed likely to extend these to the private sector.55 While Allied 
advisors complained that Sideris had done Virtually nothing' on price controls, the 
minister continued to make far-reaching concessions on wages. In early February, 
he ignored the wishes of ML by agreeing to increase the daily wage rate for 
unskilled labour by 20% and to make corresponding increases in other 
categories.56 As many private employers were already paying more than the official 
wage levels, the new rates of pay were mainly ignored, with increased wage costs 
simply passed on the consumer.57 In spite of strong opposition from ML, it was 
clear that Sideris was unwilling to draw up a comprehensive wage policy,
52 W0204/8760, Paper No. E&SC (45) 6, Aide Mdmoire, 5.1.1945.
53 Technically, the Plastiras government dismissed Zolotas by abolishing the post which had 
been especially created for him; F0371/48347 R16322, Greek Personalities Report,
17.9.1945, p.48; F0371/48326 R503, Athens to FO, Telegram no.2 Remac, 6.1.1945; 
F0371/48326 R627, Athens to FO, Telegram no.98, 8.1.1945; F0371/48326 R905, Athens 
to FO, Telegram no.4 Remac, 11.1.1945.
54 W0204/8760, Paper No. E&SC (45) 9, Implementation of Agreed Policy for the Period 
Following the ELAS Withdrawal from the Athens Area, 18.1.1945.
55 F0371/48330 R7298, Leeper to Eden, 16.4.1945 (Enclosure: Paper No. E&SC (45) 28, 
Wages and Salaries in Greece, 7.4.1945).
56 W0204/8760, E&SC (45) 2nd Meeting, 19.1.1945; WO204/8761, JCC (45) 3rd Meeting, 
8.2.1945; WO204/8761, E&SC (45) 6th Meeting, 12.2.1945.
57 Patterson, op.cit., 1948, pp. 116, 118, 122.
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preferring to grant concessions to individual groups of workers whenever 
successive waves of protest arose.58
Throughout this period, it was evident that the post-liberation governments had 
done little to secure sufficient revenue to finance public spending. As table 4.2 
indicates, during January, the budget deficit was a staggering 98%, and was 
covered only by fresh loans from the Bank of Greece, which pushed the 
government well beyond the limit - 2bn drachmae - agreed as part of the November 
stabilisation plan. Sideris proved as unresponsive on budgetary issues as he had 
been on price controls, declining to suggest any figures for more than a month or 
two in advance. As with wages, he was unwilling to commit himself to any longer 
term forecast until he knew the exact cost of the proposed military programme and 
the extent of ML imports.59 Not only did Sideris refuse to prepare a budget, but he 
also requested that the British ’foot the bill’ for the new Greek army, which he 
hoped would be paid according to British scales.60 Realising that London would 
not provide funds or loans for this purpose, Sideris eventually set new rates of pay 
at levels lower than those of the British army but still higher than those in the Greek 
civil service 61 The civil servants were themselves already agitating for higher 
salaries, and at the end of March they were given a bonus equal to one month's 
basic pay.62 As further concessions were granted to each successive crisis, it was 
obvious that the wage structure agreed in November 1944 had already 
disintegrated.63 Thus the major Allied expectation expressed back in early January 
had been completely ignored.
Greek ministers continued to display little confidence that they could manage 
without external help. Sideris warned ML that the drachma could not be saved 
without a foreign loan, while General Plastiras stressed to Whitehall that the
58 WO204/8761, E&SC (45) 7th Meeting, 19.2.1945; WO204/8761, JCC (45) 5th Meeting, 
22.2.1945; WO204/8761, E&SC (45) 10th Meeting, 12.3.1945.
59 W0204/8760, E&SC (45) 2nd Meeting, 19.1.1945; W0204/8760, E&SC (45) 3rd Meeting,
23.1.1945.
60 WQ204/8761, E&SC (45) 4th Meeting, 29.1.1945. Under British High Command in the 
Middle East, Greek forces had been paid according to British scales. After liberation, those 
who had served in the Middle East continued to draw pay at higher rates than the rest of the 
Greek armed forces; Patterson, op.cit., 1948, pp. 119-121.
61 FG371/48328 R5326, Athens to FO, Telegram no.795, 20.3.1945; F0371/48328 R5343, 
Athens to FO, Telegram no.796, 20.3.1945; F0371/48329 R6140, Athens to FO, Telegram 
no.888, 3.4.1945; F0371/48329 R6315, Paper No E&SC (45) 26, New Scales of Pay for 
Greek Armed Forces, 25.3.1945.
62 WO204/8761, E&SC (45) 9th Meeting, 5.3.1945; WO204/8761, JCC (45) 9th Meeting,
22.3.1945.
63 F0371/48334 R14166, Economic and Financial Developments in Greece November 1944- 
June 1945, C. Coombs, 1945, p.52.
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country could not survive without financial and material support. The Allies 
emphasised that a loan to save the drachma would not only be unlikely, but would 
produce no immediate results. Furthermore, given the world-wide shortage of 
commodities and means of transport, it was most important that the Athens 
government should make more efficient use of resources at its disposal.64 The 
Greeks were adamant that unless transport facilities were improved, there was little 
chance of industrial and agricultural recovery without which there would be no 
hope for raising government revenue. Both sides appeared to be at cross-purposes, 
with consistent Allied emphasis on budgetary measures and economic controls 
invariably countered by equally consistent Greek complaints about transport 
infrastructure difficulties and the necessity of increased material supplies and loans 
from abroad.65
In such circumstances, the British authorities in Athens lost patience. They were 
particularly dissatisfied with Sideris and even considered trying to remove him 
from power. Varvaressos, who continued to impress the Allied advisors after 
returning to the Bank of Greece, seemed an obvious replacement. However, given 
the political circumstances the British decided not to press this matter further.66 
Nevertheless, they maintained the line that immediate austerity measures were 
necessary, and that Greece would have to look to its own resources rather than 
external aid to promote economic recovery.
As Sideris could offer nothing to revive the economy, senior British officials 
were becoming increasingly worried about the state of public finances and the 
stability of the drachma. In mid-February, Waley warned that the currency might 
collapse within a 'week or two', unless swift action were taken on prices and 
wages.67 Soon afterwards, British exasperation with the inertia in Athens led to 
strong words from Eden, who met leading Greek politicians on his way back from 
Yalta. He made it clear that they had to take greater responsibility for their country, 
in language which was 'blunt to the verge of rudeness'.68 At the same time, Eden
64 WO204/8761, JCC (45) 1st Meeting, 25.1.1945; F0371/48257 R3657, Plastiras to 
Churchill, Telegram no.216, 6.2.1945.
65 WO204/8761, Scobie to Plastiras, 21.1.1945; WO204/8761, Scobie to Sideris, 24.1.1945; 
WO204/8761, Sideris to Scobie, 6.2.1945; WO204/8761, Plastiras to Scobie, 9.2.1945; 
WO204/8761, Scobie to Sideris, 12.2.1945; WO204/8761, Sideris to Scobie, 15.2.1945.
66 WO204/8761, E&SC (45) 4th Meeting, 29.1.1945; WO204/8761, E&SC (45) 6th Meeting, 
12.2.1945; F0371/48257 R3475, Athens to FO, Telegram no.565, 19.2.1945.
67 FG371/48257 R3559, Discussion on Greece at the British Embassy, Athens, 15.2.1945.
68 A. Eden, The Eden Memoirs: The Reckoning. London: Cassell, 1965, Vol. Ill, p.521. 
Macmillan, who was also present at the meeting, recalled that 'Eden gave them a good 
lecture'; H. Macmillan, The Blast of War, 1939-1945. London: Macmillan, 1967, p.662. For 
another eyewitness account of this meeting, see D. Dilks (ed.), The Diaries of Sir Alexander 
Cadogan, 1938-1945. London: Cassell, 1971, pp.713-714.
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pointed out that measures taken by the Greeks themselves would have to be of 
paramount importance, as there was little prospect that the extent of Allied 
assistance could be increased given current international circumstances.69 A few 
days later, a highly public expression of British dissatisfaction with the situation 
was given by Churchill. Speaking in the House of Commons, he declared that the 
Greeks could not expect the Allies to shoulder the main burden of responsibility for 
the country's recovery. The Athens government had to ensure that the budget was 
balanced, and that inflation was kept within reasonable limits.70
Sideris was careful to defend the government's record, asserting that efforts had 
been made to implement the Allied recommendations. Nevertheless, he observed 
the practical difficulties involved: it was almost impossible to impose price controls 
on domestically produced goods, while increases in indirect taxation would yield 
next to nothing until there was actual production of taxable goods. Moreover, 
superfluous state employees could not be dismissed until an unemployment benefit 
scheme was established.71 Other ministers also sought to paint an 'optimistic 
picture' of the government's plans of the economy in interviews and statements. 
The British, however, consistently felt that the Greeks were not doing enough to 
address the country's economic problems.72 Despite their optimism, General 
Plastiras and Sideris achieved little while in office. The finance minister's few 
serious initiatives proved ineffectual. His new tax on war profits turned out to be a 
dead end 73 His long overdue attempt to prohibit dealings in gold, when he 
threatened to 'bring all speculators before the firing squad', came only days before 
his departure from the ministry and was immediately dropped by his successor.74
The few concessions which Greek ministers made to British thinking during this 
period were inspired by Varvaressos at the Bank of Greece rather than any 
government figure. One important break-through was the adoption of a slightly 
more 'economic than philanthropic' approach to the price of the ML/Joint Relief 
Commission ration.75 A further achievement which owed much to Varvaressos
69 F0371/48257 R3559, Discussion on Greece at the British Embassy, Athens, 15.2.1945 
(Annex IV, Aide-Mdmoire, 15.2.1945).
70 408 H.C. DEB. 5 s., p. 1291.
71 WG204/8761, Sideris to Scobie, 15.2.1945.
72 F0371/48262 R5444, AIS Weekly Report No.21, 4-10 Mar 1945.
73 FO371/48330 R7205, Compulsory Law No. 182, Government Gazette, 12.3.1945.
74 F0371/48329 R5917, Athens to FO, Telegram no.64 Remac, 29.3.1945; F0371/48329 
R5957, Athens to FO, Telegram no.65 Remac, 30.3.1945; F0371/48266 R6723, AIS 
Weekly Report No.24,25-31 Mar 1945; F0371/48267 R7138, AIS Weekly Report No.25, 
1-7 Apr 1945.
75 WO204/8761, JCC (45) 2nd Meeting, 1.2.1945; WO204/8761, JCC (45) 3rd Meeting,
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was the setting up of a Joint Price Fixing Sub-committee within the Joint 
Coordinating Committee (JCC).76 This was to address the shortcomings of 
existing price fixing measures, as until then individual ministries had conducted 
uncoordinated ad hoc policies covering a limited range of commodities including 
kerosene, matches, salt, newspapers, playing cards, tram fares and certain road 
haulage freights. As prices had been frequently set at inappropriate levels, and as 
few guidelines had been provided to local authorities in the provinces, it was clear 
that a permanent body was necessary to coordinate policies at all levels. 
Varvaressos was the obvious choice to chair this Sub-committee.77 Nevertheless, it 
had advisory powers only, and spent most of its time fixing prices of UNRRA and 
ML supplies. It achieved little as far as domestically produced commodities were 
concerned, as ministers did virtually nothing to enforce controls on such items.78
Aggravated by government inactivity, the Greek economy languished 
throughout the first quarter of 1945, and remained as dependent on external relief 
as it had been shortly after liberation. Holders of surplus currency continued to 
prefer more stable stores of value. Gold maintained its multiple role as a medium of 
exchange, saving and investment, as the drachma lost further credibility. With 
confidence low as a result of political tensions and the weakness of the currency, 
hoarding became commonplace, leading to further shortages and inflationary 
pressures. Public finances remained precarious, as the gradual recovery of revenue 
was outpaced by massive rises in expenditure. Despite the warnings of 
Varvaressos 79 the government's relentless use of the printing press to cover 
chronic budget deficits ensured rapid increases in note circulation. With the country 
becoming locked in a vicious circle of price and wage inflation, persistent demands 
for wage increases were placing the government under severe pressure. Civil
76 Patterson, op.cit., 1948, pp. 145-146. The JCC was set up in early 1945 to provide a forum 
in which British and American advisors belonging to the ESC could discuss policy issues 
with Greek ministers. The JCC was replaced by the Joint Policy Committee (JPC) after the 
UNRRA take-over of the relief effort in Greece. It comprised Greek, British and UNRRA 
officials; DSR 868.50/4-2145, MacVeagh to the Secretary of State, 21.4.1945 (Enclosure: 
JPC (45) 1st Meeting, 16.4.1945). For the reasons for the absence of American officials in 
the JPC, see pp.213-214.
77 WO204/8761, Paper No. E&SC (45) 16, Fixing of Prices, 11.2.1945; WO204/8761, Paper 
No. E&SC (45) 6th Meeting, 12.2.1945; WO204/8761, Paper No. JCC (45) 9, Fixing of 
Prices, 13.2.1945; WO204/8761, Paper No. JCC (45) 4th Meeting, 17.2.1945.
78 Patterson, op.cit., 1948, pp. 147-151.
79 TE/AKB/B/2, Varvaressos to Sideris, 15.3.1945.
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unrest seemed inevitable if such demands were not met, but concessions would 
have led equally inevitably to further inflation and a crisis of the drachma.80
Table 3.4 Estimated Revenue and Expenditure, 1945-46 (in millions of drachmae)
Revenue
TOTAL ORDINARY 13,497
1-DIRECT TAXES 2,805
2-INDIRECT TAXES 8,692
increase by 50% of tobacco tax 2,000
TOTAL EXTRAORDINARY 37,600
1-T ransactions Tax 600
2-War Profits Tax 15,000
3-Import Duties on UNRRA Goods 2,000
4-Proceeds of Sale of UNRRA Goods 20,000
TOTAL REVENUE 51,097
Expenditure
1-Pensions 10300
2-Salaries 12339
3-Improvement of Present Wages of State Employees 3,000
4-Expenses of War Ministries 4,500
5-Public Works 4,000
6-Agriculture 3,260
7-Social Welfare and Health 5,000
8-Administrative Expenses 3,200
9-Loans for Repair of Railways etc. 1,000
10-Other 2,550
TOTAL EXPENDITURE 49,149
Source: T236/149, Greek Revenue and Expenditure, Conversations Held 
on 21st, 23rd and 25th April 1945, between the Minister of Finance (Mr 
Mantzavinos) at the Bank of Greece and Mr Harry Hill, Sir Quintin Hill, 
Mr Lingeman and Mr Patterson); T236/1044, Hill to Davidson, 
26.4.1945.
Such were the circumstances inherited by Admiral Voulgaris, who succeeded as 
prime minister in early April. The change of government added to the general 
uncertainty over the economy, and the sovereign rate reached new heights on the 
Athens market. As it soon became apparent that the new government, universally 
regarded as temporary, had failed to produce any major statement on economic 
policy, the British continued to press for action. Before long, Admiral Voulgaris 
was warned that heavy taxation, ruthless expenditure cuts and administrative 
reform had to be enacted immediately, while Georgios Mantzavinos, the new 
minister of finance, was pressed for a budget statement.
In response, a set of revenue estimates was produced within days. These 
emphasised the significance of receipts from the sale of UNRRA supplies (62%) 
and the special tax on war profits (17%), rather than those from direct or indirect
80 F0371/48334 R14166, Economic and Financial Developments in Greece November 1944- 
June 1945, C. Coombs, 1945; DSR 868.50/4-2345, MacVeagh to the Secretary of State, 
23.4.1945 (Enclosure: Memorandum by H.A. Hill, 21.4.1945).
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taxation (5% and 15% respectively). The British were extremely sceptical. Returns 
from the sale of relief supplies were almost impossible to predict as the financial 
arrangements between UNRRA and the Greek government had not yet been 
finalised. Furthermore, the deliveries were to last for six months only and not for 
the whole fiscal year. The war profits tax seemed even more dubious as assessment 
would be difficult and collection would be subject to legal proceedings. The British 
felt that much more should be done to increase yields from direct and indirect 
taxation. On the government side, while Admiral Voulgaris was afraid that higher 
taxes would provoke strikes, Mantzavinos replied that he was urgently studying 
taxation issues and would soon propose further increases. To Leeper, the only real 
choice was to take unpopular action immediately while the situation could still be 
saved, or to take similar action at a later stage after the currency had collapsed.81
Within days, Mantzavinos produced a revised version of the budget, taking 
partial account of British criticisms of his original proposals. As table 3.4 indicates, 
while the share of direct taxation remained at 5%, it was now assumed that indirect 
taxes would contribute 25%, thanks mainly to a 50% increase on tobacco duties 
and the levying of import duties on UNRRA goods. Despite this increase, the 
budget still relied heavily on the sale of relief supplies (39%) and the war profits 
tax, which saw its predicted share doubled to 29%. Anticipated revenue was to 
exceed expenditure, producing a surplus of 4% 82
Despite the minor concessions, the British regarded the estimates as 'pure 
window dressing’.83 Hill was still sceptical about the predicted yields from the war 
profits tax and the sale of UNRRA goods, but he was most upset by Mantzavinos' 
refusal to introduce a meaningful income tax. While even before the war such a tax 
was levied at 4% in the public sector and 5% in the private, the minister now 
suggested a maximum 1%. The government was adamant that a general strike 
would follow if a higher rate was imposed although it was prepared to raise the rate 
for higher incomes. Mantzavinos claimed that a heavier income tax was 
'economically and politically impossible' and he would rather resign than attempt 
such a move. Hill was equally adamant that only a more substantial income tax 
could mop up surplus purchasing power and stop inflation. He therefore concluded 
that such decisions were political in nature, and were dependent on the degree of
81 FO371/48330 R6859, Athens to FO, Telegram no.90 Remac, 16.4.1945; FO371/48330 
R7093, Athens to FO, Telegram no. 1016, 20.4.1945; FO371/48330 R7164, Athens to FO, 
Telegram no. 1017, 20.4.1945; T236/1044, Hill to Davidson, 22.4.1945.
82 T236/149, Greek Revenue and Expenditure, Conversations Held on 21st, 23rd and 25th April 
1945, between the Minister of Finance (Mr Mantzavinos) at the Bank fo Greece and Mr Harry 
Hill, Sir Quintin Hill, Mr Lingeman and Mr Patterson); T236/1044, Hill to Davidson, 
26.4.1945; T236/149, Hill to Davidson, 27.4.1945.
83 T236/1044, Hill to Davidson, 2.5.1945.
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resolution which the government was willing to display. He was anxious not to 
provoke a general strike, particularly if the Greeks were to claim that 'unreasonable 
demands' from the British had caused the tax crisis. In the face of government 
insistence that heavier taxation entailed risks of social unrest, the British grudgingly 
accepted that little progress appeared possible on budgetary issues. While Hill 
recognised that the latest proposals were probably the best which could be expected 
in the circumstances, he nevertheless emphasised that large capital outlays would 
be required to revitalise the economy, and warned that the 'whole bottom' would 
'fall out of the budget' if either the war profits tax or the sale of UNRRA goods 
failed to produce the anticipated sums.84 His distrust increased considerably 
following a subsequent meeting with a senior official from the finance ministry. 
The latter virtually admitted that the expected amounts deriving from the war profits 
tax and the sale of UNRRA supplies were fictitious', but was 'bankrupt in 
suggestions' as to other possible sources of revenue.85
3.4 Preaching the 'Gospel of Control*
By the end of April, the British authorities in Athens had come to realise that 
circumstances dictated a change of emphasis in the advice they were recommending 
to the Greeks. Although far from happy with the latest budget proposals, they 
accepted that the government had at least made some progress on increasing tax 
revenue. However, it was only during this period that the British finally seemed to 
appreciate the full extent of poverty in the country.86 They came to believe that until 
the economy began to revive, little more could be gained by forcing the taxation 
issue. Thus in answer to the Treasury's continued strictures about the necessity of 
mopping up purchasing power, Hill replied that the incomes of wage earners were 
so low that 'sterilising purchasing power' would be tantamount to 'sterilising them 
out of existence'. Despite this admission, Hill agreed that the taxation of the rich 
would still remain a priority, and promised he would continue to pay close attention
84 T236/149, Greek Revenue, T.St. Quintin Hill, 23.4.1945; T236/1044, Hill to Davidson,
26.4.1945.
85 T236/149, Hill to Davidson, 11.5.1945 (Enclosure: Greek Revenue, Note of Discussion with 
M. Pesmatzoglou, Under-Secretary for Finance, on 11th May 1945); T236/149, Hill to 
Waley, 2.6.1945 (Enclosure: Greek Budget 1945/1946, Summary Statements Furnished by 
Mr Pesmatzoglou on 11th & 15th May 1945).
86 F0371/48331 R8915, Caccia to Hasler, 5.5.1945 (Enclosure: Hill to Waley, 5.5.1945); 
T236/1044, Hill to Davidson, 26.4.1945. The recently completed report of the TUC 
representatives present in Athens since February had a particularly strong influence on the 
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taken careful note of the living conditions of wage earners in the capital; F0371/48331 
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to public finance. Nevertheless, recent events had demonstrated that economic as 
well as budgetary pressures were fuelling inflation, and that these needed to be 
addressed swiftly. With rising prices provoking wage demands in a vicious circle, 
and the hoarding of commodities and raw materials when finished goods were 
desperately needed, the British felt it was obvious that the Greek government had 
to accept a need universally recognised elsewhere: the need to impose controls of 
supply, distribution and price. Accordingly, the focus of British advice was 
switched, with a new emphasis on ’preaching day in and day out' on the 'gospel of 
control’.87 This 'preaching' took many forms. The Anglo-Greek Information 
Service (AGIS) distributed literature on the topic, while articles appeared in the 
Athens press describing the economic controls used in Britain during the war.88 
Such publications were designed to influence public opinion, and to gain wider 
acceptance for the concept of controls.
However, by this time another strand was emerging in British policy in Greece, 
in response to the move to bring Varvaressos into the government as an economic 
trouble-shooter. As will be shown in the following chapter, this decision was taken 
while Varvaressos was abroad on official business, from which he could not return 
for over a month. Realising that little of any substance could be expected until he 
came back, the British preferred to discuss policy details with him rather than with 
the cabinet, although in the meantime, ministers were still urged to take immediate 
action. In early May, the British complained to Admiral Voulgaris that next to 
nothing had been achieved since Eden's outburst in February, and stressed once 
again the need for increased state control over the country's economic life. The 
distribution of raw materials and finished goods, the stimulation of private 
industry, the control of prices of basic commodities, the tight control of wages to 
avoid inflation spirals - were all emphasised as absolute necessities without which 
the economy could not survive.89
Fresh disagreements appeared almost immediately. As a surge of labour unrest 
reached alarming proportions, senior Greek officials made a series of visits to 
Leeper, seeking advice on how to defuse the escalating wave of strikes. Most
87 T236/1044, Hill to Davidson, 26.4.1945; FO371/48330 R7752, Athens to FO, Telegram 
no.99 Remac, 1.5.1945; T236/1044, Hill to Davidson, 2.5.1945; FO371/48330 R7921, 
Athens to FO, Telegram no. 1107, 4.5.1945.
88 F0371/48266 R6723, AIS Weekly Report No.24, 25-31 Mar 1945; F0371/48268 R7816, 
AGIS Weekly Report No.27, 15-21 Apr 1945. A leading newspaper, EXevihpia, carried a 
series of articles by a Professor Pintos entitled 'Organisation or Anarchy'. According to 
AGIS, these were probably inspired by the economist Dr Rena Zafiriou, who had completed a 
doctorate at the London School of Economics, while working as assistant to Varvaressos 
during the war. Both were to serve under Varvaressos during the summer of 1945; 
F0371/48269 R8082, AGIS Weekly Report No.28,22-29 Apr 1945.
89 FG371/48331 R8189, Leeper to Sargent, 2.5.1945 (Enclosure: Aide Mlmoire, 2.5.1945).
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recent stoppages had been resolved by surrendering to the demands of the strikers, 
but Admiral Voulgaris felt particularly threatened by the latest agitation for an 
Easter bonus. He warned Leeper that a refusal would lead to even more serious 
civil disorders. Leeper repeated the standard advice given so many times before, 
reminding Admiral Voulgaris that the Greeks had undermined the progress 
achieved in recent discussions by opposing British suggestions on the introduction 
of income tax. Leeper took pains to show his disappointment with such avoidance 
of vigorous action. Citing Churchill’s reference to 'blood and sweat and tears', he 
hoped that the Greek government would also display determined leadership and 
demand sacrifices of the population. Leeper conceded the wisdom of immediate 
wage increases in order to prevent civil unrest, but extracted assurances from 
Admiral Voulgaris that the public would be informed of the seriousness of the 
situation and the necessity of the policies to be introduced.90
Admiral Voulgaris eventually admitted that economic stability required increased 
taxation and the imposition of price controls, and claimed that concrete steps had 
already been taken in both areas. Nevertheless, he continued to stress that Greece 
still needed extra supplies from abroad. He explained that until the new policies 
were enforced, wage increases had to be granted given the threat of a general 
strike. Within days, Admiral Voulgaris sought further British help to overcome the 
latest wave of labour unrest. Tobacco workers were demanding a 250% pay rise, 
and the government was afraid that any concessions would provoke similar 
demands from others, while a refusal could trigger a general strike. Admiral 
Voulgaris was unable to take any decision. The British were unwilling to give a 
definite answer on the spot, but observed that the pay rises already offered to the 
tobacco workers (150%) suggested huge profits which should be taxed by the 
state. They stressed that given the political dimension, Admiral Voulgaris would 
have to take his own decisions, but that any wage increases conceded by the 
government should be as small as possible, and should be granted solely for the 
purpose of buying time for a policy of economic controls.91
Despite consistent pressure from the British, the policy vacuum in Athens had 
continued throughout the whole of May, with the Greeks appearing reluctant to 
undertake any serious measures before the return of Varvaressos. By the time he 
finally arrived on May 27, the economic situation was becoming desperate. The
90 FG371/48330 R7868, Athens to FO, Telegram no. 1104, 3.5.1945; FO371/48330 R7921, 
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sovereign rate had recently doubled within a week and rapid inflation seemed 
imminent. With Varvaressos back, events moved rapidly. Within days, the full 
extent and scope of the UNRRA relief programme was finally announced, while 
Admiral Voulgaris publicised the government’s determination to rebuild the 
country, stressing that the success of the measures depended on a universal 
willingness to make sacrifices and work for the common good. Varvaressos 
assumed the posts of deputy prime minister and minister of supply on Jime 3. With 
this move, the long months of 'delay and indecision' finally came to an end, and 
Greece entered into a period of economic reforms which came to be known as the 
'Varvaressos Experiment'.92
3.5 Conclusions
During the seven and a half months between liberation and the return of 
Varvaressos to the government, efforts to undo the economic legacy of the 
occupation had largely met with failure. As a result, the Greek economy remained 
as much in a state of disarray as it had been in October 1944. Although the 
presence of Varvaressos in the cabinet indicated that vigorous action would at last 
be taken, it is clear that the new approach could no longer count on the frenzied 
enthusiasm which had greeted liberation but had long since evaporated in the face 
of continuing uncertainties.
While the task of restoring even a modicum of normality to such a devastated 
country was clearly never going to be straightforward, the difficulties were 
compounded by the stance of successive governments in Athens. Even before 
liberation, ministers were unable to devise any programme to foster recovery. This 
total neglect of economic planning, coupled with the exclusion of the one man who 
had appreciated the problems and suggested concrete solutions, ensured that the 
returning National Unity Government was entirely unprepared to cope with the 
reality it encountered.
Even worse was the fact that successive governments seemed content to follow 
this pattern. No member of any of the three governments appeared willing to take 
any serious initiatives to reconstruct the country's economic life. Ministers were 
essentially reactive, enacting short-term policies on an ad hoc basis. The official 
stance on economic matters was invariably more about the tactics of day-to-day 
survival than the strategy of planning for the future. When the problems of the 
economy generated specific challenges requiring a decisive response, no
92 F0371/48331 R8745, Athens to FO, Telegram no. 1182, 16.5.1945; T236/1044, Hill to 
Waley, 31.5.1945 (Enclosures: Diary of Events from Saturday 19th May to Wednesday 30th 
May; Maben to Voulgaris, 28.5.1945); T236/1044, Broadcast by Admiral Voulgaris from 
Athens Radio, 29.5.1945; Patterson, op.cit., 1948, pp. 178-179.
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government was able to offer anything more constructive than hasty capitulation in 
the face of social unrest.
Varvaressos aside, the hopes of all ministers appeared to lie solely in the 
prospect of help from abroad. As Leeper later wrote, they seemed to assume that 
the crisis could be 'put right by foreign assistance'.93 In a situation where austerity 
measures would inevitably arouse popular protest, extensive aid from the Allies 
had obvious attractions. The British wondered whether ministers were using the 
prospect of external help as an excuse to avoid unpopular decisions, and believed 
they had become convinced that nothing could be achieved 'without a foreign 
loan.'94 One observer even suggested that they had deliberately done nothing in the 
expectation that London would 'save them from the mess' which their 'delay and 
indecision' had created,95 while another sensed that the British were being 
blackmailed into bailing them out.96 Despite recent attempts to blame royalists 
alone for the view that outside aid was the main solution,97 Varvaressos seems far 
more correct in stressing that such beliefs were almost universal98 Certainly, apart 
from Varvaressos himself, this assumption does not appear to have been 
questioned by any minister, regardless of political ilk.
This apparent expectation that Allied assistance would be forthcoming was an 
unfortunate distraction, diverting attention away from the seriousness of the task 
ahead. The British were adamant that such attitudes would lead 'nowhere'.99 In a 
similar vein, Varvaressos criticised politicians, both within and outside successive 
cabinets, for living in a 'world of make-believe' while the economy continued to 
deteriorate.100 It is not possible to single out any of the governments as either more 
or less effective in facing the crisis, as all three demonstrated a remarkable 
consistency in their approach. Some attempts have been made to absolve the 
Papandreou government of the failure of the November stabilisation plan, which 
several authors saw as prematurely aborted by the outbreak of fighting in
93 Leeper, op.cit., 1950, p. 155.
94 Ibid., p. 156.
95 F0371/48331 R9017, FO to Athens, Telegram no. 1219, 25.5.1945.
96 F0371/48331 R9037, Athens to FO, Telegram no. 1230, 23.5.1945.
97 Hadziiossif, op.cit., 1987, p.27.
98 TE/AKB/B5, Memorandum on the Greek Economic Situation, K. Varvaressos, 2.8.1946, 
pp.75-79.
99 WO204/8761, Public Works in Greece, 2.2.1945.
10° TE/AKB/B5, Memorandum on the Greek Economic Situation, K. Varvaressos, 2.8.1946,
p.80.
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Athens.101 Despite the proximity of the two events, such views ignore the fact that 
the reform was already moribund by the first days of December. The claim that the 
fighting left the government no time to complete its economic programme' seems 
questionable given that no such programme ever existed.102
The chronic lack of an effective stance on economic matters derived partly from 
the fragility of successive governments, which felt they lacked both the political 
mandate and the real power necessary to force through unpopular measures.103 
Few ministers, apart from Varvaressos, had any confidence in their ability to 
combat the mounting crisis. One British observer remarked that the Greeks felt 
there was 'so little’ they could do to 'help themselves', that it was simply 'not 
worth starting to do it'.104 Varvaressos was also scathing of this belief that the 
country could do nothing to help itself.105 Such hesitancy was perhaps not 
surprising given the make-up of the provisional governments, which mindful of the 
weakness of their popular support, shied away from painful anti-inflationary 
policies. As Politakis observes, an austerity package would have to be paid for at 
the ballot box.106 Nevertheless, the crisis could not be overcome by 'delay and 
indecision', and drastic measures were clearly required. This reality, so forcibly 
repeated ad nauseam by the British, was acknowledged by Varvaressos alone.
The dismal record of successive governments prevented the successful 
implementation of any coherent policy to restore economic normality to the 
country. Even if ministers had chosen to entirely disregard British advice, they 
displayed little enthusiasm in carrying out schemes devised by leading Greek 
economists, namely Varvaressos and Zolotas. While Varvaressos was the first to 
point out the need for a clear and coordinated approach to post-liberation economic 
problems, he was excluded from decision-making even before the govemment-in- 
exile returned to Athens. While the British continued to hold him in high regard, 
the Papandreou government chose to ignore his ideas, instructing him instead to 
travel the world with a begging bowl on the country's behalf. Even after his return 
to the Bank of Greece, ministers proved no more ready to accept his advice. In
101 Hadziiosif, op.cit., 1987, p.27; Politakis, op.cit., 1990, pp. 103, 340; W.O. Candilis, The 
Economy of Greece, 1944-66: Efforts for Stability and Development. New York: Praeger, 
1968, p.27.
102Hadziiosif, op.cit., 1987, p.27.
103 FQ371/48331 R9Q37, Athens to FO, Telegram no. 1230, 23.5.1945.
104 7236/139, Hugh-Jones to Waley, 30.1.1945.
105 TE/AKB/B5, Memorandum on the Greek Economic Situation, K. Varvaressos, 2.8.1946, 
p.76.
106 Politakis, op.cit., 1990, p. 106.
109
many respects, Zolotas fared no better. Even though his ideas had been preferred to 
those of Varvaressos, little was done to ensure their success.
The pre-liberation disagreements between the two economists have been 
misrepresented by subsequent authors, who chose to contrast Varvaressos’ initial 
proposals from the spring and autumn of 1944 with a Zolotas memorandum written 
in November.107 This distorts the options available to the Papandreou government 
by presenting them as a choice between Varvaressos' simplistic formula for the 
exchange rate with Zolotas' comprehensive package. Such accounts have totally 
ignored the constant evolution of Varvaressos' views on the exchange rate, his 
consistent calls for a clear and coordinated policy, and his emphasis on the need for 
economic controls. On the other hand, Zolotas has been applauded for not ignoring 
the 'realities of liberation', and for demonstrating 'pragmatic liberalism' and a 
'carefully managed approach', balanced throughout by 'continuous corrective 
intervention'.108 Such praise fails to consider Zolotas' complete misjudgement of 
the climate likely to prevail after liberation, as demonstrated by his predictions of 
rapid dishoarding of gold.
It would be equally simplistic to dismiss the views of Zolotas out of hand. After 
all, he had pointed out the necessity of balancing the budget and halting the printing 
presses. Furthermore, he could claim with much justification that his ideas had not 
been given a full chance to succeed, as little had been done to create the necessary 
preconditions he had deemed essential. However, he seemed unable to offer any 
real solutions to the crisis. For practical purposes, his 'continuous corrective 
intervention' appears to have amounted to nothing more than the desperate sale of 
sovereigns. Even though this had clearly failed in November, he was still 
advocating the resumption of the policy after his dismissal.109
The Zolotas approach seemed to absolve the government from enacting several 
measures already taken for granted in other countries. His non-interventionist 
stance, with its tolerance of free market operations, transactions in gold, sales of
107 Candilis, op.cit., 1968, pp.23-30; Politakis, op.cit., 1990, pp.85-103; T. A)u>Yooicov<|rng -  
2. Aa^apexov, H Apaxprj: NopiopaxiKa Kaftecrrarxa teat Arffiooiovopuceg Tapaxeg oxtf 
NewTEpri EXXada. AOrjva: IMOII-AftT|vaiicTi Oikovojuictj, 1997, p. 179. All authors 
accepted the somewhat biased accounts given in two later histories of the Bank of Greece;Ta 
TJpana nevrjvra Xpovia vrjg Tpcace^rjg xrjg EXXadog 1928-1978. AOrjva, 1978, pp.242- 
247; H. Beve^r], XpoviKov rr/g T p o a t E X X a & o g .  AOrjva, 1955, pp.318-323. Both 
contained introductions written by Zolotas, who remained governor of the Bank for several 
decades. A third source of distortion was Zolotas' own work which includes the text of all his 
post-liberation statements only; S. ZoXxoxa ,^ H IIoXixiktj xrjg Tpajte^rjg xrjg EXXadog. 
Afhryva: Ilcoca^rjc,n5» 1945.
108 Politakis, op.cit., 1990, pp. 103, 339.
109 WO204/8765, Reflections on the Proper Monetary Policy, X. Zolotas, 8.1.1945. See also S. 
ZoXxorag, H  I I o X i x i k t j  xrjg Tpcate r^jg xrjg EXXadog. A0rjva: ncuta^Tjcnig, 1945.
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foreign currency, and capital flight was entirely out of step with policies to combat 
scarcity anywhere else at the time. For Varvaressos, reliance on the free market 
was 'repugnant', and could serve only the interest of 'profiteers and speculators', 
who were to be left 'completely unmolested'.110 This view was fully endorsed by 
Patterson, who pointed out that the implicit 'attitude towards war profiteers and tax 
evaders [...] compared unfavourably' with that of 'most other post-liberation 
governments of Europe'.111 Despite such damning criticisms, the essentially 
laissezfaire approach found much more favour, and was consistent with the 
actions of virtually every government between 1944 and 1947. Such measures as 
the sale of gold and foreign currency received widespread support within Greece 
not only in late 1944,112 but as will be seen, also in subsequent years.
Thus the first seven and a half months after liberation demonstrated the 
considerable conflict between two very divergent approaches, broadly articulated 
by the views of Varvaressos and Zolotas. To a large extent, Varvaressos' vision of 
state management as a solution to scarcity reflected his awareness of the success of 
measures undertaken in wartime Britain. Unsurprisingly, his views largely 
accorded with British thinking, but seemed alien in a country which had little 
understanding of what had been achieved elsewhere. In contrast, Zolotas' non­
interventionist ideas appeared to either ignore or reject lessons learned elsewhere, 
but seemed much more appealing to Greek politicians and business circles. The 
violent disagreement over which of these stances should be adopted remained 
unresolved throughout the whole period of British involvement in Greece.
110TE/AKB/B5, Memorandum on the Greek Economic Situation, K. Varvaressos, 2.8.1946, 
p.75.
111 Patterson, op. cit., 1948, p.43.
112 Senior bankers (namely Pesmazoglou and Diomedes) actually sought British help to persuade 
Zolotas to pursue an even 'bolder policy' on gold sales; F0371/43725 R19894, Athens to 
FO, Telegram no. 17 Remac, 3.12.1944.
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4 'CLARITY AND ENERGY'
While the first five months of 1945 were characterised by government inertia and 
unwillingness to take any decisive action to improve the economic situation, this 
was to change once Varvaressos joined the cabinet. After the timidity of the 
politicians, the energy and the courage of the technocrat Varvaressos offered a 
striking contrast. For the first time, a minister launched a bold programme designed 
to overcome the immediate crisis and initiate the process of recovery. Most of this 
package enjoyed the full blessing of the British, containing as it did all the main 
policies which they had long been urging the Greeks to adopt. Nevertheless, 
despite initial success, Varvaressos failed to achieve any of his major objectives, 
and his decisive stance proved as fruitless as the vacillations of his predecessors. 
This chapter explains the nature and course of the so-called 'Varvaressos 
Experiment' and the opposition it aroused, and analyses the controversy 
surrounding its failure.
4.1 The Return of Varvaressos
To understand why Varvaressos had suddenly become so important in British 
eyes, it is necessary to recount his activities since the autumn of 1944. As already 
noted, the British had looked to him to suggest a definite policy as an alternative to 
the total inertia prevailing in Athens, and were enthusiastic about his ideas. 
However, given the apparent mistrust felt towards Varvaressos in Greek 
government circles, the matter was allowed to drop.1 British respect for 
Varvaressos grew steadily from January 1945, when he returned to Athens to 
resume the governorship of the Bank of Greece. Officials at the Treasury 
welcomed the move. John Maynard Keynes felt confident that he would be able to 
'bring a breath of responsibility' into the country's economic affairs.2 In a final 
meeting before his departure, Waley was pleased to note how much his views 
concurred with those of Whitehall.3 It was precisely this perception of a common 
ground which gradually convinced the British that Varvaressos could be their most 
important ally in the struggle to restore economic stability.
His ideas had been explained at length to Allied representatives immediately after 
his return to Athens. Varvaressos was deeply worried with the current state of the 
economy and was convinced many government policies needed to be changed. He
1 F0371/43724 R17044, Minute by Laskey, 23.10.1944; F0371/43724 R17044, FO to 
Athens, Telegram no.5, 23.10.1944.
2 T236/139, Minute by Keynes, 22.1.1945
3 F0371/48326 R1120, Waley to Hugh Jones, 12.1.1945.
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was alarmed by the twin spirals of prices and wages, which he felt would lead to 
inevitable chaos. He believed that domestically produced commodities should be 
subject to price controls, while ML supplies would have to be sold at realistic 
prices rather than simply be distributed free of charge. At the same time, wages 
would have to be pegged to the controlled prices rather than to open market rates. 
He was appalled by the prevailing attitude that only external assistance rather than 
internal effort could solve the country's problems. Although he wished for 
continued British financing of the armed forces, he hoped that both their size and 
costs could be kept at levels which the country could maintain in the future. He 
believed that the drachma was seriously overvalued, but felt that political and 
psychological factors ruled out any adjustments in the near future. He emphasised 
the need to provide low-interest credit to revitalise local industry, but stressed that 
such credits would have to be targeted towards firms which were committed to 
restarting production and selling their output at designated prices. He was adamant 
that neither industrialists nor financiers should be allowed to make vast profits by 
exploiting the current situation. Finally, he condemned the gold sales policy 
previously pursued by the Bank of Greece.4
The governor's audience had been particularly impressed with his views, which 
contrasted so sharply with the apparent lack of policy and drive from the current 
government. An admiring Leeper claimed that while Sideris was content to beg for 
further Allied help, Varvaressos was tackling essential problems with 'clarity and 
energy', and seemed to be the 'only man' able to 'grasp Greece's post-war 
problems'.5 Within weeks, he had impressed even further, with his initiatives on 
price fixing and relief supplies. As already indicated, by the middle of February the 
British authorities were discussing the possibility of suggesting Varvaressos as a 
likely replacement for Sideris. Nevertheless, they feared that such an appointment 
might be resisted by many in the cabinet, or that even if appointed, Varvaressos 
could be forced out from office if the government fell. Given the political 
uncertainty, not wishing to risk the support that Varvaressos was providing from 
the Bank of Greece, it was decided not to press the matter.6
However, the British quickly changed their minds and sought to bring about 
what they had dubbed the 'Varvaressos Solution' by securing him a place within
4 FRUS, Vol.VIII, 1945. MacVeagh to the Secretary of State, 30.1.1945, pp. 196-197; 
F0371/48327 R2286, Athens to FO, Telegram no.24 Remac, 31.1.1945.
5 F0371/48327 R3109, Athens to FO, Telegram no.28 Remac, 13.2.1945; F0371/48327 
R3263, Athens to FO, Telegram no.538, 15.2.1945; F0371/48257 R3475, Athens to FO, 
Telegram no.565, 19.2.1945.
6 WO204/8761, E&SC (45) 4th Meeting, 29.1.1945; WO204/8761, E&SC (45) 6th Meeting,
12.2.1945. For the original idea of replacing Sideris, see p.99.
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the cabinet.7 Initial discussions with senior Greek officials led to the suggestion 
that Varvaressos should become a minister with overall 'authority to control and 
co-ordinate economic and financial measures'. At first, the regent was very 'non­
committal' and suggested that such an appointment might entail political 
difficulties,8 but within days, both Damaskinos and General Plastiras seemed 
agreeable to the idea.9 The regent admitted that the proposal was attracting 'much 
discussion',10 while widespread rumours in Athens predicted that Varvaressos 
would soon be joining the government (albeit as finance minister).11
Despite the apparent inevitability that Varvaressos would assume the post, 
events took a different turn. While still believing that Varvaressos would be a 
useful addition to the Plastiras government, by mid-March the British decided not 
to stir up 'personal jealousies and antipathies', as it seemed that Sideris was 
opposed to the granting of wider powers to Varvaressos.12 In any case, 
Varvaressos chose to remove himself from the Greek political scene by visiting 
Britain and the United States. In Washington, he wished to publicise the difficulties 
facing Greece, which he felt were insufficiently understood by the Americans. In 
London, he wanted to discuss more concrete matters, and was particularly 
determined to secure increased supplies of raw materials and industrial 
equipment13
It is not clear why Varvaressos made such a choice at this time. Moreover, an 
additional government request that he should join its delegation at the San 
Francisco conference after completing his talks has further clouded the issue. Some 
Allied observers speculated whether the foreign trips were merely a device to 
remove Varvaressos from Athens. Hill wondered if this was an attempt to 'side­
track' him,14 while the American ambassador Lincoln MacVeagh felt it was 
possible that his political opponents were happy to see him out of the country.15
7 F0371/48257 R3769, Athens to Cairo, Telegram no.98, 16.2.1945.
8 F0371/48327 R3263, Athens to FO, Telegram no.538, 15.2.1945.
9 F0371/48257 R3565, Athens to FO, Telegram no.586, 21.2.1945.
10 FQ371/48262 R5390, Notes on Interview with the Regent, 28.2.1945.
11 F0371/48257 R3566, The Times, 23.2.1945.
12 F0371/48261 R5072, Athens to FO, Telegram no.762, 15.3.1945. This was not the first 
time that Sideris had demonstrated such hostility: back in January, he had seemed particularly 
unenthusiastic about the prospect of Varvaressos' return to Athens (see, p.97).
13 F0371/48328 R5780, Athens to FO, Telegram no.58 Remac, 27.3.1945; FQ371/48263 
R5989, Athens to FO, Telegram no.869, 31.3.1945; T236/1044, Athens to FO, Telegram 
no.72 Remac, 4.4.1945; T236/1044, Minute by Waley, 7.4.1945.
14 F0371/48328 R5780, Athens to FO, Telegram no.59 Remac, 27.3.1945.
15 FRUS, Vol.VIII, 1945. MacVeagh to the Secretary of State, 24.3.1945, pp.204-205.
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Several later historians have accepted such speculation at face value, and have 
suggested that Varvaressos was practically prevented from taking office by his 
enemies in the Greek establishment. Thus Politakis repeats the MacVeagh quote, 
and goes on to claim that Varvaressos had been kept from power by ’significant 
domestic opposition', and that Varvaressos' opponents had won 'a temporary 
victory'.16 Richter goes even further to claim that other ministers' delight about the 
prospects of Varvaressos' absence amounted to a 'rejection of his policy of 
economic austerity'.17 Hadziiossif also exaggerated individual statements by 
various Greeks to build up an unsubstantiated picture of a coherent anti- 
Varvaressos opposition.18
It is possible that the San Francisco leg of the trip - which Varvaressos neither 
wanted nor regarded as necessary19 - may be interpreted in such a light. As already 
noted, the events of September 1944 indicated much personal hostility towards 
Varvaressos from politicians. In addition, he was also disliked by sectional 
interests, particularly bankers, most of whom were opposed to his strict credit 
policies.20 However, there is no evidence to confirm he was kept out of office by a 
concerted opposition. It seems clear that Varvaressos had little intention of joining 
the government and regarded his foreign trips (San Francisco excepted) as vital. On 
several previous occasions he had already declined offers of cabinet posts. In 
December 1944, he had refused the finance ministry, preferring to reassume the 
governorship of the Bank of Greece.21 According to Sideris, Varvaressos had 
turned down similar offers in early February and mid-March 22 Even when finally 
invited to become minister of co-ordination after the change of government in early 
April, he still indicated great reluctance to accept.23 Moreover, in interviews with 
the British, Varvaressos took pains to justify his decision to visit London and 
Washington, making it clear how much importance he attached to the move 24
16 Politakis, op.cit., 1990, pp. 110-111.
17 H. Richter, British Intervention in Greece: From Varkiza to Civil War. February 1945 to 
August 1946. London: Merlin Press, 1985, p.210.
18 Hadziiossif, op.cit., 1987, pp.29-30.
19 FRUS, Vol.VIII, 1945. MacVeagh to the Secretary of State, 24.3.1945, pp.204-205; 
F0371/48328 R5780, Athens to FO, Telegram no.58 Remac, 27.3.1945.
20 F0371/48330 R6984, Athens to FO, Telegram no.92 Remac, 18.4.1945.
21 FQ371/48347 R16322, Greek Personalities Report, 17.9.1945, p.44.
22 FD371/48328 R5780, Athens to FO, Telegram no.58 Remac, 27.3.1945.
23 T236/1044, Waley to Hill, 13.4.1945.
24 F0371/48328 R5780, Athens to FO, Telegram no.58 Remac, 27.3.1945; T236/1044, 
Athens to FO, Telegram no.72 Remac, 4.4.1945.
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Between Varvaressos' announcement of his trips in late March, and his 
departure some two weeks later, the question of his assuming office continued to 
be raised many times during the flurry of activity which accompanied the accession 
of Admiral Voulgaris. Although his name was not mentioned during the cabinet 
reshuffle of April 2, when it was rumoured that Sideris would be made minister of 
co-ordination,25 the arrival of the Voulgaris government rekindled speculation that 
Varvaressos would soon be brought in. On April 8, further rumours suggested that 
he would be offered the ministry of finance, but by the next day it was claimed he 
was finally to be brought in as minister of co-ordination 26 On April 10, 
Mantzavinos urged Varvaressos to accept the post.27 Later that day, he claimed to 
have 'no enthusiasm' for the idea 28 and still seemed unwilling to join the cabinet 
three days later,29 before finally accepting on April 17.30 Before taking office, 
Varvaressos had insisted on the removal of certain ministers and civil servants,31 
and later admitted that he was prepared to take responsibility for the economy only 
if granted suitably sweeping powers.32
In the event, his foreign trips achieved little despite a series of high level 
meetings with British and American officials.33 The San Francisco leg of his 
journey was cut short after only a few days, as the deteriorating state of the Greek 
economy moved the British to press Admiral Voulgaris to recall him from abroad 
as quickly as possible. Accordingly, on April 20, the latter promised to order him 
back upon completion of his business in Washington.34 As indicated earlier, the 
British had long regarded Varvaressos as the man most likely to implement
25 F0371/48264 R6182, Athens to FO, Telegram no.893, 4.4.1945.
26 F0371/48264 R6432, Athens to FO, Telegram no.932, 8.4.1945; F0371/48264 R6477, 
Athens to FO, Telegram no.943,9.4.1945.
27 F0371/48329 R6519, Athens to FO, Telegram no.82 Remac, 10.4.1945.
28 FQ371/48329 R6519, Minute by Laskey, 11.4.1945; F0371/48329 R6519, Minute by 
Howard, 11.4.1945.
29 T236/1044, Waley to Hill, 13.4.1945.
30 F0371/48267 R7363, Athens to FO, Telegram no.36 Saving, 17.4.1945.
31 FO371/58680 R4219, Athens to FO, Telegram no.59, 1.3.1946 (Enclosure: Political 
Summary 1945, pp. 11-12). See also T. Kaoiiurrr|£, To OixovopiKov npofiXripa: Ti Eyivc. 
Ti Tlpenei va Avei. AOrjva: Haiacovkag, 1945, pp.26-27.
32 Patterson, op.cit., 1948, p. 178.
33 While in London, Varvaressos had talks with Dalton, Eden and Bevin. In Washington, he met 
the president of the Export-Import Bank and several government officials; T236/1044, Waley 
to Hill, 13.4.1945; FRUS, Vol.VIII, 1945. Clayton to Diamantopoulos, 4.5.1945, pp.213- 
215; Memorandum by Baxter, 4.5.1945, pp.215-216.
34 FO371/48330 R7093, Athens to FO, Telegram no. 1016, 20.4.1945; FO371/48330 R7164, 
Athens to FO, Telegram no. 1017, 20.4.1945; FRUS, Vol.VIII, 1945. MacVeagh to the 
Secretary of State, 21.4.1945, pp.211-212.
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appropriate economic policies, and the way was now clear to address the most 
pressing problems of the Greek economy.35 With his imminent return to Athens, 
the British decided to take advantage of his stopover in London to explain the 
course they wanted him to pursue. The agenda for the forthcoming talks was based 
on a memorandum drawn up by E. Lingeman, Leeper's economic adviser, after 
consultations with Zafiriou, and Hill.36
The memorandum contained an analysis of those areas of the Greek economy 
where the imposition of state controls over distribution and price would yield 
tangible benefits. It highlighted many absurdities resulting either from the absence 
of suitable controls or from the uneven implementation of existing controls. Thus 
while certain districts suffered severe shortages of commodities, the same goods 
were often in plentiful supply on the free market elsewhere. Other much needed 
items were hoarded in anticipation of future price rises in the absence of official 
willingness to requisition stocks. While the government experienced huge 
difficulties with the distribution of relief supplies, owners of private transport were 
apparently making huge profits. Such anomalies were clearly unacceptable. 
Lingeman thus recommended that the government should assume far greater 
control over all modes of transport and freight charges. Moreover, a system of 
registration of stocks and powers to requisition goods were vital to combat 
hoarding and ensure a more equitable distribution of existing supplies. Only such 
measures would enable the successful operation of price controls, which would 
embrace both basic foodstuffs and other essential commodities. In addition, greater 
care was needed to prevent relief supplies from reaching the black market, and 
given huge local variations in the free distribution of UNRRA goods, consistent 
guidelines on these issues were clearly necessary. To this end, Lingeman 
suggested the appointment of a British official with relevant experience, together 
with experts on publicity and control policies to advise the ministry of co­
ordination37
35 According to Macmillan, Varvaressos was the 'only man in this field who is any good1; 
F0371/48330 R7977, Caserta to FO, Telegram no.810,6.5.1945. Leeper later described him 
as the 'man cut out for the job' of giving direction to official economic policies; Leeper, 
op.cit., 1950, p. 168. American senior officials expressed similar views. Dean Acheson 
claimed that Varvaressos was 'by far the best man in the Greek government'; D. Acheson, 
Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Department. New York; Norton, 1969, p. 199.
36 T236/1044, Hill to Davidson, 26.4.1945 (Enclosure; Minute by Hill, 24.4.1945); 
T236/1044, Hill to Davidson, 2.5.1945 (Enclosure: Economic Reconstruction of Greece: 
Notes for Programme as Evolved in Conversations with Miss Zafiriou, 30.4.1945); 
FO371/48330 R7752, Athens to FO, Telegram no.99 Remac, 1.5.1945.
37 F0371/48331 R8904, Laskey to Caccia, 16.5.1945 (Enclosure: Controls in Greece, E.R. 
Lingeman, 9.5.1945).
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With minor amendments from the Treasury, the Lingeman recommendations 
formed the basis for the subsequent discussions in London.38 The talks revealed 
broad agreement on strategy, but disagreement on priorities and the timing of 
individual measures. For the Treasury, the main priority was to construct a 'simple 
and striking' programme designed to create public confidence. Varvaressos pointed 
out the practical difficulties he would face. He emphasised that prices had risen out 
of all proportion to pre-war price and wage levels, and thus had to be reduced 
rather than merely frozen. So far, price controls extended only to relief supplies, 
but all local produce needed to supplement the UNRRA ration was 
disproportionately expensive. He therefore queried whether controls should 
embrace essential goods only or a much wider range of items. He realised the 
former option would be much easier, but warned that this would allow the 
continued production of luxury items. Worried that this would divert labour and 
capital from the production of essentials, he felt controls should be extended 
widely. He warned that strict control of each commodity price might take months to 
achieve, and thus suggested the imposition of maximum prices which could not be 
increased without special authority. He believed that the introduction of a wage 
freeze should be accompanied by immediate price reductions with further 
reductions to follow. He also hoped that the increasing production of most essential 
commodities should ease the upward pressure on prices. Varvaressos suggested 
that prices should be reduced to March levels, but the British doubted whether this 
was feasible. The meeting ended without clarifying the apparent differences of 
emphasis.39 General agreement was reached on the broad strategy to be pursued, 
with Varvaressos receiving complete freedom to work out the details.40
4.2 The 'Varvaressos Experiment'
As already noted, Varvaressos returned to Athens on May 27 to find the country in 
the midst of economic turmoil. Following last minute assurances that he would 
have a free hand in pursuing any policies he deemed necessary, he assumed the 
posts of deputy prime minister and minister of supply on June 3, without
38 F0371/48331 R8508, Sandberg to Laskey, 15.5.1945 (Enclosure: Economic Measures and 
Controls in Greece, 14.5.1945); F0371/48331 R8743, Davidson to Laskey, 17.5.1945; 
F0371/48331 R8743, Laskey to Davidson, 19.5.1945.
39 FQ371/48331 R9195, Draft Note of a Meeting Held at the Treasury on May 18th to Discuss 
the Greek Financial Position: Gold and Exchange Rate; FQ371/48331 R9208, Note of a 
Meeting Held in the Treasury on Tuesday, 22nd May, 1945, at 4.30 p.m. to Discuss 
Economic Measures and Controls in Greece.
40 T236/1044, Davidson to Hill, 24.5.1945; T236/1045, Waley to Hill, 6.6.1945.
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relinquishing the governorship of the Bank of Greece.41 With sweeping powers to 
control and coordinate all government policies on economic and financial matters, 
he was eager to take immediate action.42 On the eve of his appointment, 
Varvaressos confidently assured Leeper that he would tax the rich and put an end to 
the 'feasts of Kolonaki', in other words the extravagant lifestyle enjoyed by the 
affluent minority in Athens.43 Almost at once, the drachma was declared the sole 
legal tender, while transactions in gold by private individuals were outlawed, on 
pain of severe fines or imprisonment44
The Varvaressos programme appeared in the newspapers only three days after 
he took office. In introducing it, he claimed that the country had failed to recover 
after liberation because of two main obstacles. Firstly, successive governments 
exercised little control or supervision over the economy. Secondly, despite the 
goodwill of the Allies, relief supplies from abroad had fallen far short of the 
countiy's actual needs. The recent announcement of the UNRRA programme was 
expected to solve the latter. The most pressing need therefore was to assume 
sufficient powers to be able to ensure speedy recovery and increased material 
welfare. To explain the necessity of controls, Varvaressos pointed to the substantial 
role of the state in the economic life of other countries. In contrast, the lack of any 
form of controls in Greece had allowed a disproportionate share of the country's 
wealth to be concentrated in a few hands, while the majority of the population lived 
close to poverty.45 Moreover, some of those who enjoyed this disproportionate 
share were undermining the drachma and fuelling inflation by speculating in gold, 
while others were contributing to inflation by restricting production or hoarding 
goods and raw materials. In such circumstances, living standards could not be 
improved unless the existing maldistribution of incomes was reduced.46
41 F0371/48332 R9386, Athens to FO, Telegram no. 1281, 30.5.1945; F0371/48332 R9475, 
Athens to FO, Telegram no. 1301, 1.6.1945; Patterson, op.cit., 1948, p. 178.
42 F0371/48334 R12776, Compulsory Law No.395, Government Gazette, 12.6.1945.
43 F0371/48332 R9386, Athens to FO, Telegram no. 1281, 30.5.1945.
44 F0371/48334 R12776, Compulsory Law No.362, Government Gazette, 4.6.1945.
45 Zafiriou had recently calculated that among urban adults 14.5% of individuals held 77% of 
purchasing power. Although Coombs felt that these figures exaggerated the true extent of 
inequality, Varvaressos later defended the estimates as broadly correct; T236/1045, Hill to 
Rowe-Dutton, 4.7.1945 (Enclosure: Memorandum on the Present Structure of Money 
Incomes, and the Distribution of Purchasing Power among the Greek Population, R. 
Zafiriou, p.9); F0371/48334 R14166, Economic and Financial Developments in Greece 
November 1944-June 1945, C. Coombs, 1.8.1945, p.36; TE/AKB/B2, Varvaressos to 
Maben, 29.9.1945.
46 F0371/48334 R12776, Leeper to Eden, 8.6.1945 (Enclosure: Economic and Financial 
Programme of the Government, 5.6.1945); TE/AKB/(19)9, Avokoivcdoeis k. K. 
BapftapEOOU cog AvnitpoEhpou xqg KuftepvqaEcog, pp. 1-12.
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Varvaressos announced several measures to address this problem. Wage rates 
were increased by 50%-60%, while the prices of UNRRA foodstuffs other than 
bread were reduced by 50%. In addition, price controls were to be imposed on 
domestically produced goods, beginning with staples and gradually to be extended 
to all other commodities. He also demanded that retailers reduce their prices to 
levels prevailing before the recent wave of inflation. Claiming that the rich had 
profited from the country's misfortune, he promised heavy taxation. He called on 
traders and industrialists to comply with his programme, and warned that the 
period of 'excessive gains' was over. He added that if cooperation was not 
forthcoming, the government would not hesitate to take action to 'safeguard the 
people's interests'. He appealed to the public not to buy goods at inflated prices 
from the open market, promising that their purchasing power would soon increase 
as a result of his measures.47
The British reaction was one of relief that the policies they had long 
recommended were about to be implemented. They supported the main body of the 
programme, which largely reflected the recent London talks, but had reservations 
about the heavy reductions in the prices of UNRRA goods. Nevertheless, as Hill 
observed, since Varvaressos seemed to have 'turned politician' in pursuit of 
popular support, '100% financial purism' could no longer be expected. The most 
serious doubts centred around the government's ability to implement the measures, 
but the British strengthened their resolve to offer full support. The initial Greek 
reaction was also largely favourable. On the Athens market, both the sovereign rate 
and commodity prices reacted positively. The sovereign rate, which had closed at
17.000 drachmae on June 4, dropped to 14,500 during the next day and fell to
13.000 by the end of the week. Commodity prices on the open market fell by an 
average 7% during the same period, while Athens markets saw the reappearance of 
goods such as cheese and sugar 48
To implement his programme, Varvaressos set up the so-called 'Economic 
Service of the Vice President' within the Bank of Greece, a team of experts with 
cabinet authority to coordinate policies and issue instructions to ministries. To head 
this body, Varvaressos recruited Zafiriou, who had previously been involved with 
all his initiatives 49 Professor Pintos who had publicised price controls in the
47 Ibid.
48 T236/1045, Hill to Waley, 5.6.1945; T236/1045, Minute by Sandberg, 5.6.1945; 
T236/1045, Rowe-Dutton to Hill, 7.6.1945; F0371/48332 R9975, Athens to FO, Telegram 
no.1361, 9.6.1945; F0371/48272 R10796, AGIS Weekly Report No.34, 3-9 Jun 1945; 
FQ371/48272 R1G344, Athens to FO, Telegram no. 107 Saving, 11.6.1945.
49 T236/1045, Hill to Rowe-Dutton, 14.6.1945.
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Athens press back in May, was made under-secretary at the ministry of supply.50 
Varvaressos also created a new body to ensure more effective collaboration with 
UNRRA and the British authorities. The Economic Advisory Committee (EAC) 
replaced the Joint Policy Committee (JPC) and its various sections. Unlike the 
previous bodies, no Greek ministers or officials were to be included in the EAC, 
which would consist of the foreign advisors and Varvaressos with his allies 
Zafiriou and Pintos.51 Apart from creating new structures, Varvaressos also 
initiated a reorganisation of the ministry of supply, including the setting up of a 
new department to supervise all matters relating to UNRRA supplies.52
The first concrete control scheme came on June 10, when Varvaressos imposed 
retail price ceilings on 17 locally produced goods, mainly foodstuffs. The new 
official prices were considerably lower than those currently prevailing in the open 
market, and represented a return to levels of May 5. A second list, involving a far 
wider range of commodities and further price reductions was issued on June 17, 
after which regular updatings were issued on a weekly basis. As a result of these 
measures, Varvaressos claimed an early victory. Within three weeks, he announced 
that the ceilings were being observed, and that the cost of living had consequently 
dropped by 30%. Competent observers confirmed this, adding that the prices of 
some items had even fallen below official levels. However, some deterioration in 
the quality of market goods was noted, and several commodities were becoming 
increasingly scarce. Varvaressos recognised some shortages, but claimed these 
were the result of increased purchases rather than hoarding. The undeniable initial 
success was limited mainly to foodstuffs, as no manufactured goods had been 
covered by the June announcements. At first, the measures were introduced in the 
Athens area only, but the swift establishment of a network of provincial 
committees53 allowed the imposition of a uniform policy throughout the country by 
the end of June. By this time, a market police corps had been set up to enforce the 
policy.54
50 FG371/48272 R1Q344, Athens to FO, Telegram no. 107 Saving, 11.6.1945.
51 F0371/48333 R10910, Minutes of a Meeting Held at the Bank of Greece, 14.6.1945;
F0371/48333 R11265, Paper No. EAC (45)1; F0371/48333 R11266, EAC (45) 1st 
Meeting, 23.6.1945.
52 F0371/48334 R12776, Compulsory Law No.451, Government Gazette, 9.7.1945;
F0371/48334 R12776, Compulsory Law No.452, Government Gazette, 9.7.1945;
F0371/48333 R11601, Paper No. EAC (45)2.
53 F0371/48334 R12776, No 21367 Decision of the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of 
Supply, 14.6.1945.
54 Patterson, op.cit., 1948, pp.216-218; F0371/48334 R14166, Economic and Financial 
Developments in Greece November 1944-June 1945, C. Coombs, 1.8.1945, pp.47-48; 
F0371/48334 R12776, Kadrjpepivrj, 26.6.1945.
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To further discourage violations of his control schemes, Varvaressos enacted a 
measure designed to combat 'offences threatening the vital interests of the public'. 
Actions falling under this heading included the closure or suspension of any 
industrial or retail business for the purpose of evading government regulations, the 
concealment or hoarding of goods of basic necessity, and infringements of the 
newly imposed price controls. Producers or traders failing to comply were to be 
punished by heavy fines or imprisonment, together with the withdrawal of licenses 
to operate their businesses for a period of at least six months, during which time 
their enterprises would be administered by the state.55
Shortly afterwards, Varvaressos announced major initiatives designed to balance 
the budget. To reduce expenditure, he declared his resolve to end severe 
overmanning within the civil service.56 To increase revenue, he devised a new 
form of taxation. Explaining that the country's budgetary problems could not be 
solved by squeezing the poor via the raising of indirect taxes or the cost of 
UNRRA rations, he recalled his earlier promise to tax the rich. Given the 
inadequacies of the tax collecting machinery and the need to produce immediate 
yields, he rejected increases in conventional direct taxation, choosing instead to 
introduce the so-called 'Special Contribution'.57 This was to be paid by almost all 
commercial, industrial and professional enterprises for a period of nine months. 
Each month, every business renting its premises was to be charged a multiple of its 
rent, while those owning their premises were to pay a similar multiple of imputed 
rental values of their properties. The special contribution was to be levied at three 
different rates varying between 6 and 15 times the rental value. Varvaressos 
justified this measure by claiming that as rents had become nominal as a result of a 
general rent moratorium, businesses had made large savings in a period when all 
other goods and services had experienced considerable inflation. Although 
Varvaressos was in effect taxing these savings, he admitted the special contribution 
hardly constituted a 'scientific' form of taxation.58
With the announcement of the new tax, the Varvaressos programme ran into 
immediate problems. The special contribution attracted a huge wave of hostility 
from those who felt it threatened their interests. Many organisations representing 
traders or industrialists issued vigorous protests, most notably the Athens
55 F0371/48334 R12776, Constitutional Act No.57, Government Gazette, 22.6.1945.
56 F0371/48334 R12776, Constitutional Act No.59, Government Gazette, 26.6.1945.
57 FOS71/48334 R12776, Compulsory Law No.431, Government Gazette, 21.6.1945.
58 TE/AKB/(19)9, AvaKoivtooeig k . K. Bapftapeoou tog Avxiicpoedpou Trig Kvpepvnoeajg,
pp. 13-19; F0371/48334 R14166, Economic and Financial Developments in Greece 
November 1944-June 1945, C. Coombs, 1.8.1945, pp.33-37; Patterson, op.cit., 1948, 
pp. 183-186.
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Federation of Traders and Small Manufacturers. Within days, the Federation 
attempted to send a delegation to Varvaressos, and announced plans for a 
shopkeepers' strike after the minister refused to meet them. The press reported that 
industrialists had asked for the special contribution to be suspended until all 
affected groups could be consulted. Varvaressos refused to compromise. In 
protest, the Federation announced an indefinite shopkeepers' strike to begin on 
July 9. Varvaressos restated his determination to collect the tax and warned that 
failure to pay the first instalment on time (by July 10) would be punished by the 
imposition of draconian fines. He promised that individual complaints would be 
addressed, but only after the July instalment was paid. As for the threatened strike, 
Varvaressos warned that the full force of the law would be applied to those who 
undertook such an illegal act. Stronger warnings were issued by Pintos, who 
announced that any shop closed for more than 24 hours would be reopened and 
operated by his ministry. This resolute stance had the desired effect. Instead of the 
indefinite stoppage, a one-day strike was called for July 9. Even this was 
unsuccessful. No more than 15% of shops in Athens and Piraeus joined the strike, 
of which very few remained shut for the entire day.59
While the special contribution had aroused the hostility of many within the 
business community, Varvaressos encountered further problems when he 
attempted to fulfil a previous promise to ensure an adequate supply of cloth and 
clothing at reasonable prices. This involved conflict with both government inertia 
and stout resistance from industrialists. As the textile industry had not yet 
recommenced production, the country experienced severe shortages of clothing, 
and prices of material had risen more quickly than those of almost any other 
commodity. These shortages had been further aggravated by the woeful 
inefficiency of successive governments in distributing the huge amounts of finished 
textiles supplied by ML/UNRRA. ML alone had furnished over 3 million of yards 
of cloth between February and May, with further quantities being delivered by 
UNRRA. In addition, both agencies had provided large amounts of ready-made 
garments. Up to this time, these items had simply been allowed to pile up in 
Piraeus warehouses, a situation which Hill described as an 'outstanding scandal'. 
Varvaressos finally ended months of government inaction by introducing a ration 
system in late July, and fixed moderate prices for all imported textiles. Even so, 
administrative difficulties ensured that the distribution of these goods did not begin 
until late August A further problem arose from UNRRA deliveries of raw cotton, 
of which 7,500 tons had been received by late summer. This was sufficient to
59 F0371/48273 R11371, AGIS Weekly Report No.36, 17-23 Jun 1945; F0371/48274 
R12219, AGIS Weekly Report No.38, 1-7 Jul 1945; FG371/48275 R12702, AGIS Weekly 
Report No.39, 8-14 Jul 1945; Patterson, op.cit., 1948, pp. 187-189.
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allow the country's cotton industry to work at full capacity for a year. Negotiations 
on how to allocate these supplies to revive textile production had begun in June, 
but had produced few results. Varvaressos was determined that the whole capacity 
of the sector should be devoted to the manufacturing of utility goods, with all 
products, prices and profit margins to be decided by the government. Mill owners 
reacted unfavourably to these plans, resenting what they saw as an unprecedented 
degree of state control over all aspects of the production process. Particular 
disagreement was raised over estimates of production costs and profits for the 
manufacturers. Stubborn opposition by the industrialists ensured that negotiations 
dragged on for two months. Agreement was finally reached on August 4. The 
textile producers had been able to secure relatively generous terms. Officially, they 
were allowed 8% profits on government contracts. However, as competent 
observers were convinced that the mill owners had deliberately overstated their 
production costs, actual profits were likely to be considerably higher.60
While Varvaressos was engaged in such struggles, cracks had begun to appear 
in the entire control system. By mid-July, analysts were noting a 'slackening' of 
the programme's momentum. For the first time since Varvaressos joined the 
cabinet, the cost of living began to rise again. On July 21 the sovereign rate 
returned to June 5 levels. The initial success of the fixed prices began to evaporate 
as the availability of several commodities started to drop alarmingly. During July 
olive oil virtually disappeared from the Athens markets. By the first weeks of 
August, cheese, sugar, butter and soap were also in short supply. These shortages 
applied to commodities at controlled prices only, as more and more goods were 
being sold at higher prices in open defiance of the government. Varvaressos could 
only increase the number of policemen patrolling the markets and threatened severe 
penalties for those who ignored the controls. By this time, British observers were 
ruefully noting that early enthusiasm for the Varvaressos programme had faded 
sadly'.61
The return of inflation brought a new series of demands for higher wages, 
mainly from groups which had not benefited from the rises announced on June 5. 
Varvaressos fulfilled his promise to grant substantial wage increases to civil 
servants on June 22, but was determined not to make similar concessions to the
60 F0371/48332 R9723, Athens to FO, Telegrant no. 120 Remac, 5.6.1945; FQ371/48334 
R12776, KaffrifiepivT), 26.6.1945; FQ371/48273 R11371, AGIS Weekly Report No.36, 17- 
23 Jun 1945; FQ371/48276 R13678, AGIS Weekly Report No.41, 22-28 Jul 1945; 
F0371/48277 R13868, AGIS Weekly Report No.42, 29 Jul-4 Aug 1945; Patterson, op.cit., 
1948, pp.222-225; F0371/48337 R18405, Economic and Financial Developments in Greece 
July-August 1945, C. Coombs, 17.9.1945, pp.7-8.
61 F0371/48275 R12961, AGIS Weekly Report No.40, 15-21 Jul 1945; F0371/48278 
R14422, AGIS Weekly Report No.43, 5-11 Aug 1945.
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armed forces. This move failed to satisfy any of the interested parties. The civil 
servants regarded the raise insufficient and were generally opposed to the 
redundancy measures announced on the same day. The military were obviously 
dissatisfied at missing out, and Varvaressos came under relentless pressure from 
members of the armed forces and the police. In early August, he was forced to 
grant both groups pay rises comparable to those given in the civil service. At the 
same time, he bowed to similar pressure to grant massive rises to pensioners. 
Despite these unwelcome concessions, Varvaressos was adamant that he could not 
allow another series of general wage increases, and refused to accede to the 
demands of the Piraeus dock workers who had threatened strike action. Even in 
this case, he was forced to make compromises. Instead of higher wages, he 
conceded extra payments in the form of foodstuffs, and more generous working 
conditions.62
Table 4.1 Estimated Revenue and Expenditure, 1945-46 (in millions of drachmae)
Revenue
TOTAL ORDINARY 18,275.5
1-DIRECT TAXES 3345.0
2-INDIRECT TAXES 14,930.5
TOTAL EXTRAORDINARY 59,914.3
1-War Profits Tax 10,000.0
2-Prizes of War 10,000.0
3-Special Contribution 16,000.0
4-Proceeds from Supplies Imported from Abroad 22,000.0
5-Other 1,914.3
TOTALREVENUE 78,189.8
Expenditure
1-Pensions 12,200.0
2-Pay List 24,474.8
3-War Ministries (not including salaries) 7,776.4
4-Public Security (not including salaries) 1,954.5
5-Ministry of Mercantile Marine (not including salaries) 2,139.0
6-Public Works 8,251.3
7-Social Welfare 2,777.1
8-Allowances Paid to Reservists 2318.0
9-Public Health 5,122.2
10-Distribution of Supplies Imported from Abroad 12,000.0
11-Subsidies (Railways etc) 4,660.0
12-Reserve 5,000.0
13-Other 8388.7
TOTAL EXPENDITURE 97,062.0
Source: T236/149, Notes of Discussion on Revised Greek Budget, 3rd August 1945
The wage concessions undid much of Varvaressos' good work on public 
finance. Despite the extra revenue produced by the special contribution, spiralling 
expenditure meant that Varvaressos had little chance of achieving budget
62 Patterson, op.cit., 1948, pp. 198-206.
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equilibrium. As table 4.1 indicates, this was tacitly admitted in early August, when 
new budget estimates were presented to the British authorities and UNRRA. 
Varvaressos seemed confident that by increasing revenue, he could reduce the 
deficit to 20% over the coming year. This admission was far more honest than the 
unrealistic predictions made back in April, but the August estimates also contained 
doubtful assumptions. Varvaressos anticipated that less than a third of total revenue 
would come from direct and indirect taxes (4% and 19% respectively). Sales from 
UNRRA goods were to furnish 28%, but the biggest doubts surrounded three 
items which were to produce almost half of government revenue. The special 
contribution was to furnish 20%, based on the projection that the amounts collected 
in July could also be collected throughout the following eight months. As will be 
shown, such assumptions proved far from accurate. The second item was the war 
profits tax, which was to bring in an anticipated lObn drachmae or 13% of total 
revenue. However, this had so far produced pitiful results, yielding only 100m 
drachmae since its creation. The final problematic heading was war prizes, also 
predicted to provide 13%. Varvaressos was vague as to the basis for such a high 
estimate, as no revenue had yet been obtained from the sale of any article falling 
into this category. Competent analysts were convinced that neither the special 
contribution nor the two war-related taxes would furnish anything like the sums 
envisaged in the estimates.63
The initial results of the special contribution had seemed very promising, with a 
total of 1.7bn drachmae being collected in July. As table 4.2 indicates, during that 
month, Varvaressos made considerable progress towards his goal of balancing the 
budget as the deficit fell to 25%. This compared favourably with the equivalent 
figure for June (52.8%). Nevertheless, vigorous opposition to the special 
contribution ensured that such a success could not continue for long. At the end of 
July, Varvaressos responded by introducing a series of amendments. These 
included the raising of rates paid by industrial establishments, the reclassification of 
several categories of small businesses into lower bands of payment, and the 
granting of total exemptions to regions which had suffered particular damage 
during the war. Although Varvaressos wished to shift the burden from small to 
larger enterprises, the immediate consequence was a reduction in receipts for 
August, when only 1.3bn drachmae was collected. As a result, the budget deficit 
rose to 42.5% in August. Nevertheless, Varvaressos' concessions did little to 
soften the general hostility towards the tax, and opposition continued to mount.
63 T236/149, Notes of Discussion on Revised Greek Budget, 3rd August 1945; T236/149, Muir 
to Sandberg, 23.8.1945 (Enclosure: Notes on Discussion Held 13th August 1945 on the 
Revised Greek Budget of August 1945); T236/149, August Budgetary Estimates of the Greek 
Government, C. Coombs, 10.9.1945.
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While shopkeepers considered another one-day strike, the increasing incidence of 
refusal to pay the special contribution forced Varvaressos to issue dire threats, 
warning that defaulters would face confiscation of their property. This provoked a 
mass meeting of Athens and Piraeus tradesmen, who denounced both the tax and 
the punitive measures. As hostility escalated, Varvaressos was forced to climb 
down, and on September 1 he announced that no penalties would be imposed for 
non-payment of the special contribution as long as all outstanding sums were paid 
in by September 10.64
Table 4.2 Government Payments and Receipts (in millions of drachmae)
Period Payments (a) Receipts (b)
Surplus of 
Receipts (+) or 
Overdraft (-)
Receipts 
as Percentage 
of Payments
11- 30 November 1944 1,130 71 -1,059 6.3
Dec 1944-Jan 1945 2,443 56 -2387 2.3
February 1945 .... 2J43... . 177 -2,566 6.5
March 5,150 1,572 -3,578 30.5
. .... . ........ April ......... 4,906 1,784 -3,122 36.4
May 5,417 2,801 -2,616 51.7
June 6,901 3,259 -3,642 47.2
July 8,062 6,050 -2,012 75.0
August 9,448 5,429 -4,019 57.5
September 11,080 5,793 ....  -5,287. .. 52.3
October 14,082 7,167 -6,915 50.9
November 18,941 10,511 -8,430 55.5
December 40,441 15,254 -25,187 37.7
January 1946 50,449 22,487 -27,962 44.6
Source: Patterson, op.cit., 1948, op.cit., p.264.
(a) including payments to UNRRA; (b) Including receipts from sale of ML/UNRRA supplies
As the Varvaressos reforms stalled in the face of growing opposition, its central 
element - price controls - began to collapse completely during August. With official 
prices being ignored as totally irrelevant, foodstuffs could be bought only at ever 
higher free market prices. As the cost of manufactured goods rose unabated, 
farmers felt little incentive to cooperate with a programme which offered 
increasingly meaningless returns for their produce. Thus, substantial numbers of 
agricultural producers chose to withhold commodities from the market. All major 
foodstuffs were affected in this way, but the most serious consequences were 
visible with olive oil supplies. As already noted, this had been the first article to 
disappear from markets. As far back as June, Varvaressos had conceived a barter 
plan to induce farmers to release stocks of olive oil, offering other foodstuffs and 
UNRRA clothing in exchange. Such was the apparent distrust of producers that
64 Patterson, op.cit., 1948, pp. 190-193, 264; T236/149, August Budgetary Estimates of the 
Greek Government, C. Coombs, 10.9.1945.
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instead of the envisaged 2,000 tons, the scheme had yielded a mere 3 tons by the 
beginning of August. By this time, Varvaressos became increasingly convinced 
that organised groups within society, primarily merchants and industrialists, were 
conspiring to thwart his policies. He saw the failure of the olive oil scheme as 
further evidence of such a conspiracy, singling out traders rather than farmers as 
responsible for the crisis. By the middle of August, he decided that even stronger 
measures were necessary to break the opposition. On August 22, he attempted to 
solve the olive oil shortage by decreeing a state monopoly on sales of the product. 
Two days later, a further decree commanded all industrialists and traders to declare 
their stocks of staple articles and raw materials, with direct state control to be 
imposed on any businesses failing to comply. By the end of August, it was clear 
that the Varvaressos programme had failed to achieve most of its objectives. In an 
angry exchange of open letters, the Greek Union of Industrialists denied the charge 
of obstruction and complained that Varvaressos had done nothing to secure their 
cooperation. They expressed a willingness to invite British experts to advise on 
industrial organisation, and investigate the charges. In reply, Varvaressos refused 
to accept any blame for the situation. However, his tendency of blaming everybody 
else finally backfired, and earned him almost universal hostility. The press, which 
had been relatively moderate in its criticisms of the measures, launched a violent 
campaign against him, with papers representing both the Left and the Right 
attacking his handling of the economy in similar tones.65
With few cards left to play, Varvaressos turned to the British. He asked them to 
deliver large quantities of vital commodities such as olive oil, cheese and soap, in 
addition to the pre-arranged UNRRA quota, to improve the supply situation and 
'break the ring of profiteers'. He warned that failure to assist would lead to the 
abandonment of his entire programme.66 Although determined to do everything 
possible to support Varvaressos, the British made it clear that the delivery of large 
quantities of scarce supplies at such short notice was almost impossible 67
65 Patterson, op.cit., 1948, pp.225-230; T236/1046, To Brjpa 24.8.1945; T236/1046, 
Ka&nnepivr] 25.8.1945; F0371/48277 R13868, AGIS Weekly Report No.42, 29 Jul-4 Aug 
1945; F0371/48278 R14422, AGIS Weekly Report No.43, 5-11 Aug 1945; F0371/48279 
R14971, AGIS Weekly Report No.44, 12-18 Aug 1945; F0371/48279 R15076, AGIS 
Weekly Report No.45, 19-25 Aug 1945; F0371/48279 R15586, AGIS Weekly Report 
No.46, 26 Aug-1 Sep 1945; FG371/48337 R18405, Economic and Financial Developments 
in Greece July-August 1945, C. Coombs, 17.9.1945, pp.8-9.
66 TE/AKB/B/2, Note by the Vice-President of the Council Mr. Varvaressos to the American 
and British Embassies, 20.8.1945; T236/1045, Athens to FO, Telegram no. 1733, 21.8.1945; 
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Varvaressos repeated that if the shipments were not forthcoming he would have to 
resign. He predicted that his departure would usher in a 'brief period of chaos', 
resulting in 'widespread trouble and discontent', which would convince his 
opponents of the necessity of his policies. The British advised him to remain in the 
government and make fundamental changes to his programme to address its 'most 
glaring weaknesses', including the delegation of responsibilities and the forging of 
a new relationship with industry and commerce. Although Varvaressos agreed to 
reconsider his position, on the evening of September 1 he resigned from all his 
cabinet posts.68 At first, the government assured the British and the country that 
existing policies would be continued.69 On September 4, Admiral Voulgaris 
reiterated that price controls were the 'sole means of recovery' for Greece.70 Three 
days later, all price controls on foodstuffs were abolished.71 The 'Varvaressos 
Experiment' was over.
4.3 Conclusions
The period between the closing of the civil war and the departure of Varvaressos 
can be divided into twoliighly contrasting phases. During the first, from January 
until the end of May, successive Greek governments played only a passive role in 
managing the economy. As Richter observes, this early period is notable for the 
'virtual non-existence of an economic policy'.72 In contrast, the second phase, 
from June until the end of August, saw the implementation of a well-defined 
package of policies, which enjoyed initial success but provoked an avalanche of 
hostility from diverse groups within Greek society.
Both contemporaries and later historians offered several reasons to explain 
Varvaressos’ failure. These fall into two broad categories: one concerned with the 
sources of opposition to the Varvaressos programme, and the other concentrating 
on the shortcomings of the policies and the man himself. Reasons adduced for the 
former include the inadequacies of the administrative machinery, the lack of 
support within the government and the civil service, insufficient backing from the 
Allies, the hostility of the opposition parties, and the conspiracies of an economic
68 F0371/48335 R14794, Athens to FO, Telegram no. 1801, 1.9.1945; FQ371/48335 R14795, 
Athens to FO, Telegram no.1804, 1.9.1945; F0371/48279 R15349, Athens to FO, 
Telegram no. 175 Saving, 4.9.1945.
69 F0371/48335 R14822, Athens to FO, Telegram no. 1808, 2.9.1945; FQ371/48335 R14823, 
Athens to FO, Telegram no.l808A, 2.9.1945; F0371/48335 R14823, Athens to FO, 
Telegram no. 1810, 2.9.1945; F0371/48335 R14863, Athens to FO, Telegram no. 1819,
3.9.1945.
70 F0371/48335 R16253, Prime Minister Voulgaris' Broadcast, 4.9.1945.
71 F0371/48280 R16135, AGIS Weekly Report No.47, 2-8 Sep 1945.
72 Richter, op.cit., 1985, p.202.
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oligarchy determined to bring down the programme. Arguments from the second 
category concentrate on specific details of the policies and the damaging effects of 
Varvaressos' lack of flexibility. All these reasons need to be addressed, although 
none can be dealt with in isolation.
From the point of view of fiscal orthodoxy, the basic tenants of his programme 
were undeniably correct. The economy could not recover unless the currency was 
stabilised by putting a break on inflation, which required the elimination of the 
budget deficit. Nevertheless, the implementation of his policies was fraught with 
problems. As even the Nazi occupation authorities had recognised, no state 
controls would function properly in a country like Greece, with its tradition of 
'economic individualism’.73 Predictably, many Greeks resented the seemingly 
authoritarian tone of Varvaressos' pronouncements. The left-wing press compared 
him with Dr Schacht, the president of the Reichsbank under the Nazis, and accused 
him of introducing 'totalitarian methods' reminiscent of 'Hitlerite Germany'.74 
Varvaressos' determined stance alarmed not only the Left: a later historian 
commented on the similarities between the language of Varvaressos and communist 
jargon, and noted its frightening effect on the middle classes 75
Varvaressos was thus faced with an unenviable task. The vacillations of 
previous ministers had allowed the situation to deteriorate to a point where only 
drastic measures could save the economy. Fiscal orthodoxy dictated the 
implementation of policies which were almost guaranteed to arouse the opposition 
of many sections within Greek society. While increases in government revenue 
would inevitably attract hostility from those obliged to shoulder the burden, 
reductions in expenditure would evoke a similar response from affected groups 
such as civil servants or pensioners, and controls over prices and supplies would 
be liable to impinge upon the interests of farmers, industrialists and traders. For the 
Varvaressos reforms to have any chance of success, all these interest groups 
needed to be handled with a mixture of tact, judgement and resolution. If the tact 
and judgement had to come from Varvaressos himself, resolution required the 
complete backing of his cabinet colleagues and the civil service.
Despite the basic soundness of the Varvaressos programme, his implementation 
of certain policies contained hasty half-measures and misjudgements. He 
introduced price controls in the full knowledge that the government was clearly 
unable to impose any controls over supply, distribution or transport, and had made
73 Ritter, op.cit., 1969, p. 128
74 Alexander, op.cit., 1982, p.269, fn 51; F0371/48274 R12219, AGIS Weekly Report No.38, 
1-7 Jul 1945.
75 Hadziiossif, op.cit., 1987, p.33.
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no plans to ration foodstuffs in particularly short supply. Moreover, despite some 
tinkering with personnel, he achieved little to improve the administrative 
machinery, and created no viable body to oversee his reforms. To embark on a 
policy of price controls without appropriate levels of control over supplies was 
clearly risky. Varvaressos did not even seek to ascertain the extent of existing 
supplies until the end of August, with his attempt to conduct a census of stocks. By 
this time, his programme was already doomed, and a British observer described the 
move as 'locking the stable door after the horse has bolted'.76 The Varvaressos 
price controls were also fundamentally flawed in that they offered no real incentives 
for many producers and traders to continue their activities. The imposition of price 
ceilings on foodstuffs, without similar controls on manufactured goods, alienated 
farmers, who increasingly withheld output from the market. Retailers and 
middlemen, who had seen their profit margins slashed, also chose to hoard stocks. 
Varvaressos' punitive laws were of little avail in the face of such resistance, as the 
state could not realistically take-over private businesses. A more cautious approach, 
demonstrating a more realistic attitude towards price levels and profit margins, 
could have avoided many of these problems.
In terms of his personal qualities, it is possible to question to what extent 
Varvaressos was suited to fulfil the role entrusted to him. Although he vigorously 
defended himself against claims that he had acted in a 'dictatorial, authoritarian 
[and] inflexible' manner,77 he later confessed to resorting to 'high-handed 
methods'78 Even the British, once his staunchest supporters, readily testified to 
his difficult nature, reporting his 'violence in discussion', 'unconcealed distrust of 
all but his immediate circle', 'doctrinaire rigidity', and 'his high-minded manner, 
and his refusal to listen to critic or to friend'79 Given the nature of the opposition 
he faced, some degree of exasperation might be perfectly understandable, but the 
implementation of such a bold programme would have required possibly 
superhuman levels of diplomacy, which Varvaressos clearly did not demonstrate.
Varvaressos was also unable to maintain popular support for his reforms. He 
never organised an adequate publicity machine to offer the public clear explanations 
of his policies, despite persistent British appeals and a clear awareness within his
76 F0371/48279 R15076, AGIS Weekly Report No.45, 19-25 Aug 1945.
77 TE/AKB/B2, Varvaressos to Sophianopoulos, 20.12.1945.
78 TE/AKB/B5, Memorandum on the Greek Economic Situation, K. Varvaressos, 2.8.1946, 
p. 115.
79 FOS71/48335 R15140, Athens to FO, Telegram no. 1835, 6.9.1945; FQ371/48280 R15829, 
Athens to FO, Telegram no. 179 Saving, 10.9.1945; F0371/48282 R16649, Athens to FO, 
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own circle of the crucial importance of this issue.80 All his major initiatives were 
announced solely through the press. His first radio broadcast did not come until 
August 17, by which time it was almost certainly too late to rekindle any 
enthusiasm for his programme.81 The British were adamant that the failure to keep 
the public informed was a serious mistake.82 As Leeper wrote later, any statesman 
unable to get his way by force would have to 'get it by persuasion'83 Varvaressos 
seemed unwilling or unable to pursue the latter approach. In his dealings with 
various interest groups, he possessed neither the ability to secure cooperation nor 
sufficient powers to punish non-cooperation.
Such an austerity programme had little chance of success unless backed by a 
government of sufficient strength and confidence to carry it through. As indicated 
earlier, unconditional government support had been one of the major conditions 
which Varvaressos had demanded before joining the cabinet Whether he actually 
enjoyed such support is a moot point. He subsequently claimed that the rest of his 
colleagues took a neutral attitude to his reforms, acting as 'spectators in the 
economic fight' rather than offering him assistance.84 Later historians went much 
further, alleging that the lack of government support was a key cause of his 
failure.85 Once Varvaressos had accepted his post, it was rumoured that Professor 
Grigorios Kasimatis, an advocate of contrasting policies, had threatened to resign 
along with several cabinet colleagues 86 By August, the British authorities in 
Athens were certainly aware that many ministers were said to be deliberately 
obstructing Varvaressos’ moves and undermining his policies 87 and later reported
80 T236/1044, Hill to Davidson, 26.4.1945 (Enclosure: Minute by Hill, 24.4.1945); 
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<og AvrinpoESpot) rrjg KvPepvrjoeoag, pp.28-38.
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Rowe-Dutton, 26.6.945; F0371/48275 R12961, AGIS Weekly Report No.40, 15-21 Jul 
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83 Leeper, op.cit., 1950, p. 177.
84 FQ371/48337 R18546, Note of Conversation with Mr. Varvaressos 23rd October, 1945.
85 Richter, op.cit., 1985, p.214; Politakis, op.cit., 1990, p.132; J.V. Kofas, Intervention and 
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Communism 1944-1949. Ithaca: Cornell UP, 1989, p.75.
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that Kasimatis had conducted a 'whispering campaign' against the reforms.88 The 
very nature of such allegations makes them difficult to prove. Although widespread 
sabotage cannot be established in the absence of concrete evidence, the lack of any 
apparent endorsement of the programme from other ministers does not suggest any 
great enthusiasm for Varvaressos within the cabinet.
Civil service support largely evaporated as early as June, with the announcement 
of redundancies and the cancellation of wartime promotions. For the rest of his 
period in office, Varvaressos found himself locked in a fruitless struggle with the 
civil service employees' union, which successfully resisted the attempted purge.89 
Equally serious was the active sabotage conducted by KKE members within the 
civil service, to be discussed below. Varvaressos scathingly dismissed the 
bureaucracy as a sick organism,90 and it seems that few implemented his policies 
with any vigour.
Even without deliberate obstruction, Varvaressos found that his options were 
severely limited by the traditional shortcomings of the state administration. This 
had a particularly damaging effect on his taxation promises. As he had pledged, tax 
increases would be targeted at the rich. Nevertheless, the woeful inadequacies of 
the tax collecting machinery ensured that the rich could not be squeezed via the 
normal means of higher rates on income and business taxes. In May 1945, annual 
revenue from taxes on company profits and private salaries had been estimated to 
produce less than half the amounts to be collected from levies on theatres and 
cinemas, and roughly one fifteenth of the expected revenue from the tobacco tax.91 
Varvaressos was fully aware that the shortcomings of the system could not be 
overcome quickly. Moreover, it had become obvious that the only other suggestion 
for taxing the rich - the war profits tax - was failing to deliver the anticipated sums. 
Given the desperate need for immediate returns, Varvaressos was forced to rush 
through an imaginative measure to secure increased revenue from businesses, 
hence the creation of the special contribution.
At first, the levy fulfilled all expectations. In the first month alone, it produced a 
sum nearly three times greater than the revenue Varvaressos expected to receive 
from direct taxation during the entire fiscal year. In terms of popular support, the 
results were far less positive, as Varvaressos was forced to pay a high price for his
88 FQ371/48284 R19491, AGIS Weekly Report No.55, 28 Oct-3 Nov 1945; T236/1047, Hill 
to Davidson, 3.11.1945.
89 Papastratis, op.cit., 1987, pp.50-53.
90 T236/1046, Translation of a Statement by Mr. Varvaressos on Monday 3rd September 1945; 
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windfall. The special contribution aroused considerable hostility from the business 
community, which condemned it as excessive and unfair. Unable to tax profits by 
normal methods, Varvaressos chose to tax rental values as a proxy for profits. 
While the absence of statistical data rules out any definitive assessment, it is very 
unlikely that there was a high correlation between 1940 rental values and 1945 
profits, although Coombs' suspicion that the tax had been set too high cannot be 
proved or disproved.92 Neither Varvaressos’ admission that the contribution was 
hardly 'scientific', nor the modifications introduced in response to the protests, can 
alter the fact that the contribution was a deeply flawed mechanism for taxing the 
rich. Increases in direct income and business taxes would have been a much fairer 
solution, but Varvaressos possessed neither the means to implement such increases 
nor the time to await the results.
The taxation problems underline the difficulties of imposing any kind of 
economic controls in a country with such an inefficient administrative machinery. 
The failure to distribute the ML/UNRRA clothing and cloth was a particularly 
striking example of official ineptitude. Neither government fears of undertaking 
unpopular measures, nor the stubbornness of industrialists offer any convincing 
explanation for the inability to distribute such finished and semi-finished goods so 
desperately needed by the population. This had several serious consequences. The 
government deprived itself of a considerable amount of revenue which would have 
been generated by the sale of the textiles, while many Greeks were forced to pay 
higher than necessary prices for their clothing, thus further fuelling inflation. 
Bottlenecks were created by the failure to empty much needed warehouses 
precisely when UNRRA deliveries were arriving in unprecedented quantities. 
Finally, by exacerbating the clothing shortages, the government reduced its 
bargaining power vis-a-vis mill owners whose cooperation was vital if the 
country's industries were to be revived.
The textile fiasco was merely the worst of many examples of state inability to 
organise production and distribution, suggesting that little had improved since the 
embarrasing disasters of the earlier period.93 The British felt that the Greeks
92 T236/149, August Budgetary Estimates of the Greek Government, C. Coombs, 10.9.1945; 
F0371/48334 R14166, Economic and Financial Developments in Greece November 1944- 
June 1945, C. Coombs, 1.8.1945, p.36.
93 Months after liberation, the British berated the ministry of public works for failing to even 
consider the drawing up of plans and estimates; WO204/8761, Public Works in Greece,
2.2.1945. In another case, while the government was pressing ML to help with the transport 
problem, the British were able to point out that coastal shipping was frequently making 
empty return journeys despite the desperate need to move cargoes, and that many lorries, tyres 
and caiques already delivered had never been utilised. In addition, nothing had been done to 
salvage the large numbers of steamers scuttled in coastal waters. Many of these vessels were 
lying in shallow water and could thus be raised relatively easily. Ministers seemed to have 
little grasp of developments affecting their departments. One embarrassing example concerned
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seemed entirely unsuited to the task of administering economic controls. Leeper 
suggested that price controls seemed to have no appeal to 'the Greek mind',94 
while Hill was frequently exasperated by the attitudes of senior officials who 
claimed that 'what Greece needed was freedom'.95 To be fair to the Greeks, the 
recent experience of dictatorship and enemy occupation, and hostility to communist 
programmes must have made the concept of a managed economy far less attractive. 
However, such Hellenocentric perceptions of the recent past remained blissfully 
unaware that state intervention in the economy had proved compatible with 
democracy and private enterprise in other countries. Apart from Varvaressos and 
Zafiriou, few Greeks had any knowledge of the extent and the achievements of 
control measures in Britain or the United States at the time.
British observers wondered to what extent hostility towards control schemes 
were linked to corruption in ministerial circles, suspecting that 'everyone in power' 
was 'connected with everyone else who matters'.96 One even seemed to take it for 
grafted that the entire cabinet was hand-in-glove' with the rich, and that many 
were prospering because they had 'friends at court'97 The charges of corruption 
are hard to refute. The official UNRRA history described the Greek government as 
one of the major obstacles to its operations 98 while a later historian felt compelled 
to emphasise the 'inertia, venality, political biases, and corruption* of the Athens 
government.99
Apart from the problems with the government and the bureaucracy, the lack of a 
clear commitment from the Allies has also been cited as an important factor 
explaining the failure of the Varvaressos programme. Varvaressos himself seemed 
convinced of this and expressed great bitterness towards the British, accusing them 
of withdrawing support once his policies began to generate serious opposition.100
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Several recent studies echoed this theme. Thus, one author highlights Allied 
reluctance to support Varvaressos,101 while another stresses that Varvaressos had 
been misled as to the extent of UNRRA supplies, and that his resignation was 
triggered by the Allied refusal to offer full backing during the final crisis. The latter 
study also suggests that Whitehall had always been reluctant to support 
Varvaressos in a conflict with industrialists and the middle class, as these groups 
'formed the social foundations' of British policies for Greece.102 Another work 
offers a series of bold statements, claiming that initial British support for 
Varvaressos turned into neutrality by August, that the British flatly refused to 
accede to Varvaressos' request for emergency supplies, and that the change of 
government in London had created a 'vacuum of authority’, which Varvaressos 
interpreted as a 'betrayal'.103 Yet another study makes equally bold claims, citing 
the 'counterproductive role' of UNRRA supplies as a major cause of Varvaressos' 
downfall, because of the hostility such supplies aroused among traders and 
industrialists.104
All these arguments seem to be based on the misreading of events and a poor 
understanding of several wider issues, arising mainly from an ignorance of British 
policy as explained in Foreign Office and Treasury documents. As already shown, 
Whitehall’s commitment to the reforms, which offered the only hope of achieving 
the kind of economic solutions advocated by the British, was never in doubt. 
Varvaressos was not misled as to the extent of supplies Greece would be receiving, 
and his resignation followed a declaration from the British that they were simply 
unable to fulfil his request for large additional consignments of foodstuffs at such 
short notice. The 'vacuum of authority' argument ignores the continuity of British 
personnel in Athens, and of general British policies for Greece. Criticisms of the 
effect of UNRRA supplies seem to overlook the realities of the post-liberation 
Greek economy. While UNRRA deliveries inevitably reduced excess demand for 
certain commodities, supplies were never sufficiently abundant enough to seriously 
reduce the profit margins of traders or producers. Moreover, with most of the 
country's industrial capacity lying idle, UNRRA supplies were hardly competing 
with locally produced goods. The claim about the 'social foundations' of British 
policies for Greece seems highly questionable. As noted previously, British 
policies sought to secure broad support for the middle ground.
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Direct contacts between British advisors and Greek officials seem far less 
frequent during the Varvaressos period, but this should not imply any withdrawal 
of support. In late July Hill reminded Whitehall that British support was the 'one 
rock' on which Greece was standing, and he was not alone in warning against any 
actions which could embarrass the Athens government during such a critical 
period.105 In sharp contrast to the claims that London was downgrading its 
commitment to Varvaressos, there is evidence to suggest that he himself was 
reluctant to accept some British offers of help. Thus, British proposals to send 
several experts to Greece were not taken up because Varvaressos had not been 
enthusiastic about the idea. Only at the end of August did he agree to the sending of 
experts connected with textile production.106
The problems within the government and the civil service might not have proved 
insurmountable had the country pulled together as the British had intended. 
Unfortunately for Varvaressos, not only did the lack of any real support from 
within the machinery of state severely weaken his ability to confront opposition 
arising from other quarters, but resistance to his programme was to escalate 
steadily throughout his period in office. By the end of August it was clear he was 
unable to survive without strong government backing which was never 
forthcoming.
Contemporary observers and later historians expressed very definite views as to 
the sources of opposition to Varvaressos. However, such attempts have all too 
frequently reflected the political sympathies of their authors. Varvaressos himself 
was in no doubt that his programme had been undermined by powerful economic 
interests. While he could later express admiration for the 'capitalist class' of both 
Britain and the United States for their 'self-discipline and voluntary sacrifices' and 
the 'commendable social conscience',107 his attitudes towards their Greek 
counterparts were far less positive. He claimed that he had been defeated by the 
actions of an 'economic oligarchy'.108 Later historians, particularly from the Left, 
accepted this notion of the economic oligarchy, and used the language of class 
struggle to conclude that Varvaressos had indeed been the victim of a coherent 
group, alternatively described as the 'nouveaux riches', or the 'new
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106 7236/1045, Laskey to Dennehy, 31.8.1945.
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bourgeoisie'.109 Several terms seem to be used interchangeably, with another 
historian from this group appearing to equate the economic oligarchy with a 
parakratos - a state within a state.110
Although right-wing opposition to Varvaressos was considerable, and probably 
included many influential members of the Greek establishment, claims of an 
effective conspiracy emanating from an economic oligarchy are difficult to 
substantiate. Despite the consistency and apparent sincerity of Varvaressos' belief 
in such a cabal, the evidence is inconclusive. Even the British, whose wholehearted 
support for Varvaressos and relative naivete about Greek realities might have led 
them to embrace any conspiracy theory, refused to believe such claims. While 
readily acknowledging continuous hostility from the Communists, and some 
degree of concerted opposition from elsewhere towards the end, they were totally 
dismissive of the Varvaressos allegations.111
The rejection of the single conspiracy argument need not be inconsistent with the 
notion of several smaller but equally opportunistic conspiracies to exploit the crisis. 
Many supporters of the Right were obviously working against the reforms, but the 
motivation for opposition was unlikely to be solely ideological. In the case of 
Varvaressos’ particular bite noire - the industrialists and traders - economic 
rationality could go hand-in-hand with ideological prejudice. In reacting to price 
controls, it is not unreasonable to suppose that producers and traders were 
behaving rationally in seeking the best possible deal for themselves. Similarly, the 
textile manufacturers, who had held out for the most favourable terms, were acting 
effectively in their own self-interest. Such a relentless pursuit of self-interest 
inevitably conflicted with the welfare of other individuals. Although less repugnant 
than the wartime profiteering, such blatant exploitation of the immediate post-war 
crisis can only be viewed with distaste. Thus, the moral arguments used by 
Varvaressos may well have much validity, but still do not prove the conspiracy of 
which he complained.
Those who highlight the hostility of the economic oligarchy do not seem to have 
considered the possibility of organised opposition from the Left. One study blames 
Varvaressos for compromising with the oligarchy rather than securing the support 
of the masses, as 'represented by EAM'. This interpretation ignores Varvaressos' 
strenuous attempts to gain popular support by granting substantial wage increases
109 K. Vergopoulos, The Emergence of the New Bourgeoisie,1944-1952', in J.O. Iatrides (ed.), 
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and reducing the prices of UNRRA rations - his only major divergence from 
British advice. It also assumes that the Left would have been willing to cooperate 
with Varvaressos had such cooperation been sought.112
In reality, EAM's main component - the KKE - felt no inclination to support 
Varvaressos. Unlike the Right, it also resented the British presence in Greece. 
Thus, it had a double interest in undermining government policies, and it instigated 
several campaigns expressly designed to obstruct individual measures. KKE 
members within the taxation department were instructed to create confusion over 
the special contribution payments, while the party was actively involved in attempts 
to boycott the tax. The KKE was particularly concerned not only to mobilise the 
workers against the Varvaressos programme, but also to secure the support of 
other groups opposed to its provisions, such as small shopkeepers.113 In contrast 
with the Right, which was represented by loosely structured parties and several 
competing interest groups, the KKE was well organised, highly disciplined and 
driven by one overriding motivation. If there was a grand conspiracy to topple 
Varvaressos, the very tangible Communists deserve to be considered as 
conspirators no less than the ill-defined parakratos, new bourgeoisie or economic 
oligarchy.
In the end, Varvaressos was brought down by what one study described as a 
'coalescence of hostile factors',114 a coming together of individuals and interest 
groups implacably opposed to his reforms. Attempts to put the entire blame on one 
or another set of extremists seem highly disingenuous, as both the Left and the 
Right contributed to Varvaressos' downfall, and must share responsibility for the 
continuation of the chaos. After a brief interlude when bold policies were pursued 
energetically, the country returned to a policy vacuum which could only exacerbate 
the economic crisis and strengthen the hand of the extremists.
The Varvaressos reforms were the first serious attempt to address both the most 
acute and the most chronic problems of the Greek post-liberation economy. He had 
tried to overcome the crisis by updating the country’s essentially laissez fare  
capitalism with the hasty introduction of several aspects of state economic 
management as practised in the Western democracies during the war. However, the 
impressive results achieved in Britain and the United States could not be easily 
replicated in a country so devoid of the tradition, mentality and consensus required 
to accept such measures, and the machinery to administer and enforce them. 
MacVeagh was probably correct in claiming that Varvaressos had attempted to do
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'too much too quickly'.115 The failure to gain wider acceptance for closer state 
involvement in the economy ensured that Greece would continue to suffer the 
disastrous effects of what Zafiriou described as 'full nineteenth century economic 
practice operating uncontrolled in conditions of nightmare scarcity'116 which 
allowed powerful interest groups full rein to prosper to the detriment of others 
within society.
115 DSR 868.51/9-11.45, MacVeagh to the Secretary of State, 11.9.1945.
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5 THE LONDON AGREEMENT
With the departure of Varvaressos, the forceful policies he had pursued were 
quietly laid aside. Apart from sporadic well-publicised though abortive initiatives, 
successive governments lapsed back into inertia, while the economy continued to 
slide. In the face of a new catastrophe, the persistent British emphasis on fiscal 
orthodoxy appeared increasingly insufficient to redress the situation, prompting 
Bevin and the Foreign Office to propose a much broader initiative amounting to 
increased involvement in Greece's economic affairs. Despite Greek misgivings and 
Treasury scepticism, this new approach culminated in the London Agreement of 
January 1946. The Agreement and its implementation over the following fifteen 
months marked the climax of British intervention in Greece. Political and strategic 
considerations had forced Whitehall to mount an increased effort to address 
Greece's major economic problems. This chapter explains the shift in British 
thinking which produced the new approach. It describes the two institutions - the 
British Economic Mission (BEM) and the Currency Committee - arising out of the 
initiative, and analyses the consequences of Greek government actions and inaction 
during the period up to the annunciation of the Truman Doctrine. It ends by 
assessing the significance of the London Agreement and the nature of the obstacles 
which undermined it.
5.1 The British Response to the New Policy Vacuum
At first, the departure of Varvaressos triggered off nothing more than a cabinet 
reshuffle, with the government insisting that the existing policies would be 
maintained. The British applauded this continuity, and offered full support as long 
as policies were conducted 'on the same lines'.1
Nevertheless, within days, the government abolished price controls on all major 
foodstuffs. This decision was taken without any prior consultation with either the 
British authorities or UNRRA despite recent meetings.2 Privately, although British 
observers felt that the removal of price controls was a practical measure, they were 
alarmed by the absence of clear government policies coupled with rising inflation.
1 F0371/48335 R14822, FO to Athens, Telegram no. 1860, 4.9.1945; FQ371/48335 R15140,
Athens to FO, Telegram no. 1835, 6.9.1945.
2 Following this move, Athens markets saw the reappearance of olive oil and most other 
commodities in abundant quantities at prices well below black market rates but still very 
much higher than the previous controlled prices. Thus olive oil, which had cost 440 drachmae 
per oka (1.28 kg) under controlled prices (at which none was obtainable in the market place) 
and at 1,300 drachmae on the black market (at which only small transactions could be made) 
was selling at an average price of 700 drachmae. Other commodities followed the same trend; 
F0371/48335 R15242, Athens to FO, Telegram no. 1853, 8.9.1945.
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Reconsidering their priorities, the Treasury acknowledged that the Greeks were not 
only clearly unable to administer efficient economic controls, but were also 
unwillingly disposed to the concept. They were thus willing to accept a more liberal 
economic policy, but they were becoming increasingly concerned about public 
finances and felt that revenue had to be increased via heavier taxation and the more 
profitable sale of UNRRA goods.3
The British in Athens shared the Treasury concerns, but took pains to stress the 
urgency of the situation. Hill felt it would be 'intolerable' to simply 'sit and watch' 
while the economy faced potential collapse, believing that the only appropriate 
course was to keep 'pegging away' for a suitable policy.4 Accordingly, Leeper and 
Hill pressed the government to take immediate action on the budget and gold 
speculation, and suggested that the danger of inflation meant that a policy of 
controls was still appropriate, although this would have to be administered with 
'greater flexibility' than before. In reply, the prime minister promised drastic 
measures, but the British were unconvinced that such 'brave words' could be 
translated into similar deeds. Admiral Voulgaris had continued to claim that 
controls were central to government policy, despite the abandonment of price 
controls, and the half-hearted application of related schemes.5
Before long, Hill warned Mantzavinos that another month without energetic 
countermeasures would lead to severe inflation. He re-emphasised the need to 
outlaw the gold market and warned against official sales of gold by the Bank of 
Greece, a move commonly advocated in Athens. Although the minister was in 
general agreement with Hill, he admitted that it was extremely difficult for a 
provisional government to pursue vigorous policies in case it offended powerful 
interest groups. However, he opposed any moves against the gold market, 
claiming this was a symptom and not a cause of the country's problems. By now, 
Hill had severe doubts whether any serious measures would be enacted to save the 
economy.6
3 F0371/48335 R16112, Hill to Davidson, 11.9.1945; T236/1046, Rowe-Dutton to Hill,
25.9.1945.
4 T236/1046, Hill to Davidson, 2.10.1945.
5 T236/1046, Athens to FO, Telegram no.1959, 25.9.1945; F0371/48282 R16628, Athens to 
FO, Telegram no. 1982, 28.9.1945; F0371/48336 R16773, Athens to FO, Telegram 
no.2022,2.10.1945. As an example of other control schemes, an agreement had been reached 
in early September, by which various industrialists were to resume production under official 
control. However, this foundered amidst general confusion due to the vagueness and 
contradictory nature of the guidelines issued by the minister concerned; F0371/48335 
R15242, Athens to FO, Telegram no. 1853, 8.9.1945; FG371/48280 R16154, Athens to FO, 
Telegram no. 181 Saving, 18.9.1945.
6 T236/1046, Hill to Davidson, 5.10.1945
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In an analysis of the causes of the economic crisis, Hill singled out chronic 
budget deficits as the main factor leading to inflation, gold speculation, industrial 
stagnation and commodity shortages, leading in turn to labour unrest, higher wages 
and a vicious circle of rising volume and velocity of circulation, destroying 
confidence in the currency. Despite this gloomy assessment, Hill was optimistic 
about the country's prospects, claiming that Greece was still in a healthier position 
than other liberated states. It had no internal debt and was thus spared the burden of 
interest and redemption payments, while its foreign debts were not being serviced. 
It also possessed substantial foreign exchange reserves, amounting to 
approximately £40m in sterling, dollars and gold. Moreover, for the time being, it 
was receiving massive foreign aid: both in volume and value the MIVUNRRA 
supplies considerably exceeded pre-war levels of imports. Britain was carrying the 
sole cost of maintaining the armed forces and much of the cost of reorganising the 
police, while also providing occasional aid for relief and reconstruction purposes. 
Hill concluded that Greece possessed a uniquely 'favourable basis for 
reconstruction and recovery', but warned that inflationary pressures could be 
checked only by overbalancing rather than simply balancing the budget. He urged 
drastic increases in state revenue via higher taxation and returns from the sale of 
UNRRA goods, together with cuts in expenditure. He suggested the setting up of a 
special committee, including members from outside the government, to oversee all 
aspects of public finance. He also proposed various measures to reduce price 
levels, including action against speculation in gold, and the imposition of economic 
controls to supervise production and distribution.7
The Hill recommendations became the cornerstone of British advice to the Greek 
government, and discussions over their implementation formed the core of endless 
meetings over the following weeks. As will be shown, the proposals remained 
central to the wider plans which culminated in the London Agreement. Sharing 
Hill's concern over public finances, inflation and the gold market, the Treasury 
nevertheless felt little hope of achieving cuts in public spending although they 
advocated strong discouragement of all new expenditure. Instead, they emphasised 
the need to augment revenue, by increasing existing duties on entertainment, 
alcohol and tobacco, and by creating new forms of taxation, particularly a purchase 
tax, and new levies on commercial and residential property. Moreover, as huge 
profits were being made from the resale of UNRRA supplies on the black market, 
the prices of such goods should be raised substantially, while the number of
7 T236/1046 and T236/1047, The Finances of Greece, T.St. Quintin Hill.
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indigents receiving free rations would have to be reduced drastically.8 As for 
speculation in gold, they stressed that existing government powers to curtail the 
market should actually be enforced, and that the Bank of Greece should not sell 
gold.9 Within days, British thinking was articulated even more clearly, when 
advisors in Athens produced the first detailed proposals on ways to raise additional 
revenue. They suggested that receipts could be almost doubled by a series of tax 
increases ranging from 50% (the special contribution) to 200% (tobacco duties), 
coupled with a new tax based on controlled rents and a trebling of the price of 
UNRRA supplies.10
Despite British insistence that immediate action was crucial, their sense of 
urgency was not shared by the Greek side. Matters were delayed by the fall of the 
Voulgaris government, while the regent claimed that as the head of a provisional 
government he had no authority to act.11 Although Mantzavinos was finally 
compelled to study both the Hill recommendations and the concrete suggestions on 
taxation, he too refused to commit himself, preoccupied as he was with his own 
proposals for a new budget. In the meantime, the press was hopefully suggesting 
that budgetary equilibrium would at last be achieved in the current fiscal year.12 
Indeed, as table 5.1 demonstrates, the second Mantzavinos budget was far more 
optimistic than that drawn up by Varvaressos in August, anticipating increases of 
revenue and expenditure of 30% and 12% respectively, resulting in a deficit of less 
than 6%. However, his revenue estimates assumed that only 3% would derive 
from direct taxation, while almost 22% would come from war related taxes (on war 
profits and prizes of war, together with a new tax on merchants who had imported 
supplies during the occupation). The prices of UNRRA goods and tobacco duties 
were to be raised considerably to yield 41% and 11% of total receipts respectively, 
but the special contribution was to provide only 12%. On the expenditure side, 
wages and pensions were to absorb 44%, with 15% going on the distribution of
8 According to Coombs, indigents accounted for 19% of the population in Athens and Piraeus
and 75% in the provinces; T236/1046, Hill to Davidson, 29.10.1945.
9 T236/1046, Davidson to Hill, 9.10.1945; FQ371/48282 R16628, FO to Athens, Telegram
no.2072, 10.10.1945; T236/1046, Davidson to Hill, 17.10.1945; T236/1046, Davidson to 
Hill, 20.10.1945.
10 FG371/48337 R18575, Davidson to Laskey, 30.10.1945 (Enclosure: Greek Budget, Annex 
C, Suggested Additional Taxation).
11 T236/1046, Athens to FO, Telegram no.2122, 18.10.1945.
12 Patterson, op.cit., 1948, p.255.
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UNRRA supplies, 13% on public health and social welfare and 10% on public 
works including reconstruction.13
Table 5.1 Estimated Revenue and Expenditure, 1945-46 (in millions of drachmae)
Revenue
TOTAL ORDINARY REVENUE 24,038
1-DIRECT TAXES 3,445
2-INDIRECT TAXES 20,593
Tobacco Tax 11,000
TOTAL EXTRAORDINARY REVENUE 78,152
1-Sale of Relief Supplies 42,000
2-Prizes of War 10,000
3-War Profits Tax 7,000
4-Special Contribution 12,000
5-Tax on Merchants who Imported during the Occupation 5,000
6-Other Extraordinary Revenue 2,152
TOTAL REVENUE 102,190
Expenditure
1-Pensions 15,700
2-Salaries 32300
3-Public Works 10,954
4-Public Health and Social Welfare 13,508
5-Expenses of Distributing Relief Supplies (excluding salaries) 16,718
6-Reserve 3,100
7-Other 16389
TOTAL EXPENDITURE 108,669
Source: F0371/48337 R18575, Davidson to Laskey, 30.10.1945 (Enclosure: Greek Budget).
Although the Mantzavinos estimates had appeared deceptively sound on paper, 
the minister had in effect wasted precious time on a document amounting to nothing 
more than a ’happy-go-lucky shot in the dark’.14 While applauding the action on 
UNRRA supplies and tobacco duties, the British were decidedly unimpressed with 
a budget containing so many 'illusory' and 'dubious' figures. They were 
particularly annoyed that the proposals almost entirely ignored their recent 
suggestions on taxation, while continuing to attach so much importance to such 
unreliable sources as the war related taxes which had failed to yield meaningful 
sums. They were exasperated by the minister's obstinate stance in subsequent 
discussions, when he not only resisted further pressure to amend his estimates, but 
also maintained his determination to publicise the existing version as widely as 
possible.15 Thus, when the British were doing their utmost to emphasise the need
13 F0371/48337 R18575, Davidson to Laskey, 30.10.1945 (Enclosure: Greek Budget); 
FQ371/48336 R17885, Athens to FO, Telegram no.2139, 20.10.1945.
14 Patterson, op.cit., 1948, p.255.
15 F0371/48337 R18575, Davidson to Laskey, 30.10.1945 (Enclosure: Greek Budget); 
F0371/48336 R17885, Athens to FO, Telegram no.2139, 20.10.1945.
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for swift and decisive action, time was being squandered on a budget that was no 
more realistic than any other since liberation. Despite these charades, nothing came 
of the episode in any case as the minister left office within days, with the passing 
of the Damaskinos government.
The new Kanellopoulos government immediately indicated a more resolute 
stance, with the prime minister promising 'vigour and decision', and determination 
to 'end the economic chaos'.16 Mantzavinos was succeeded by Kasimatis, recently 
one of the fiercest opponents of Varvaressos and his reforms. In previous weeks, 
Kasimatis had given wide publicity to his own ideas to address the country's 
problems. He emphasised that given the extent of Greece's wartime losses, only 
extensive foreign loans could make good the damage. The bulk of the foreign 
exchange reserves had to be mobilised to finance commercial imports. Such 
imports would stimulate the productive machinery of the country and lower 
domestic price levels, leading to dishoarding. He claimed it would be better if the 
foreign exchange ran out, rather than if it simply sat doing nothing. He stressed 
that the deep-rooted gold mentality ensured that commodity prices were driven by 
the sovereign rate, and that the latter would have to be stabilised before price 
stability could be achieved. Convinced that the 'gold sickness' could be cured only 
with gold itself, he underlined the necessity of utilising Greek sovereign reserves to 
take control of the gold market. He was adamant that a strenuous reconstruction 
effort must not be delayed out of fear of inflation. He advocated the widespread 
granting of credit and the rapid distribution of raw materials to further industrial 
recovery, and proposed the removal of all restrictions on internal commerce. He 
acknowledged the need to impose certain economic controls on production, but 
dismissed price controls as unenforceable. He also advocated devaluation of the 
drachma, significant pay rises for civil servants, and adjustments to the taxation 
system in order to increase the tax burden of the rich.17
Shortly after assuming his new post, Kasimatis informed the British of his 
intentions to launch a comprehensive programme on the above lines. Hill 
recognised that the abolition of controls merely reflected current realities, but urged 
caution as the ideas offered little to balance the budget. He was unhappy about the 
use of gold, and feared the immediate inflationary effects of a devaluation. Above 
all, he felt uneasy about the possible consequences of commercial imports.
16 F 0371/48284 R18726, Athens to FO, Telegram no.2218, 3.11.1945; F0371/48284 
R19491, AGIS Weekly Report No.55, 28 Oct-3 Nov 1945.
17 KaaiixaTqg, op.cit.y 1945, pp.42-61. See also T236/1047, Hill to Davidson 3,11.1945 
(Enclosure: Economic Programme of M. Kassimatis: Summary of a Memorandum Published 
by him in 'PARON' Monthly Political Review Special Edition of the 12th October and 
Submitted to the Regent and Admiral Voulgaris).
146
However, he believed the idea might have some merit if it could be proved that 
certain imports could stimulate industry and dampen down inflation, and that 
suitable safeguards could prevent the flight of capital. In reply, Kasimatis stood his 
ground on the imports issue, threatening resignation if he could not get his way. 
He repeated his determination to implement the programme and rejected Hill's 
emphasis on balancing the budget to the exclusion of other considerations. Hill 
could only repeat his advice and requested that Kasimatis should inform the British 
of the government's intentions. The minister agreed, but took pains to wring an 
admission from Hill to the effect that all the details were still 'open for 
discussion'.18
Hill's reservations over the Kasimatis proposals were shared in London, with 
officials at the Treasury and the Bank of England equally hostile to the ideas. The 
Treasury bemoaned what it saw as Greek unwillingness to introduce stern 
measures to combat the crisis, accusing them of still looking for an 'easy way out'. 
They felt that any relaxation on the sale of gold and foreign exchange would only 
aggravate the situation and refused to consider a loan, believing that the country 
possessed ample foreign exchange reserves. They reiterated that the budget deficit 
would have to take priority over every other issue, stressing that the 'hard way' 
was the 'only way' out of the crisis, and that 'almost penal taxation' was called for. 
The Treasury views were largely mirrored by those of the Bank of England, which 
rejected the possibility of sterling credits and expressed considerable scepticism 
about plans to intervene in the gold market. Although they recognised that gold 
sales could mop up purchasing power, they felt that de facto confirmation of the 
weakness of the drachma could prove far more damaging.19
Despite British scepticism, Kasimatis was able to win virtually unanimous 
Greek support for the majority of his programme, the proposal on gold sales 
having been withdrawn following the opposition of leading Greek financial 
experts.20 The amended proposals were duly presented to the British.21 Privately, 
Leeper admitted that the ideas should be supported despite their clear shortcomings, 
as any British veto could bring down the government. Moreover, London was
18 F0371/48337 R18716, Athens to FO, Telegram no.151 Remac, 3.11.1945; F0371/48337 
R18717, Athens to FO, Telegram no.152 Remac, 3.11.1945; F0371/48337 R18754, Athens 
to FO, Telegram no. 153 Remac, 4.11.1945; T236/1047, Summary of Proceedings of a 
Meeting Held in the Greek Ministry of Finance at 11 a.m. 4 November 1945.
19 F0371/48337 R18717, FO to Athens, Telegram no.121 Camer, 3.11.1945; T236/1047, 
Minute by Davidson, 5.11.1945; T236/1047, Minute by Rowe-Dutton, 5.11.1945; BoE 
OV80/26, Bolton to Davidson, 5.11.1945.
20 Kaai\iaxr\g,op.cit., 1945, pp.79-82, 85-90.
21 F0371/48337 R18833, Athens to FO, Telegram no.2237, 6.11.1945.
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hardly in a position to impose any alternative policies.22 Meanwhile, British and 
American officials met the minister once more. Hill attempted yet again to persuade 
Kasimatis to postpone devaluation, and after heavy pressure the minister agreed to 
keep existing rates for a month. In addition, commercial imports were to be subject 
to the approval of the government rather than that of UNRRA or the British, and 
surcharges were to be imposed on all foreign exchange sold to prospective 
importers.23 Following the concession on exchange rates, the British and American 
embassies, together with UNRRA local representatives endorsed the amended 
proposals.24 Whitehall approved, but ruled out any form of British loan, offering 
instead to provide support for internal reform and reorganisation 25
The Kasimatis economic programme was duly broadcast to the country amid 
solemn speeches underlining the seriousness of the crisis.26 At the same time, the 
minister announced a new budget. As table 5.2 shows, this was by far the most 
optimistic set of estimates produced since liberation, in that it assumed that 
budgetary equilibrium would be achieved over the coming fiscal year. The minister 
anticipated unprecentended levels of revenue, of which only 3.1% was to derive 
from direct taxation, and 8.4% from the special contribution. Sales of UNRRA 
supplies were to provide a massive 60%, while a further 27% was to come from 
the war related taxes and the sale of war booty. The expenditure figures were far 
more vague, but assumed large rises in the cost of salaries and pensions and the 
distribution of UNRRA supplies. The estimates even provided for the creation of a
22 FQ371/48337 R18868, Athens to FO, Telegram no.2236, 6.11.1945.
23 Surcharges were to be set at three levels according to the category of goods: 110% for articles 
of primary necessity; 125% for articles of non-primary necessity and 150% for all other 
articles; Kaoijiaxrig, op.cit., 1945, p. 125.
24 The programme comprised the following points: '(1) Readjustment of taxation and 
augmentation of prices of UNRRA supplies in order to balance the budget on a strong 
foundation; (2) Increase of imports. Foreign currency will be definitely allotted without 
obstruction for import of every item considered useful and permitted to be imported by the 
state. The price and use of imported goods will be controlled; (3) Credit will be issued under 
control in order to support production and internal trade; (4) Foreign exchange will be sold to 
importers at official rates but subject to surcharges, varying with types of goods in order to 
absorb difference between world and domestic price levels; (5) An application for financial 
assistance from Allied sources on a broader basis will be made and when allotted will be used 
mainly for immediate rehabilitation of the country; (6) UNRRA supplies will be distributed 
and valorised quickly; (7) Effective control of prices with regard to particular peculiarities of 
the country will be organised'; Kaainarrig, op.cit., 1945, pp.96-97.
25 FCX371/48337 R18869, Athens to FO, Telegram no.2239, 6.11.1945; F0371/48337 
R18941, Athens to FO, Telegram no.2242, 7.11.1945; F0371/48337 R18869, FO to 
Athens, Telegram no.2271, 8.11.1945.
26 F0371/48285 R19827, AGIS Weekly Report, No.56, 4-10 Nov 1945.
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'budgetary reserve', to be used for 'real and absolute needs'.27 The budget failed 
to arouse any enthusiasm among foreign observers. The figures proved 'quite 
beyond the understanding' of one competent analyst, while another dismissed the 
entire budget as 'even less satisfactory [...] than any of its predecessors', with 
public spending 'grossly underestimated' and revenue 'sufficiently inflated' in 
order to achieve the 'required arithmetic’.28
Tabic 5.2 Estimated Revenue and Expenditure, 1945-46 (in millions of drachmae)
Revenue
TOTAL ORDINARY REVENUE 31338
1-DIRECT TAXES 4,445
2-INDIRECT TAXES 26,893
TOTAL EXTRAORDINARY REVENUE 111,152
1-Sale of Relief Supplies 67,000
2-Prizes of War 10,000
3-War Profits Tax 12,000
4-Special Contribution 12,000
5-Tax on Merchants who imported during the Occupation 8,000
6-Other 2,152
TOT AL REVENUE 142,490
Expenditure
1-Pensions 21,050
2-Salaries 42,450
3-Public Works and Reconstruction 10,954
4-Public Health and Social Welfare 6,552
5-Allowances Paid to Reservists 1,888
6-War Ministries and Public Security (excluding salaries) 8,526
7-Expenses of Distributing Relief Supplies (excluding salaries) 26,718
8-Reserve 10,251
9-Other 14,101
TOTAL EXPENDITURE 142,490
S o u r c e :  K a o i |A c m i £ ,  op.cit., 1 9 4 5 ,  p p . 1 0 1 - 1 0 2 .
This apparent flurry of activity did not last for long. The budget was never 
published, and within days both the government and the regent were pleading for 
financial assistance from the British. Kasimatis called for an indication from 
London that such assistance would be forthcoming, while Damaskinos demanded a 
public recognition of the Greek plight. The latter complained that Greece's 
economic problems could hardly be solved by 'sympathy, advice [or] declarations 
of friendship' alone, neither could the crisis be overcome by taxation measures or
27 Kaoifiarns, op.cit., 1945, pp. 108-132. See also T236/1047, Statement to Be Made by M. 
Kasimatis Announcing his Programme over the Radio. Translation of a Document Handed to 
Financial Advisor on 9th Nov. 1945.
28 Patterson, op.cit., 1948, p.260.
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police action. He warned that the country could simply not survive without foreign 
aid.29
Shortly afterwards, yet another government was sworn in, but the new 
ministers merely reiterated what their predecessors had said.30 Tsouderos, the 
minister of coordination, repeated the need for external aid, while the minister of 
finance Alexandras Mylonas dismissed British emphasis on the budget by claiming 
that the economy could not bear any additional taxation. In subsequent meetings, 
Tsouderos attempted to gain leverage by hardening his position, stating he would 
not make any public declaration on the economic and financial situation unless the 
Allies promised extensive assistance.31 The British were unimpressed, as the 
government was doing little to improve public finances or to suppress the gold 
market. In reply, Tsouderos claimed that gold speculation was merely a political 
weapon used by the Right to undermine the government, and dismissed fiscal 
measures as a solution to the problem.32 Further contacts between the two sides 
merely produced a repetition of the fundamental positions: while the Greeks 
emphasised the need for foreign help, the British continued to stress the budgetary 
situation as the real key to the problem. Despite Hill's insistence on a much closer 
control of public spending, Mylonas could offer no helpful suggestions. Claiming 
that the maximum taxable capacity of the country had been reached following the 
Kasimatis measures, the minister felt he could neither increase revenue, nor reduce 
expenditure. Hill warned that only vigorous action on the budget could prove 
effective and added that taxes would not only have to be raised drastically in order 
to bring them in line with current prices, but would also have to be pegged to 
inflation to avoid future depreciation.33 Similarly, officials at the Treasury were
29 F0371/48285 R19828, Record of a Conversation between the Prime Minister, Mr. McNeil 
and His Majesty's Ambassador on 14th November, 1945; FQ371/48285 R19830, Record of a 
Conversation Held at His Majesty's Embassy, Athens, on Thursday, 15th November, 1945, 
at 11 o'clock; F0371/48338 R20280, Record of Conversation Held at His Majesty's 
Embassy, Athens on Friday, 16th November, 1945, at 10.30 a.m.; F0371/48338 R20282, 
Record of a Discussion Held at the Palace of the Regency on 19th November at 11.30 a.m.; 
F0371/48286 R20281, Discussion Held at the Palace of the Regency on 19th November, 
1945, at 6 o'clock.
30 F0371/48416 R21248, Record of Meeting Held at the British Embassy at 10 a.m. on 21st 
November 1945; F0371/48416 R21249, Record of Meeting Held at H.B.M. Embassy, 
Athens at 2.30 p.m. 22nd November 1945.
31 F0371/48338 R20171, Athens to FO, Telegram no. 155 Remac, 29.11.1945; FQ371/48338 
R20320, Athens to FO, Telegram no.2403, 30.11.1945; F0371/48338 R20382, Athens to 
FO, Telegram no.2416, 2.12.1945.
32 F0371/48338 R20299, Athens to FO, Telegram no.2405, 30.11.1945; F0371/48338 
R20345, Athens to FO, Telegram no.2414, 1.12.1945.
33 F0371/48338 R20704, Davidson to Laskey, 6.12.1945 (Enclosure: Greek Finances,
28.11.1945); T236/1048, Report of Proceedings of a Meeting in the Ministry of Finance at 
17:00 Hours 5 December 1945. The total government inertia on public finance contrasted
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adamant that only internal measures could solve the country’s problems. Douglas 
Davidson was convinced real scope for improving public finance did exist, and 
dismissed the notion that Greek taxable capacity had been reached as a dangerous 
idea, which was likely to cause trouble in the future.34
* * *
The despatch of the under-secretary for foreign affairs Hector McNeil to Athens, 
heralding the preparation of a sizeable advisoiy economic mission, signalled the 
advent of a much broader British approach to the Greek crisis. For the adherents of 
fiscal orthodoxy, preoccupied as they were with public finance, this new initiative 
created a double danger. For one thing, they felt that the Greeks would avoid any 
vigorous action on the budget, pending the outcome of the London talks. Hill was 
convinced that the government believed that British assistance would remedy all the 
country's problems and planned to 'let things slide', and to blame Britain for the 
crisis should such assistance be refused. He deplored the numerous press rumours 
about an impending British loan, which the government was doing nothing to 
dispel, and even suggested that these had originated within the cabinet itself.35
For Hill and Davidson, the very breadth of the proposed mission posed an even 
greater danger. They felt anxious that the initiative would divert attention away 
from what they saw as the only guaranteed solution to the crisis. Davidson was 
appalled by the priorities of McNeil, who seemed to emphasise 'supply and 
production' rather than 'financial problems'. Although he acknowledged that the 
former issues were important, he did not believe that recovery could be possible 
unless the budget was balanced.36 Hill went even further. While admitting that the 
mission could achieve much in reviving industry and assisting distribution, he felt 
this would not be enough unless inflation could be checked. By now, he doubted 
whether an economic solution could be found to the crisis given the country's 'free 
economy', coupled with 'the Greek temperament and lack of efficiency'.37
with other actions it took in response to the escalating political and economic crisis. At the 
end of November, after sharp rises in the sovereign rate, it finally heeded British advice and 
passed a law prohibiting transactions in gold. As this had no effect, it was shortly followed 
by a second law promising drastic penalties (including confiscation, imprisonment and exile) 
for those who continued to trade. This proved no more effective than the first, and within days 
the Bank of Greece resorted to secret sales of gold, without informing the British. By these 
means, 97,000 sovereigns were sold by the end of January 1946; Patterson, op.cit., 1948, 
pp.304-308.
34 T236/1048, Greek Finance, D. Davidson, 23.11.1945; T236/1048, Greek Financial 
Situation, D. Davidson, 26.11.1945; T236/1048, Minute by Davidson, 28.11.1945.
35 F0371/48338 R21506, Hill to Rowe-Dutton, 13.12.1945.
36 T236/1048, Minute by Davidson, 28.11.1945.
37 T236/1047, Hill to Rowe-Dutton, 21.11.1945 (Enclosure: Note by Hill, 21.11.1945).
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The only vigorous action which the government took during this period was to 
demand participation in the London talks, where the details of the economic 
mission and other forms of British support were to be finalised. Both Tsouderos 
and Georgios Kartalis, the minister of supply, sought invitations to London to state 
the Greek case. The latter warned that the government would fall unless immediate 
measures were enacted, and threatened to resign unless he was invited to join the 
discussions. A worried Leeper urged the Foreign Office to comply in the interests 
of political stability.38 As he warned, a 'narrow financial view' could completely 
destroy British policy in Greece, whereas a 'wide and realistic' approach could 
yield 'big results'.39 Officials at the Foreign Office felt resentful towards the idea 
of various 'visiting Greek ministers' seeking to obtain an 'immediate cut-and-dried 
scheme' which would 'get them out of all their troubles', and were annoyed that 
Kartalis was not prepared to remain at his post.40 Nevertheless, given the political 
circumstances, they relented on condition that the ministers should not expect any 
immediate results from the forthcoming discussions.41
Upon arrival in London, the ministers emphasised that Greece's financial 
problems were entirely dependent upon immediate reconstruction. They claimed 
that any attempt to deal with the two questions in isolation would lead to further 
collapse, as they believed that only a long-term reconstruction programme would 
make it possible to stabilise the currency and balance the budget. They added that 
Greece was utterly unable to provide resources required for such a programme, as 
revenue could not be increased, nor could expenditure be reduced. Thus in their 
view, reconstruction would only be possible through massive Allied assistance and 
a greater relief effort from UNRRA,42
The British fully acknowledged the urgent need for reconstruction, but pointed 
out that the immediate stabilisation of the currency was of at least equal importance. 
This would require much more efficient utilisation of Greece's own resources. 
They agreed that Greece would need a great deal of help from abroad, but stressed 
that reconstruction could not be wholly dependent on Allied aid, as UNRRA 
resources were limited, and Greece was already receiving a 'disproportionately 
large share' of what was 'available'. Such high levels of aid could be maintained 
only if the Greeks could demonstrate they were putting it to constructive use. They
38 F 0371/48338 R21366, Athens to FO, Telegram no.2535, 21.12.1945; F0371/48289 
R21403, Athens to FO, Telegram no.2548, 23.12.1945.
39 F0371/48289 R21543, Athens to FO, Telegram no.2573, 27.12.1945.
40 F0371/48289 R21543, FO to Athens, Telegram no.2575, 28.12.1945.
41 F0371/48338 R21366, FO to Athens, Telegram no.2538, 22.12.1945; T236/1048, FO to 
Athens, Telegram no.2555, 24.12.1945.
42 FO371/58720 R398, The Greek Ministers' Memorandum, 2.1.1946.
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declared that the British government was anxious to provide technical assistance, 
together with limited aid for the rebuilding of housing, industrial plants, and 
transport infrastructure. However, they underlined that London was neither able 
nor willing to undertake long-term financial obligations, and that British assistance 
could be provided for a limited period only, after which Greece would have to 
cany on alone. They added that in any case, foreign credits would be of little help 
unless the government stopped covering budget deficits by resorting to the printing 
press. They urged a greater effort to restart industrial and agricultural production, 
but as Waley warned, ’printing more paper money’ would not 'make the chickens 
lay more eggs'. Only stabilisation of the budget could diminish speculation and 
restore confidence in the economy.43
5.2 The Broader Approach
Throughout the autumn, British advice had been limited to issues relating to the 
immediate crisis. As the situation deteriorated, it became increasingly clear to most 
observers outside Treasury circles that fiscal orthodoxy alone would not be enough 
to solve Greece's problems. This realisation forced the British to broaden their 
approach in order to concentrate on the wider underlying weaknesses of the Greek 
economy as much as on the immediate threat of inflation. This prompted a series of 
initiatives culminating in the London Agreement of January 1946, by which the 
British assumed a far more direct role in Greek economic affairs.
Suggestions for wider Allied involvement came from the Greeks themselves, 
and were made shortly after the departure of Varvaressos.44 In the end, fears of a 
political breakdown forced the British to rethink their approach towards the 
economic crisis. In a radical departure from previous practice, Bevin's swift 
conversion to a policy of active intervention produced an offer to send McNeil to 
Athens to discuss a programme of technical advice and expert assistance.45 Bevin 
envisaged that Britain could soon offer the Greeks a full economic mission 
consisting of experts attached to various ministries. These would advise on matters 
relating to the army, public finance, transport, and distribution. In addition, Britain 
would assist the Greek import programme, with special emphasis on the 
acquisition of capital goods and raw materials. In exchange, Bevin expected the
43 F0371/48289 R21668, FO to Athens, Telegram no. 14, 2.1.1946; FO371/58720 R398, 
Minute by Sargent, 1.1.1946; T236/1049, Minute by Waley, 7.1.1946; F0371/58721 R793, 
Waley to Laskey, 8.1.1946 (Enclosure: Points for Reply to the Greek Ministers' 
Memorandum Dated January 2nd 1946).
44 FO371/48280 R16154, Athens to FO, Telegram no.181 Saving, 18.9.1945.
45 F0371/48284 R18571, FO to Athens, Telegram no.2224, 1.11.1945.
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Greeks to undertake a series of measures dealing with industry, distribution and 
transport infrastructure, along with various political measures.46
While in Athens, McNeil communicated the British government's willingness to 
send a mission to assist with the 'task of economic reconstruction'. Its ultimate aim 
would be to re-establish the country as a 'going concern' after which it would be 
withdrawn. However, such a mission would not be sent unless the Greek 
government gave an undertaking to 'implement and operate' any programme it 
devised 47 The Greeks professed astonishment at the British proposals and claimed 
that as an interim government, they had no right to commit future administrations to 
such an arrangement.48 Nevertheless, with the formation of the Sophoulis 
government, Tsouderos accepted the programme in principle, and gave a 
'gentleman's assurance' that the mission's advice would be accepted.49
The Grove Plan
In mid-December, two of the key figures in the planned economic mission visited 
Athens for a further fact-finding trip ahead of the London talks. These were Sir 
Vyvyan Board and Edward Grove, responsible for industry and finance 
respectively.50 Within days, Grove concluded that the measures which had hitherto 
been central to British advice to successive Greek governments were 'inappropriate 
to the present circumstances'.51 Accordingly, he devised a plan which reflected 
changed priorities. He claimed that although budgetary equilibrium would probably 
stabilise prices, it would not dispel the general distrust of the drachma, and thus 
could not in itself overcome the crisis. He believed that as it would be difficult to 
restore public confidence in any currency other than gold, the only possible 
solution would be a currency with a 100% backing in gold or foreign exchange. As 
an interim measure, he advocated the complete withdrawal of the drachma, and its 
replacement by gold coins as the standard medium of exchange. Believing that the
46 CAB129/4/C.P. (45) 266, Greece, Memorandum by the Secretary of State for Foreign 
Affairs, 3.11.1945; CAB128/2/C.M. 49(45), Greece, 6.11.1945; FG371/48284 R18832, FO 
to Athens, Telegram no.2266, 7.11.1945.
47 FQ371/48285 R19826, McNeil to Kanellopoulos, 14.11.1945.
48 FRUS, Vol. VIII, 1945. MacVeagh to the Secretary of State, 17.11.1945, pp.270-271.
49 F0371/48285 R2344, Athens to FO, Telegram no.2344, 22.11.1945.
50 F0371/58667 R155, Athens to FO, Telegram no.283 Saving, 21.12.1945. Board was 
chairman of the Distillers' Company, and had acted as alcohol, molasses and rubber controller 
at the ministry of supply during the war; Grove had been employed at the firm Lazards 
Brothers in London; F0371/48416 R20671, FO to Athens, Telegram no.2466, 9.12.1945; 
FG371/48416 R20906, FO to Washington, Telegram no. 12455, 12.12.1945.
51 T236/1048, Meeting with M. Tsouderos, M. Kartalis, Sir Vyvyan Board, Mr. Grove, 
Financial and Economic Advisers at the Bank of Greece on 20th December, 1945 at 10 a.m.; 
FQ371/48416 R21223, Athens to FO, Telegram no.2524, 21.12.1945.
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Bank of Greece held sufficient reserves for this purpose, he claimed the 
arrangement would effectively prevent the government from resorting to the 
printing press. He doubted whether a foreign loan would be necessary, but pointed 
out that a small loan of £5m, for the purchase of industrial plant and capital goods, 
would be an encouraging gesture. He agreed that the Greek government would 
have to act decisively to balance the budget, no matter how drastic the necessary 
measures might be. Moreover, they would also have to accept a rigid financial 
control by a mission from the British Treasury. Finally, he assumed that the 
country would require foreign assistance until at least the end of 1948, and urged 
that the Greeks should be assured they would not be allowed to starve in the period 
between the end of the UNRRA programme and the complete recovery of the 
economy.52
No other British financial expert betrayed any enthusiasm for the plan. Whereas 
one was content to describe it as 'far-reaching' and 'revolutionary', another 
dismissed it as 'egregious'.53 Hostility centred around particular proposals. 
Officials at the Treasury disliked the idea of a gold backed currency. Sir Wilfrid 
Eady claimed that such a move essentially amounted to a 'confidence trick', with 
'no avenue of retreat' in the event of failure. Waley was equally sceptical, but 
added that any objection to the use of gold would be removed if the budget could 
be balanced quickly. However, both had severe doubts whether anything drastic 
would be done to save the economy. Eady acknowledged that Greece would need 
extensive assistance, but felt Britain could not commit itself to any financial help 
beyond the end of 1946. Nevertheless, he was prepared to recommend that the 
British government offer the Greeks substantial aid until that time.54
Officials at the Bank of England also displayed marked reserve towards the use 
of gold, with Harry Siepmann and George Bolton equally hostile to the idea. 
Instead, the Bank proposed the establishment of an international currency 
commission, operated by one British and one American representative with 
additional members from other European countries, to issue a new currency backed 
by gold and foreign exchange. The commission would include several advisers, 
who would seek to 'bring some order into the Greek administration', while the
52 F 0371/48416 R21309, Athens to FO, Telegram no.2529, 21.12.1945; F0371/48416 
R21314, Athens to FO, Telegram no.2530, 21.12.1945.
53 T236/1048, Hill to Davidson, 19.12.1945; T236/1049, Minute by Eady, 10.1.1946. The 
unanimous hostility towards the plan belies Hadziiossifs bizarre claim that ’Grove's ideas 
reflected the findings of the British Embassy in Athens'; Hadziiossif, op.cit., 1987, p.38.
54 F0371/48338 R21610, Laskey to Reily, 4.1.1946 (Enclosure: Record of Meeting Held in 
Mr. McNeil's Room in Foreign Office at 2.45 pm on 24th December).
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Bank of Greece would lose its note issuing authority. The suggestions met with the 
approval of the Treasury, which duly incorporated them into its own plan.55
The Treasury Plan
The Treasury was convinced that fiscal orthodoxy could no longer ensure a 
successful stabilisation unless excessive money issues could be prevented. 
Accordingly, they proposed the setting up of a currency control committee 
consisting of up to four members: the Greek minister of finance and the Governor 
of the Bank of Greece, together with a Briton and an American if possible. Their 
unanimous agreement would be required for new note issues. The new currency 
would be fully backed by foreign exchange, but the British representative on the 
committee would have to be consulted as to the appropriate measures to prevent 
any possible flight of capital. The Greek government would have to deposit £15m 
out of its foreign exchange reserves into a special note cover account, to which the 
British would add a further £5m on condition that vigorous action was taken on 
public finance. In addition, the British would provide experts to advise Greek 
ministers on taxation measures and budgetary control as well as an adviser for the 
sole purpose of reforming the Greek civil service. The proposals concluded that 
although no further financial assistance would be extended, Britain should waive 
repayment of wartime loans amounting to £46m if the Greeks undertook 
appropriate financial measures.56
Although the Chancellor approved the suggestions,57 Cobbold, the deputy 
governor of the Bank of England, was less than enthusiastic. While claiming there 
was nothing wrong with the plan itself, there was little likelihood that the Greeks 
would ’carry it out.' Without political stability and a willingness to 'do what is 
necessary' he felt the proposals amounted to 'putting new money down the same 
old drain'.58 He firmly believed that the proposed currency committee would have 
to possess executive powers, but doubted whether even this would be enough. He 
objected to full convertibility into sterling, but felt little confidence that the new 
currency would be viable without such convertibility.59
Despite such misgivings, the Foreign Office supported the idea of full 
convertibility into sterling, claiming that this alone could guarantee the prerequisite 
degree of confidence in the new currency. They argued that the dangers of capital
55 BoE OV80/26, Minute, Greece, 31.12.1945; BoE OV80/26, Minute by Bolton, Greece 
31.12.1945.
56 T236/1049, Memorandum by Davidson, 1.1.1946.
57 T236/1049, Minute by Eady, 3.1.1946; T236/1049, Davidson to Laskey, 7.1.1946.
58 BoE OV80/26, Minute by Cobbold, 4.1.1946.
59 BoE OV80/26, Minute by Cobbold, 7.1.1946.
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flight could be avoided if convertibility was accompanied by sufficiently 'watertight 
arrangements'.60 Nevertheless, the Treasury continued to emphasise the possibility 
of capital flight as a major objection to convertibility, concluding that the measure 
was in any case pointless unless the Greeks were prepared to take the 'painful and 
difficult' measures which the situation demanded.61
Following two weeks of largely theoretical discussions, the subsequent course 
of events was heavily influenced by political considerations. Believing that the 
British proposals were insufficiently generous, the Greek ministers threatened to 
return to Athens.62 Not for the first time, an angiy Leeper warned the Foreign 
Office of the potentially disastrous consequences of treating the Greek crisis as a 
'purely financial problem'63 He feared the impasse could bring down the 
government, after which the most likely outcome would be a 'regime of the 
Extreme Right' followed by a 'Communist dictatorship'. To avoid 'bloodshed and 
famine', he urged a more 'generous approach'.64
The Foreign Office was of similar mind. It suggested that the £5m earmarked to 
back the stabilisation plan should be doubled, feeling this would appear more 
impressive to the Greeks. The Treasury was anything but impressed. They argued 
there was little financial justification for such a move, particularly as Britain's own 
balance of payments was so unsatisfactory. They reluctantly accepted that the 
Foreign Office had its own agenda for Greece based on criteria other than financial. 
The Treasury objections were overruled as the broader Foreign Office agenda 
prevailed. After consulting with Bevin, Dalton consented to the proposal, despite 
his clear lack of enthusiasm for the Greek leadership. Claiming he had little 
confidence in Tsouderos and Co.', he urged Bevin to ensure that the £5m would 
not be simply thrown 'down the drain'.65
As a result of the political pressure, the Treasury produced a revised set of 
proposals. These included the £10m stabilisation loan, the waiving of the £46m 
wartime debt, some material assistance, and British advisers to be placed within 
Greek ministries, in addition to the economic mission. In return, the Greek 
government would have to issue a new currency and set new exchange rates. The
60 F0371/58790 R209, McNeil to Waley, 4.1.1946.
61 FQ371/58790 R209, Waley to McNeil, 5.1.1946.
62 FG371/58722 R1310, Record of a Meeting Held in Mr. McNeil's Room on January 8th at 
4.30 p.m.; FQ371/58720 R532, Athens to FO, Telegram no.76, 10.1.1946.
63 FQ371/58720 RS31, Athens to FO, Telegram no.75, 10.1.1946.
64 FO371/58720 R595, Athens to FO, Telegram no.87, 11.1.1946; FO371/58720 R595, 
Athens to FO, Telegram no.88, 11.1.1946.
65 T236/1049, Minute by Eady, 10.1.1946; FO371/58720 R485, Minute by Laskey, 
10.1.1946; FQ371/58721 R979, Dalton to Bevin, 14.1.1946.
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government would have to provide £15m from their own foreign exchange 
reserves to supplement the British loan. The new currency would be freely 
convertible, with all new issues subject to the unanimous approval of a currency 
committee comprised as in the original plan. Safeguards to prevent capital flight 
were left to the discretion of the Greek government. The proposals demanded 
austerity in public finance, with expenditure cuts to be achieved by reducing the 
size of the state bureaucracy. New taxes would have to be introduced, while all 
existing taxes would have to be revalorised to take account of inflation. Revenue 
from the sale of UNRRA supplies would have to be increased, partly by raising 
their price and partly by cutting the numbers of non-paying recipients.66
The Greek ministers' response was guarded. They declared that the amended 
plan offered a 'satisfactory basis for discussion', but refused to commit themselves 
at first They accepted the need to balance the budget, and claimed that they would 
not be deterred by the likely unpopularity of some of the proposed measures, but 
took pains to re-emphasise that increased taxation would have to await the recovery 
of industrial production and foreign trade, and that the whole stabilisation plan 
would be jeopardised unless UNRRA supplies were increased. Eventually, they 
accepted, feeling this would 'ensure continued foreign interest in Greece's 
welfare'.67 In the meantime, both sides had agreed to set up a committee to control 
public finance. This would comprise British and Greek officials and would have 
advisory functions only 68 Rather than creating an entirely new currency, the 
existing drachma would be retained. Following a final compromise, the drachma 
was to be freely convertible for 'imports and for other approved purposes including 
approved capital transactions'.69 The stabilisation plan was formally adopted on 
January 24, and the details of the agreement were announced the next day.70
5.3 The London Agreement and Its Instruments
The London Agreement superseded all previous forms of British economic aid to 
Greece. Apart from the stabilisation loan to back up convertibility, little material
66 T236/1049, Economic and Financial Situation in Greece, 15.1.1946.
67 T236/1049, Minute by Somerville Smith, 16.1.1946; F0371/58722 R1311, Greek 
Ministers' Comments, 16.1.1946; T236/1049, Athens to FO, Telegram no.117, 17.1.1946.
68 FO371/58790 R1221, Record of a Meeting Held at 21, St. James's Square on Thursday,
17.1.1946.
69 F0371/58790 R1221, Minute by Laskey, 18.1.1946; T236/1049, Minute by Waley, 
18.1.1946; F0371/58790 R1049, FO to Athens, Telegram no.19 Camer, 18.1.1946; 
FG371/58722 R1308, Waley to Tsouderos, 23.1.1946.
70 FQ371/58722 R1355, FO to Athens, Telegram no. 162, 24.1.1946; F0371/58722 R1355, 
Financial and Economic Agreement between His Majesty's Government in the United 
Kingdom and the Greek Government, London, 24.1.1946.
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assistance was offered. Instead, the most important result was the creation of two 
new institutions: the British Economic Mission (BEM) and the Currency 
Committee, both of which were designed to play central roles in subsequent 
events.
As the British were already largely familiar with the major problems of the 
Greek economy, the areas in which the economic advisory mission would operate 
were clearly defined from the very beginning. Thus within weeks, a provisional 
body had been devised to deal with issues relating to finance, industry, agriculture, 
labour and transport.71 By February 1946, the BEM consisted of six sections: Co­
operative Movement, Supply and Distribution, Labour, Transport, Finance and 
Industry.72 With slight amendments, this basic structure remained in force until the 
termination of its activities.
Whereas the scope of the Mission was thus well defined, its aims were never 
clearly formulated. Originally, it was stated that the proposed body would strive to 
'get [the] Greek economy working again',73 and transform the country into a 
'going concern'74 However, the directive drawn up in December 1945 merely 
specified that the Mission would co-operate with Greek officials in planning the 
'various phases of reconstruction', and would seek to ensure that 'any decisions 
reached' would be acted upon.75 These general statements were never formally 
refined or redefined. Instead, as the work of the Mission progressed, each section 
developed an independent list of priorities and objectives, ranging from general 
topics to extremely specific courses of action.76
An even more contentious issue was the extent of the powers which the BEM 
could wield. The Greeks had been particularly anxious to avoid the granting of 
executive authority to any foreign experts, and warned against any arrangement 
which could offend 'rather touchy circles' or 'certain susceptibilities'. Accordingly, 
the British took great pains to emphasise the advisory nature of the Mission, and 
never officially departed from the line that its members were effectively 'servants'
71 F0371/48416 R20139, Minute by McNeil, 28.11.1945.
72 F0371/58723 R2967, British Economic Mission to Greece, Fortnightly Report no. 1.
73 CAB129/4/C.P. (45) 266, Greece, Memorandum by the Secretary of State for Foreign 
Affairs, 3.11.1945.
74 FG371/48285 R19826, McNeil to Kanellopoulos, 14.11.1945.
75 FG371/48416 R20906, Economic Advisory Mission to Greece (Draft Directive), 10.12.1945.
76 For a list of objectives of each section as defined in April 1946, see F0371/58798 R6681, 
English Text of a Memorandum Submitted in Greek by the British Economic Mission to His 
Excellency M.S. Stephanopoulos, Minister ctf Co-ordination, April 1946.
159
of the Athens government.77 The Mission would thus merely provide advice, with 
responsibility for its adoption or otherwise to lie entirely with the Greek 
government.78 As will be shown, this arrangement was to prove one of the most 
serious weaknesses of the entire Bevin initiative.
When the BEM was first proposed, British authorities optimistically suggested 
that it would operate for between three and six months 79 As set out in the London 
Agreement in January 1946, this became eighteen months, with the possibility of a 
further six months' extension by mutual agreement.80 The Mission was headed by 
Lieutenant-General John Clark, with Thomas Rapp acting as deputy from July 
1946. Initially, its most important members included Edward Grove as head of the 
finance section, and Sir Vyvyan Board who led the industry section. Both had 
played central roles in the negotiations which led to the London Agreement. In May 
1946, Grove was replaced by Sir John Nixon, who combined BEM duties with his 
existing role as British member of the Currency Committee.81
In contrast with the BEM, the scope, aims and powers of the Currency 
Committee were much more clearly defined. The London Agreement had laid down 
that the proposed committee was to have 'statutory management of the note issue', 
and its unanimous approval was required if further drachma issues were 
contemplated.82 These stipulations were duly enshrined in Greek law, but another 
clause, stating that the £25m note cover account could be used only in agreement 
with the Bank of England, was omitted.83 Likewise, a suggestion that the account 
should be subject to the Committee's control was vetoed by Tsouderos on political 
grounds, although it was agreed in practice that no unilateral action would be 
taken.84 However, the Committee eventually assumed additional duties not covered
77 FO371/58790 R1221, Record of a Meeting Held at 21, St James's Square on Thursday, 17th 
January, 1946.
78 FO371/67101 R2377, Interim Report of the British Economic Mission to Greece,
31.1.1947, p. 1.
79 F0371/48416 R20906, Economic Advisory Mission to Greece (Draft Directive), 10.12.1945.
80 F0371/58722 R1355, Financial and Economic Agreement Between His Majesty's 
Government in the United Kingdom and the Greek Government, London: HMSO, 24.1.1946.
81 Lt-General Clark had headed the SHAEF Mission responsible for the military relief effort in 
the Netherlands; Nixon had filled a series of senior posts within the Indian civil service; Rapp 
had served previously as consul-general in Thessaloniki; F0371/58723 R1776, FO to 
Athens, Telegram no.227,4.12.1946; F0371/48416 R20906, FO to Washington, Telegram 
no. 12455, 12.12.1945.
82 F0371/58722 R1355, Financial and Economic Agreement Between His Majesty's 
Government in the United Kingdom and the Greek Government, London: HMSO, 24.1.1946.
83 FQ371/58726 R4590, Common Law No. 1015, Government Gazette, 20.2.1946.
84 T236/1050, BEM/SEC/18/46/1, 14.2.1946; T236/1050, BEM/FIN/8/46/17, 22.2.1946.
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in its original statute, such as the approval of major commercial loans and private 
imports, and the sale of foreign exchange. The Committee, or for practical 
purposes its foreign members, was thus furnished with powers which the Mission 
never possessed, in that it was authorised to veto government actions which it 
deemed inappropriate. The Bank of Greece initially undertook to provide regular 
statistical updates on note circulation and foreign exchange and bullion assets,85 
but within weeks, it was agreed that this obligation should be extended to cover 
virtually every aspect of public finances, balance of payments and the money 
supply.86 Like the BEM, the Committee was designed to function for an eighteen 
month period, with the possibility of a six months’ extension.87 The foreign 
members invited to participate were the already mentioned Nixon (replaced by 
Theodore Gregory in November 1946), and Gardner Patterson, previously of the 
Economic and Supply Committee (ESC), as the American representative.88 In their 
official capacity, both were to play important roles in subsequent events, and their 
names frequently reccur in the narrative.89
The Bevin initiative which culminated in the London Agreement thus led to the 
establishment of two institutions designed to address and eliminate some of the 
most obvious shortcomings of the Greek economy. While the BEM's remit was 
extremely broad, the brief of the Currency Committee was limited to a relatively 
small number of key issues. While the Mission could merely advise, with no 
effective mechanism of ensuring that its advice was heeded, the Committee was 
empowered to block government measures which ran counter to its objectives. If 
the purpose of the Mission was to offer constructive solutions and promote positive 
actions, the Committee's task was primarily one of damage limitation, in that it 
sought to minimise the potentially harmful effects of government policy. Although 
both instruments were independent of each other, their general objectives were 
convergent and mutually supporting. Despite differences in their scope and power,
85 F0371/58726 R4590, Common Law No. 1015, Government Gazette, 20.2.1946.
86 T236/1051, Currency Committee, First Informal Meeting, 21.3.1946.
87 F0371/58722 R1355, Financial and Economic Agreement Between His Majesty's 
Government in the United Kingdom and the Greek Government, London: HMSO, 24.1.1946.
88 Gregory had played an important role at the MESC anti-inflationary conferences.
89 The role of the Bank of Greece personnel in the Currency Committee has been misinterpreted 
by Pepelasis Minoglou, who underlined the Bank's subservience to the government in 
Athens, but failed to mention the powers of the foreign members. In reality, the Currency 
Committee was a tool to impose an external veto over the actions of both the Bank of Greece 
and the government; I. Pepelasis Minoglou, Transplanting Economic Ideas: International 
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the success of each depended largely on the degree of co-operation offered by the 
Greeks.
5.4 Inflationary Factors
British advice to successive governments in Athens had emphasised the need to 
combat inflation by pursuing sound financial and monetary policies. This implied a 
much greater effort to improve the budget situation and avoid recourse to the 
printing press. Despite persistent British pressure, developments over the 
following fifteen months increased rather than reduced inflationary forces, which 
were held in check only by measures that had little to do with fiscal orthodoxy. The 
following section describes the factors contributing to inflation: the continuation of 
budget deficits, the escalation of expenditure on wages and military purposes and 
the granting of huge credits to agriculture.
Budgetary Developments
Under the terms of the London Agreement, the government undertook to reduce, 
and as soon as possible eliminate, the budget deficit by increasing revenue from 
taxation and minimising unnecessary expenditure.90 To assist the Greeks in this 
endeavour, the BEM provided two advisors, Blackburn and Macintosh from the 
Inland Revenue and the Treasury respectively. This pair formed the nucleus of a 
committee comprising leading British, Greek and UNRRA officials, which was set 
up to scrutinise public finances,91 and preliminary estimates for a new budget were 
prepared by the end of March.92 In the meantime, following additional pressure 
from Whitehall, specific recommendations on tax increases were presented to 
Tsouderos 93 However, given the proximity of the elections little immediate action 
was taken.94 While the budget was being discussed, the situation continued to 
deteriorate. State receipts as a share of expenditure amounted to only 44.6% in 
January, and fell to 36.5% in February. In March, the share rose to 51.1%, but 
this improvement was due almost solely to massive increases in revenue from
90 F 0371/58722 R1355, Financial and Economic Agreement Between His Majesty's 
Government in the United Kingdom and the Greek Government, London: HMSO, 24.1.1946.
91 FQ371/58725 R4369, Note on the Financial Policy of Greece, E. Grove, 8.3.1946.
92 FQ371/58726 R5252, Budget 1945/46 and 1946/47, J. Nixon, 25.3.1946.
93 F0371/58724 R3488, FO to Athens, Telegram no.467, 5.3.1946; F0371/58724 R3862, 
Athens to FO, Telegram no.499, 11.3.1946.
94 FO371/67101 R2377, Interim Report of the British Economic Mission to Greece,
31.1.1947, p.80.
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MLVUNRRA supplies, rather than to higher tax yields, which had been entirely 
absorbed by rising expenditure.95
Table 5.3 Greek Budget, 1945-46 (in millions of drachmae)
Revenue
TOTAL ORDINARY REVENUE 96,837
1-DIRECT TAXES 27,144
Special Contribution 20,167
Tax on Tobacco Production 1,105
Turnover Tax 1,793
Tax on Salaries, Wages and Corporare Profits 1,954
Other r 2,125
2-INDIRECT TAXES 40,507
Tobacco Consumption Tax 31,592
Tax on Spirits 4,652
Import-Export Duties 1,168
Other 3,095
3-State Monopolies 5,014
4-Stamp Duties 5,479
5-T ransportation T axes 1,706
6-Entertainment Taxes 6,194
7-Post, Telephone, and Telegraph 5,290
8-Other Ordinary Revenue 5,503
TOTAL EXTRAORDINARY REVENUE 89333
1-Sale of UNRRA/ML and Other Supplies from Abroad 69,016
2-Revenue from War Booty 1,511
3-Revenue from Sea Transport 2,739
4-Tax on War Profiteers 9,307
5-Tax on Imports during Occupation 5,003
6-Other Extraordinary Revenue 1,757
TOTAL REVENUE 186,170
Expenditure
1-Pensions 40,336
2-War Ministries and Public Security (a) 66,772
3-Health and Welfare 20,478
4-Public Works and Reconstruction 35,238
5-EF-EX (Distribution of Supplies from Abroad) 87,286
6-Sea Transport 6,990
7-Post, Telephone, and Telegraph 7,698
8-Other 48,137
TOTAL EXPENDITURE (b) 312,935
Source: Patterson, op.cit., 1948, p.344.
(a) It does not include the value of goods supplied to the Greek armed forces free 
of charge by the British government.
(b) Of this total, 96,732 million drachmae was represented by salaries of persons 
on the government payroll.
Once the newly elected government was installed, attention was quickly 
refocused on the pressing economic issues. Within days of taking office, 
Stephanos Stephanopoulos, the new minister for coordination, highlighted
95 Patterson, op.cit., 1948, pp.339-341.
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budgetary equilibrium as one of the most urgent tasks to be addressed.96 An 
analysis of the actual budget figures for 1945-46 demonstrates the enormity of the 
task facing the Tsaldaris government. As table 5.3 shows, during the fiscal year, 
total revenue covered slightly less than 60% of expenditure. State receipts were still 
heavily dependent on extraordinary sources (48%). Proceeds from the sale of 
ML/UNRRA supplies were the biggest single component (37%), while 
extraordinary taxes on wartime profits, on which such hopes had been placed by 
successive finance ministers since liberation, produced disappointing results, 
yielding less than 8%. Ordinary taxation provided 52%, but a detailed breakdown 
suggests that many potential sources of revenue were undertapped. The largest 
sums were derived from duties on tobacco consumption (17%), easily dwarfing 
yields from direct taxation (less than 15%). The special contribution generated 
significant sums (11%, or 74% of all direct tax revenue). In sharp contrast, the 
returns from income and corporate taxes were pitifully small, providing a mere 
1 . 1%.
Public spending was dominated by the current costs of administration, 
distribution and security, rather than reconstruction. By far the largest single 
expenditure item was the government payroll, which accounted for 31% of the 
total. The burden of pensions for former employees constituted a further 13%. 
Thus almost half of all expenditure was devoted to the maintenance of current and 
former state personnel. The huge cost of distributing ML/UNRRA supplies also 
absorbed a large share (28%), as did the security forces (21%). The latter figure 
did not include the substantial costs of equipping and maintaining the armed forces, 
which were still borne by the British. Conversely, expenditure on reconstruction 
and public works was negligible, amounting to a mere 11%.
The above figures make grim reading and illustrate two major points. Firstly, 
the tax gathering capability of the state fell woefully short of even its current 
requirements, let alone the enormous long-term demands of reconstruction. 
Secondly, the surprising contrasts between the different shares of items on both the 
expenditure and revenue sides suggested obvious means by which the overall 
budgetaiy situation could be improved. As Patterson notes, the 'regressive nature' 
of the tax system was readily apparent.97 Yields from income and corporate taxes 
were so low as to be virtually symbolic, and the special contribution remained the 
only meaningful mechanism for taxing the business community and the 
professions. By contrast, duties on tobacco consumption alone yielded 16 times 
more than taxes on income and profits, and more than all direct taxation combined.
96 F0371/58727 R6134, British Economic Mission to Greece, Fortnightly Report no.5.
97 Patterson, op.cit., 1948, p.345.
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Given the extent of poverty in post-war Greece, the poor were shouldering a 
disproportionately large share of the tax burden. The problem of how to tap the 
large profits and incomes enjoyed by a narrow section of society, so frequently 
discussed back in 1945, still awaited a solution. As for the expenditure side, it was 
clear that drastic measures were needed to address both the excessive costs of the 
state machinery and distribution. On the former, the bloated government payroll 
required urgent trimming to reduce chronic overmanning. On the latter, only 
substantial improvements in infrastructure and administration could avoid the 
absurdity of a situation where the costs of distributing UNRRA supplies to the 
population exceeded proceeds from the sale of those supplies.
* * *
British pressure on public finances took two complementary forms: the drawing up 
of a comprehensive budget statement, coupled with the need to improve the 
existing system of taxation, to examine the feasibility of additional levies, and to 
maximise receipts from the sale of UNRRA supplies. As noted previously, 
progress on a budget statement was painfully slow. However, both the pre- and 
post-election governments enacted several measures to increase returns from both 
ordinary and extraordinary sources.
Between January and May, a series of increases of the tax on tobacco 
consumption raised duties by 275% on basic tobacco and 176% on luxury grades, 
bringing prices roughly in line with pre-war levels.98 In February, the special 
contribution, which had not been adjusted since the departure of Varvaressos, was 
raised to 225% of the August levels. This still fell short of the original burden, as 
retail prices had risen by over 1400% in the meantime. From the beginning of 
April, the special contribution was revamped as the 'professional tax'. This worked 
on the same principles as the original levy, though it involved a further reduction in 
real terms.99 Also in February, import duties were fixed at 40 times the 1941 
levels,100 and the rates of the 'net proceeds tax' were raised by 40%.101 In March, 
stamp duties were set at 20-30 times the pre-war rates, while in May, the land tax 
was increased five fold.102 Apart from adjustments of the basic threshold, no 
serious action was taken on income taxes which remained fixed at 1%. The so- 
called'turnover tax' also remained unchanged.103 During the overall period, all
98 Ibid., pp.360-361.
99 Ibid., pp.339, 363-366.
100 Ibid., p.373.
101 Ibid., p.363.
102 Ibid., p.369.
103 Ibid., pp.367-368.
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other indirect levies were raised substantially, particularly those involving state 
monopolies or various forms of entertainments.104 Several measures were also 
enacted to increase yields of extraordinary sources, especially from the sale of 
UNRRA supplies.105
Table 5.4 Comparison between Budgeted and Actual Receipts, 1946-47
Revenue Budgeted Actual (in millions of 
drachmae)
Actual as 
Percentage 
of 
Budgeted
Actual as 
Compared 
with 
Budgeted
TOTAL ORDINARY 602,284 706,167 117.2 103,883
1-DIRECT TAXES 91,964 171,068 186.0 79,104
Professional Tax 44,000 32,975 74.9 -11,025
Tobacco Production Tax 26,000
Olive Production Tax 4,000 32,039 106.8 2,039
Tax on Buildings 7,400 6,122 82.7 -1,278
TumoverTax 1,000 70,000 1000.0 69,000
Wages, Salaries, Net Income and 
Industrial Profits 2,162 27,585 1275.9 25,423
Other _  1*402. 2,347 31.7 5,055
2-INDIRECT TAXES 351,000 337,514 96.2 13,486
Tobacco Consumption Tax 245,000 205,000 83.7 -40,000
Import and Export Duties 81,086 79,902 98.5 -1,184
Alcohol Consumption Tax 18,929 27,584 145.7 8,655
Other 5,985 25,028 418.2 19,043
3-State Monopolies 79,004 34,953 44.2 -44,051
4-Stamp Duties 12,038 52,179 433.5 40,141
5-Transportation Duties 3,001 12,091 402.9 F 9,090
6-Entertainment T axes 23,050 26,800 116.3 3,750
7-Post, Telephone and Telegraph 32,134 45,052 140.2 12,918
8-Other 10,093 26,510 262.7 16,417
TOTAL EXTRAORDINARY 798,716 703,602 88.1 -95,114
1-Sale of Supplies from Abroad 567,750 605,500 106.6 37,750
2-Sale of Allied War Surplus Material 95,000 12,000 12.6 -83,000
3-Sea Transport Revenue 25.1001 20,420 81.4 *4,680
4-Sale of Sequestered Enemy Property 30,000 0 0 -30,000
5-Sale of War Booty 2,000 4,739 237.0 2,739
6-Sale of State Owned Tobacco 45,000 36,000 80.0 -9,000
7-Sale of Beneficiaries of Blocked 
Foreign Exchange 9,300 14,913 160.4 5,613
8-Other 24,566 10,030 40.8 -14,536
TOTAL REVENUE 1,401,000 1,409,769 100.6 8,769
Source: Patterson, op.cit., 1948, p.395.
As demonstrated above, successive governments had made some genuine 
efforts to increase revenue. However, the formulation of a comprehensive budget 
statement was a long process, which involved persistent pressure from the 
British.106 Estimates were finally presented in early June, and were the result of
104 Ibid., pp.370-372.
105 Ibid., pp.374-381.
106 F0371/58728 R7298, Nixon to Waley, 26.4.1946; F0371/58728 R7297, Bevin to 
Aghnides, 15.5.1946; FQ371/58728 R7338, Athens to FO, Telegram no. 1090, 15.5.1946;
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close collaboration between the new minister of finance Dimitrios Helmis and the 
BEM. The new budget was much more realistic than any of its predecessors, in 
that it recognised that the deficit would not be eliminated during the fiscal year. 
Instead, the main priority was to keep this deficit down to a minimum without 
compromising the efficient functioning of the government.107
Table 5.5 Estimated Expenditures, 1946-47 (in millions of drachmae)
Distributed by Major Purposes (a) % of Total
Interest on State Debt 0 0
Pensions 151,601 9.7
War Ministry and Public Security (b) 327,852 20.8
Health and Welfare 106,566 6.8
Public Works and Reconstruction 145,681 9.2
EF-EX (Distribution of Supplies from Abroad) 450,478 28.6
Sea Transports 16318 1.0
Post, Telephone and Telegraph 38,429 2.4
State Monopolies 21,795 1.3
Refunds out of Budget Revenues 17,059 1.1
Financial Assistance to Legal Entities 60,000 3.8
Reserve Fund 30,000 2.0
Expenditures for Past Fiscal Years 14,965 1.0
Other Expenditures 195,970 12.3
Total .,!£76,714 100.0
Source: Patterson, op.cit., 1948, p352.
(a) Of this total 352,535 million drachmae represents salaries and wages to 
persons on the state payrolls.
(b) Not included are the value of military supplies of all kinds furnished to 
the Greek armed forces free of charge by the British government These 
were estimated to total 415 billion drachmae for the fiscal year 1946-47.
In drawing up the estimates, it was assumed that wages and prices had returned 
to equilibrium, and that future price stability could be ensured through the increased 
availability of consumer goods. In addition, it was taken for granted that UNRRA 
supplies would continue until the end of 1946, and that the British government 
would cover all military expenditure until the end of the fiscal year. Moreover, it 
was finally recognised that few rapid improvements could be expected from 
taxation on incomes or business profits, and that indirect taxes offered far more 
immediate potential for raising revenue. Expenditure estimates were largely based 
on actual figures from February and March 1946, with a small additional provision 
for reconstruction purposes. Revenue estimates were based on yields from the 
preceding fiscal year, adjusted to take account of the various increases enacted in
F0371/58729 R7744, Athens to FO, Telegram no. 1174, 22.5.1946; FQ371/58729 R7870, 
Athens to FO, Telegram no. 1196, 25.5.1946.
107 FO371/67101 R2377, Interim Report of the British Economic Mission to Greece, 31.1.1947,
p.80.
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recent months, and the anticipated improvements in assessment and collection of 
taxes.108
Table 5.6 Comparison Between Budgeted and Actual Expenditures, 1946-47
Ministries Budgeted Actual (in millions of 
drachmae)
Excess of 
Actual 
over 
Budgeted
Actual as 
Percentage 
of 
Budgeted
Parliament 3,667 4,350 653 117.8
Finance 315,642 398,140 82,498 126.1
Coordination n.a. 591 591 -
Foreign Affairs 11,929 20,144 8,215 168.9
Press 2,329 4,674 2,345 200.7
Justice 24,693 43,239 18,546 175.1
Interior 8,418 .. ...9,472 1,054 112.5
Public Order (a) 102,550 185,052 82,502 180.5
Supply and EF-EX 464,941 467,748 2,807 100.6
Public Works 65,988 75,091 9,103 113.7
Reconstruction r  26,581 28355 1,774 106.6
F.T. 38,430 56,221 17,791 146.3
Transport 11,771 17,508 5,737 148.7
Education 62,736 91,747 29,011 146.2
National Economy 4,909 6,496 1,587 132.3
Office of Tounsm 591 793 202 134.2
Labour 2,625 5,403 2,778 205.8
Agriculture 25,231 29310 4,079 116.2
Welfare 37,664 45,774 8,110 121.5
Health 75,402 77,993 2,591 103.4
_War(a)__________ _ 170,434 233,401 62,967 136.9
Navy (a) 39,599 46,748 7,149 118.1
Air(a)... 35,4701 42,566 7,096 120.0
Mercantile Marine 42,1171 49,110 6,993 116.6
TOTAL 1,576,714 1,939,896 363,182 123.0
Source: Patterson, op.cit., 1948, p.396.
(a) Not included are the value of military supplies of all kinds furnished to 
the Greek armed forces free of charge by the British government.
The 1946-47 budget estimates assumed that revenue would cover 88.8% of total 
expenditure (tables 5.4 and 5.6). This figure, although less optimistic than the 
various predictions of the preceding year, represented a huge improvement 
compared with the actual performance during 1945-46. As table 5.4 demonstrates, 
it was anticipated that 57% of total revenue would come from extraordinary 
sources. As before, proceeds of the sale of UNRRA supplies were to constitute the 
biggest single item (40.5%). Ordinary revenue was to provide only 43%, while a 
mere 6.6% would derive from direct taxation. On the expenditure side, as table 5.5 
shows, it was assumed that government salaries and pensions (32%), the 
distribution of UNRRA supplies (28.6%), and internal and external security 
(20.8%) would continue to be the major areas of public spending. Expenditure on
108 Ibid., pp.80-81.
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reconstruction and public works was set at a mere 9.2%. This was recognised as 
completely inadequate, but it was hoped that savings in other departments could be 
channelled into additional reconstruction projects.109
The budget estimates of June 1946 proved reasonably accurate. On the revenue 
side, positive results were achieved, as receipts fractionally exceeded anticipated 
sums. As table 5.4 shows, for the first time since liberation, direct taxes surpassed 
all expectations: actual yields were 86% higher than estimated, and contributed 
12.1% of total revenue. Proceeds from income and corporate taxes were 
particularly encouraging, exceeding estimates by almost 3000%. Other direct taxes 
and the duty on tobacco consumption were more disappointing, but all other 
sources of ordinary revenue were largely in line with expectations. Extraordinary 
receipts fell 12% short of the anticipated sums, despite favourable returns from the 
sale of UNRRA supplies (7% more than planned). Nevertheless, as table 5.6 
demonstrates, the undeniable progress was dissipated by substantial increases in 
public spending, which overshot estimates by 23%. As will be described below, 
the most important single source (almost 60%) of overspending resulted from 
concessions on state salaries and pensions, with increased military expenditure 
(also largely consisting of pay increases to forces personnel) accounting for another 
31%, and additional outlays on reconstruction contributing 5.5%. As a result, only 
73% of total expenditure was covered by revenue.110
Wages
Ever since liberation, British officials had regarded wage restraint as one of the 
primary weapons in the fight against inflation, and repeatedly advised successive 
Greek governments to resist excessive pay demands. While acknowledging the low 
purchasing power of the labour force, they felt that wage levels had to be based on 
what the country could afford rather than the cost of living, and should not be 
raised before the economy had recovered.111 Accordingly, the London Agreement 
laid down that wages would be 'kept stable', after initial adjustments to take 
account of the simultaneous devaluation of the drachma.112 At the beginning of 
February, new scales for wages and pensions were set at 10 times the June 1945 
levels. However, even these increases were deemed insufficient by the trade 
unions, which demanded that pay would be automatically pegged to changes in the
109 Ibid., p.83.
110 Percentages calculated from data in Patterson, op.cit., 1948, pp.383,395-396.
111 FO371/67101 R2377, Interim Report of the British Economic Mission to Greece, 31.1.1947, 
PP-7, 71.
112 F0371/58722 R1355, Financial and Economic Agreement Between His Majesty's 
Government in the United Kingdom and the Greek Government, London: HMSO, 24.1.1946.
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cost of living. The government resisted at first, but at the end of February it 
announced the free distribution of locally produced clothing to civil servants. The 
new scales remained relatively intact throughout the spring, as stable prices kept 
strikes to a minimum. Although concessions were granted to Piraeus stevedores in 
March, the government seriously undermined its principles by awarding the 
traditional Easter bonus, despite opposition from the BEM and UNRRA. In the 
meantime, official wage rates outside the state sector were being surreptitiously 
replaced by piece-work and bonus schemes. Before long, the banks were also 
paying salaries above the legal scales.113
Table 5.7 Wages, Salaries and the Cost of Living (October 1940=100)
Period
Money Wage 
& Salary Index
_____ (11........
Cost of Living 
Index 
(2)
Real Wages & 
Salaries 
(1-2)
March 1945 327 408 80.1
May 329 633 56.7
August 579 773 74.9
October 1034 1381 74.8
December 4039 5376 75.1
January 1946 4706 8784 53.6
February 5500 7998 68.8
March 5505 8415 65.4
April 9231 8500 108.6
May 6851 8731 78.5
June 7460 9032 82.6
July 7460 10481 71.2
August 7707 9685 79.6
September 7707 10317 74.7
October 10213 10886 93.8
November 7707 10123 76.1
December 15432 9596 160.8
January 1947 7707 9889 77.2
February 9550 10108 94.5
March 9550 9843 97.0
Source: Patterson, op.cit., 1948, p.431.
In June, the government itself made a mockery of the official rates by resorting 
to the practice of advancing half-monthly salaries and pensions every 14 days. 
According to Patterson, this move added approximately 7% to the government 
wage and pension bill. Moreover, it was enacted without the consent of the 
Currency Committee, which had not even been informed. In early July, another 
disguised pay rise appeared in response to strong pressure from state employees. 
Once again, the government attempted to circumvent official wage scales by 
distributing UNRRA imported food and clothing free of charge without first
113 Patterson, op.cit., 1948, pp.403-412.
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seeking permission from the Agency. The goods were distributed despite 
UNRRA's refusal to give its consent.114
Notwithstanding these thinly disguised pay rises, fresh wage demands erupted 
by the end of the month. During early August, individual strikes in Athens were 
resolved only by granting open raises. Three weeks later, while maintaining the 
facade of the official scales, the government announced another free distribution of 
UNRRA foodstuffs to civil servants, and declared that the practice of advanced 
payments would be continued, with half-monthly salaries to be paid every 12 days. 
By this time, the February wage structure had become an empty fiction completely 
superseded by an intricate system of monetary and non-monetary payments, 
euphemistically described as bonuses, loans, special allowances, overtime pay or 
fees for attending functions.115
Nevertheless, even this failed to satisfy the trade unions, which demanded a 
doubling of the legal wage rates in mid-October. Within days, civil servants joined 
the agitation for pay increases. When the Currency Committee refused to sanction 
these fresh demands, the government briefly resisted. Throughout November 
strikes for higher wages became widespread. Unable to grant open pay rises, the 
government attempted to defuse the situation by announcing a cut-price sale of 
UNRRA imported goods to all lower paid employees, public or private. Similariy, 
it made no attempt to refuse the annual Christmas bonus. However, it did accede to 
demands to scrap advanced salary payments, although these were replaced with the 
promise of a fresh 25% wage rise.116
Within the private sector, labour unrest was resolved through further unofficial 
pay increases, but civil service agitation continued unabated following government 
refusals to agree to their latest demands, culminating in a week-long strike in 
January. In the face of steadfast opposition from the foreign members of the 
Currency Committee, the new prime minister Dimitrios Maximos threatened to 
resign. Unwilling to risk the political repercussions, Gregory and Patterson felt 
forced to back down, although they made their disapproval clear with a formal 
protest. The government chose to ignore both this and the later call for a pay freeze. 
Although substantial concessions placated the civil servants, periodic strikes by 
various occupational groups remained an almost permanent feature throughout the 
spring.117
114 Ibid., pp.384-385,413-415.
1 ^  Ibid., pp.415-418.
116 Ibid., pp.419-423.
117 Ibid., pp.423-427; DSR 868.515/2-447, Groves to the Secretary of State, 4.2.1947 
(Enclosures: a) Gregory and Patterson to Maximos, 28.1.1947; b) Record of Meeting of
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While the struggle over civilian wages was played out in a series of demands 
and concessions, the parallel issue of payments to the armed forces took an equally 
serious turn away from the public gaze. The major initiative came neither from the 
government nor from below, but from the War Ministry which unilaterally awarded 
extra payments to army officers in early August. As with civilian wages, fierce 
opposition from the foreign members of the Currency Committee proved to no 
avail. Thereafter, pay rises within the armed forces took on familiar fictitious 
forms, masquerading as various special allowances and bonuses. With the 
escalation of fighting, military expenditure, consisting primarily of payments to 
personnel, was virtually the sole responsibility of the minister of war. As such it 
was effectively outside the control of even the Ministry of Finance, not to mention 
the Committee.118
Loans to Agriculture
A final source of inflationary pressure arose from the granting of huge loans to 
farmers by the Agricultural Bank of Greece from the spring of 1946. Initially 
happy to approve individual requests for specific purposes, by October 1946 the 
Currency Committee became alarmed at the sheer scale of the Bank's operations, 
which were putting vast sums of drachmae into circulation. The foreign members 
of the Currency Committee threatened to suspend approval for further loans until a 
full agricultural credit programme was drawn up. A comprehensive programme 
was duly presented, in which the Bank announced its intention of issuing loans 
totalling 655bn drachmae in the year up to September 1947. As this would have 
represented a net increase of note circulation amounting to 332bn drachmae, 
compared to the existing circulation of 496bn as at the end of August 1946 (table 
5.10), the inflationary potential was enormous. Following pressure from the 
Currency Committee, the programme was modified, but up to the end of April 
1947 its operations had added nearly 160bn to note circulation. Even after the 
British withdrawal, credits to agriculture were to remain a serious threat to 
inflation.119
* * *
Throughout the period of British involvement with Greece, the necessity of 
improving public finances and of maintaining stable wages formed a crucial part of 
the advice given to the government Accordingly, the BEM devoted a huge amount
Currency Committee, 31.1.1947); FO371/67013 R5587, Gregory and Patterson to Maximos,
28.2.1947.
118 Patterson, op.cit., 1948, pp.386-391.
1X9 Ibid., pp.496-507.
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of time to these issues, and their painstaking efforts finally bore some fruit, at least 
as regards the budget, where persistent pressure resulted in an unprecedented level 
of co-operation from Greek officials. The budget estimates of June 1946 were the 
first since liberation which were based on solid research rather than wishful 
thinking. The accuracy of the revenue predictions suggests a thoroughly realistic 
appraisal of potential yields, and far greater efficiency in the assessment and 
collection of taxes. On the expenditure side, greater discipline was imposed, much 
waste was eliminated, and some degree of central control was established over the 
spending of individual departments. Compared with previous years, this 
represented a serious step forward.
However, despite undeniable achievements, the situation at the end of the 1946- 
47 fiscal year was far from rosy. The budget deficit, although drastically reduced in 
relative terms, was still considerable. Moreover, the growing intensity of the civil 
war, coupled with the still enormous demands of reconstruction, ensured that a 
balanced budget was likely to remain as elusive as ever. British persistence had 
indeed instilled a large measure of efficiency and discipline into the collection of 
revenue, but the institutional mechanisms of the London Agreement proved 
powerless to control government spending, as the foreign members of the 
Currency Committee found themselves either forced into reluctant acquiescence or 
completely circumvented when they attempted to oppose Greek demands for 
increased expenditure. Moreover, despite the claims of the BEM, that they had 
wielded a restraining influence over the government on the wage issue, this 
influence was far from decisive.120
On the revenue side, public finances could not be put on a modem footing until 
the taxation system was completely overhauled. Given the enormity of the task, the 
British had mainly concentrated on refining the existing system, and had not 
seriously challenged its regressive nature. Despite some new levies, both personal 
income and corporate profits still remained severely undertaxed by western 
standards. The British recognised that little could be achieved until proper and 
honest accounting practices had been adopted by firms, and until the government 
possessed a cadre of suitably trained accountants and auditors. Moreover, the 
continued survival of many anachronistic taxes, particularly at the local level, 
unnecessarily complicated a system which was in clear need of simplification.121
Nevertheless, the relative success on the revenue side was more than neutralised 
by increases in expenditure. Although the Currency Committee vetoed 'literally
120 FG371/67101 R2377, Interim Report of the British Economic Mission to Greece, 31.1.1947, 
pp.73-74.
121 Patterson, op.cit., 1948, pp.363, 367, 398.
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hundreds of [...] proposals' for additional spending, this stance was undermined 
by the frequent authorisation of new outlays passed without the knowledge of 
either the Committee or even the finance minister.122 In their understandable urge 
to complete reconstruction projects, ministries used up their funds with scant 
regard for budget estimates.123 Less understandble was the disastrous government 
tendency to make continuous compromises on wages. Neither the provisional nor 
the elected government even attempted to draft a comprehensive wage policy, and 
their measures were essentially ad hoc panic responses to demands from below. 
The only major departure from previous practice was the manner in which 
concessions were granted. Formally bound by the promise to maintain the 
February wage structure, the government largely avoided open raises. Instead, it 
resorted to a series of underhand measures, including the free distribution of 
supplies, the granting of periodical bonuses, subsidies and bogus loans. Whatever 
the outward appearance, the end effect was the same.
Table 5.8 Greek Public Finances, 1946-47
Actual Budget (A) (A)-UNRRATransactions
(A)-UNRRA+British 
Military Expenditure
Revenue(R) 1,410 804 804
Expenditure (E) 1,940 1,472 1,887
R as % of E 73 55 43
Source: Patterson, op.cit., 1948, pp.395-396.
Developments on the expenditure side ensured that by the spring of 1947, public 
finances had returned to the precarious state of previous years. The budget was still 
heavily overreliant on external assistance: the international relief effort and the 
British financing of the armed forces. Both were to cease shortly: the former at the 
end of 1946, and the latter at the end of March 1947. As tables 5.5 and 5.6 
indicate, during the fiscal year 1946-47, the sale of UNRRA supplies had yielded 
large profits for the first time, with returns exceeding distribution costs by 29%. If 
all UNRRA-related transactions are subtracted from the actual figures for 1946-47, 
and if British military assistance (which did not figure in the budget) was added, 
revenue would cover a mere 43% of expenditure (table 5.8). Even if the lag 
between the arrival of goods and their sale delayed the full shock of the post- 
UNRRA reality until well into 1947, it was clear that fresh problems were 
imminent. Moreover, although increased military spending had proved so 
damaging to public finances, the sums involved were merely the tip of the iceberg, 
as the British were still bearing most of the cost. By the spring of 1947, the 
government faced grim choices: without massive increases in tax revenue, a tighter
122 Ibid., p.382.
123 Ibid., pp.391-393.
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rein on expenditure, or renewed large-scale external assistance, the coming fiscal 
year would inevitably bring inflationary pressures as violent as those which had 
caused such chaos back in 1944-45. However, an even more ominous danger was 
emerging: with the intensification of the civil war and the imminent cessation of 
British military funding, the price of resisting the Communist threat was clearly 
about to rise way beyond the means of the Greek state.
5.5 Anti-inflationary Policies
The practical consequences of government action or inaction and the resumption of 
credit operations caused an inevitable expansion in note circulation. As table 5.9 
demonstrates, between January 1946 and March 1947, advances to the state to 
cover current expenditure and loans to agriculture and industry contributed 43.7% 
and 53% respectively to a gross increase of l,236.6bn drachmae. However, this 
was largely neutralised by other factors, leaving a net increase of only 427.9bn 
drachmae. Note circulation rose rapidly during the earlier part of the period: 
363.9bn drachmae between January and August 1946, but the corresponding rise 
between September 1946 and March 1947 was only 64bn drachmae, with some 
months actually witnessing a contraction (table 5.10). Two policies slowed down 
this expansion: the sale of gold coins by the Bank of Greece, and the lifting of 
restrictions on commercial imports coupled with unconditional issuing of foreign 
exchange to prospective importers. Both were designed to restore and maintain 
price stability by reducing inflationary pressure through the mopping up of surplus 
currency. Both were pursued with great vigour by successive Greek governments, 
in sharp contrast to their lukewarm reaction to British insistence on fiscal 
orthodoxy.
Gold Sales
The main aim of the gold policy was to stabilise the drachma by creating what 
amounted to an internal gold standard or rather sovereign standard, with the 
drachma firmly pegged to the sovereign.124 There was nothing new in this. As 
noted previously, gold sales had been used by the German occupiers as a last 
desperate means of keeping the economy afloat until the military situation 
improved. The Bank of Greece had also sold sovereigns in late 1944. For most of 
1945, while Varvaressos was in charge no sales were permitted, but the practice 
was resumed after his departure. From November 1945, substantial amounts of 
sovereigns were sold secretly in order to bolster the drachma. Having received a
124 FO371/67101 R237^, Interim Report of the British Economic Mission to Greece, 31.1.1947, 
p. 95.
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promise of 500,000 sovereigns from the Bank of England,125 the Sophoulis 
government felt able to pursue an open policy of massive gold sales to the public. 
On February 12, all internal gold transactions were legalised, and three days later a 
law was passed authorising free sales of gold on the Athens Stock Exchange.126
Table 5.9 The Drachma Note Issue (in billions of drachmae)
from November 11,1944 to
Jan 31 1946-
Jan. 31, 1946 Mar. 31,1947 Mar 31’ 1947
SOURCES OF INCREASE
Advances to the state (a) 96.2 637.0 540.8
Payments to UNRRA (b) 2.6 33.1 30.5
Loans, Advances etc. 37.6 693.1 655.5
Net Purchases of Foreign Exchange (c) 33.9 - -33.9
Miscellaneous - 43.7 43.7
170.3 1,406.9 1,236.6
SOURCES OF DECREASE
Deposits of the State 12.3 77.0 64.7
Other Deposits 25.0 166.0 141.0
Proceeds of Sale of Gold 0.1 304.1 304.0
Net Sales of Foreign Exchange (c) - 300.4 300.4
Miscellaneous 1.5 - -1.5
Total New Drachma in Circulation 131.4 559.4 (428.0)
Old Drachma Circulation - - -
Subsidiary Notes of the State 0.6 0.5 0.1
Total Currency in Circulation 132.0 559.9 . ..J427.9)......
Source: Patterson, op.cit., 1948, p.510.
(a) Payments by the Bank of Greece to the Greek State less receipts effected by the Bank of 
Greece for die account of the state.
(b) For internal administrative costs of the UNRRA, Greece Mission.
(c) Including BMA notes and foreign exchange on London representing advances to the 
British Forces in Greece.
The move achieved its immediate aim: the sovereign rate, which had peaked at 
180,000 in December 1945, reached a new equilibrium around 135,000 before the 
end of February. This was bought dearly, as during the first two months, the Bank 
of Greece sold 646,000 sovereigns, representing nearly 21% of the country’s gold 
reserves. Despite this steady attrition of gold, the Bank defended its actions at the 
end of April. Claiming that gold sales had steadied the sovereign rate, thus 
contributing to general price stability, the Bank expressed confidence that the 
associated risks had been removed by the psychological changes resulting from the 
establishment of the country’s first elected government. Believing that the policy 
was the best means of shoring up the drachma pending economic recovery and a 
return to budget equilibrium, and aware that the country's gold reserves would
125 FO371/58790 R1049, FO to Athens, Telegram no. 19 Camer, 18.1.1946; T236/1050, 
Siepmann to Tsouderos, 23.1.1946.
126 Patterson, op.cit., 1948, p.536.
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allow sales to be maintained at current rates for another six months, the Bank 
committed itself to further sales as long as the favourable psychological climate 
remained unchanged.127
Table 5.10 Note Circulation (in billions of drachmae)
Period Drachmae
31 January 1946 132.0
28 February 1946 218.6
31 March 278.7
30 April 363.5
31 May 389.4
30 June 412.0
31 July 444.1
31 August 495.9
30 September 511.7
31 October 505.3
30 November 468.0
31 December 537.5
31 January 1947 499.3
28 February 523.5
31 March 559.9
Source: Patterson, op.cit., 1948, p.508.
As noted previously, British hostility to gold sales was almost unanimous, with 
only one expert supporting the policy. Despite the rejection of his original plan, 
Grove continued to recommend the use of gold as a means of stabilising the 
drachma.128 However, he was isolated in this view, and all the other British 
officials, both in Whitehall and in Athens, were hostile to the idea. While they 
recognised that central bank intervention in the gold market was a valid instrument 
for correcting temporary exchange rate fluctuations, they were prepared to sanction 
sizeable gold sales by the Greeks only as long as the latter were implementing the 
'energetic measures’ they had undertaken to enact under the London Agreement. 
Reluctantly, they gave conditional support on the understanding that gold sales 
were merely a means to buy time for more fundamental economic reforms.129 
Nevertheless, as it rapidly became clear that no drastic action was being taken on 
the central issues of public finances and a recovery plan, the policy seemed 
increasingly ludicrous. Whitehall had obvious misgivings about a measure which
127 F0371/58728 R7072, Nixon to Waley, 29.4.1946.
128 T236/1051, Athens to FO, Telegram no.88 Saving, 27.2.1946; F0371/58725 R4369, Note 
on the Financial Policy of Greece, E. Grove, 8.3.1946; FO371/67102 R1G370, Final Report 
of the British Economic Mission to Greece, 10.7.1947, p. 11.
129 For discussions of the gold policy within Whitehall, see FG371/58725 R4092, Waley to 
Laskey, 12.3.1946 (Enclosure: Clark to Waley, 4.3.1946; T236/1051, Siepmann to Waley, 
12.3.1946; FQ371/58727 R5625, Minute by Laskey, 15.3.1946; BoE OV80/27, Greece - 
Gold Sales, Memorandum by Sandberg, 21.3.1946.
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did nothing to address the 'root causes' of the crisis and felt that it should be 
discontinued as soon as possible.130
Gold sales forced the Greeks to seek new supplies of sovereigns from the 
British, as immediate stocks became periodically depleted. Whitehall recognised 
they had no powers to prevent the government from using its gold reserves in 
whichever way it saw fit, but were both reluctant and occasionally unable to 
convert Greek bullion into sovereigns to allow sales to continue. Nevertheless, in 
the absence of any other source of stability, they were forced to acquiesce to 
continued demands for gold coins. 300,000 sovereigns were duly delivered in 
March. Whatever their general views, the British were particularly anxious to avoid 
instability at any cost in the period leading up to the election. They thus agreed to 
further requests to provide another 500,000 before the polling day.131
However, British tolerance finally ran out once it became clear that the Tsaldaris 
government, despite its popular mandate, was as content to rely on gold sales as its 
predecessors had been. Upon hearing that Stephanopoulos intended to continue the 
gold policy for a possible 'four or five months' until confidence returned, Nixon 
retorted that the measure was merely an excuse to do nothing, and would end in 
failure long before confidence could be restored. Dismissing gold sales as a 'frail 
reed', he warned that no more sovereigns would be forthcoming, and that public 
confidence would return only if the government presented a resolute budget.132 
Despite this rebuff, the Greeks made yet another request for 750,000 sovereigns 
within days. This annoyed the British. Having accepted gold sales before the 
elections as a dangerous 'palliative', they refused to condone further sales in the 
light of the government's failure to comply with the London Agreement. The 
Greeks were informed that the delivery of such an amount of sovereigns was 
logistically impossible, and added that in any case Whitehall regarded gold sales as 
'highly undesirable'.133
Despite unanimous British mistrust of the gold policy, by the middle of May the 
BEM came to stress the need for flexibility. Recognising that the Tsaldaris
130 FG371/58725 R4259, FO to Athens, Telegram no.603, 20.3.1946.
131 F0371/58724 R3855, Athens to FO, Telegram no.515, 12.3.1946; F0371/58724 R3856, 
Athens to Cairo, Telegram no.33, 12.3.1946; F0371/58725 R4160, Athens to FO, 
Telegram no.52 Remac, 15.3.1946; FQ371/58725 R4259, Athens to FO, Telegram no.586, 
18.3.1946; F0371/58725 R4321, Athens to FO, Telegram no.593, 19.3.1946; 
F0371/58725 R4259, FO to Athens, Telegram no.603, 20.3.1946; F0371/58725 R4345, 
FO to Athens, Telegram no.660, 28.3.1946.
132 F0371/58728 R7298, Nixon to Waley, 26.4.1946.
133 F0371/58728 R7298, Somerville Smith to Selby, 4.5.1946; F0371/58728 R7298, FO to 
Athens, Telegram no.935, 7.5.1946; F0371/58728 R7297, Somerville Smith to Selby, 
7.5.1946; F0371/58728 R7297, Minute by Hayter, 13.5.1946; F0371/58728 R7297, Bevin 
toAghnides, 15.5.1946.
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government had at least made an effort to understand the situation, and fearing that 
the termination of gold sales would prove immediately disastrous, they felt that the 
prospect of the 750,000 sovereigns should be used to gain leverage over the 
government, in that the sovereigns would be delivered only after the latter had 
taken irreversible steps to honour its promises.134 In the meantime, the British 
refusal had created considerable unease inside the government, which realised that 
its sovereign reserves would be exhausted within three weeks unless the volume of 
sales was curtailed. Afraid that such a move would simply create a new black 
market in gold, inevitably pushing up commodity prices, the Greeks could only 
reiterate the desperate need for further sovereigns. However, they did resolve to 
explore possibilities of limiting gold sales, and promised to produce a new budget 
within days. Given these concessions, the BEM recommended to Whitehall that the 
possibility of further shipments of sovereigns should be suggested to the Greeks, 
as long as a 'threatening attitude' was employed to force them to make further 
irreversible concessions on restricting gold sales and balancing the budget.135 At 
the Bank of England, Siepman bemoaned the 'fatal policy', but recognised that the 
Treasury had little alternative but to agree.136 The Foreign Office sanctioned the 
conditional release of 500,000 sovereigns, on the strict understanding that the 
consignment would have to last until the budget was finally balanced.137
Expressing disappointment that so little had been done since the signing of the 
London Agreement, the BEM demanded concrete action on the budget and a drastic 
reduction of the volume of gold sales. This de facto ultimatum, and the British 
insistence on 'deeds not words', worried the government, which appeared 'willing 
to agree to almost anything'. A confident Norton felt that more had been achieved 
in a few days than in the previous five months, and London duly authorised the 
shipment.138
However, British optimism was not bome out by subsequent events. The 
government did indeed attempt to reduce the volume of gold sales by discontinuing 
transactions on the Athens Stock Exchange. Sovereigns could be purchased only in
134 FG371/58728 R7238, Athens to FO, Telegram no. 1080, 14.5.1946.
135 FQ371/58728 R7338, Athens to FO, Telegram no. 1090, 15.5.1946; FQ371/58728 R7309, 
Athens to FO, Telegram no. 1091, 15.5.1946; F0371/58728 R7339, Athens to FO, 
Telegram no. 1092, 15.5.1946; F0371/58728 R7340, Athens to FO, Telegram no.105 
Remac, 15.5.1946.
136 BoE OV80/27, Minute by Siepman, 16.5.1946.
137 F0371/58728 R7339, FO to Athens, Telegram no. 1028, 16.5.1946.
138 F0371/58729 R7744, Athens to FO, Telegram no. 1174, 22.5.1946; FQ371/58729 R7785, 
Athens to FO, Telegram no. 1186, 23.5.1946; F0371/58729 R7870, Athens to FO, 
Telegram no.1196,25.5.1946; F0371/58729 R8069, FO to Athens, Telegram no.94 Camer,
31.5.1946.
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person from a handful of counters at the Bank of Greece, which had sold gold 
coins directly to the public since early April. This created considerable 
inconvenience to buyers, as massive queues formed at the Bank. However, such 
crude restrictions on supply rapidly proved ineffective in the face of undiminished 
demand. Within days, a dual sovereign rate emerged, with open market prices 
rising up to 15% above the official selling rate. Blaming speculators for this fiasco, 
the government temporarily succeeded in stabilising open market prices by 
reducing its official selling rate and by resorting to large scale secret sales. After a 
week, an attempt to restrict purchases per customer triggered another rise in open 
market quotations, which was controlled only by increasing the volume of secret 
sales. Between June 5 and June 27, when this practice was discontinued, secret 
sales accounted for 84% of the 206,000 sovereigns sold to the public.139
Stability in the gold market returned from the end of June as demand plunged 
temporarily. Far from reflecting any genuine return to confidence in the drachma, 
this situation arose from a combination of incidental and external factors. Firstly, 
with the gradual decline of gold prices on the Alexandria market, arbitrage 
transactions by Athens dealers were no longer profitable. The process was reversed 
on a smaller scale as 'significant' amounts of sovereigns were smuggled back into 
Greece from Egypt during the summer. Secondly, with the arrival of privately 
sponsored imports, traders were forced to cash in large numbers of gold coins to 
repay government credits. A third factor was seasonal: as demand for non- 
perishable goods customarily plummeted during the summer, many shopkeepers 
were obliged to part with sovereigns in order to meet current expenses. Finally, it 
was increasingly felt that the price stability achieved during the year had at last re­
established public faith in the drachma. As a result of all these factors, gold 
purchases by the Bank of Greece actually exceeded sales by a narrow margin 
between the end of June and August 21.140
Superficially, this period of relative calm suggested that the gold policy had 
indeed been correct. However, continued efforts by Greek officials to obtain gold 
coins on international markets during the summer indicated anxiety that massive 
sales would probably have to be resumed in the future.141 In the absence of any 
fundamental improvement in the economy, confidence in the drachma remained
139 Patterson, op.cit., 1948, pp.542-546.
140 Ibid., pp.546-548.
141 Without consulting the foreign members of the Currency Committee or any other British 
sponsored body, the Greeks made a series of deals to convert remaining bullion into gold 
coins. Napoleons worth half a million sovereigns were bought from France, and a similar 
deal was negotiated with the Canadian government; F0371/58731 R12321, Somerville 
Smith to Selby, 17.8.1946.
180
acutely sensitive to both internal and external shocks. The inherent weakness of the 
’frail reed' was demonstrated by developments in late August, when growing 
international tensions triggered a new flight from the drachma. On August 22, the 
American ultimatum to Yugoslavia created a massive increase in demand for 
sovereigns. By the next day, the Bank of Greece was forced to resume secret sales 
to defend the drachma. Despite a temporary lull at the beginning of September 
following the plebiscite on the future of the king, continued anxiety over the 
international situation kept demand for gold at high levels. At the end of the month, 
armed clashes within Greece itself, coupled with instability inside the government, 
ensured that the clamour for gold, and the prospect of further inflation assumed 
alarming proportions.142
By the end of October, British anxieties over the dire state of Greek sovereign 
reserves led to demands that action should be taken to discourage public purchases, 
and suggested closer screening of all commercial credit applications in the belief 
that drachma loans had been used primarily to buy gold. Given the political 
turmoil, nothing was done. In the meantime, gold sales continued to escalate, and 
an immediate crisis was averted only by a delivery of 250,000 sovereigns from the 
Bank of England in mid-November.143 By this time, Gregory and Patterson had 
completely lost patience, and declared that without the implementation of other 
economic reforms gold sales were a waste of irreplaceable reserves and should be 
stopped as quickly as possible.144 Despite these strictures, and the increasingly 
desperate state of the country's foreign exchange position, the Greeks were still 
reluctant to abandon gold sales. Gregory noted a government tendency to assume 
that something would 'turn up' to remedy the situation, and a reluctance to accept 
the inevitable termination of the policy.145 Within days, Helmis could only repeat 
that stopping sales would simply lead to new inflation.146
Demand for gold eased off following the imposition of restrictions on 
commercial credits, fuelling perceptions that these had been routinely used to 
finance purchases of sovereigns. Temporary reductions in international tensions 
arising from conciliatory Soviet moves also helped calm the situation. As a result, 
gold sales in December fell by 85% compared to the previous month. Once again, 
the respite proved to be short-lived. By sanctioning the payment of a Christmas
142 Patterson, op.cit., 1948, pp.548-552.
143 Ibid., pp.553-555.
144 F0371/58806 R17388, Memorandum by Gregory and Patterson, 25.11.1946.
145 F0371/58732 R16957, Athens to FO, Telegram no.2481, 22.11.1946; F0371/58733 
R17072, Athens to FO, Telegram no.2497, 25.11.1946.
146 Patterson, op.cit., 1948, p.556.
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bonus amounting to one month's salary for all employees, the government ensured 
a massive cash injection into the economy. By the middle of January, the surplus 
drachmae had found their way to retailers and producers, who apparently lost no 
time in converting them into sovereigns. In addition, the escalation of fighting in 
northern Greece and continued instability within the government, contributed to a 
new flight from the drachma. This roused Gregory and Patterson into demanding 
that gold sales be stopped immediately before stocks were finally exhausted, in 
order to maintain a last reserve to deal with any temporary crisis. In reply, Greek 
ministers claimed that the current problems constituted precisely such a crisis and 
vigorously refused to stop selling gold. When the Maximos government was 
finally formed on January 24, Gregory and Patterson gave added urgency to their 
calls to put an end to the policy. Nevertheless, within days the new ministers 
declared that the sales must continue if a complete financial collapse was to be 
avoided.147 In desperation, the government sought the return of a large 
consignment of bullion previously pledged to the Federal Reserve Bank of New 
York (FRBNY) as security for a $10m loan.148 The foreign members of the 
Currency Committee warned that such a measure would be considered only if the 
government committed itself to a vigorous anti-inflationary programme. Thus 
thwarted, the government exchanged almost the entire remainder of its bullion for 
90,000 sovereigns from India.149 By the end of February, the Bank of Greece 
possessed less than twenty days supply at the current rate of sales. With financial 
disaster looming, the situation changed dramatically as a result of the Truman 
speech on March 12. The confidence created by the prospect of extensive material 
and moral support from the world's greatest economic and military power 
provoked a dramatic turnaround in perceptions: within days massive queues 
reappeared at the Bank of Greece, with the difference that this time, the rush was to 
sell rather than buy gold.150
Between February 1946 and the end of March 1947, net sales of sovereigns 
amounted to over 2 million.151 Thus, a perfectly valid instrument for correcting 
temporary fluctuations in international exchange rates came to be adopted as the
147 Ibid., pp.557-562.
148 For the FRBNY loan, see pp.185, 220-221.
149 FO371/67013 R1758, Athens to FO, Telegram no.20 Remac, 7.2.1947; FO371/67013 
R2609, Gregory and Patterson to Maximos, 7.2.1947; FO371/67102 R10370, Final Report 
of the British Economic Mission to Greece, 10.7.1947, pp.26-27; Patterson, op.cit., 1948, 
p.562.
150 Patterson, op.cit., 1948, pp.563-564.
151 Ibid., p.564.
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primary mechanism for maintaining the internal value of the drachma. Furthermore, 
the longer this mechanism was employed, the more it assumed an air of 
permanence, with successive ministers appearing increasingly reluctant even to 
consider its dismantling. They frequently made references to buying time, claiming 
that an extended period of price stability would allow ample time for fundamental 
reforms to address the underlying problems of the economy. Moreover, by creating 
a de facto sovereign standard, they hoped to increase public willingness to hold on 
to drachmae, and to help wean Greeks away from their obsession with gold.152
The gold policy achieved its primary objectives for long periods, as the 
sovereign rate remained relatively stable. Even the British opponents of the policy 
reluctantly admitted that convertibility into gold allowed the drachma, and thus the 
entire economy, to 'function more smoothly'.153 Nevertheless, the measure was 
hardly an unqualified success. In terms of its secondary objectives, it failed 
miserably, achieving little and creating fresh problems for the future. Moreover, 
this partial success was bought at a potentially high price.
Gold sales involved considerable risks, both immediate and long-term. By 
relying on a particularly scarce form of gold the government frequently courted 
disaster, being almost forced to suspend sales as its supply of sovereigns 
approached zero. However, the effect on overall reserves was much more serious. 
The policy proved an expensive means of shoring up the drachma, swallowing up 
almost all the country's gold stocks. By failing to create any incentive for this gold 
to return to its coffers, successive governments deprived themselves of 
considerable resources which could have been earmarked for other purposes. Few 
countries could afford to sacrifice such huge sums to so little effect.
British approval for gold sales was secured only on the assumption that a 
breathing space would be utilised effectively to address other chronic problems 
within the economy, a view with which American observers largely concurred.154 
Unfortunately, this assumption proved misplaced. Much to the disgust of the 
British, the gold policy came to dominate the thinking of successive ministers, 
almost to the exclusion of any other consideration. As little was done to implement 
any of the fundamental measures of the London Agreement, the British became 
exasperated as the time so dearly bought was being squandered, and resented the 
fact that gold was being 'poured down the Athenian drain'.155 Throughout the
152 FQ371/67101 R2377, Interim Report of the British Economic Mission to Greece, 31.1.1947, 
p. 97.
153 Ibid., p.96.
154 DSR 868.515/3-2847, Groves to the Secretary of State, 28.3.1947 (Enclosure: Gregory and 
Patterson to Maximos, 10.3.1947).
155 BoE OV80/28, Lithiby to Waley, 14.6.1946.
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period between the conclusion of the Agreement and the Truman pronouncements, 
the monotony of continuous British appeals that the Greeks should concentrate on 
areas such as public finances, and the equally insistent reply that gold sales had to 
continue, make depressing reading.
By creating an illusion of stability, gold sales reduced the urgency to undertake 
fundamental economic reforms. Apart from perpetuating past and current 
shortcomings, the policy also led to further negative consequences. Gold sales 
generated their own momentum independent of other economic factors. Once the 
possession of gold became a means of profit via arbitrage and resale, demand for 
sovereigns rose accordingly, giving rise to a vicious circle which made it 
increasingly difficult to terminate the policy. Rather than striking blows at the 
speculators, the government inadvertently provided a new source of handsome 
profits. Moreover, the attractiveness of gold as a source of both security and profit 
diverted resources away from productive investment, thus delaying economic 
recovery. Far from eradicating the gold mentality, the ease of acquiring gold coins 
actually weakened public willingness to hold on to drachmae. The Bank of Greece 
admitted that gold sales had almost certainly undermined public confidence in the 
currency.156 The longer the policy was maintained, the more it reinforced the very 
mentality it sought to overcome.
Commercial Imports
Alongside gold sales, the liberalisation of commercial imports formed the second 
central pillar of Greek economic policy, both before and after the elections. Under 
Varvaressos private imports had been strictly regulated by a licensing system, but 
after his resignation these restrictions were gradually relaxed. Thus in September 
1945, the Voulgaris government gave its approval to private imports of industrial 
equipment, and certain concessions were made regarding private trade with the 
United States. By October, the short-lived Damaskinos government was declaring 
that privately sponsored imports would relieve pressure on domestic prices, but it 
was the succeeding Kanellopoulos government which embraced the liberalisation 
of private trade as part of its economic programme. Having made references to the 
desirability of utilising the country's foreign exchange reserves to combat price 
rises, it declared that although licensing requirements would still be maintained, 
foreign exchange would be sold to finance all 'useful imports'. While recognising
156 DSR 868.516/4-1048, Smith to the Secretary of State, 10.4.1948 (Enclosure: The Economic 
Situation in Greece and the Bank of Greece in 1946: Report for the Years 1941, 1944, 1945, 
and 1946. Athens: Bank of Greece, 1948, pp.47-48).
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that non-essential items could also be imported, this was discouraged by the 
imposition of heavy surcharges on currency sales for such goods.157
Shortly after the London Agreement was concluded, the Sophoulis government 
scrapped most of the remaining controls on private imports. In a decree passed on 
February 15, licensing requirements were removed for a wide range of essential 
commodities, for which foreign exchange could be purchased from the Bank of 
Greece. The surcharges were also abolished, thereby removing the differentials 
discouraging non-essential imports. In addition, prospective importers already 
possessing their own foreign exchange could ship in any items without 
restriction.158 By a subsequent decree of February 23, importers were promised 
almost total freedom in pricing and distribution of imported commodities, and were 
required to lodge only moderate deposits, ranging from 30% to 60%, in support of 
foreign exchange applications.159
These liberalising measures had significant effects, as private imports 
flourished, and associated sales of foreign exchange attained alarming levels. In the 
first three months, prospective importers bought foreign currency worth $61m, 
with total sales reaching $109m by the end of August. By this time, unrestricted 
private imports were threatening to exhaust the country's foreign exchange (sterling 
and dollars) and gold assets, which had amounted to only $193m at the beginning 
of the year. During the first eight months of 1946, outflows of foreign exchange 
more than doubled receipts, leaving a deficit of $53m. As almost all available dollar 
holdings had been either spent or committed for imports, the government 
approached the Federal Reserve Bank of New York (FRBNY), seeking credits 
worth $10m against an equivalent amount of Greek bullion. Within weeks, the 
government withdrew £4m out of the £25m currency cover account at the Bank of 
England to provide funds for further imports.160
In curious contrast to the close attention paid to gold sales, neither the BEM nor 
Nixon seemed unduly concerned about the consequences of the imports policy until 
the seriousness of the situation became apparent. As late as August, the latter felt 
optimistic about the general state of the economy, and failed to mention the rapid 
depletion of the foreign exchange reserves.161 Patterson was more cautious. 
Although in late July he described the general economic situation as 'gratifyingly
157 Patterson, op.cit., 1948, pp.309-311. For the surcharges, see fn 23.
158 Articles no longer requiring import licenses included footwear, clothing, industrial raw 
materials, building materials, drugs and medical supplies, fertilisers and agricultural supplies, 
and spare part for automobiles, and mechanical equipment; Ibid., pp.577-578.
159 Foreign Trade in Greece, op.cit., 1946, pp. 12-13.
160 Ibid., pp. 13-14, 28-29; Patterson, op.cit., 1948, pp.576, 580-582.
161 F0371/58731 R11916, Nixon to Somerville Smith, 6.8.1946.
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quiet', he pointed out the lack of import controls was hardly to help Greece's 
foreign exchange position.162 To be fair, the British themselves had demonstrated 
some earlier unease. Back in April, the BEM had suggested the drawing up of a 
detailed summary of Greek commodity requirements in order to formulate a 
national import programme, under which priority would be given only to the most 
essential goods. To administer the programme, the BEM proposed the 
establishment of a new body the Greek Commercial Cooperation.163 The 
government chose to ignore these recommendations, despite subsequent pressure 
on Tsaldaris.164
By October, it was obvious that the country's freely accessible foreign exchange 
reserves would soon run out completely, but the Greeks and the foreign members 
of the Currency Committee held very different views as to the most appropriate 
solution. Tsaldaris desperately sought help from London and Washington in order 
to continue the existing policy.165 By contrast, Gregory and Patterson pressed for 
the abandonment of unrestricted imports in favour of a carefully planned import 
and export programme.166 By the end of November, Greek officials had at least 
attempted to tackle the less urgent task of drawing up an import programme for 
1947. Based on unrealistic assumptions, this proved to be of doubtful value. 
Unable to complete the task, the officials handed over the whole problem to the 
foreign members of the Committee.167 It was not until mid-December that the 
government finally heeded the calls to amend those aspects of the import policy 
which required immediate action. Firstly, the Bank of Greece agreed to review all 
credit applications already approved but not yet taken up, cancelling those which 
did not cover essential goods. Secondly, new applications for foreign exchange 
were made subject to the Committee's approval. Within days, the final demise of 
the unrestricted imports policy was hastened by a new crisis when the government
162 DSR 868.51/8-1246, MacVeagh to the Secretary of State, 12.8.1946 (Enclosure: The 
Financial Situation in Greece, G. Patterson, 22.7.1946).
163 F0371/58798 R6681, English Text of a Memorandum Submitted in Greek by the British 
Economic Mission to His Excellency M.S. Stephanopoulos, Minister of Co-ordination, 
April 1946.
164 FQ371/58727 R6718, Athens to FO, Telegram no.978, 2.5.1946; F0371/58729 R7744, 
Athens to FO, Telegram no. 1174, 22.5.1946; T236/1053, Bevin to Norton, 20.7.1946 
(Enclosure No. 8); FG371/58804 R13646, Report on the British Economic Mission and its 
Activities, C. Mackenzie, 9.9.1946, pp.24-25.
165 F0371/58732 R16019, Athens to FO, Telegram no.2369, 2.11.1946; F0371/58732 
R16020, Athens to FO, Telegram no.2370, 2.11.1946.
166 F0371/58806 R17388, Memorandum by Gregory and Patterson, 25.11.1946.
167 With the aid of the BEM and UNRRA personnel, the programme was finalised over the 
following weeks, and eventually served as the basis for discussions with the Porter Mission 
during late January and early February 1947; Patterson, op.cit., 1948, pp.586-587, 597-603.
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found itself unable to pay for two crucial import deals. From December 26, all 
future commodity imports required the approval of a newly created Special Imports 
Committee comprising representatives of several ministries but effectively 
controlled by the Bank of Greece. In February 1947, this body was reorganised 
with overall control passing to the Ministry of National Economy.168 In the same 
month, after consulting with Buell Maben, the UNRRA chief of mission in Greece, 
Gregory and Patterson suggested the creation of a centralised agency, to be known 
as the Foreign Trade Administration (FTA), to oversee both imports and exports. 
Although accepted in principle, nothing was done until the arrival of the American 
Mission of Aid to Greece (AMAG) later in the year.169
* * *
The rationale behind the liberalisation of commercial imports was twofold. Clearly, 
normal trade had to be resumed, particularly as UNRRA supplies alone could not 
satisfy all the country's needs, and were in any case planned to terminate after the 
end of 1946. Moreover, an additional inflow of imports onto the domestic market, 
through sales of foreign exchange, could complement gold sales as a mechanism 
for neutralising inflationary pressures.170 Although closely interrelated, both sets 
of policy objectives were driven by partly divergent factors.
Much of the pressure to free imports from government controls appears to have 
come from within the Greek business community which resented official 
interference in economic matters. Competent observers felt that this pressure was a 
major factor behind the partial lifting of restrictions in late 1945, and described the 
February measures as a total capitulation to the 'demands of private importers’.171 
However, belief in the need for a more liberal policy was shared not only by 
leading financial experts,172 but also by many politicians, who saw commercial 
imports as an effective means to alleviate commodity shortages and inflationary 
pressures. After assuming power, the Tsaldaris government made firm pledges to 
allow private enterprise to flourish without hindrance.173
168 Ibid., pp.583-595.
169 FQ371/67013 R2609, Gregory and Patterson to Maximos, 7.2.1947; DSR 868.515/3-747, 
Groves to the Secretary of State, 7.3.1947 (Enclosure: Economic Programme of Maximos 
Government); FG371/67013 R5587, Gregory and Patterson to Maximos, 28.2.1947. For the 
FTA, see p.230.
170 Patterson, op.cit., 1948, pp.567-568.
171 ForeignTrade in Greece, op.cit., 1946, p.12.
172 Kaoijicrrrig, op.cit., 1945, pp.79-82, 85-90.
173 TE/AKB/B5, Memorandum on the Greek Economic Situation, K. Varvaressos, 2.8.1946, 
pp. 118, 133; Coombs, op.cit., 1953, p. 14.
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As indicated earlier, the British were initially more inclined to regard privately 
sponsored imports as a means to stimulate industrial recovery rather than combat 
inflation. However, this longer term stance soon gave way to more immediate 
considerations. Before long, the British were emphasising the anti-inflationary 
aspect of increased imports, as the short-term expedience of maintaining price 
stability totally eclipsed the broader goals of economic recovery. Apart from the 
BEM recommendations in April, Bevin's original belief that imports should 
provide machinery rather than food was quietly forgotten, as the British were now 
highlighting the desirability of consumer goods to absorb surplus drachmae. Thus, 
in February, both Grove and Nixon warned that stability could be ensured only if 
sizeable quantities of imports arrived soon. In April, Nixon interpreted the larger 
than expected volume of imports as a definite ’sign of hope1. Even in July, Waley 
claimed that Greece needed to import 'as many consumer goods as possible', while 
in a similar tone, another Treasury official felt that 'more energetic steps' had to be 
taken to increase imports. None of the above statements indicated any particular 
concern about the country's foreign exchange reserves. Grove had even declared 
that the required imports could be secured only if foreign exchange was sold off 
'sufficiently quickly'. In August, Nixon warned that the danger of inflation was 
'much more imminent' than the exhaustion of Greek foreign exchange reserves. 
Even as late as October, Norton singled out inflation as the most serious threat and 
suggested that 'flooding' the country with 'imported consumer good[s]' was the 
'only immediate remedy', ruefully adding that there was little likelihood that this 
would happen.174
Given the gradual shift away from the view that imports should assist economic 
recovery, towards an increasing emphasis on the anti-inflationary aspect, any 
assessment of the unrestricted imports policy has to take account of both aims by 
analysing such factors as the composition and utility of imports, the contribution 
of customs duties to public finances, and effects on note circulation and commodity 
prices.
At first glance, aggregate trade figures suggest that private imports did consist 
mainly of'useful' goods, in accordance with the original justification of the policy. 
During 1946, agricultural products, textiles, clothing and minerals accounted for 
over half the total value of imports.175 When pressed to abandon the unrestricted
174 F0371/58724 R3352, Grove to Waley, 20.2.1946; T236/1050, Nixon to Waley, 26.2.1946; 
F0371/58727 R6383, Nixon to Waley, 15.4.1946; T236/1052, Visit of Greek Prime 
Minister, Memorandum by Somerville Smith, 6.7.1946; T236/1053, Notes of a Meeting 
Held in the Treasury, 9.7.1946; F0371/58731 R11682, Nixon to Somerville Smith, 
7.8.1946; FG371/58731 R14873, Athens to FO, Telegram no.2210, 7.10.1946.
175 Bulletin Mensuel Du Commerce Special De La Grece Avec Des Pays Etrangers, Jan-Dee 
1947. Athenes: Ministere De LEconomie Nationale- Statistique Generale De La Grece, 1948.
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imports policy, the government defended its record by claiming that practically all 
the acquired goods had been necessary.176 However, aggregate statistics give a 
misleading picture of the utility of private imports, and suggest less favourable 
interpretations. Neither raw materials nor capital goods materialised in large 
quantities, while many frivolous items were imported. At the same time, purchases 
of non-essential goods, including many which were considered luxuries in the 
immediate post-war period, were far from negligible. Thus, expenditure on 
machinery was almost equalled by that on coffee and perfumes.177 Indeed, in 
comparison with 1938-39, imports of the latter commodities rose fourfold in 
1946.178 Such figures question the credibility of government claims, and eye­
witness descriptions of shops full of foreign luxuries in the midst of poverty- 
stricken Athens provoked scathing comments from observers.179
Whatever the wider merits or demerits of the unrestricted imports policy, the 
generation of revenue in the form of customs duties was a positive consequence 
given the overall state of public finances. Levies on imports had played an 
important role in the pre-war budget, contributing 26% of total revenue in 1938-39. 
As table 5.4 shows, the budget estimates for 1946-47 anticipated 81bn drachmae 
from this source, amounting to 5.8% of total revenue. Thus, the actual yield of 
80bn drachmae almost entirely fulfilled expectations. However, this was not quite 
the success it appeared to be. Patterson felt that the returns could have been far 
higher. As noted previously, customs duties had been set at 40 times the 1941 
levels. As commodity prices had risen about 80 times in the same period, import 
duties were roughly 50% lower in real terms. Importers were thus able to enjoy 
substantial profits. Complaints about the inadequacy of the new tariffs led to the 
creation of a study group, but this achieved virtually nothing. Patterson was 
convinced that the government was extremely reluctant to raise customs duties to 
previous levels, fearing that the additional costs would simply be passed on to 
consumers in the form of higher prices.180 Having allowed importers total freedom 
in pricing their commodities, the government thus sacrificed a source of 
considerable extra revenue, thereby diluting one of the few beneficial effects of a 
doubtful policy.
176 FG371/58733 R17114, Athens to FO, Telegram no.2498, 26.11.1946.
177 Bulletin Mensuel Du Commerce Special De La Grece Avec Des Pays Etrangers, Jan-Dee 
1947. Athenes: Ministere De L'Economie Nationale- Statistique Generale De La Grece, 1948.
178 Politakis, op.cit., 1990, pp.201-202.
179 FO371/67017 R2882, Report of the British Parliamentary Delegation to Greece, 10.10.1946, 
p. 12; A.W. Sheppard, Britain in Greece: A Study in International Interference. London: The 
League for Democracy in Greece, 1947, pp. 19-20.
180 Patterson, op.cit., 1948, pp.372-374, 398-399.
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Given their composition and their meagre contribution to public finances, it is 
extremely questionable whether commercial imports provided any significant basis 
for economic recovery. Competent observers outside the government made 
frequent allegations highlighting the more undesirable consequences of the policy. 
Thus many commodities were shipped in solely to provide high or fast profits. In 
addition, importers often hoarded their goods in the expectation that even higher 
profits could be obtained in the future. More seriously, foreign exchange, allocated 
for prospective imports, could be diverted for other purposes, offering both 
security against depreciation of the drachma and the possibility of capital export.181 
In a close parallel with gold sales, the indiscriminate allocation of foreign exchange 
created its own momentum, appearing to serve the interests of a small section of the 
population rather than the long-term needs of the country. Such a development 
could only aggravate existing social tensions and economic inequalities. As 
Varvaressos contemptuously noted, the policy had created a 'heaven' for private 
importers in one of the poorest countries of the world, where the 'poverty of the 
masses' went hand in hand with the 'impunity of profiteers'.182
Before the full impact of the imports had become apparent, the government had 
attempted to launch a policy even more obliging to the holders of surplus wealth in 
Greece. In June, the minister of finance indicated his intention of authorising 
transfers of dollars by individuals to the United States, up to a maximum $400 per 
month. While attempts to sell sterling had created little damage because of the 
considerable unattractiveness of Britain's incovertible currency, the free sale of 
dollars was an altogether more serious prospect. Patterson, alarmed that the 
measure would actively encourage capital flight, protested vigorously and the 
matter was allowed to drop.183
* ♦ *
As both the liberalisation of commercial trade and the gold policy shared the aim of 
restoring and maintaining price stability by mopping up surplus drachmae, their 
effectiveness should be assessed in conjunction with each other. Given almost 
permanent budget deficits, periodical wage increases, and the granting of huge 
loans for agricultural and industrial recovery, note circulation continued its 
inexorable rise. However, as table 5.9 indicates, between January 1946 and March 
1947, nearly 60% of the increase was absorbed by the sale of foreign exchange and
181 Ibid., pp.373, 398-399, 578-579, 595-596; Foreign Trade in Greece, op.cit., 1946, p. 15; 
Bap(3apeoo£, op.cit., 1947, p,358.
182 TE/AKB/B5, Memorandum on the Greek Economic Situation, K. Varvaressos, 2.8.1946, 
p. 131.
183 DSR 868.5151/6-2446, Rankin to the Secretary of State, 24.6.1946 (Enclosure: 
Memorandum by G. Patterson, 19.6.1946).
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gold, with each contributing in roughly equal measure to this result. With increases 
in the stock of paper money thus moderated, private imports also played an 
obvious role in preventing a recurrence of inflation by reducing commodity 
shortages. Consequently, the period from the London Agreement to the 
announcement of the Truman Doctrine witnessed remarkable price stability, with 
none of the inflationary upheavals so characteristic of previous years. As table 5.11 
shows, between February and July 1946, the retail price index actually fell by 
almost 19%, and thereafter rose only 9% by February 1947. In this respect, both 
policies made an undeniable contribution to short-term stability.
Table 5.11 Retail Price Index (October 1940=100)
Period Index
11 November 1944 605
May 1945 1969
August 1807
October 4404
December 12583
January 1946 26176
February 22828
March 22738
April 21795
May 21729
June 20118
July 18540
August 18648
September 19232
October 19877
November 19861
December 19698
January 1947 20114
February 20266
March 19470
Source: Patterson, op.cit., 1948, p.528.
However, this stability was bought at a considerable cost. According to 
Patterson, the end result was nothing short than a 'reckless and irresponsible 
dissipation' of the country's foreign exchange reserves.184 The limitations of both 
policies have been succinctly put by Coombs: such huge outflows were feasible 
only if fundamental reforms were undertaken in the meantime, or if another country 
was willing to 'underwrite the expense'.185 With the Greeks unwilling to act on the 
former, and the British both unwilling and unable to act on the latter, the policies 
were doomed to failure.
By using irreplaceable foreign exchange and bullion holdings to subsidise its 
current deficits, the government was sparing itself the painful task of balancing the
184 Patterson, op.cit., 1948, pp.511-512.
185 Coombs, op.cit., 1953, pp.33-34.
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budget by the imposition of heavier taxation and the reduction of expenditure, as 
recommended ad nauseam by the British. This evasion offered certain political 
advantages, removing the necessity to take on either the rich or the civil service, 
both of whom would have lost out had more orthodox measures been applied. 
However, in both economic and social terms the move proved disastrously short­
sighted. By the beginning of 1947, the country faced an uncertain future, still 
having to confront the economic problems it had failed to solve since liberation, 
with the major difference that its foreign exchange reserves had been exhausted, 
and the international relief effort had come to an end.
Such apparent short-sightedness on the part of the government suggests that the 
Greeks did indeed believe that their losses would be underwritten by others. 
Despite British exhortations that Greek problems would have to be solved 
internally rather than by a ’fairy godmother’186 in the form of foreign aid or 
reparations, a point repeated time after time by Allied representatives, the likelihood 
of significant assistance from abroad was virtually taken for granted by the Greek 
political establishment187 Patterson was convinced this was the case, although no 
senior Greek official would admit as much.188 However, leading politicians 
frequently referred to promises of Allied aid or reparations in public speeches, 
raising popular expectations that salvation would come from abroad. Varvaressos, 
by far the best informed and most perceptive of all Greek observers, complained 
derisively about such 'demagoguery' with its assurances of 'astronomical' sums 
which would shortly be flooding into the country.189
* * *
If the motives of the Greek government in launching the gold and imports policy 
appear to be relatively straightforward, British motives and perceptions in the same 
episode are more difficult to explain. Patterson, who subsequently regarded the 
depletion of Greek foreign exchange reserves as an unparalleled catastrophe, took 
frequent pains to emphasise British responsibility for the debacle.190 As such a 
statement raises important questions regarding British priorities and the resulting 
quality of advice given to the Greeks, this issue requires careful attention.
As described previously, the British were always unenthusiastic about gold 
sales, and the measure was not embodied in the London Agreement. Nevertheless,
186 FQ371/58727 R6718, Athens to FO, Telegram no.978, 2.5.1946.
187 TE/AKB/B5, Memorandum on the Greek Economic Situation, K. Varvaressos, 2.8.1946, 
p. 135.
188 Patterson, op.cit., 1948, p.535.
189 BapPapsoog, op.cit., 1947, pp.346-347.
190 Patterson, op.cit., 1948, pp.568, 577.
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fears about political instability ensured a reluctant acquiescence. Successive Greek 
demands for sovereigns invariably produced admonitions, repetitions of earlier 
advice and attempts to gain leverage, but the requests were always granted in the 
end. Thus, British exasperation over the failure to act on more fundamental issues 
was tempered by the unwelcome realisation that they could not force the 
government to abandon a policy it was determined to continue.
The imports policy was also a Greek initiative which met with a doubtful 
response from British officials. However, on this point, the latter can not be 
exonerated so easily. As already indicated, when the original Kasimatis proposals 
had been announced, Hill had warned that capital flight would be a likely outcome. 
During discussions over drachma convertibility in January 1946, the fear of capital 
flight had been paramount in the minds of Treasury and Bank of England officials. 
Despite Foreign Office assurances that watertight arrangements could prevent such 
an occurrence, the necessary safeguards were left to the discretion of the Athens 
government once it became clear that Tsouderos and Kartalis were equally opposed 
to luxury imports and capital flight.191 Thus the London Agreement sanctioned the 
provision of foreign exchange for prospective importers and approved capital 
transactions, embodying a compromise which Waley feared could produce the 
’worst of both worlds'.192
As the British were becoming increasingly enthusiastic about the potential 
impact of imports on inflation, this consideration soon eclipsed both their original 
emphasis on imports as a source of capital goods and raw materials, and their fears 
of capital flight. Thus, the London Agreement made no reference to either the utility 
of imports or the prevention of capital flight. Moreover, neither issue was raised 
following the relaxation of restrictions and thus the abandonment of safeguards in 
February. Although the BEM eventually made suggestions that a controlled 
import/export programme should be adopted, this was not done until a third of the 
Greek foreign exchange reserves was committed for imports. In any case, the 
suggestion was allowed to drop, and it was not until the autumn, when the failure 
of the policy was becoming increasingly obvious, that the British became
191 T236/149, Minute by Waley, 18.1.1946; F0371/58790 R1049, FO to Athens, Telegram 
no.19 Camer, 18.1.1946; FO371/58790 R1221, Record of a Meeting Held at 21, St. James's 
Square on Thursday, 17th January 1946.
192 F0371/58722 R1308, FO to Athens, Telegram no.154, 23.1.1946. Waley had consistently 
warned about the dangers of capital flight A year earlier, he had criticised an idea from 
Zolotas to mop up purchasing power by selling sterling cheques claiming that by such a 
move would simply add the dissipation of Greek external reserves to 'all their present 
troubles'; FQ371/48326 R1120, Waley to Hugh Jones, 12.1.1945.
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concerned. Even then, Bevin and others tended to emphasise the scale of remaining 
reserves rather than bemoan the huge sums which had already been dissipated.193
This apparent lack of concern about the fate of Greek foreign exchange reserves 
seems particularly curious when compared with the almost permanent pressure the 
British were applying to end the gold policy. To a large extent, this reflected the 
British view that imports represented a 'better method of using foreign exchange 
reserves than selling gold'.194 However, even this does not entirely explain the 
contrasting British reactions to both policies. Thus, while they agonised over the 
latest statistics on gold sales, they did not seem unduly worried about the almost 
complete disappearance of the country's dollar holdings, preferring to take heart 
from the continued availability of the note cover account.
Possibly, the delayed British response partly reflects a lack of up-to-date 
information. Nixon complained that the BEM had not been furnished with the 
promised monthly statements on the foreign exchange position, and eventually they 
came to realise that foreign exchange sales were far larger than had previously been 
assumed.195 Nevertheless, this does not seem to excuse the readiness with which 
the British chose to ignore initial fears about commercial imports and capital flight, 
and their neglect to ensure that adequate safeguards were maintained. Once the 
restrictions on imports were lifted, the only dissenting voice was that of 
Varvaressos, who was soon issuing dire, and ultimately accurate, predictions of 
the likely outcome of the policy.196
A final assessment of the British stance on the imports episode would have to 
concur with Patterson's strongly expressed and frequently repeated conviction that 
their preoccupation with suppressing inflation overrode eveiy other consideration 
to an excessive degree.197 Although not initially responsible for the liberalisation of 
commercial imports, the British embraced it with enthusiasm, eagerly forgetting not 
only earlier reservations but also their original emphasis on longer term goals. 
Increasingly obsessed with the immediate threat of inflation, the British failed to 
prevent the very catastrophe that Hill and Waley had feared. Undoubtedly, they 
must therefore shoulder a large measure of blame for the foreign exchange debacle.
193 T236/1053, Nixon to Somerville Smith, 20.9.1946; F0371/58732 R16020, FO to New 
York, Telegram no.2058, 11.11.1946; F0371/58732 R16478, FO to Athens, Telegram 
no.2319, 15.11.1946; FG371/58733 R17258, Norton to Tsaldaris, 22.11.1946.
194 F0371/58728 R7339, FO to Athens, Telegram no. 1028, 16.5.1946.
195 FG371/58733 R17067, Nixon to Somerville Smith, 4.11.1946.
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Economic Trends op to 1946
The period under review witnessed a gradual but uneven recovery of the Greek 
economy. The most satisfactory feature was the strong resurgence of certain 
branches of agriculture, notably the cultivation of cereals, fruit and vegetables, 
which benefited from particularly favourable weather conditions. Grain 
productivity exceeded pre-war levels as gross yields approached the 1935-38 
averages, while the output of potatoes far surpassed pre-1939 figures. However, 
yields of tobacco, raisins and currants, previously the country's biggest export 
earners, reached only 66% and 42% of pre-war levels respectively. In contrast to 
arable production, livestock farming did not recover so swiftly. Although by the 
end of 1946, stocks had registered satisfactory increases over the previous year, 
they were still roughly a third lower than in 1938.198 With the substantial capital 
assistance provided by UNRRA deliveries of machienry, livestock, and seeds, and 
the generous provision of credit, agriculture was slowly returning to its pre-war 
state, but much remained to be done.199
As with agriculture, industry also recovered unevenly. By December 1946, total 
output was calculated at 67% of pre-war levels. Substantial progress was achieved 
in the production of consumer goods, notably cotton and woollen textiles, and 
electrical appliances. Production of wine, spirits, cigarettes and pharmaceutical 
items performed even better, approaching or exceeding pre-war output Electricity 
generation was actually 23% higher than in 1939. In contrast, the metal, wood and 
leather based industries were slow to revive, with the production of capital goods 
lagging behind other sectors. Equally disappointing was the meagre progress of the 
extractive industries, which had played such an important role in the pre-war 
balance of payments.200
Clearly, the pace and extent of recovery was far from encouraging. All sectors 
of the economy continued to suffer as a result of the economic and political 
problems facing the country. Budgetary restraints delayed badly needed 
reconstruction measures, particularly the rebuilding of the communications 
network. Consequently, transport costs remained excessive. The resulting high 
prices reduced the viability of producing many commodities, discouraging 
investment and expansion. In addition, the continuing instability of the drachma,
198 Coombs, op.cit., 1953, pp. 19-21.
199 The need to rejuvenate Greek agriculture by overcoming its traditional backwardness was 
emphasised by the report of an investigative mission from the UN Food and Agriculture 
Organization (FAO), which visited Greece in May 1946. This recommended several long-term 
measures to raise the efficiency and the diversity of production; Report of the FAO Mission 
for Greece. Washington DC: Food and Agriculture Organization, March 1947.
200 Coombs, op.cit., 1953, pp.21-24.
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reinforced by the psychological effects of political uncertainties, proved equally 
damaging by encouraging the hoarding of raw materials rather than their 
processing, and investment in gold or foreign exchange rather than in productive 
assets. Successive governments inability or unwillingness to address the most 
urgent needs of the economy thus created additional obstacles hampering recovery. 
The failure to curb both the exorbitant profits charged by carriage firms and port 
facilities, and the high levels of local taxation imposed on the movement of all 
goods, ensured that huge cost increases would be borne by potential producers.
Even when action was taken to tackle various aspects of the crisis, this 
frequently proved counterproductive. While imports flourished during 1946, 
exports failed to recover to any similar degree. To a certain extent, this reflected the 
continuing problems of both the lost European markets and the reduced demand for 
goods such as tobacco and dried fruit, which were still regarded as 'luxuries' in the 
prevailing circumstances. However, other factors helped retard the recovery of the 
export trade, particularly the exchange rate set in January 1946. As the year 
progressed, it became increasingly clear that the new rate overvalued the drachma, 
raising local costs and prices above world levels, with detrimental consequences to 
potential exporters, and one attempt to find a way around this problem was the 
revival of barter trade and bilateral arrangements. Accordingly, several agreements 
were concluded with various European countries.201 By August 1946, the slow 
recovery of exports led to divisions between the foreign members of the Currency 
Committee, which revealed significant differences of opinion on the exchange rate 
issue. Patterson, anxious about the damaging effects of the overvalued drachma on 
the export trade and thus the balance of payments, argued that a further devaluation 
was essential. Nixon, equally worried about the inflationary threat, and the 
psychological blow which devaluation would bring, chose to disagree, claiming 
that internal prices would rather have to readjust to the existing exchange rate. 
Enjoying Whitehall's support for his views, Nixon refused to compromise, and 
there were no further adjustments during the period under review.202
Apart from the general problems affecting the whole economy, industry 
continued to be plagued by more specific problems, many of which remained 
unresolved at the end of the period under review. Several obstacles needed to be
201 For details, see Patterson, op.cit., 1948, pp.606-625.
202 Ibid., p.574; F0371/58731 R11682, Nixon to Somerville-Smith, 7.8.1946; BoE OV80/28, 
Waley to Siepman, 13.8.1946; BoE OV80/28, Siepman to Waley, 14.8.1946; DSR 
868.5151/8-1946, MacVeagh to the Secretary of State, 19.8.1946 (Enclosure: The Drachma 
Exchange Rate, Memorandum by G. Patterson, 12.8.1946). A further negative consequence 
of the overvalued drachma was the bypassing of the Bank of Greece by dollar remittances: it 
was estimated that at least two thirds of the total went straight into black market channels; 
Patterson, op.cit., 1948, p.571.
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overcome before production could return to pre-war levels. Some of these 
obstacles resulted from government policy, while others reflected deeper problems 
of the manufacturing sector, exacerbated by wartime neglect and the uncertainties 
of the immediate post-war years. The damaging effect of the overvalued drachma 
and delays in the reconstruction have already been noted. In addition, producers 
were seriously hit by the new tariffs of 1946, which made little distinction between 
raw materials and finished articles. Legislation governing relationships in the 
workplace also proved troublesome for employers. Although the obligation to 
retain redundant employees was finally abrogated in May 1946, the difficulties and 
costs of discharging surplus personnel ensured continued overmanning. The labour 
force created additional problems, with its continuing inefficiency and its high 
propensity to threaten or take strike action in support of wage claims.
A further obstacle adding to production costs was the credit policy of 
commercial banks. By early 1946, little had been done to overcome the deficiencies 
of the banking system. The Bank of Greece still had no meaningful control over the 
multitude of commercial banks, which remained overstaffed, and unprofitable. 
Private banks retained obsolete organisational structures, with little distinction 
between commercial and investment functions. They were able to operate only with 
the assistance of loans from the Bank of Greece. Nevertheless, relations between 
the Bank of Greece and the private institutions were still strained. Moreover, the 
latter were fiercely competitive with each other, and charged 'usurious' interest 
rates, but lack of confidence in the drachma kept bank deposits at low levels.203 
Clearly, without streamlining and a total overhaul, the plethora of overstaffed, 
unsophisticated and virtually bankrupt credit institutions had little chance of 
facilitating economic recovery, particularly as interest rates remained prohibitively 
high.
Accordingly, the BEM investigated the issue, and recommended several 
measures, especially the establishment of proper divisions between commercial and 
investment banking and the reduction of interest rates.204 The Currency Committee 
was also quick to involve itself with such matters, and sought to obtain reliable 
estimates of the credit needs of industry, and assumed the right to refuse 
applications for commercial credit.205 From May onwards, the Currency 
Committee continued to emphasise the need to reform the banking system and to 
formulate a credit policy, and during the following month a separate Banking
203 Patterson, op.cit., 1948, pp.435-436.
204 F0371/58728 R6878, British Economic Mission to Greece, Fortnightly Report No.6 
(Appendix B: Memorandum Concerning Banking Submitted by the British Economic 
Mission to the Greek Currency Committee).
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Committee was established to examine the topic.206 Its report in August called for 
the imposition of maximum interest rates, and proposed greater central bank control 
over the commercial banks to ensure that their credit policies were consistent with 
state guidelines, with the 'usefulness1 of the economic activity concerned the sole 
criterion for assessing loans. The suggestions aroused the conceited hostility of the 
private banks, which were particularly opposed to both interference from the Bank 
of Greece and the concept of a ceiling on interest rates. The recommendations also 
met with a negative response from industrialists, who regarded them as far too 
lenient towards the banks. By March 1947, it was clear that the main thrust of the 
proposals had been almost entirely ignored by the private institutions, and virtually 
nothing had been achieved to reform the banking system, which as a competent 
observer ruefully admitted, remained a 'frightful muddle'.207
Industry thus suffered from the self-interest of several groups and institutions: 
central and local government, labour, and the transport and banking sectors. 
Moreover, as the capital requirements and entry costs within manufacturing were 
so much higher than in any other sector, internal and external insecurities acted as 
an even more powerful disincentive to investment, as demonstrated by the meagre 
levels of private imports of industrial equipment In addition, the absence of a 
rigorous reconstruction programme provided little stimulus for expansion, 
particularly in the capital goods industries. However, many of the problems 
hampering recovery were deeply rooted within industry itself. Most of the plants 
were small and inefficient, with much obsolete and poorly maintained capital 
equipment. Efficiency was further reduced by the absence of modern cost 
accounting and record keeping practices. The attitudes of the industrialists, 
particularly those who had resumed production, also complicated the picture. They 
were as much motivated by self interest as any other group within the country. As 
the BEM ruefully noted, profit margins which seemed excessively high in Britain 
were condemned as scandalously low in Greece,208 and the Mission's cost 
accountants encountered considerable hostility in their investigations.209 
Furthermore, the monopolistic abuses which had caused such bitterness back in the 
previous year were still very much in evidence. Competent observers suspected
206 FO371/67101 R2377, Interim Report of the British Economic Mission to Greece, 31.1.1947,
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that textile mill owners were acting as a cartel in late 1946, restricting output in 
order to maintain high prices, and it was hinted that such practices remained the 
norm rather than the exception.210 As indicated earlier, these were not the only 
allegations of dishonestly levelled at the industrialists: other observers believed that 
despite complaints about credit difficulties, not only did many manufacturers find 
ample funds to invest in gold, but these funds themselves had been derived from 
commercial loans.
Thus by the first months of 1947, the Greek economy remained precariously 
poised and the country was in no position to fend for itself. According to the Bank 
of Greece's own figures for 1946, the balance of payments was still severely 
unfavourable, with current receipts amounting to less than a quarter of 
expenditures. The total current account deficit of $317m was financed only by 
foreign aid ($224m) and a loss of reserves ($96m).211 With the termination of the 
UNRRA programme in the end of 1946, it was clear that huge amounts of foreign 
aid would be needed long into the future.
5.6 Conclusions
The period between January 1946 and March 1947 marked the culmination of 
British intervention in Greek affairs. While the political and strategic motives 
remained unchanged, the continuing economic turmoil forced Whitehall to launch 
an initiative designed specifically to address the country's major economic 
problems. This assumption of wider involvement found expression in the London 
Agreement. As already noted, this offered two new institutions, drachma 
convertibility into sterling and relatively scant material assistance. In the broadest 
terms, the package was clearly unsuccessful. By the end of the period, the Greek 
economy was barely 'working again', and in no way could the country be 
described as a 'going concern'. In many respects, the economy was still poised as 
precariously as it had been back in late 1945. In early 1947, the BEM admitted that 
the country's 'fundamental problems’ not only remained 'unsolved', but were 
becoming even worse.212 In March, following the British decision to withdraw, 
the Mission's head confessed it could no longer achieve anything useful in the 
circumstances.213 In April, it became clear that the Americans had no interest in a
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joint economic mission with the British, and the BEM was formally terminated in 
July, although Gregory remained as member of the Currency Committee.214
Such was the end of the London Agreement, which found few friends among 
either contemporary observers or later researchers, and has usually been dismissed 
as inadequate, irrelevant or even harmful. However, oversimplistic judgements 
have blurred a complex picture, which deserves much more careful analysis as a 
full explanation is central to the understanding of the outcome of the entire British 
involvement in Greece. Firstly, the performance of both institutions has to be 
considered carefully, taking into account the very different problems arising from 
their respective briefs. Secondly, the episode should not be judged simply in terms 
of British success or failure, as the Greek side of the equation also needs to be 
addressed. Thirdly, the course of events must be appraised in the light of the 
widely held belief that the Agreement imposed extraordinary levels of foreign 
control over Greece. Fourthly, no assessment can be complete without an 
exploration of the internal dilemmas of the British, particularly the coherence of 
their motives. Finally, as critics have all too often focused on policies not actually 
forming part of the Agreement, a separation of fact from fiction is necessary in 
order to distinguish between the consequences of British moves and those of 
successive governments in Athens.
The performance of the new institutions was decidedly mixed, as notable 
examples of success went hand in hand with equally notable failures. The most 
undeniable achievement of the BEM was the excellent work it undertook in the field 
of public finances, where unprecedented levels of revenue were both accurately 
predicted and collected. It also made less spectacular though tangible contributions 
to improvements in administration, distribution, and many other areas of the 
economy. The Currency Committee could claim much success in instilling a large 
degree of discipline into the government's monetary and credit policies, and was 
able to force the abandonment of unrestricted imports. Nevertheless, the success of 
both bodies was limited. The Committee could not prevent considerable rises in 
note circulation, wages or government expenditure, and proved virtually powerless 
to stop the sale of gold. Even the Mission's financial section, which helped achieve 
so much in augmenting state revenue, shied away from the colossal task of 
overhauling the taxation system. Despite its strenuous efforts, the Mission felt that
214 F0371/67101 R4616, Minute by Williams, 11.4.1947; FO371/67101 R4616, Washington 
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little had been accomplished compared with what remained to be done,215 and at 
best it had created Valuable breathing space' for the country.216
However, the overall success or otherwise of BEM/Currency Committee 
involvement in any particular area provides a merely partial picture of the reality, as 
it fails to take account of Greek actions and attitudes. As Whitehall appreciated 
from the start, the British never expected to be able to transform the country single- 
handedly, and understood that the effectiveness of the package depended upon both 
extensive co-operation and a vigorous response from the Greeks themselves. Thus 
Bevin candidly recognised that British assistance would prove valuable only if it 
formed part of a wider programme to be devised and carried out by the latter.217 
Despite persistent British pressure, no such initiative was ever contemplated by any 
government in Athens.
Unlike the elusive programme, co-operation from the Greek side was often 
forthcoming, although this was limited to a few specific areas. Thus the 
considerable success of Blackburn, the Inland Revenue advisor on taxation, 
reflected harmonious collaboration with the Finance Ministry. On the other hand, 
the experience of Macintosh, the Treasury advisor on public spending, was much 
more typical. His comparative ineffectiveness was largely indicative of government 
unwillingness to accept his advice. The contrasting fortunes of the two advisors, 
who both made equally strenuous efforts to grapple with their sides of the budget, 
illustrate the central problem of the BEM - and ultimately, of the entire British 
presence in Greece - in that Greek consent and co-operation formed one of the most 
fundamental restraints on what the British could achieve. Without such co­
operation, good work could rarely be translated into good results.
The purely advisory role of the BEM rendered it powerless to ensure that its 
recommendations would be implemented. This was anticipated even before the first 
experts departed for Athens. Despite Greek promises that advice would be heeded, 
sceptical British officials doubted whether anything could be achieved unless the 
advisors possessed 'almost dictatorial' authority.218 In the absence of any such 
power, the Mission recommendations could be simply ignored if deemed 
undesirable bythe recipients.
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The different legal status of the Currency Committee created a contrasting set of 
circumstances. Unlike the BEM, its statutory powers ensured that it could not be 
openly ignored. Instead, its presence forced various ministers into great feats of 
ingenuity in order to circumvent its power of veto. Thus, when the Committee 
insisted that gold sales be stopped, the central bank simply switched to secret sales 
in the open market. As this soon became common knowledge, disgusted British 
officials wondered what the Greeks expected to gain from such ’tricks’,219 but 
were largely unable to prevent a repetition later in the year. 220 A related example 
was the covert withdrawal of £4m from the note cover account in order to finance 
more imports 221 Similarly, ministers proved particularly creative in devising an 
entire arsenal of euphemisms to disguise wage increases. Finally, one of the most 
serious problems facing the Committee was the government's failure to honour its 
promise to provide regular economic statistics. Without possessing complete and 
fully updated data, the foreign members of the Committee frequently found 
themselves unable to ascertain the true picture of the economy. This often delayed 
or even prevented the formulation of an appropriate response, and proved 
particularly dangerous in the case of the foreign exchange crisis, where earlier 
action could have reduced the extent of the debacle.
The generally poor co-operation offered by the Greeks, coupled with the glaring 
inefficiencies of the administrative machinery, combined to further reduce the 
effectiveness of the BEM and the Currency Committee. Frustrated that appropriate 
action was not being taken, both became progressively involved with an ever wider 
range of issues. This proved time-consuming and prevented the proper addressing 
of the more strategic problems of the country. Thus the Mission found itself unable 
to see the 'wood for the trees', as it became increasingly bogged down in the 
minutiae of the Greek economy.222 Similarly, the Committee took on additional 
responsibilities, to the point where its ultimate aims became obscured amidst a 
welter of relatively minor items. As Patterson ruefully noted, the processing of 
credit applications took up a disproportionate amount of the Committee's time 223 
To have experts of the calibre of Nixon, Gregory and Patterson dissipating their
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energies on such matters was clearly absurd, and the Mission bemoaned the fact 
that their 'high qualifications' were 'unable to find proper expression'.224
Contemporary critics of the London Agreement resented what they saw as the 
imposition of foreign control over the Greek economy. Varvaressos, who had 
withheld his support partly for this reason 225 dismissed the despatch of foreign 
experts as 'contemptuous of elementary national dignity and pride'.226 The 
Communist press denounced the convention as an act of 'imperialism' and 
'colonialism',227 predicting a situation where ministers would be 'ordered about' 
by their British advisors,228 and later portrayed the BEM as the 'economic dictator 
of Greece'.229 The American ambassador in Athens had gone even further, 
describing the entire concept of the British advisory role as a form of control more 
complete than that attempted by the German occupiers 230 Several later historians 
also chose to highlight this aspect of the Agreement, with references to a new 'form 
of foreign tutelage',231 and a 'device' allowing 'greater British control in Greece's 
internal affairs'.232 Sfikas interpreted the entire Bevin initiative as an attempt to 
restore the 'British position in Greece by economic means', merely another stage in 
a policy which displayed 'some of the trappings on nineteenth century 
imperialism'.233 The strongest condemnation of all came from Tsoucalas, who 
completely misunderstood the whole episode. According to him, a 'permanent' 
mission acted as an 'independent ministry of economic affairs'. Moreover, the 
country's 'economic difficulties' were 'exacerbated by the rigidity of British 
economic control'.234
As the events of 1946-47 demonstrate, such control was largely illusory. 
Successive Greek governments were usually able to pursue policies of their own 
choice despite the opposition of the two institutions. Notwithstanding the allusions
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to the dictatorial role of the BEM, the British clearly appreciated that it possessed 
nothing more than a 'strong nuisance value'.235 Although the Currency Committee 
enjoyed considerable statutory powers, these were rarely exercised to any 
significant degree. While it did indeed possess the legal sanction to impinge upon 
the authority of the government and the central bank, it invariably found itself either 
circumvented or forced to give ground. As the compromises over wages 
demonstrate, the Committee frequently refrained from asserting its authority, when 
it wished to avoid the risk of political unrest, which would further undermine the 
government. Even when it did act decisively, as in the case of the foreign exchange 
crisis, the resulting measures placed no meaningful restraint on the government, 
which had already lost its freedom of action along with its foreign exchange 
reserves. Although the British occasionally felt that a tough stance could indeed 
force ministers to act, as in the sovereign crisis of May 1946, few tangible results 
were achieved. The apparent ease with which the Greeks successfully evaded most 
forms of economic interference makes a mockery of the claim of foreign control, 
and any comparison with the wartime experience is patently ludicrous. Far from 
acknowledging an unprecedented degree of control over the Greek economy, the 
British, who had consciously shied away from more drastic alternatives, were fully 
aware that the lack of any real means of coercion was a major constraint preventing 
the implementation of what they saw as appropriate solutions.
A further limitation on what the London Agreement could achieve derived from 
the fact that it failed to offer anything like the levels of material assistance the 
Greeks felt were necessary. The BEM was painfully aware that this failure 
weakened its influence and reduced Greek propensity to accept British advice.236 
While the Greeks were prepared to recognise that Britain's own economic standing 
ruled out the possibility of substantial financial help, it was felt that the actual sums 
given were paltry. As Varvaressos remarked, in view of the extent of British 
involvement in the country, 'she could have done more [...] than supply £500,000 
worth of dyed battle-dresses and similar goods.1237
The lack of financial clout accompanying the London Agreement reflected 
Whitehall's consistent line that Britain was in no position to finance the 
reconstruction of Greece. Thus, British energies were devoted to making the most 
efficient use of existing resources, but within the BEM, divergent interpretations 
reflected the contrasting priorities of the individual sections. For the financial
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advisors, the maintenance of currency stability was all important, and took 
precedence over the longer term needs of reconstruction. This orthodox approach 
actively discouraged expenditure on reconstruction, fearing the inflationary effects 
of increased spending. However, several dissenting voices deplored this narrow 
view. Nixon, the chief proponent of fiscal orthodoxy, was criticised for his 
preoccupation with the budget to the exclusion of most other considerations.238 
The transport experts warned that 'reconstruction alone' could ensure economic 
progress, and stressed the urgency of the task.239 Board called for a relaxation of 
restrictions on expenditure in order to place greater emphasis on the restoration of 
housing and transport links, claiming that in a 'primitive country' such as Greece 
'there were worse things than a certain measure of inflation’.240 Mackenzie, 
Board's successor as head of the industrial section, indicated growing anxiety 
about Nixon's intransigence, stressing that additional outlays on reconstruction 
were vital if recovery was 'not to be held u p '241 Likewise, General Clark later 
regretted that the Mission had not advocated far greater expenditure on 
reconstruction, particularly on road repairs, even 'at the cost of a bigger deficit and 
more inflation'.242 These divergences of opinion reflect understandable differences 
of approach between the practically minded industrialists, transport specialists and 
military men, and the economists. In the end, the latter invariably held sway, and 
the former were forced to acknowledge that the 'vicious circle' could not be broken 
as currency stability ruled out an extensive reconstruction programme.243
It was precisely this preoccupation with the immediate stability of the drachma 
which led the British to support a measure which Patterson described as the most 
disastrous feature of 1946, namely the loss of foreign exchange as a result of the 
unrestricted imports policy. As already noted, initial British enthusiasm had 
concentrated on the positive developmental contribution of capital goods imports. 
The abandonment of this stance in favour of currency absorbing imports of 
consumer goods can only demonstrate the ascendancy of fiscal orthodoxy, which
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remained unshaken despite the massive depletion of the foreign exchange reserves. 
Similar reasoning lay behind Nixon's refusal to contemplate a further devaluation 
of the drachma. Notwithstanding the likelihood that devaluation would help the 
country's balance of payments, Nixon feared that such a move could provoke 
another wave of inflation.
This approach was partly inevitable when a financial expert such as Nixon was 
pre-eminent among the British advisors in Greece. He not only held key positions 
in both the BEM and the Currency Committee, but was also of much higher 
standing than General Clark. One observer wondered whether Nixon was not 
inadvertently distorting the entire policy of the Mission.244 The stance was 
modified once Nixon was replaced by Gregory. According to Patterson who 
worked alongside both men, the latter was far more flexible on many issues.245 To 
a large extent, the conflict between fiscal orthodoxy and broader considerations 
was a recurrent theme, which reflected previous differences of priority between 
Whitehall's financial establishment and those responsible for British foreign policy. 
Although the Bevin initiative had suggested the ascendancy of the latter, the views 
of the former remained central to advice given to the Greeks.
The dilemma of the partly conflicting priorities was never fully resolved. For the 
British experts on the ground, this created additional confusion. As late as 
September 1946, halfway through the life of the BEM, one of its leading members 
claimed that its aims still required 'clearer definition', as it was never apparent 
whether various Whitehall departments were 'speaking [...] with one voice'.246 
Without a guiding framework to reconcile the concerns of its individual sections, it 
was hardly surprising that the Mission itself was unable to speak with 'one 
voice'.247
This lack of an overriding grand purpose illustrates the second major constraint 
on the economic goals of British policy in Greece: the lack of financial resources.
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Given Britain's own economic difficulties and the extent of its commitments 
elsewhere, the huge cost of maintaining the Greek armed forces meant that little 
could be spared to address the country's other problems. It was thus impossible to 
both preserve immediate currency stability and undertake extensive reconstruction 
in such a devastated country. The inability to fulfil both aims created an intractable 
dilemma: economic revival would be impossible unless confidence in the drachma 
could be rebuilt and sustained, while the pace of recovery would be delayed by any 
postponement of the reconstruction effort. The experience of 1946-47 merely 
confirmed that Greece required huge levels of material assistance, far beyond what 
Britain was able to afford.
The two major constraints outlined above ensured that the London Agreement 
achieved far less than its initiators anticipated. Although its positive contribution 
was admittedly negligible, it is worth considering whether or to what extent it was 
responsible for the 'calamitous' and 'ruinous' consequences cited so forcefully by 
its critics.248 The overall picture is much more complex than most authors 
acknowledge, as the latter have invariably failed to distinguish between three 
separate factors: the provisions agreed in January 1946, the Greek interpretation of 
those provisions and the subsequent measures initiated by the latter. As already 
demonstrated, the gold policy was not part of the convention and was never 
supported by London. It was merely the continuation of similar policies carried out 
by several governments after liberation. Persistent attempts to force the cessation of 
gold sales foundered on the chronic British inability to impose their will on the 
Greeks. Similarly, although the sale of foreign exchange to finance imports did 
appear in the Agreement, the actual implementation of this policy was hardly in 
accord with British intentions, even if the latter must share responsibility for the 
consequences. Far from being foisted on the Greeks by the Agreement, both 
policies were already being proposed by the Kanellopoulos government back in late 
1945, and must have appeared far more attractive alternatives than the British 
insistence on fiscal discipline. The enthusiasm with which the first two policies 
were pursued contrasts strikingly with the reluctance to act on the budget
Unfortunately, the combined effects of the gold and unrestricted imports policies 
allowed speculation and capital flight to flourish as unproductive alternatives to 
productive investment, protecting the assets of a narrow section of Greek society. 
Varvaressos had indeed criticised the London Agreement as an attempt to 'win the 
confidence of vested interests' within the country.249 However, rather than
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pandering to sectional interests, London anticipated that the package should 
promote general stability by restoring confidence in the currency. Such stability 
would offer a breathing space until the all important elections and would encourage 
a gradual resumption of normal economic activity. As the British believed, the only 
alternative was chaos leading to a Communist Greece. Whitehall had never 
intended that any 'vested interests' should be able to exploit the terms of the 
Agreement, but had little power to impose safeguards or prevent subsequent abuses 
of gold and foreign exchange. If the policies of 1946-47 unduly benefited the rich, 
this was the result of actions and shortcomings of successive Greek governments 
rather than British design.
Whitehall had hoped to keep Greece afloat by means of a package, which 
included neither the resources required to address the country's myriad problems, 
nor the powers to ensure that those problems would be addressed in a systematic 
manner. Greek disappointment with the material provisions reduced the levels of 
co-operation the British could expect to receive, and resentment over the 
sovereignty issue further diminished the effectiveness of the foreign advisors. The 
London Agreement was a compromise experiment involving a limited increase of 
commitment, and its failure hastened the British departure from Greece, as London 
recognised that its objectives were no longer tenable in view of the constraints. 
Unsatisfactory as this compromise was, it is difficult to see how these constraints 
could have been overcome. Any British attempt to acquire real executive power 
would probably have aroused universal condemnation, not only from the Greeks, 
but also from Whitehall departments anxious to avoid such an apparently unlimited 
responsibility. Any British attempt to increase the levels of financial assistance to 
Greece would have provoked the wrath of a hostile Treasury and necessitated the 
downscaling of British commitments elsewhere. Given the relentlessly uninspiring 
record of successive governments in Athens, which made such poor use of the 
resources they were granted, it is hopelessly naive to assume that the country could 
have been magically restored had immense sums simply been handed over. The 
experience of 1946-47 ensured that no external aid would be given unconditionally. 
Despite the failure of the Agreement, its lessons were not lost on the Americans, 
who were soon to take over the British role in Greece. Careful to avoid the twin 
pitfalls which had plagued the British involvement, the United States proved 
willing to furnish the necessary resources to both maintain and rebuild the country, 
but only after assuming the powers to ensure compliance with their own view as to 
how those resources should be employed.
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6 THE AMERICAN AFTERMATH
If Greece was a virtual British protectorate after the liberation, it came to rely 
exclusively on the United States by the middle of 1947. At first, Washington 
ignored calls to become actively involved in Greece, being reluctant to assist a 
country which demonstrated so little resolve to help itself, and unwilling to be 
drawn into what it regarded as a British adventure. By the spring of 1947, 
however, these twin misgivings were set aside as the United States accepted sole 
responsibility for Greece, backed up by the promise of extensive assistance. This 
chapter outlines the gradual transition from initial detachment to wholehearted 
espousal of the Greek cause, the evolution of American perceptions of the crisis, 
and the practical results of the US aid programme during 1947-48.
6.1 The International Dimension 
Sharing the 'Headache'
Although British statesmen took it for granted that Greece lay within their sphere of 
interest, American moral and material support was accorded increasing significance 
as the price of extensive involvement in Greek affairs escalated without bringing 
even the appearance of a solution. Initially regarded as desirable, a greater role for 
Washington came to be seen as crucial for Greece’s survival, and eventually to 
allow the British to reduce their own presence without sparking off a fresh crisis.
The first manifestation of the British desire to formalise Anglo-American 
collaboration came with the establishment of the Military Liaison (ML) in 1944. 
This was originally proposed as the Allied Military Liaison (AML) implying a 
degree of American responsibility for an area where no US troops would be 
involved.1 As ML increased its role in Greece’s internal affairs, the implication of 
American co-responsibility could only be strengthened. Such efforts were not 
abandoned when ML was replaced by UNRRA. As early as March 1945, the War 
Cabinet had approved Macmillan's proposal for a joint Anglo-American committee 
to coordinate advice on economic and financial matters, and suggested that 
everything should be done to promote collaboration between the two embassies in 
Athens.2 As will be seen, the initiative was to prove abortive.
In contrast to this search for bilateral cooperation in Greece, the British reacted 
violently to Roosevelt’s suggestion that a tripartite mission, including Soviet
1 Frazier, op.cit., 1991, p.60.
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members, should be despatched to advise on economic matters. Implacably 
opposed to any role for the Soviets, the British instead proposed a similar bipartite 
mission containing representatives of the western Allies only.3 The idea lapsed 
with Roosevelt's death. Although raised one more time in cabinet discussions 
during the summer, there is no evidence that the proposal was actually put to the 
Americans.4
As the crisis dragged on, senior officials from international agencies joined the 
chorus calling for a more resolute stance from Washington. At first, such calls 
were more concerned with the US relationship with UNRRA and with the nature of 
UNRRA's role in Greece. In the spring of 1945, Buell Maben, the UNRRA chief 
of mission in Greece, urged the State Department to consider 'more active 
participation' in the relief effort on the ground and a 'less standoffish policy' 
towards the Greek problem.5 By October, the emphasis shifted when Commander 
Jackson, the senior deputy director of UNRRA, suggested that UNRRA should 
extend its functions to become the 'controlling authority' in economic matters and 
that the major powers should strengthen their own direct involvement in the 
country.6 Washington was soon receiving more ominous signals. Lt-General Sir 
William Morgan, Supreme Allied Commander in the Mediterranean (SACMED), 
warned that Britain alone would not be able to shoulder the burden for assisting the 
Greeks indefinitely. He insisted that the United States should assume some 
responsibility and that a wider long-term Allied policy should be devised for the 
country. Unless this was forthcoming, financial constraints might force Britain to 
withdraw completely from Greek affairs.7
British pressure was resumed in November following Bevin's new initiatives. 
At first, the approach was indirect, with calls on Washington to endorse proposals 
for closer UNRRA involvement in Greece.8 Before long, more direct cooperation 
was sought. After proposing an economic mission, London indicated that it would
3 FG371/48264 R6104, Roosevelt to Churchill, Telegram no.723, 21.3.1945; F0371/48264 
R6104, Churchill to Roosevelt, Telegram no.932, 3.4.1945; F0371/48265 R6648, 
Roosevelt to Churchill, Telegram no.737, 8.4.1945.
4 CAB 65/63, CM (45) 10, 20.6.1945.
5 FRUS, Vol.VIII, 1945. Memorandum by Baxter, 5.5.1945, pp.216-217; MacVeagh to the 
Secretary of State, 18.6.1945, pp.224-228.
6 FRUS, Vol.VIII, 1945. Jackson to Lehman, 27.10.1945, pp.246-247; Jackson to Lehman,
28.10.1945, pp.247-250; Jackson to Lehman, 27.10.1945, pp.250-251.
7 FRUS, Vol.VIII, 1945. Kirk to the Secretary of State, 2.11.1945, pp.251-252; Kirk to the 
Secretary of State, 4.11.1945, pp.253-255.
8 FRUS, Vol. VIII, 1945. Bevin to the Secretary of State, 29.9.1945, pp.238-240.
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'gladly consent' to American participation if Washington felt so inclined.9 The 
Foreign Office formally suggested that the two governments should 'act together' 
in a 'joint venture'.10 Similarly, it recommended a joint declaration in support of 
the Athens government to boost confidence in the country.11 These efforts brought 
little result. The joint declaration was not issued, and no significant American 
cooperation was secured.
The conclusion and subsequent enactment of the London Agreement took away 
much of the urgency of such attempts, and during the first half of 1946 British 
authorities do not appear to have exerted any direct pressure on Washington. In 
April, an alleged remark by the secretary of state James Byrnes, stressing the 
importance of preventing a Communist take-over of Greece, revived hopes in 
London that the Americans might be prepared to share the 'financial burdens' of 
supporting the country. Officials in the Foreign Office and elsewhere, however, 
took the view that the Americans should not be pressed, particularly as their 
cooperation was being sought in other troubled areas such as Palestine. Thus plans 
for Bevin to discuss the issue at a meeting with Byrnes in June were dropped.12
Growing British anxieties about the costs of military aid to Greece, which came 
to a head during the late summer of 1946, brought new urgency to the search for 
American financial support. Hopes were rekindled by evidence of increasing 
American fears over the Communist threat, the resulting offer to supplement British 
military assistance, and the decision to send the Porter Mission to Greece. 
Nevertheless, as Frazier points out, subsequent British approaches to Washington 
were confused and often misleading, reflecting the internal disagreements between 
Dalton and other policy makers in Whitehall. Lack of consensus within the cabinet 
interfered with the formulation of concrete overtures towards the Americans. Thus 
in October, when Bevin proposed that a large reconstruction loan could be secured 
from Washington if the British maintained their military payments until the end of 
1947, the idea was vetoed by Dalton, who refused to retreat from his opposition to 
any extension of British subsidies beyond March 1947. Similarly, a fresh Foreign 
Office initiative in December, pledging large sums for the Greek armed forces on
9 F0371/48285 R19826, McNeil to Kanellopoulos, 14.11.1945; FRUS, Vol. VIII, 1945. 
MacVeagh to the Secretary of State, 15.11.1945, pp.267-268.
10 F0371/48416 R20388, FO to Washington, Telegram no. 12081, 1.12.1945; FRUS, 
Vol.VIII, 1945. The British Embassy to the Department of State (Aide-Memoire), 3.12.1945, 
pp.276-277.
11 F0371/48338 R20345, FO to Washington, Telegram no.12159, 4.12.1945; FRUS, 
Vol.VIII, 1945. The British Embassy to the Department of State (Memorandum), 5.12.1945, 
pp.277-280.
12 Frazier, op.cit., 1991, pp. 108-109.
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condition that the Americans granted similar credits for civilian purposes, was 
dropped once it became clear that Dalton would not agree.13
The full extent of the disagreements within the cabinet were not revealed to the 
Americans. As late as the end of January 1947, US embassy officials in London 
were told that some British aid would continue beyond March. In early February, 
the British ambassador in Washington was instructed to tell the secretary of state, 
George Marshall, that between £70m and £80m would be needed in Greece in the 
nine months after March, and that the United States would have to provide the 
'lion's share' of the amount. This implied a partnership rather than a cessation of 
the British contribution. It was only on 19 February that the Foreign Office 
informed the Americans of its clashes with the Treasury, and confessed that it was 
not confident of 'gaining its point'. Two days later, the British communicated their 
decision to terminate all payments at the end of March. Pending the arrival of the 
aid promised by Truman, the British agreed to provide interim assistance worth up 
to £6m over the following three months.14
The confused events of early 1947 culminated in success for Britain's long- 
running effort to secure some degree of American involvement in Greece. As early 
as 1945, a senior Foreign Office official admitted that the British had 'always 
wished to get the Americans to help [...] in Greece'15 A year later, a colleague 
expressed similar sentiments, confessing an anxiety to 'interest the Americans in 
Greece in every possible way'.16 Towards the end of the period, this desire was 
complicated by endless internal disagreements over the wisdom of extending the 
British commitment to Greece. The resulting uncertainties not only made it more 
difficult to agree a coherent approach to Washington, but also ensured that the 
Americans were given extremely short notice of the final decision to terminate all 
aid.
Given the clear British desire to secure American help, the apparent ambivalence 
with which the aim was pursued may seem puzzling. The probable explanation is 
that British statesmen were unwilling to make a direct request for substantial 
economic assistance for Greece, fearing it would be taken as a tacit admission that 
Britain's role as a major international player was over. It seems likely that they 
hoped the Americans, by participating in various collaborative committees and 
missions, would themselves come to the conclusion that their material support was 
required. Thus the British deliberately refrained from asking for aid until their
13 Ibid., pp. 110-112.
14 Ibid., Chapter 8.
15 F0371/48284 R18735, Minute by Hayter, 6.11.1945.
16 F0371/58732 R16478, FO to Athens, Telegram no.2319, 15.11.1946.
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economic difficulties seemed to outweigh political loss of face. The associated 
question - to what extent the British feared that American involvement in Greece 
would supplant their own influence in the country - is much more difficult to 
answer. At first, it is likely that material and moral backing from the Americans 
was seen as strengthening rather than weakening Britain's position in Greece. 
However, as the policy dragged on with limited success and the maintenance of 
British control became less and less feasible, an American dominated Greece must 
have seemed infinitely preferable to the prospect of yet another Soviet satellite.
Contrasting Fears
Initially, the American response to British calls for closer involvement in Greece 
was cool. This partially reflected the fact that Washington felt that it had no major 
interests in Greece, but was mainly the result of American suspicion of British 
motives. American hostility to the creation of spheres of influence in the post-war 
world was combined with a long-standing distrust of Britain as an imperial power 
devoted to the maintenance of an exclusive imperial bloc. On both counts, the 
percentages agreement with Stalin could only heighten Washington's distrust. With 
the outbreak of fighting in Athens in December 1944, the Americans objected to 
what they saw as a flagrant British policy to impose a client government in Athens 
against the wishes of the Greek people. Senior US naval officers attempted to 
prevent the British from using US ships to transport military supplies to Greece, 
while MacVeagh went to great lengths to demonstrate his neutrality in the conflict. 
Much publicity was given to a statement from secretary of state Edward Stettinius, 
expressing a hope that the 'newly liberated countries' should not be subjected to 
'outside interference'. Privately, he told the British ambassador in Washington that 
'British actions in the Mediterranean' amounted to 'neo-colonialism'.17
Given such tensions, the Americans were anxious to avoid any close association 
with British activities in Greece, and persistently rebuffed the invitation to enter 
into the formal bilateral arrangements sought by London. They thus refused to 
provide combat troops for the liberation of Greece, and agreed to participate only in 
the subsequent ML relief effort. Formal collaboration with the British was limited 
to relatively minor bodies such as the Joint Transportation Facilities Mission 
Greece (JTFMG).18 With the disbanding of ML, American distrust towards the 
British resulted in a hostile response to the proposals of new advisory bodies. 
MacVeagh suspected that the British were deliberately creating a false 'impression 
of joint responsibility', and feared that the international relief effort would become
17 Frazier, op.cit., 1991, Chapter 5.
18 Ibid., pp.60-62; M.M. Amen, American Foreign Policy in Greece 1944/1949. Frankfurt am 
Main: Peter Lang, 1978, pp.61-63.
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an 'instrument of British policy'. Accordingly, he rejected the idea of an Anglo- 
American committee, and US advisers in Athens were instructed not to participate 
at any formal meetings of the Joint Policy Committee (JPC).19 Such reticence did 
not rule out participation in a wider set up, as demonstrated by Roosevelt's 
suggestion of a tripartite mission. Although the proposal was dropped following 
Churchill's refusal, Roosevelt remained opposed to any bilateral Anglo-American 
arrangement, but stipulated that some support and advice would continue to be 
provided directly to Greece.20
This basic stance survived the change of administration. During the crisis of late 
1945, when MacVeagh and Maben urgently appealed for closer attention to Greek 
affairs, Washington remained more concerned to maintain its independent role.21 
Despite British calls for coordinated declarations and a 'joint venture', the 
Americans refused to participate in the proposed economic mission and their 
representatives attended the London talks as observers only.22 Similarly, when US 
authorities finally agreed to participate in the Currency Committee, it was only on 
condition that the US member should act as a private individual rather than as a 
representative of the US government, thus absolving Washington from formal 
responsibility for the Committee's decisions. Instead of associating with the 
London Agreement, the United States indicated a willingness to send its own 
experts if requested.23
Such decisions demonstrated Washington's continued determination to steer 
clear of formal collaboration with the British, or as the latter saw it, to operate on 
'parallel lines'.24 There was still little apparent urgency in Washington over Greek 
affairs. Patterson was not appointed until May 1946, and discussions over the 
despatch of individual experts dragged on interminably until the matter was
19 FRUS, Vol.VIII, 1945. MacVeagh to the Secretary of State, 14.3.1945, pp.202-203; 
MacVeagh to the Secretary of State, 21.4.1945, pp.211-212; MacVeagh to the Secretary of 
State, 18.6.1945, pp.224-228; T236/1044, Hill to Waley, 11.4.1945.
20 FQ371/48264 R6104, Roosevelt to Churchill, Telegram no.723, 21.3.1945; F0371/48264 
R6104, Churchill to Roosevelt, Telegram no.932, 3.4.1945; F0371/48265 R6648, 
Roosevelt to Churchill, Telegram no.737, 8.4.1945.
21 FRUS, Vol.VIII, 1945. MacVeagh to the Secretary of State, 5.11.1945, pp.256-257; 
MacVeagh to the Secretary of State, 15.12.1945, pp.284-288; FRUS, Vol.VII, 1946. 
MacVeagh to the Secretary of State, 11.1.1946, pp.91-92. For Maben's advice, see DSR 
868.50/1-1046, Hawkins and Taylor to the Secretaries of State and Treasury, Telegram 
no.328, 10.1.1946.
22 FRUS, Vol. VIII, 1945. MacVeagh to the Secretary of State, 16.11.1945, pp.268-269; The 
British Embassy to the Department of State (Aide-Memoire), 3.12.1945, pp.276-277; 
Acheson to MacVeagh, 17.12.1945, pp.288-289; Acheson to Winant, 27.12.1945, p.297.
23 FRUS, Vol. VII, 1946. Acheson to Winant, 10.1.1946, pp.89-90; The Secretary of State to 
Tsouderos (Memorandum), 15.1.1946, pp.95-96.
24 T236/1048, Washington to FO, Telegram no.8544, 22.12.1945.
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eventually dropped. As late as August, MacVeagh could quote Patterson's report 
that despite the many underlying problems, the country's immediate financial 
situation remained 'gratifyingly quiet’.25 Within weeks, such cautious optimism 
was replaced by a growing sense of anxiety, originating not so much from any 
reassessment of the economic situation, but from increasing fears arising from 
regional and international developments. Growing perceptions of the Communist 
threat both within and outside Greece proved crucial in reshaping American 
attitudes. With wider issues at stake, reservations about becoming associated with 
the British rapidly became irrelevant.
By the end of September, Bymes privately expressed his anxiety about recent 
world developments, particularly the attitude of the Soviet Union. He emphasised 
the necessity of offering American support to Turkey and Greece.26 Such fears 
were fuelled by dire warnings from MacVeagh, who stressed Greece's 
vulnerability in face of overwhelming hostile forces, and the risk that it would be 
overrun almost immediately if the British withdrew their military presence.27 
Within weeks, the State Department cited a long list of anti-Greek activities 
undertaken by Moscow and its satellites to demonstrate that Greece and Turkey 
constituted the 'sole obstacle to Soviet domination of the Eastern Mediterranean’. It 
recommended that Washington should announce its readiness to 'take suitable 
measures' to safeguard the 'territorial and political integrity of Greece', including 
diplomatic and moral support, and practical assistance in the form of credits and 
military equipment28
At first, the shift of emphasis did not imply the immediate adoption of any major 
commitment to Greece. In early November, Washington agreed to assume 
responsibility for economic assistance, while London would continue to supply 
military material.29 Nevertheless, there was still no overwhelming sense of 
urgency. Decisions on economic aid were to await the findings of an investigative 
mission, to be despatched to Athens, partly to identify projects requiring American
25 FRUS, Vol.VII, 1946. MacVeagh to the Secretary of State, 12.8.1946, pp.188-189.
26 FRUS, Vol.VII, 1946. The Secretary of State to Clayton, 24.9.1946, pp.223-224.
27 FRUS, Vol.VII, 1946. MacVeagh to the Secretary of State, 30.9.1946, pp.226-227.
28 FRUS, Vol.VII, 1946. Memorandum by Henderson, 21.10.1946, p.240; Memorandum
Prepared in the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Memorandum Regarding Greece),
21.10.1946, pp.240-245.
29 FRUS, Vol.V, 1947. Memorandum by Acheson to the Secretary of State, 21.2.1947, pp.29- 
31; Acheson to MacVeagh, 8.11.1946, pp.262-263.
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credits.30 The State Department declared that it would furnish only such equipment 
as the Greeks were unable to obtain from the British.31
During subsequent months, this relatively leisurely approach disappeared as 
Washington became increasingly preoccupied with the threat posed by the 
country's northern neighbours, as demonstrated by countless references to border 
incidents, and political and economic instability in official exchanges.32 By early 
1947, the tone of despatches from US personnel in Athens had become positively 
alarmist. MacVeagh pointed out that the combination of external pressure and 
internal unrest was likely to lead to revolution and 'Soviet control', while Mark 
Ethridge, the US representative on the UN Commission of Investigation, compared 
Greece to a 'ripe plum' likely to fall in Soviet hands within weeks 33
Responding to these panic-laden signals, Washington moved closer towards 
concrete action. On 21 February, under secretary of state Dean Acheson warned of 
the consequences of allowing Greece to fall under Soviet domination simply 
through the 'lack of adequate support' from the United States and Britain. Aware 
that Britain was unable to supply necessary military equipment on schedule, he 
recommended that the United States extended its own assistance in that Held. 
Above all, he urged that a special bill be rushed through Congress authorising a 
direct loan to Greece.34 Given the sense of urgency already pervading Washington, 
the receipt of the British note of 21 February had an immediate effect. Within 
weeks, the Truman Doctrine had been articulated, and the way was open for the 
policy of all-out containment of Soviet Communism and the accompanying 
ideological crusade.
6.2 The United States and Greece
If international developments largely explain the motives behind the escalation of 
American involvement in Greece, the story is only complete with the consideration
30 FRUS, Vol. VII, 1946. Memorandum by Baxter to Henderson, 29.10.1946, pp.247-249. For 
a full account of the mission, see pp.223-227.
31 FRUS, Vol. VII, 1946. Memorandum Prepared in the Office of Near Eastern and African 
Affairs (Memorandum Regarding Greece), 21.10.1946, pp.240-245; Memorandum by 
Hilldring to Acheson, 29.10.1946, p.255; Acheson to MacVeagh, 8.11.1946, pp.262-263.
32 FRUS, Vol.VII, 1946, pp.264-288, passim.
33 FRUS, Vol.V, 1947. MacVeagh to the Secretary of State, 11.2.1947, pp. 16-17; Ethridge to 
the Secretary of State, 17.2.1947, pp.23-25. The Commission of Investigation was 
established by the UN Security Council on December 19, 1946, to examine alleged frontier 
violations by insurgent forces said to be using the territories of Yugoslavia, Albania and 
Bulgaria as operational bases; see FRUS, Vol. VII, 1946. Johnson to the Secretary of State,
19.12.1946, pp.284-285.
34 FRUS, Vol.V, 1947. Memorandum by Acheson to the Secretary of State, 21.2.1947, pp.29- 
31.
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of two other fundamental but less-publicised issues: the relentless pursuit of US aid 
undertaken by successive governments in Athens after 1944, and the evolution of 
American perceptions of Greece's economic problems. The following section 
begins by describing the Greek efforts to secure financial assistance, and then 
charts the gradual change of heart within Washington, from an initial reluctance to 
go beyond a limited degree of help to a willingness to commit extensive resources 
in an all-out effort to achieve a combination of political, military and economic 
objectives.
The Pursuit of US Aid
The British were far from alone in their efforts to persuade the Americans to show 
greater interest in Greek affairs after 1944. Similar pressure from the Greeks 
themselves was even more intense and persistent. Throughout the period under 
review, Greece's pursuit of American credits was almost relentless. As early as 
1942, the govemment-in-exile sought a loan to finance its international obligations, 
but the story began in earnest shortly before liberation. In July 1944, Varvaressos 
formally applied for a loan of $25m to cover the government's day-to-day 
expenses.35 When this was refused, for reasons which will be discussed below, 
the matter dragged on interminably. The request was repeated several times over 
the following months, with an additional emphasis on the need to support 
stabilisation, secure essential imports, and promote industrial recovery.36
The Greeks never allowed the matter to drop from the agenda, as demonstrated 
by the stance of Sideris 37 but the next major offensive came with Varvaressos' 
return to prominence. He had brought up the question of US aid during his visit to 
Washington in the spring of 1945.38 Some success was achieved in July, when the 
Foreign Economic Administration (FEA) agreed to provide short-term credits up to 
the value of $20m.39 However, this was not the end of the matter. In August, with 
his programme running into difficulties, Varvaressos gave wide publicity to a fresh
35 FRUS, Vol.V, 1944. Memorandum by Stettinius, 28.7.1944, pp.216-220.
36 FRUS, Vol.V, 1944. Memorandum by Kohler, 5.8.1944, pp.220-222; DSR 868.51/9-844, 
Memorandum by Kohler, 8.9.1944; FRUS, Vol.V, 1944. Memorandum by Miller,
28.10.1944, pp.223-224; DSR 868.51/10-3044, Memorandum by Miller, 30.10.1944; DSR 
868.51/11-244, Memorandum, 2.11.1944; FRUS, Vol.V, 1944. Stettinius to MacVeagh,
7.11.1944, pp.224-226.
37 See pp.97-100.
38 FRUS, Vol.VIII, 1945. MacVeagh to the Secretary of State, 24.3.1945, pp.204-205; 
Memorandum by Baxter, 3.5.1945, p.213; Clayton to Diamantopoulos, 4.5.1945, pp.213- 
215; Memorandum by Baxter, 4.5.1945, pp.215-216; T236/1044, Statement on the Greek 
Economic Situation and on the Need for Immediate Outside Assistance, K. Varvaressos, April
1945. See also pp.114-115.
39 FRUS, Vol. VIII, 1945. Memorandum by Kohler, 28.7.1945, p.232.
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application to the Ex-Im Bank for a massive loan worth $250m.40 Following 
indications that the Americans felt this was excessive, a more modest request for 
$25m was made in September.41 After lengthy delays, the smaller sum was finally 
approved in November, but not announced until January 1946 42
Following this breakthrough, the stakes were raised as the Greeks sought far 
larger amounts to finance reconstruction. From the spring of 1946, this campaign 
was conducted not by the government in Athens, but through the facade of the 
Greek Reconstruction Claims Committee (GRCC). In a direct address to Truman, 
the GRCC president Sophocles Venizelos complained that the former occupying 
powers had done nothing to make amends for the wartime destruction, and that his 
country was in no state to finance economic recovery from its own resources. He 
therefore asked that Greece be suitably rewarded for the sacrifices it had made, and 
demanded either an American loan to cover its reconstruction costs, to be serviced 
by the 'invaders', or that the Allies themselves foot the bill. He warned that unless 
either step was taken Greece would 'remain in ruins'.43
Although this emotional appeal was ignored, the offensive was maintained. An 
attempt by Tsaldaris to press the issue with a visit to Washington was abandoned 
after the State Department discouraged the trip 44 Instead, senior Greek officials 
raised the matter with their American counterparts at the Paris Conference on 
Reparations in early July. They presented a detailed breakdown of the capital 
requirements for Greek reconstruction, with the total cost over the following five 
years assessed at $6,04bn. Tsaldaris complained to Byrnes that 'piecemeal help' 
alone would not revive the country. Bymes pointed out the desirability of further 
negotiations with the Ex-Im Bank, but warned that the requested sums were 'not 
within the realm of possibilities'45 Such rebuffals did nothing to deter the Athens
40 FRUS, Vol.VIII, 1945. MacVeagh to the Secretary of State, 18.8.1945, pp.232-233; 
Diamantopoulos to Taylor, 20.8.1945, pp.233-234.
41 FRUS, Vol.VIII, 1945. Bymes to MacVeagh, 25.8.1945, p.235; Acheson to MacVeagh,
22.9.1945, p.236; Memorandum by Unger, 25.9.1945, pp.237-238.
42 DSR 868.50/11-2845, Bymes to MacVeagh, Telegram no.1200, 28.11.1945; DSR 868.50/1- 
546, Bymes to MacVeagh, Telegram n o .ll, 5.1.1946; DSR 868.50/1-546, Byrnes to 
MacVeagh, Telegram no. 12, 5.1.1946; DSR 868.50/1-946, Acheson to MacVeagh, Telegram 
no,30, 9.1.1946.
43 DSR 868.51/4-1746, Venizelos to Truman, 17.4.1946.
44 FRUS, Vol.VII, 1946. Acheson to Rankin, 13.6.1945, pp. 169-170; Rankin to the Secretary 
of State, 18.6.1945, pp.170-171; Acheson to Rankin, 22.6.1945, pp. 171-172.
45 DSR 868.51/7-1746, Greek Requests for Economic Assistance, Memorandum by Baxter, 
17.7.1946; FRUS, Vol.VII, 1946. Memorandum by Freeman Matthews, 5.7.1945, pp. 177- 
179. See also F0371/58730 R10375, Copy of Memorandum on Greece's Economic Problem 
Handed to the Rt Hon. Ernest Bevin, Secretary of State, and Secretary of State Bymes by the 
Greek Premier M. Tsaldaris, Paris, 3.7.1946.
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government. In mid-July, while on a trip to seek British aid, Tsaldaris visited the 
US embassy in London. He brought up the matter of Ex-Im Bank credits, and 
suggested that a delegation, chaired by Venizelos, be received in Washington to 
discuss the country's needs.46 This last approach met with a cool response in 
Washington, where it was pointed out that there was little likelihood of any further 
help given the failure to make any use of the previous $25m loan. The State 
Department was prepared to receive the delegation, but only to discuss Greece's 
general financial and economic problems, particularly those relating to trade. The 
meeting would take place only if the loan issue was not raised 47
Eager for the trip to go ahead, the Greeks gladly consented to the stipulation.48 
When the delegation arrived in Washington at the end of July, its Erst action was to 
bring up the prospect of a $500m loan in interviews given to the press.49 From its 
first meeting with American officials, it was clear that the members of the 
delegation regarded the negotiation of new loans as the 'primary purpose' of their 
visit. The Americans were adamant that no further help would be forthcoming from 
the Ex-Im Bank, and that Greece would have to await until the International Bank 
of Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) commenced operations.50 Within 
days, the delegation asked for credits worth $175m, a sum which they described as 
'modest' and 'cut down to a bare minimum'. Venizelos stressed that it would be 
'impossible for him to return' to Athens without securing some assistance. He felt 
this would create the impression that Greece was being 'deserted' by the Allies.51 
The urgency of the plea for aid was reiterated during a direct meeting with 
Truman.52
The pressure was maintained despite the American refusal to offer any further 
assistance 53 In early November the foreign exchange fiasco led to a renewed
46 FRUS, Vol. VII, 1946. Harriman to the Secretary of State, 12.7.1946, pp. 180-181.
4  ^ FRUS, Vol.VII, 1946. Acheson to Harriman, 13.7.1946, pp. 181-182.
48 DSR 868.51/7-1846, Harriman to the Secretary of State, Telegram no.6808,18.7.1946.
49 DSR 868.51/7-3146, Memorandum by Baxter, 31.7.1946. Apart from Venizelos, the 
delegation consisted of Michael Ailianos, deputy minister of co-ordination, Anastasios 
Bakalbasis, a former minister of agriculture and Konstantinos Karamanlis, a member of 
parliament (later prime minister and president); DSR 868.50/8-546, Memorandum from 
Baxter to Henderson and Acheson, 5.8.1946,
50 DSR 868.51/8-346, Memorandum from Fetter to Acheson, 3.8.1946.
51 DSR 868.50/8-546, Memorandum by Baxter, 5.8.1946; DSR, 868.50/8-646, Venizelos to 
Acheson, 6.8.1946.
52 DSR 868.50/8-746, Memorandum from Baxter to Henderson, 7.8.1946.
53 For details of the American refusal, see pp.222-224.
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offensive.54 Desperate to secure financial help, the Athens government not only 
sought an extension of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York (FRBNY) loan, but 
also the return of its $10m security together with emergency aid.55 Within weeks, a 
personal visit of Tsaldaris to Washington resulted in a further request for credits 
worth $56m to finance imports of consumer goods over the following four 
months.56 Such appeals continued unabated until the end of January.57 Thereafter 
attention was focused on the Porter Mission. Greek officials had welcomed the 
original decision to despatch the Mission, and had urged its speedy departure.58 
Once in Greece, the Porter team was seen as the herald of closer American 
involvement in the future, and thus went a long way towards both the calming of 
fears and the raising of expectations.59
American Misgivings
American advice to the Greeks did not differ substantially from that offered by the 
British. This reflected a similar understanding of the nature of the crisis, the 
shortcomings of the government in Athens, and of the measures likely to restore 
normality to the country. Despite the growing realisation that US aid would be 
necessaiy, Washington never departed from the stance that internal measures were 
crucial if Greece was to recover.
This position was made clear in late 1944, in response to the first requests for 
credits. Washington pointed out that internal monetary reform by the Greek 
government was a far more appropriate solution to current problems than foreign 
loans.60 This stance was maintained throughout the period under review and was 
reiterated on many occasions. In late 1945, MacVeagh pointed out the need for 
Greece to make a larger contribution to its own recovery by repatriating the large
54 FRUS, Vol.VII, 1946. MacVeagh to the Secretary of State, 4.11.1946, pp.259-260; DSR, 
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amounts of foreign investments held by Greeks abroad.61 After the announcement 
of the $25m loan, the government in Athens was informed that it would be 
expected to undertake a series of 'rigorous measures' to combat inflation, stabilise 
the drachma, improve public finance and foster the recovery of industry and trade. 
It was clearly suggested that the likelihood of further US economic assistance 
would be dependent on the effectiveness of the action taken.62
By the summer of 1946, US officials recognised that successive governments 
had done very little to improve the situation, and frequently expressed 
dissatisfaction. One major cause of irritation was the inept use of assistance already 
received. The $25m loan was not even touched before August, and only $3,4m 
was actually disbursed by the end of the year. Moreover, Greek officials had been 
too lethargic to secure any significant benefit from American credits to purchase 
surplus property.63 In such circumstances, the persistent clamour for further loans 
had little chance of meeting with a sympathetic response. This was even more 
certain after the breach of promise in sending the Venizelos delegation. The 
Americans were hardly likely to be impressed by the emissaries' sole focus on the 
loan issue after the solemn assurance that the matter would not be raised.
The negative impressions were further reinforced by the subsequent contacts 
with the Venizelos delegation. Its members seemed poorly briefed, and appeared to 
have little understanding of the precise state of their country's economy. The only 
statistics they produced were either false or had little basis in reality. They were 
able to offer few suggestions on improving public finances or the balance of 
payments; or the uses to which foreign assistance would be put. Even worse, they 
surprised their hosts with their ignorance of how economic problems were being 
tackled elsewhere, their stance towards wartime profits and controls over trade and 
capital movements, and their bizarre statements on various issues (particularly the 
claim that higher taxation would aggravate inflation). The Americans were 
dismayed, feeling that the delegation was 'constitutionally incapable' of grasping 
the need for progressive taxation, capital levies and economic controls, and were 
appalled that a 'belief in private enterprise and free trade' should be regarded as a 
sufficient excuse for the failure to apply essential measures. A disgusted State 
Department official suggested that the Greeks should be made to understand that
61 DSR 868.51/10-2645, MacVeagh to the Secretary of State, 26.10.1945.
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'private enterprise' could not be equated with 'private exploitation', and that 
'private enterprise' was doomed unless it operated for the 'people as a whole'.64
Equally damaging was the confused manner in which US assistance was being 
sought. As on previous occasions, the request for the original $25m loan contained 
little relevant information, and despite the protracted nature of the negotiations, 
successive applications could still be dismissed as 'hurriedly' prepared and 
carelessly handled. Only with the help of foreign advisors could a suitable 
document be drafted.65 The Greeks learned little from this experience. 
Documentation submitted in July 1946 outlining the capital requirements of Greek 
reconstruction prompted American criticism that it was riddled with 
'inconsistencies and errors', while the programme presented by the Venizelos 
delegation in support of its request for $175m was rejected as 'poorly conceived' 
and 'pathetically inadequate'. At the Ex-Im Bank, it was felt that the Greek case 
was 'so weak' there was little point in conducting any discussions at that time 66 
By September 1946, American exasperation in Athens led to the decision that no 
further credits would be made available by the Ex-Im Bank, and that any future 
approaches should be made to the International Bank of Reconstruction and 
Development (IBRD) only.67
A further source of annoyance in Washington was the way in which the 
prospect of US aid was being used for political purposes within Greece. In August 
1945, MacVeagh simply noted that Varvaressos' references to the $250m being 
sought had been mainly for domestic consumption.68 In the following month, the 
State Department criticised the 'unfortunate publicity' generated by the government, 
which was fuelling the impression that the sum had been approved.69 During the 
summer of 1946, they were equally 'disturbed' by persistent rumours surrounding
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a request for $200m, and deplored the attitude that compliance with the request was 
virtually taken for granted in Athens despite the lack of any vigorous action by the 
government.70 Another similar case occurred in January 1947, when Tsaldaris 
deliberately suggested that the Americans had committed themselves to further aid. 
Bymes dismissed his remarks as regrettable.71
The Porter Mission
Despite the many sources of frustration listed above, the Americans had never 
denied that some financial assistance would have to be provided to Greece. As 
already indicated, successive Greek applications for loans had been invariably 
rejected either because of the lack of clarity as to their purpose, or because of the 
inflated size. Washington had encouraged the search for credits so long as realistic 
sums were sought for clearly defined purposes. In late 1944, they indicated a 
willingness to provide funds for the promotion of industrial recovery,72 and even 
during the heated negotiations of 1946 conceded that aid could be made available to 
finance feasible projects 73 Once Washington recognised that some increased 
commitment to Greece was inevitable, it became clear that the agenda needed to be 
moved away from the somewhat melodramatic approach of Venizelos and Tsaldaris 
towards a more hard-headed means of assessment. This required the precise 
quantification of the country's reconstruction needs, and the creation of an efficient 
mechanism to ensure that these needs could be met. These were to become central 
aims of the Porter Mission.
Even before Paul Porter, Chief of the American Economic Mission to Greece, 
left for Athens, both questions had received much attention from US officials. In 
the spring of 1946, Karl Rankin, the American charge d'affaires in Athens, had 
estimated that Greek reconstruction would require $600m over the following five 
years. He assumed that over half of this amount could be found within Greece 
itself, with $250m to come from external sources including reparations. He felt that 
such a 'generous' sum would, if effectively utilised, restore the country to its pre­
war position. However, this could not be taken for granted. Rankin warned of the 
obstacles likely to arise from the fact that Greece was a 'country of free enterprise 
par excellence'. He suspected that if foreign assistance were to be 'handled [...] on 
a political basis', not only would far larger sums be required, but the whole
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process would be delayed interminably.74 He highlighted the shortcomings of 
government agencies, which played only a 'limited' role in the country's economic 
life. He also pointed out that officials at various ministries had virtually no idea as 
to the precise purpose to which US assistance should be put. Rankin therefore 
suggested that credits would have to be extended on a 'project basis', with each 
individual project to be scrutinised by a competent American firm.75 Overall, given 
the shortcomings of the administration, the chaotic fiscal system and the 
widespread aversion to income tax and economic controls, US officials had severe 
doubts whether Greece was 'equipped' to handle the sums it had requested 76 
It was in the light of such perceptions that an investigative mission under Paul 
Porter was despatched to Greece to recommend 'specific steps' to be taken by the 
government, and to gauge the 'extent of foreign assistance needed'.77 Although the 
decision to send the mission was a tacit acknowledgement that US resources had to 
be pumped into Greece, it was also tantamount to a vote of no confidence in the 
policies of the government in Athens and the estimates of reconstruction costs 
submitted by Greek officials. The Mission arrived in late January 1947, and 
conducted a thorough investigation of the economy over the following two and a 
half months. This involved face-to-face discussions with ministers, officials, 
industrialists and academics, and the use of questionnaires to canvass the opinions 
of interested parties such as commercial and industrial associations. The Mission 
did not limit its activities to the capital, but devoted several weeks to a tour of the 
provinces. It also spent a considerable amount of time consulting with members of 
the BEM and the Currency Committee, and supported them in various dealings 
with the Greek government.78
Porter was not encouraged by what he saw in Greece. His general observations 
were largely consistent with those made by other American and British officials. 
He was disappointed that so few active steps had been taken to overcome the crisis. 
He felt the political system was largely to blame, observing that in the absence of 
any 'western concept of the state', politics was mainly limited to power struggles 
between individuals for whom economic policy was a low priority. Moreover, he
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dismissed the civil service as a 'depressing farce' and deplored the general 'sense 
of helplessness' within the country. He did not believe that the government would 
be up to the task of carrying through the necessary reforms, and suggested that 
'guidance by American personnel' would be necessary.79
Such perceptions underlay the report of the Porter Mission which was delivered 
in April 1947. According to this, the Greek economy was still in a precarious 
position, and the country had 'merely managed to survive' since 1944, despite 
'substantial foreign aid' worth $700m and 'competent foreign advice'. The 'time 
bought' so expensively had been squandered as a result of policies of 'drift and 
expediency'. The report recognised that the problems would be insurmountable 
without fresh injections of external assistance and the adoption by the Athens 
government of 'strong control measures', but stressed that previous mistakes 
would have to be avoided if US help was to prove effective. It therefore 
concentrated on three issues: the likely amount to be provided, action to be taken by 
the government, and means to ensure that American advice was heeded.80
In addition to UNRRA, post-UNRRA relief and surplus property imports, it 
was estimated that a minimum of $300m would be needed over the following 
fifteen months. Moreover, a longer term recovery programme was necessary, 
requiring at least $335m over the following five years. Most of the sum, 
particularly in the early period, would have to come from abroad. In addition, it 
was assumed that military expenditure over the fiscal year 1947-48 would amount 
to $180m, and this would also have to be provided by the United States. Such a 
level of aid could ensure both a balancing of the budget, and an adequate supply of 
consumer goods, thus minimising the risk of inflation.81
The impossibility of predicting the ultimate costs of the military struggle ruled 
out any precise assessment of the overall aid requirements. Nevertheless, the report 
stressed that reconstruction costs would be 'substantially reduced' if the 
government in Athens was prepared to 'mobilise the country’s own resources' and 
carry out a series of measures in conjunction with US advisers. Action was to be 
taken in several areas including public finances, the balance of payments, 
administration, industry and agriculture.
Public finances were to be improved by vigorous action to augment revenue and 
control expenditure. The entire structure of taxation would have to be simplified. 
Income tax rates needed to be raised by at least 50%, and strictly enforced by a
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compulsory registration of all commercial enterprises and maintenance by them of 
prescribed accounts for income tax purposes. Importers were to be prevented from 
making excessive profits arising from differences between Greek and world prices. 
All local taxes on the movement of goods would have to be lifted as soon as 
possible. On the expenditure side, an efficient audit and accounting system had to 
be created, and the ministry of finance had to be granted tighter control over public 
spending. All 'special funds' had to be abolished, while pension and indigence lists 
were to be subject to severe scrutiny. Finally, the report advocated an earlier 
suggestion by Gregory and Patterson, that a wage board be established to 
adjudicate on pay disputes in the state sector.82
Several measures were necessary to improve the balance of payments. Policies 
on the exchange rate and gold sales were to be amended after consultation with the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF). Strict controls were to be imposed on imports, 
with utility as the primary criterion for the granting of licenses, and the importation 
of luxury goods was to be prohibited. The government would undertake to recover 
lost markets and secure new markets for exports, to promote tourism, and to 
ensure that a greater share of Greek shipping earnings was repatriated. To prevent 
the illicit flight of capital, the report endorsed another Gregory and Patterson 
suggestion that all incoming and outgoing mail should be subject to financial 
censorship.83
Other measures included the improving of the administrative machinery. The 
civil service was to be pruned and its quality was to be raised via training and 
selection. It was recognised that a comprehensive system of price controls had little 
chance of success given public distrust and the lack of suitable means of 
enforcement. However, existing price, rent and wage controls needed to be 
maintained and improved, while an antihoarding campaign should be undertaken 
backed up by the threat of confiscations. A wage policy had to be devised and a 
mechanism for settling labour disputes had to be created. Reconstruction had to 
proceed according to a master plan, with priorities to be identified by a planning 
board consisting of economists and engineers. Foreign capital was to be 
encouraged for the undertaking of reconstruction projects. Industrial recovery was 
to be promoted via the judicious use of credits, the favouring of imports of raw 
materials rather than finished goods competing with domestic production, and the 
removal of abuses of monopolies and subsidies. The obligation to retain surplus 
employees had to be abolished. Agricultural production was to be stepped up by 
the application of intensive methods and better irrigation and drainage. An
82 Ibid.
83 Ibid.
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educational campaign would be employed to disseminate knowledge of best 
practices. Apart from these long range measures, farmers should be granted access 
to credits at low interest rates, and in adequate amounts, through cooperatives if 
feasible. Nevertheless, the report looked beyond a mere return to the pre-war 
economic situation. It stressed that Greece needed to become 'reasonably self 
sufficient', and suggested the drawing up of a development programme 
concentrating on mining, metallurgy and agroindustries.84
The administration of the US aid to Greece was to be entrusted to an economic 
mission, which was to comprise up to fifty high calibre specialists on various 
aspects of the economy. The mission was to have complete control over the use of 
funds, and was to supervise the planning and execution of reconstruction projects. 
While the mission was to concern itself with strategic issues, its work was to be 
complemented by foreign advisors to be placed in key government posts. The latter 
would concentrate on day-to-day issues. The Currency Committee was to retain its 
composition, but its powers were to be broadened. To ensure that Greek foreign 
trade proceeded along lines consistent with the objectives of the mission, the report 
advocated the adoption of yet another idea of Gregory and Patterson. This was the 
Foreign Trade Administration, to be chaired by a mission member, which was to 
have the final say on all matters relating to foreign trade and procurement. A final 
mechanism was needed to ensure consistent compliance with the mission's 
recommendations: the ultimate power to 'curtail or suspend' all aid if its advice was 
not heeded.85
6.3 The US Aid Programme, 1947-1948
In March 1947, before the Porter Report was completed, Truman announced his 
determination to extend assistance to Greece in an address to Congress. In the 
speech, which came to be seen as the first articulation of the so-called Truman 
Doctrine, the President warned of the dangers threatening Greece and Turkey, and 
of the serious regional and international consequences of allowing those countries 
to fall into the hands of hostile forces. To counter this threat, he emphasised the 
need of allocating economic and military aid worth $400m, of which $300m would 
go to Greece. The assistance would enable the government in Athens to restore its 
authority by overcoming the subversive 'armed minority' and to maintain internal 
order by continuing purchases of vital imports. With the help of US advisers, the 
aid would be used to ensure Greece's survival as a 'free nation', and to create a 
'stable and self-sustaining economy', conducive to a 'healthy democracy'. The
84 Ibid.
85 Ibid.
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request was finally approved by Congress in May 1947.86 In contrast to the 
specific and detailed recommendations of the Porter Report, the immediate 
assistance to be given to Greece was articulated in vague and emotive terms with an 
emphasis on the threat posed by unspecified, but clearly Communist efforts to 
subvert the countiy's independence. Thus the primary aim of the measure was to 
counter this threat, with economic policies as secondary instruments of the political 
aim of ensuring internal stability. The political emphasis was reinforced by the 
reference to democracy, indicating the desire to remove the abuses associated with 
recent governments in Athens. The following section describes the implementation 
of the emergency aid package, the problems it encountered and the results it 
achieved.
The American Mission for Aid to Greece (AMAG)
In the interim period before the despatch of AMAG, the body created to administer 
the proposed assistance, more attention was paid to defining its powers than to 
refining its objectives. After completing his report, Porter had laid special emphasis 
on the need to ensure that the mission would be equipped to overcome any 
'refusals by the Greek government to carry out specific measures for recovery’.87 
In this spirit, the US aid package was to be made conditional not only upon the 
granting of sweeping powers to AMAG, but also on the undertaking by the 
government in Athens to carry out vigorous measures of its own. The latter was 
obliged to endorse a declaration drafted in Washington, outlining the actions it was 
prepared to take and the degree of authority it would concede to the proposed 
mission. It promised to marshal the country's resources to the 'fullest extent' to 
achieve the programme's aims, and to refrain from enacting any 'economic steps' 
before consulting the mission.88
When AMAG commenced operations in July, it further strengthened its brief by 
insisting not only on being consulted on every economic decision, but also by 
declaring that it expected complete adherence to its advice.89 The Mission soon 
came to resemble a shadow government with a structure closely mirroring that of 
ministries. Each of its divisions expanded rapidly, and instead of the compact body
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originally proposed by Porter, it already had a staff of over 128 by September 
1947, and over 1,100 by May 1948. It was headed by Dwight Griswold, a former 
governor of Nebraska, who had been involved in the US military administration in 
Germany.90
Equipped with wide powers and backed up by extensive resources, AMAG set 
out to realise the ambitious objectives indicated in the Truman address. It rapidly 
became apparent, as Porter had already understood, that few comprehensive 
economic controls could be applied in a country with such an inefficient civil 
service. Thus neither rationing nor controls on prices, production or distribution 
seemed feasible and were not attempted. Instead, the Mission concentrated on the 
'major strategic points' of the Greek economy, including public finances, wages, 
imports and the external value of the drachma.91 In each field, AMAG found it 
necessary to create new institutional arrangements or to assume an unprecedented 
degree of control over the actions of the Athens government.
The first such field was public finances. One of the most protracted struggles 
with the Greek authorities came over the need to solve the perennial problem of 
budgetary deficits. As on previous occasions, the main difficulty lay in persuading 
the government first to draw up realistic estimates and then to stick to them. A 
clearly unsatisfactory budget was presented in September. Thereafter, prolonged 
pressure and substantial input from the Public Finance Division sought to reduce 
the anticipated deficit by both enforcing ruthless expenditure cuts and by tapping 
new sources of revenue. After a lengthy struggle a detailed budget was finally 
thrashed out by December. Unlike before, when expenditure estimates were never 
taken seriously, the extensive powers assumed by AMAG ensured a significant 
degree of control over public spending. Whereas in the previous period, when the 
Currency Committee had been invariably presented with a fait accompli, the 
Mission itself took the initiative by insisting on monthly updates on the state of 
public finances. These reports were prepared by auditors answering to AMAG's 
budget control advisor. All requests for additional spending were rigorously 
screened by American personnel. According to Coombs, AMAG supervision 
amounted to virtual 'day-to-day control over relatively minor items of budgetary 
expenditure'.92
A further means of curbing the profligacy of the government was the creation of 
the Drachma Reconstruction Fund (DRF), a mechanism through which the costs of 
all reconstruction projects were to be channelled. The DRF, using what were
90 Merrill, op.cit., 1996, pp.334, 336, 490.
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commonly known as counterpart funds, was endowed with the receipts from all 
consumer goods imports financed by US aid. In contrast with the revenue from 
UNRRA supplies, which was at the complete disposal of the government, 
disbursements of the drachma counterpart funds required AMAG approval, and 
thus could not be diverted for short-term political purposes. Similarly, all receipts 
from the post UNRRA-programme remained under the control of the Mission 
rather than the government in Athens.93
Another major concern of AMAG was to formulate an imports programme 
closely geared both to the realities of the Greek balance of payments and the 
Mission's overall objectives. The task of ensuring that actual imports remained 
consistent with AMAG's assessment of current requirements was entrusted to the 
Foreign Trade Administration (FTA), created in October 1947. The FTA was 
charged with the overseeing of all import license applications, an extension of the 
temporary powers previously exercised by the Currency Committee. Though 
formally part of the ministry of national economy, it was headed - but not 
controlled by an American official.94
An additional issue requiring immediate attention was the gross overvaluation of 
the drachma, with its damaging effects on Greek exports and invisible earnings. 
Both AMAG and the government were agreed that a new parity should not be fixed 
while the crisis continued, as it would soon lose relevance in any case. Moreover, 
Washington was opposed to any major alteration in the exchange rate without the 
prior approval of the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The solution was the so- 
called 'Exchange Certificate Plan' introduced in October 1947. While the official 
parity was to remain unchanged, all approved foreign currency transactions were to 
be conducted by the use of 'exchange certificates', the value of which would be 
determined by market forces. This value, effectively a premium on top of the 
official parity, was to represent the de facto exchange rate of the drachma. The 
plan's main aim was to reduce the discrepancy between official and black market 
rates, and to provide an incentive to exporters.95
The control exercised by AMAG and the FTA was supplemented by the work of 
other entities. The execution of reconstruction projects was undertaken directly by 
American firms. In many cases, the contracts had been placed even before the
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Mission arrived in Athens. The supervision and auditing of reconstruction work 
was entrusted to the US Army Engineering Corps. Similarly, all purchases of 
military and bulk foodstuffs were handled directly by US procurement agencies. 
Use was also made of existing bodies such as the Currency Committee. Originally 
intended to last until 1947, its existence was prolonged by special legislation. Many 
of its activities were taken over by various divisions of AMAG, leaving it free to 
supervise the credit operations of the Bank of Greece. It also assumed additional 
functions, particularly the regulation of the 'Exchange Certificate Plan'.96
The Fresh Crisis
The extensive powers assumed by AMAG enabled it to achieve a measure of 
success in persuading the government to adopt a more realistic approach to public 
finances. The estimates of September 1947, which had envisaged a deficit of nearly 
50%, were subjected to a radical revision by the Public Finance Division. The 
December estimates saw overall spending cut by 23%, with the largest economies 
to be made in military expenditure, which was to be slashed by over 30%. On the 
revenue side, considerable progress was also anticipated. Diminished returns from 
the sale of relief supplies were to be almost entirely offset by a rise in yields from 
taxation. Despite the desirability of taxing income rather than consumption, the 
Public Finance Division recognised the obvious problems in implementing a proper 
income tax. Acknowledging that substantial increases could not be achieved 
immediately, it concentrated on promoting government legislation requiring the 
proper maintenance of business accounts and records. In the short-term, several 
new taxes were devised, notably the Special War-time Contribution, a repackaged 
version of the Varvaressos levy of 1945, and several retrospective taxes.97 In 
combination, it was expected that these would contribute more than half of the 
projected increase in returns from taxation. Indirect taxes were to provide the 
remainder, although this entailed political difficulties. Neither the government nor 
the trade unions were keen on measures which would push up prices, a position 
shared by many members of AMAG itself. In the end, it was agreed to raise 
customs duties by 150%, and to stop subsidising several commodities, particularly 
bread. Under the new revenue structure, it was anticipated that recurring sources of 
income would provide almost 60% of the total (44% and 15% from indirect and 
direct taxes respectively), with 23% to come from the sale of relief supplies and
96 Ibid., pp.48, 53-54; Amen, op.cit., 1978, p. 128.
97 The retrospective measures included taxes on profits from private imports between liberation 
and March 1947, and on all repayments of bank credits made during the period of high 
inflation up to January 1946.
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18% from extraordinary levies. By such means, it was hoped that the budget deficit 
could be reduced to a mere 7%.98
Although AMAG was reasonably successful in overcoming government 
intransigence on public finances, it proved far more difficult to achieve any 
significant degree of control over the real economy. Even while the details of the 
budget were being thrashed out, several dangerous developments threatened to 
invalidate most of the assumptions on which the new estimates were based. By the 
end of the year, both public finances and the stability of the drachma were 
deteriorating rapidly with note circulation, prices and the drachma's sovereign rate 
all spiralling upwards due to a combination of mistakes by the government and by 
AMAG itself, and circumstances outside the control of both.
The first serious challenge arose from wage concessions. During the summer, 
civil servants had launched a major campaign in pursuit of pay claims, culminating 
in the threat of a general strike. Thus instead of pruning the civil service as 
originally intended, AMAG became immediately involved in heated negotiations 
over both redundancies and wage demands. Due to the late arrival of the Public 
Finance Division, negotiations on the AMAG side were conducted by advisors 
from the Civil Government Division, who had little understanding of budgetary 
matters. Consequently, AMAG gave its approval for a 30% pay rise in exchange 
for the acceptance of an administrative reform package. This opened up a 'gaping 
hole in the budget', with a 'flood of new money' pouring into the economy. 
Unsurprisingly, the agreement soon provoked a response from workers in the 
private sector, who demanded pay increases to take account not only of the raises 
given to the civil servants, but also to compensate for the subsequent wave of 
inflation. Although the Labour Division was instrumental in moderating the pay 
claims, raises averaging 35% to 40% were granted in November."
The consequences of the wage concessions soon became apparent. By October, 
the sovereign rate jumped by over 20%. The crisis was compounded by fresh 
AMAG mistakes. The agreement with the civil servants had allowed higher wage 
increases to compensate for the cancellation of the traditional holiday bonuses. For 
some unfathomable reason (described by Coombs as an 'unexplained failure'), the 
Public Finance and Labour Divisions failed to coordinate policies when negotiating 
with the private sector employees in November. As a result, the latter were allowed 
to retain their bonuses on top of their pay rises. Immediately, indignant civil 
servants demanded the restoration of their own bonuses. Placed in an acutely 
embarrassing situation, AMAG shied away from the political costs of attempting to
98 Percentages calculated from data in Coombs, op.cit., 1953, pp. 107-137, 142.
99 Ibid., pp.79-82.
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cancel the private sector bonus and was obliged to approve the enormous economic 
costs of acceding to the demands of the civil servants.100
Unsurprisingly, the pay rises ushered in a new wave of price increases. At the 
same time, other developments contributed to an intensification of inflationary 
pressure. Notable among these was an unavoidable expansion of credit for 
agriculture. This was partly caused by a severe drought during the summer of 
1947, which reduced cereal yields by more than 30%. This delayed the repayment 
of existing loans, and necessitated the allocation of far higher sums in order to 
avoid a severe curtailment of acreage under cultivation. Moreover, given the 
continued fighting in the provinces, such credit was deemed opportune to retain the 
political allegiance of the countryside. Nevertheless, the amounts involved 
represented an even larger injection of cash into the economy than that resulting 
from the urban wage increases. Credit to industiy from the Bank of Greece was 
kept under tighter reins by the Currency Committee, but the operations of the 
private banks, not subject to such restraints, were beginning to reach worrying 
levels. In late 1947, the Public Finance Division appealed to private bankers to cut 
their loans, but met with a lukewarm response.101
Further inflationary pressure resulted from the de facto devaluation of the 
drachma following the introduction of the 'Exchange Certificate Plan', and the tax 
increases. AMAG and the government had naively hoped that the higher costs of 
both would be absorbed by importers and the business community rather than 
simply passed on to consumers, but this was little more than wishful thinking. 
Although the apparent public response was passive acceptance, this seemed 
unlikely to last for long.102
The dangers of inflation were seriously compounded by a fresh deterioration in 
the supply position. The blow to domestic food production resulting from the 
drought and the fighting could be offset only by large increases in imports. 
However, this failed to materialise. Part of the problem lay in Washington, where it 
was decided that owing to shortages of aid funds the value of the post-UNRRA 
programme was to be reduced to $38m instead of the $50m originally envisaged. 
Even more serious was the fact that AMAG's own import programme had run into 
enormous difficulties. It had become painfully obvious that the FTA was
100 Ibid., pp. 169-170.
101 Ibid., pp. 150-154,159. AMAG's demand that the Bank of Greece be allowed to supervise the 
private institutions aroused howls of indignation, and led to a lengthy stalemate. Eventually, 
a compromise obliged the banks to accept Currency Committee supervision. A credit squeeze 
was finally enforced in August 1948, in the face of fierce opposition not only from the 
banks, but also from the cabinet; Ibid., 148-151, 213-220.
102 Ibid., pp. 104-105, 134-135.
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undermanned from the start, and its staff were overwhelmed by the immense task 
of assessing each import application. During the second half of 1947, imports were 
roughly 50% lower than the corresponding period in 1946. The resulting shortfall 
in the counterpart funds was overcome only by the help of a temporary loan 
involving the printing of new drachmae worth $83m, adding further to inflationary 
pressure. The consequences of the tailing off of imports were complicated by the 
dislocation of the internal distribution of supplies caused by the fighting and 
evacuations, and the reappearance of extensive hoarding. By the end of November, 
shortages of several essential commodities became acute.103
The economic problems were complicated yet further by the persistence of the 
political crisis. The failure to bring the civil war to a swift conclusion was proving 
costly both in financial and human terms. By the late summer, the government in 
Athens was complaining that it had insufficient means to defeat the insurgents, and 
sought to expand the size of its armed forces.104 Despite relentless pressure, and 
the support of MacVeagh, AMAG remained opposed to such a move.105 Amid 
general American scepticism as to whether troops were being deployed effectively, 
Griswold offered suggestions for improving their quality rather than their 
quantity.106 However, by September, the progressive deterioration of the security 
situation persuaded him to modify this stance, and he accepted the need to expand 
the military establishment. Further increases were sanctioned in December, 
following a fresh series of guerrilla successes against the Greek army.107 The 
increased military costs were to play havoc with the finances of both the 
government and the Mission.
The fighting created an even greater burden on public finances as a result of the 
increasing flood of refugees. At first, people abandoned their homes through fear 
of guerrilla raids. However, it soon became clear that the numbers of displaced 
persons were rising rapidly as a result of a decision by the Greek general staff to 
evacuate remote areas in order to hinder recruitment into the guerrilla forces. 
Although the civilian divisions of AMAG were fiercely opposed to the policy on 
economic grounds, they were overruled by the US Army Group Greece
103 Ibid., pp. 145, 156-158, 163.
104 FRUS, Vol.V, 1947. Memorandum by Witman, 29.7.1947, pp.265-267; Memorandum by 
Villard to the Secretary of State, 7.8.1947, pp.281-284; Memorandum by Villard to the 
Secretary of State, 8.8.1947, pp.287-289; Griswold to the Secretary of State, 11.8.1947, 
p.294.
105 FRUS, Vol.V, 1947. MacVeagh to the Secretary of State, 21.8.1947, pp.303-304.
106 FRUS, Vol.V, 1947. Memorandum by Baxter, 26.8.1947, pp.314-315; Griswold to the 
Secretary of State, 6.9.1947, p.330.
107 FRUS, Vol.V, 1947. Memorandum of Meeting with State Department Representatives on 
the Greek Situation, 17.9.1947, pp.344-346; Lovett to AMAG, 30.12.1947, pp.478-480.
234
(USAGG). Over 250,OCX) were made homeless by the end of October. By the end 
of the year, the evacuation drive had pushed the number of refugees beyond the 
half million mark, necessitating huge emergency relief payments.108
In the meantime, fresh agitation for pay rises was creating another potential 
source of inflationary pressure. Prices rose an average 40% between the summer 
and the end of 1947, making another confrontational round of wage bargaining 
increasingly probable. The country seemed on the brink of fresh hyperinflation and 
inevitable economic collapse.109 With the civil war still unresolved, the likely 
political price of such a demoralising outcome galvanised both AMAG and the 
government into enacting a series of countermeasures.
Countermeasures
In early December 1947, relations between AMAG and the government in Athens 
had reached a low point as a result of the mounting crisis. Protesting against what it 
saw as the inadequacy of the Mission's programme, the government pressed 
AMAG for increases in US aid and a substantial diversion of counterpart funds for 
immediate budgetary purposes.110 At one point, the whole government threatened 
to resign unless the Mission sanctioned the flooding of the market with consumer 
goods and unrestricted sales of gold by the Bank of Greece. AMAG found itself in 
a difficult position. It was fully aware of the problems resulting from the shortfall 
in imports, but knew that Washington was hardly likely to budge on the second 
issue. All it could do was to advise the imposition of a wage freeze.111
Left with little choice, the government rushed through emergency anti-strike 
legislation embodying a wage freeze, in response to proposed strike action by 
banking and public utility employees. For the duration of the civil war, the law 
threatened strikers with draconian punishments including life imprisonment and 
death. Although it was not seriously believed that the more severe penalties would 
actually be enforced, the measure aroused considerable opposition both inside and 
outside Greece. Nevertheless, it was successful in averting a second wave of 
strikes and pay rises during subsequent months.112
For its part, AMAG made strenuous efforts to address the imports problem. 
Faced with the cut in the post-UNRRA programme and the need to divert resources 
towards military purposes, the Mission appealed to the State Department for an
108 Coombs, op.cit., 1953, p. 167.
109 Ibid., pp. 160-161.
110 Ibid., p. 119.
111 Ibid., pp. 174-176.
112 Ibid., pp. 176-177.
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emergency aid package. This was refused as politically inopportune, given the 
delicate state of negotiations concerning the European Recovery Programme 
(ERP). However, Washington sanctioned the accelerated spending of remaining 
AMAG funds, hoping that the sums could be replaced from ERP sources as soon 
as these became available. By such means, and by the diversion of $29m from 
reconstruction projects, the Mission was able to ensure that imports during the first 
three months of 1948 were nearly double those of the previous quarter. This 
allowed a substantial improvement in the supply position, leading to a general 
downturn in prices by early April.113
A further stabilising factor was the outcome of successive AMAG compromises 
vis-a-vis the government regarding the latter's traditional safety valve, the sale of 
gold. As indicated in the previous chapter, the stampede for gold which almost 
drained the Bank of Greece's last reserves came to a halt with the revival of 
confidence after Truman's announcement. Public pressure to buy sovereigns 
virtually disappeared with many individuals choosing to resell their gold to the 
Bank. Despite occasional outbursts of panic over the next six months, the situation 
never approached the critical point it had reached in early March.114 However, in 
October 1947, the government sought to reverse increases in the sovereign rate 
with a new wave of gold sales. At first, the Mission had been hostile, warning that 
a 'vigorous recovery programme' was a far more appropriate way of overcoming 
the crisis.115 Washington was equally opposed pointing out that gold sales did little 
to control inflation and merely led to the 'accumulation of private fortunes', and 
urged that the proposal be rejected.116 Nevertheless, AMAG soon felt compelled to 
agree to a limited volume of sales. Almost 40,000 sovereigns were sold in secret 
by the end of the month, achieving temporary stability. However, fresh panic 
ensued within a week. This time the Bank of Greece was permitted to resume sales 
on condition that the foreign members of the Currency Committee were to 
supervise operations. Despite this proviso, the advice of Gregory and Patterson 
was totally ignored and over 100,000 sovereigns were wasted during the following 
month in a futile attempt to stabilise the sovereign rate at the 135,000 level.117
In early December, AMAG agreed to further sales only if its Public Finance 
Division could oversee operations. While the government continued to clamour for
113 Ibid., pp. 177-180
114 For regular updates on the gold reserves of the Bank of Greece, see a series of reports 
contained with FO371/67103, including R3542, 15.3.1947; R3938, 23.3.1947; R4952, 
12.4.1947; R6334, 10.5.1947; R7326, 31.5.1947; R9223, 7.7.1947; R9554, 13.7.1947.
115 Coombs, op.cit., 1953, p. 189.
116 FRUS, Vol.V, 1947. Lovett to AMAG, 18.10.1947, pp.371-372.
117 Coombs, op.cit., 1953, pp. 189-190.
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a high volume of sales to bring the sovereign rate back down to previous levels, the 
Mission deliberately restricted sales during December and January in an attempt to 
conserve gold stocks. In such circumstances, with the injection of more drachmae 
into the economy, the way was open for a speculative rush on gold. With the US 
Treasury refusing to replace previous losses, and the understandable fear of 
abandoning the policy at such a time, 60% of the Greek gold reserves passed to the 
speculators within a three week period. The crisis was temporarily overcome by the 
conversion of other gold reserves into sovereigns, and by announcements that the 
Bank of Greece would no longer attempt to bring about a substantial reduction in 
the sovereign rate. The pressure was eased once prices began to stabilise towards 
the spring. Nevertheless, the pattern continued to be repeated on a smaller scale 
during subsequent months, mainly in response to military and political instability. 
In total, over a million sovereigns worth $8.7m were sold between October 1947 
and June 1948.118
Table 6.1 Comparative Economic Indicators, 1947-48
Period
Private Sight 
Note Issue Deposits Total Money 
(in billions Supply 
of drachmae)
Sovereign Rate 
(in thousands 
of drachmae)
AMAG Price 
Index 
(Oct 1939=1)
June 1947 690 96 786 135 197
___ July ...... 692 100 792 144 203
August 732 108 840 152 205
September 764 121 885 147 213
October 822 129 951 173 228
November 829 136 965 190 252
December 974 140 1,114 204 273
January 1948 893 146 1,039 207 282
February 866 150 1,016 230 296
March 888 160 1,048 230 299
April 970 161 1,131 230 294
May 956 177 1,133 230 287
June 1,011 189 1,200 230 289
Source: Coombs, op.cit., 1953, p.201.
As table 6.1 indicates, the combined impact of the wage freeze, increased 
imports and gold sales had a considerable calming influence on the economy. 
Prices began to stabilise in March 1948, and even decreased slightly during April 
and May. The sovereign rate peaked in February, and remained largely stable until 
the summer. The slowdown of prices took place against the background of a 
continuing increase in the money supply, indicating a substantial reduction in the 
velocity of circulation. Moreover, a rise in the value of sight deposits as a 
percentage of the total money supply (from 12.6% in December 1947 to 15.75% in 
June 1948) suggested an increased propensity to retain drachmae.
118 Ibid., pp. 190-200; Folitakis, op.cit.3 1990, p.243.
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AMAG took advantage of the lull to sponsor further measures to improve public 
finances. During the spring of 1948, export subsidies were virtually eliminated. In 
June, the cigarette tax was raised by 25%, and bread subsidies were finally 
removed in July.119 As table 6,2 demonstrates, by the end of the fiscal year (1947- 
48), public finances were also displaying a degree of improvement. Despite huge 
military outlays and the enormous cost of maintaining the refugees, the budget 
deficit amounted to only 6%. Moreover, the likelihood of further recourse to the 
printing press was reduced by the healthy expansion of the counterpart funds 
resulting from the increased imports programme. Nevertheless, the aggregate 
figures disguised the continued dependence on foreign aid. Taxation provided only 
67.8% of total revenue, with the remainder deriving from UNRRA, post-UNRRA 
and AMAG aid. There were some grounds for optimism. For the first time, 
taxation yields exceeded ordinary expenditure by an emphatic 44%. The Greek 
balance of payments had also improved. Thanks mainly to the restraint exercised 
over licensing, the value of total commodity imports was reduced from $387m in 
1946 to $318m in 1947-48. The devaluation of the drachma allowed commodity 
exports to more than double from $41m to $95.6m. Total foreign exchange receipts 
rose from $102m to $150.5m. As with public finances, the balance of payments 
was heavily dependent on foreign aid worth $177m, but the overall trend seemed 
encouraging.120
Table 6.2 Greek Budgetary Developments, 1946-49 (in billions of drachmae)
Expenditures 1946*47 1947-48 1948-49 
and Revenue (12 months) (15 months) (12 months) (12 months)
TOTAL EXPENDITURES 2,730 3,506 2,805 3,439
Military 418 1,175 940 1,159
Refugees and Relief 37 540 432 r 505
Ordinary and other 1,088 1,456 ..... U 6 5 ____ 1,775
Hidden Subsidies 1,187 335 268 -
TOTAL REVENUE 2,459 3,102 2,482 2,734
Taxation 804 2,104 1,684 2,439
UNRRA, OFLC 1,575 889 711 195
Other 80 109 87 100
DEFICIT 271 404 323 705
AMAG Aid - 186 186 -
ECAAid - - - 500
NET DEFICIT 271 218 137 205
Source: Coombs, op.cit., 1953, p.212.
6.4 The First Year of US Aid
By the middle of 1948, a modicum of stability had thus been restored to the Greek 
economy. The improvement in several economic indicators suggested that some
119 Coombs, op.cit., 1953, pp.210-212.
120 Ibid., p.236.
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progress had been achieved in particularly unfavourable circumstances. This 
outcome can be interpreted in many ways, depending on the choice of starting 
point. As AMAG had received no detailed blueprint for its activities, it must 
therefore be judged in the general terms suggested by the Truman address rather 
than the precise long-term objectives of the Porter Report. It fulfilled the most basic 
expectation, in that Greece obviously had not been conquered by the insurgents. 
The final outcome was still far from clear, as the guerrilla forces continued to pose 
a considerable threat. Even so, the temporary economic stability did enable the 
government to pay much closer attention to the war in the near future, thus 
increasing the likelihood of an ultimate victory.
As for the other broad aims, the results were equally far from clear. Even if 
Greece had not fallen into the Soviet orbit, the continued prevalence of fundamental 
abuses of human rights, particularly the arrests, executions and deportations, called 
into question any description of Greece as a 'free nation'. At first, many of the 
Americans regarded the Greek Right as little better than the insurgents. Porter was 
criticised for his belief that 'both sides' were 'equally unprincipled', and many 
AMAG members felt that the Greek political elite shared much of the blame for the 
civil war.121 While Washington's official stance was to support the elected 
government, it was indicated that there were limits that should not be crossed. 
Accordingly, before Griswold left for Athens, he had been warned that while the 
government might End it necessary to employ 'stem and determined measures' to 
defeat the guerrillas, 'excesses' were not to be tolerated.122 With time, the 
distinctions became somewhat blurred. The Americans seemed generally reluctant 
to exploit their sweeping powers to soften the government's repressive policies, 
and their apparent unwillingness to take a stand on the civil liberties issue 
contrasted with the position adopted by the international press and the British 
authorities in Athens. This failure to act made Truman's avowed intention to 
promote a 'healthy democracy' seem distinctly hollow.123
In economic terms, the results were also decidedly mixed, amounting to little 
more than a maintenance of the existing situation. Truman had offered a vague 
mixture of short-term expediency (increased imports) and long-term vision (self- 
sufficiency). Much success was eventually achieved as far as the first aim was 
concerned. US aid did indeed ensure that necessary imports continued to pour into 
the country, far in excess of the levels which could have been obtained from Greek
121 FQ371/67034 R3055, Athens to FO, Telegram no.559, 6.3.1947; Warren, op.cit., 1998, 
p.76.
122 FRUS, Vol.V, 1947. The Secretary of State to Griswold, 11.7.1947, pp.219-224.
123 Wittner, op.cit., 1982, Chapter 5.
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export earnings alone. Even this outcome was under threat for a period, as the 
imports programme was almost undermined by the shortcomings of the 
institutional arrangements imposed by AMAG. Much trouble could have been 
avoided had the FTA been expanded as rapidly as the Mission’s own divisions.
The grander goal of the self-sustaining economy was never realistically 
attainable within a year. As the Coombs figures indicated, Greece’s balance of 
payments and public finances improved over the year, but its dependence on 
foreign aid was still overwhelming. Truman had offered nothing specific to ensure 
self-sufficiency, and many of the fundamental problems of the economy remained 
as intractable as ever. Despite modest successes in several areas, notably the 
increased efficiency of tax collection, in other areas satisfactory solutions seemed 
no nearer in 1948 than they had been at any time since liberation. The continuing 
weakness of the civil service, the regressive nature of the taxation system, the 
appalling maldistribution of wealth, the persistent ability of the rich to shield 
themselves from the wider problems of the country, and the failure to make any 
structural adjustments to restore international competitiveness all boded badly for 
the future, and testified to the relative impotence of the Mission to effect any 
sweeping changes.124
According to Coombs’ later account, AMAG had felt hampered from the start by 
several erroneous assumptions held by the planners in Washington. The serious 
underestimation of the tenacity of the insurgents led to unrealistic expectations as to 
the shares of aid to be allocated for various purposes. The planners had expected 
that the Mission, as the instrument of US aid, would enjoy considerable popular 
support, and that the ’Greek public would enthusiastically rally around’ its 
programme. They had also assumed that their efforts to broaden the government in 
Athens would at last create a source of ’decisive leadership' to deal with the 
country's problems. Besides these misapprehensions, they had failed to take 
account of the strong bargaining power of the trade unions, which rendered the 
task of maintaining wage stability exceedingly difficult.125
AMAG officials had some grounds for complaint. Above all, the military 
situation had the decisive influence over what could be done in other areas. Porter 
had anticipated that any escalation of the fighting would necessitate an inevitable 
squeeze on the funding of non-military objectives, and this was precisely what
124 One particularly glaring example of the continued failure to impose anything heavier than
symbolic levels of taxation, was the situation with the operators of the Liberty ships sold to 
Greece in late 1946. Tax rates of little more than 3%-4% were levied on the immense profits 
earned by these vessels; P.A. Porter, 'Wanted: A Miracle in Greece', Collier's, 20.9.1947. 
Efforts to secure higher tax revenue from shipowners met with concerted opposition from the 
latter and were unsuccessful until 1950; Amen, op.cit., 1978, pp. 116-120.
125 Coombs, op.cit., 1953, pp.84-85.
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happened. Even before Griswold departed for Athens, he had been informed that 
Washington regarded military and economic aims as being of ’equal 
importance’.126 At first, the balance was open to different interpretations. 
According to Coombs’ later account, he initially felt that too much emphasis had 
been placed on providing economic solutions to essentially political problems.127 
While Griswold reiterated the emphasis on both objectives, by December the US 
embassy in Athens was stressing that American efforts in Greece could be as easily 
negated by 'economic forces’ as by any other.128 By the beginning of 1948, a 
senior US official could describe the ’Greek problem' as 'military [...] and 
political' rather than simply a question of 'reconstruction and economic 
development’.129
This gradual shift towards an emphasis on military issues merely helped resolve 
what had been a consistent dilemma for AMAG. While the overall importance of 
economic measures was hardly questioned, the choice as to which economic 
measures should take precedence was a long-running source of controversy. As 
late as October 1947, George McGhee, coordinator of the Greece-Turkey aid 
programme, could inform British officials that alongside the restoration of internal 
security, both reconstruction and the budget were equally crucial.130 Certainly, the 
Mission arrived in Greece with little sense of clarity as to immediate priorities, a 
state of affairs which led to incessant bickering between the heads of various 
divisions, each of whom was anxious to further his own cause. This proved 
particularly damaging in the struggle against inflation, where members responsible 
for civilian projects clashed with those who were anxious to restrict increases in the 
money supply. The lack of consensus and coordination could prove calamitous, as 
demonstrated by the course and outcome of the wage negotiations. The Public 
Finance Division was invariably at loggerheads with the rest of the Mission over 
any action likely to increase the threat of inflation, fighting long battles over the 
need to restrict reconstruction spending and the issuing of industrial credit.131 The 
fundamental rift was succinctly described by Clinton Golden, the head of the 
Labour Division, who complained scathingly about the actions of the ’budget
126 FRUS, Vol.V, 1947. Marshall to Griswold, 11.7.1947, pp.219-224.
127 Coombs, op.cit., 1953, p.84.
128 FRUS, Vol.V, 1947. Griswold to the Secretary of State, 9.10.1947, pp.361-363; Keely to 
the Secretary of State, 8.12.1947, pp.438-439.
129 FRUS, Vol.IV, 1948. Memorandum by Henderson to the Secretary of State, 9.1.1948, pp.9- 
14.
130 F 0371/67046 R13868, Wallinger to Norton, 16.10.1947.
131 Coombs, op.cit., 1953, pp.56, 143, 150.
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balancers' brigade'.132 According to Coombs, who personified the latter group, 
the other divisions did not acknowledge the necessity of containing inflation until 
the advent of the major crisis at the end of 1947.133
The steady shift of funds from civilian to military purposes meant not so much 
the abandonment of economic aims per se, but rather the shelving of the longer 
term economic goals in order to meet the emergencies of the moment. Each increase 
of the military effort involved the temporary sacrifice of expenditure on 
reconstruction. The first $9m were diverted in September 1947.134 Three months 
later, the expansion of the armed forces was achieved at the cost of slashing civilian 
projects, including $11.2m from reconstruction, $2.3m from agricultural 
rehabilitation, and $0.5m from the medical programme.135 As already noted, the 
imports emergency of late 1947 was solved only by diverting yet another $29m 
away from reconstruction projects. By June 1948, the sums earmarked for 
reconstruction were less than half of what had been envisaged a year before.136 
Thus the growing pre-occupation with the twin goals of defeating the insurgency 
and containing inflation meant unfortunate delays to the reconstruction effort, a 
tactical abandonment of the most direct path to ultimate self-sufficiency.
Nevertheless, the maintenance of financial stability could still involve recourse 
to unwelcome compromises. In December 1947, the political section of the US 
embassy in Athens had highlighted the urgent need for further economic assistance 
from Washington. It advised that given the gravity of the situation, the United 
States should no longer feel bound by 'economic theory and sound business 
principles' when considering the matter.137 According to Politakis, this was 
tantamount to a green light for the abandonment of all economic common sense in 
the single-minded pursuit of a military-political solution, a course which would 
soon lead to American acquiescence in the resurrection of the detested gold sales 
policy.138 The reality was far more complex. There was no soft pedalling on fiscal 
orthodoxy, as witnessed by the Public Finance Division's continued vigilance over 
all budget related issues. However, AMAG did indeed reverse its initial stance 
towards gold sales. As one of its senior officials stated, it was 'entirely justified' to
132 Cited in Wittner, op.cit., 1982, p. 174.
133 Coombs, op.cit., 1953, p.56.
134 FRUS, Vol.V, 1947. Griswold to the Secretary of State, 15.9.1947, pp.337-340.
135 FRUS, Vol.V, 1947. Lovett to AMAG, 30.12.1947, pp.478-480.
136 Wittner, op.cit., 1982, p.375, fn 55.
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make exceptions to certain aspects of general economic policy should these conflict 
with overall political aims. He believed that it was desirable to make use of 
'palliatives' such as gold sales in order to 'buy time' until the military situation 
improved and the Mission's other reforms began to bear fruit. In particular, he felt 
it was 'critically important' to maintain political and economic stability until the 
forthcoming offensive against the insurgents.139 Moreover, the endorsement of the 
gold policy was seen as a source of potential leverage over the government, which 
was obliged to promise several reform measures. Coombs later argued that the 
temporary expenditure of gold worth $8.7m was a small price to pay in order to 
save the entire AMAG programme.140
Thus in essence AMAG found itself adopting a stance eerily reminiscent of that 
taken by the British two years before. In both cases, longer term goals were 
temporarily subordinated to more immediate considerations. If anything, the 
repetition of the gold scenario merely indicates how little had been achieved on the 
fundamental problems. Historical accounts of AMAG's role in Greece by and large 
emphasise the unprecedented degree of control which the US advisors were able to 
exercise over the Greeks.141 However, the fact that the Mission felt so compelled 
to compromise, despite its powers and financial clout, suggests that its control was 
far from complete. It is worth considering why AMAG was so unable to impose its 
will on the Greeks on several major issues.
Part of the explanation lies in the general response of the government in Athens. 
Initially, it seemed that the extensive powers granted to AMAG could be exercised 
without generating too much friction. Fully aware that the Mission was an 
unavoidable element of the US aid package, the government was happy to agree to 
stringent conditions. The Greek charge d'affaires in Washington was under no 
illusions as to the extent that the arrangements infringed his country's sovereignty, 
but felt this was a relatively minor issue given the more pressing need to secure US 
help. The only hostile reaction to Public Law 75, the congressional act approving 
Truman's proposals for Greece and Turkey, came from the Turkish foreign 
minister rather than from any Greek official.142
This apparent eagerness to cooperate with AMAG, however, did not always 
translate into a harmonious relationship once the Mission was in place. Every 
controversial measure became a battle of wits between AMAG and the government,
139 FRUS, Vol.V, 1947. Howard to the Secretary of State, 10.12.1947, pp.449-452.
140 Coombs, op.cit., 1953, pp. 195, 200.
141 Typical of this approach are the works of Amen, op.cit., 1978; Kofas, op.cit., 1989; Wittner, 
op.cit., 1982; and T.C. Kariotis, 'American Economic Penetration of Greece in the Late 
Nineteen Forties', Journal of the Hellenic Diaspora, VI(4), 1979:85-94.
142 Politakis, op.cit., 1990, pp.213-214.
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creating interminable delays. Thus, the FTA was not set up until October 1947, 
even though a previous government had approved the measure as far back as 
February. Despite governmental approval of the abandonment of bread subsidies, 
indicated by the acceptance of the December budget, the move was not enacted until 
the summer of 1948. While Greek politicians deliberately avoided direct 
confrontation with the Mission, they were reticent when it came to publicly 
supporting its policies. In the meantime, the persistent clamour for increased US 
aid continued unabated. Coombs felt that the assumption that Greece deserved 
further help was so taken for granted that any politician who failed to stress the 
point was risking political suicide. Such attitudes proved unhelpful in the light of 
AMAG's determination to secure the maximum deployment of Greece's own 
resources, and with local politicians still reluctant to assume any responsibility for 
the country's recovery, the Mission perceived itself as a 'convenient scapegoat’ for 
every unpopular policy.143 Thus before long, AMAG found itself in a situation far 
removed from that which had been envisaged, as the public did anything but 'rally 
around' its programme.
The difficulties facing AMAG were well illustrated by the obstacles encountered 
by the administrative reform drive. The September agreement with the civil 
servants had secured several concessions in exchange for the pay rises. Over 
15,000 employees, nearly a quarter of the total, were to be laid off, while all new 
appointments were to be frozen. A uniform 40-hour week was to be adopted in all 
offices, and the use of overtime was to be curtailed. According to Hubert 
Gallagher, who headed the Civil Government Division, these measures proved 
particularly unpopular, attracting widespread opposition from the government and 
the civil service, and provoking violent anti-American sentiments from the Athens 
press. While delegations of sacked employees protested vociferously, the 
government obstructed matters by endlessly debating and finally rejecting special 
legislation to cover the redundancies. Although open strikes were avoided, 
workplace disruptions became commonplace as officials resorted to go-slow 
actions. In the end, the results of the reform drive were mixed. No more than 
8,500 employees were dismissed, roughly half of the projected total. Even this 
exaggerated the true picture as most of those laid off were temporary employees, 
often wives or daughters of civil servants, while many others were holders of more 
than one post. In some cases, vital personnel were deliberately discharged 
apparently in an attempt to undermine the entire venture. AMAG claimed greater
143 Coombs, op.cit., 1953, pp.57-62.
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success with the other clauses in the agreement, though it was clear that a vast 
effort would still be required in the future.144
Even more damaging was the general stance of many interest groups within the 
country. At first, the Americans were reluctant to judge the wealthy sections of 
Greek society too harshly. An official at the US embassy in Athens responded 
coolly to complaints about the selfishness of the 'Greek business classes' voiced 
by Gregory and Patterson, claiming that all private individuals, whether Greek or 
otherwise, tended to protect their own interests, and that only government policy 
could be blamed for the situation. Nevertheless, the same 'business classes' were 
potentially jeopardising their interests by failing to cooperate with AMAG.145 As 
Thomadakis points out, they were playing a risky game in antagonising the 
Mission. They had to regard the Americans as their political allies given that 
Washington's support was the principal guarantee of a non-Communist Greece. 
Nevertheless, they frequently refused to act as economic allies by continuing to 
pursue their own self-interest even when this cut across the Mission's policies.146 
The persistence of gold speculation, capital flight, resistance to taxation and any 
form of institutionalised supervision all served to embarrass AMAG throughout its 
period of activities. The all too frequent inability of both the Mission and the 
government to impose any meaningful restraint on the actions of certain groups 
allowed such behaviour to pass unpunished.
Thus in its dealings with both the government and powerful interest groups, 
AMAG found itself facing the same relentlessly uphill struggle which had proved 
so daunting for the BEM. As Fatouros observes, Greek politicians were 
particularly adept at subverting formal controls to achieve their aims.147 In such 
circumstances, the Mission's powers could not easily translate into practical 
results. Like the British before them, the Americans felt obliged to sanction gold 
sales partly in the hope of staving off immediate disaster, and partly in the belief 
that such a concession could be used to gain leverage over the Greeks on other 
issues. Both lines of thinking amounted to a tacit admission of powerlessness.
To a certain extent, AMAG itself was to blame for some of the friction. Its 
powers were not always used in the most tactful manner. Initially, the overzealous
144 Gallagher, op.cit., 1948, pp.250-258; Colman, op.cit., 1949, pp.86-93.
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expectations of the Mission's members, together with their apparent emphasis on 
'action almost for the sake of action', their naive assumption that US aid amounted 
to 'pure generosity', and their inflexibility and inclination to 'impose American 
methods' did little to foster smooth relations with the Greeks. Coombs claimed that 
such difficulties were largely overcome with time.148 More serious was the 
consistently crude approach of Griswold, who summed up his general stance by 
claiming that the achievement of 'good results' was far more important than 
worries about accusations of interference.149 His dealings with Greek politicians 
were notable for a marked lack of subtlety, particularly during his efforts to 
broaden the government in the summer of 1947. Moreover, despite clear 
instructions to exercise great caution of his handling of the press, his concept of 
public relations left much to be desired.150
Not everyone was equally enthusiastic about this approach. The British 
ambassador Sir Clifford Norton claimed he 'could never speak to the Greeks' as 
Griswold did. Even US officials began to feel deep disquiet. Rankin warned that 
the Greeks were unlikely to warm to such 'colonial treatment’.151 More 
fundamental was the opposition voiced by MacVeagh, which led to a serious rift 
between the US embassy in Athens and AMAG. When the Mission was first 
proposed, he had specifically requested that it should not be headed by a politician, 
but was ignored. Before long, he came to feel deep dismay about the way in which 
American policy was being conducted. It was MacVeagh who had complained of 
the apparent one-sidedness of the London Agreement, and had likened the powers 
granted to the British as akin to those once wielded by the German occupiers. 
Consistent with this stance, he stressed the advisability of 'careful non interference 
in Greek internal affairs', and warned that the Mission was in danger of appearing 
as a 'disintegrating factor' thanks to Griswold's meddling in the country's politics. 
Moreover, he deplored the adverse publicity which some of Griswold's blunter 
statements were attracting in the international press. However, his opposition failed 
to sway Washington. The preferred solution to the conflict was not to force 
Griswold to tone down his approach, but to remove MacVeagh from office. After 
leaving Athens, the former ambassador warned that the execution of the Marshall 
Plan should take care to avoid the mistakes made in Greece, and predicted dire
148 Coombs, op.cit., 1953, pp.61-62.
149 FRUS, Vol.V, 1947. Griswold to the Secretary of State, 5.8.1947, pp.279-280.
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consequences if the activities of US advisors in Europe were to be subordinated to 
the 'interference and dictation of politically ambitious amateurs'.152
6.5 Conclusions
Between 1944 and early 1947, Washington was subjected to almost continuous 
pressure from all quarters to become more involved in Greek affairs. While the 
British sought moral and material support, the Greeks looked to the United States 
as the only feasible source of large-scale financial assistance, and campaigned 
relentlessly for sizeable American credits. In the meantime, officials from both 
American and international agencies warned of the gravity of events unfolding in 
the country. Nevertheless, although the full extent of the problems was clearly 
perceived in Washington, there was little initial interest in taking any direct action. 
On the contrary, fears of being seen to associate with a British venture deterred the 
US government from considering anything more than a token commitment. Far 
from the 'Anglo-American struggle for hegemony in Greece' which some accounts 
portray, the truth was that the Americans were simply not sufficiently interested in 
Greece for most of the period under review.153
Such apparent indifference rapidly evaporated once Washington started to feel 
anxious about the potential threat of Communism. Whereas the Americans had 
once decried British attempts to exclude any Soviet involvement in Greece, their 
own conversion to an anti-Moscow line was to culminate in an ideological crusade 
first suggested by the Truman doctrine. Whether or not the new American stance 
was an excuse to launch the cold war or the response to a British plot to achieve the 
same end is entirely beyond the scope of this thesis. What is important is the fact 
that the United States chose to take over Britain's role in Greece and was thus 
obliged to face the same problems which had earlier defeated the British. The 
proposed solutions, subsequent compromises and ultimate outcome of the 
American involvement during 1947-48 are particularly valuable in assessing the 
earlier activities of the British.
Before the Americans became involved in earnest, they were fully aware that 
Greek recovery would require immense sums. However, they also understood that 
little would be achieved if they heeded Greek requests to extend huge credits 
without any conditions as to their utilisation. Given the dismal record of successive 
governments in Athens, it was clear that any extensive US help would require the 
imposition of strict guidelines as to the use to which the aid was put. Fearful of 
provoking accusations of imperialism from Athens and Washington, the British
152 Iatrides, op.cit., 1980, pp.716-734.
153 Kofas, op.cit., 1989, p.31.
247
had always shied away from imposing any effective restraints on Greek 
government actions. The Americans, anxious both to safeguard their considerable 
outlays and ensure the country's future as a bulwark against the Communist threat, 
felt no such qualms.
Such perceptions were central to the Porter Report, the most detailed summary 
of American understanding of the Greek crisis and the solutions necessary to 
restore stability. On the practical side, the Porter recommendations largely tallied 
with the British approach, in that fiscal orthodoxy and currency stability were seen 
as the only guarantee of a return to economic normality. The Porter Report, 
however, went much further by recommending the deliberate investment of 
extensive resources to foster economic development.
By and large, British officials gave a favourable reception to the Porter Report. 
It contained 'no surprises' for them, as the Porter Mission had consulted 
extensively with members of the BEM. However, while they accepted that some 
parts were 'full of good sense', they were convinced its entire tone was 'over- 
optimistic'. They believed that even if the US programme lasted a full five years, 
its objectives could not be achieved. Moreover, they were critical of the failure to 
appreciate the difficulties associated with certain measures. They warned that the 
assumption of a substantial increase in taxation was entirely unrealistic, and the 
American insistence that firms should maintain detailed business records would be 
meaningless without the creation of a proper body of auditors. They also clearly 
saw that Porter's call for even such minor control measures as an anti-hoarding 
campaign would necessitate an 'onerous' effort. They dismissed his 
recommendations on industry and agriculture as 'well-worn advice' not backed up 
by any realistic indication as to how it could be enacted.154
Apart from such tactical differences, the broad emulation of the British emphasis 
on fiscal orthodoxy reinforced by selective control measures has attracted 
considerable criticism from later authors, who reject the anti-inflationary priorities 
as overly conservative. For Thomadakis, the basic failing of American actions was 
that they failed to challenge the 'existing structure of property relations', and thus 
the 'prerogatives' of the local 'bourgeoisie'.155 Elsewhere, he dismisses such 
institutional arrangements as the FTA as creating not so much a comprehensive 
'antispeculative program' as a compromise ’"dual'' structure', with central 
supervision imposed on some areas while others were left to 'uninhibited "private
154 FO371/67101 R8888, Comments cm Mr. Paul Porter's Report of April 30th, 1947, British 
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initiative'".156 For Wittner, price controls would have been far more progressive 
than the measures taken on public finances and wage restraint. According to him, 
AMAG policies offered nothing more than the 'familiar nostrum of free enterprise 
economics', taken directly from Adam Smith.157 Kofas goes even further. He 
castigates the 'laissez faire minded Americans', particularly for agreeing to the 
raising of import duties while Washington was actively promoting free trade via 
GATT. Moreover, he declares that the excessive emphasis on military expenditure 
ruled out the chance of a 'speedy economic recovery' on the lines of that occurring 
in Yugoslavia and elsewhere in the Balkans.158
Some of these criticisms are confusing, in that AMAG is condemned as being 
both too laissez faire and too interventionist. Such views fail to appreciate that 
economic management as practised by both the British and the Americans during 
the war combined state intervention with free enterprise. Although economic 
controls sought to elevate the broader interests of the state, particularly in the 
deployment of scarce resources, the private sector was allowed to flourish within 
certain limits. The failure to implement the full range of potential controls in Greece 
was due less to an obsession with Adam Smith, than to the opposition of powerful 
interest groups and successive governments in Athens, all of which far exceeded 
the Americans in their zealous attachment to the laissez faire approach. For the 
interest groups, this meant continued freedom to exploit the crisis, while for the 
government, it meant doing as little as possible, in the hope that huge injections of 
foreign aid would provide a ready-made solution. It is likely that much more could 
have been achieved had economic abuses been tackled as ruthlessly as the real or 
imagined political opposition to the right-wing governments after 1946.
More seriously, the criticisms of AMAG imply that it deliberately favoured 
business circles, while promoting policies prejudicial to the interests of the working 
classes. Although it is clear that the rich in Greece were consistently able to protect 
their own interests, while the poor were not so fortunate, it is highly debatable 
whether the Americans should be blamed for such a distasteful outcome. AMAG's 
failure to enforce a fuller range of controls is less ideologically black and white than 
some authors choose to believe. Porter's conviction that extensive controls would 
not work in Greece was a reluctant acknowledgement of the weakness of the 
country's administrative machinery. The suggestion that price controls should have
156 S.B. Thomadakis, 'Stabilization, Development, and Government Economic Authority in the 
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been adopted fails to take account of the enormous effort involved in administering 
such measures. The main reason why AMAG refrained from insisting on 
widespread controls, just as the British ceased to press the point, was that a 
comprehensive system was clearly beyond the pathetically inadequate Greek civil 
service. The same reality also ruled out meaningful returns from direct taxation 
necessitating a reliance on customs duties. The real tragedy of the failure to 
introduce economic controls was perhaps not so much AMAG’s reluctance to take 
a stand on the issue, but the fact that the government and bureaucracy in Athens 
had moved no nearer towards accepting the concept despite so many years of 
outside pressure. While the emphasis on wages may indeed seem morally tainted 
given the absence of corresponding action on prices, the simple fact was that 
formal controls on wages were considerably easier to apply. The near disaster of 
the FTA episode, where highly experienced and zealous officials were 
overwhelmed by the sheer volume of work, illustrates the enormity of such tasks. 
How the administration of sophisticated control measures, not to mention the 
launching of a centrally planned industrialisation drive, could have been expected 
from a state machinery unable even to collect a decent income tax, is left 
unexplained by the critics of American policy.
The essentially ideological approach taken by much of the subsequent 
historiography fails to take account of the causes and consequences of inflation. 
While it is clearly possible to question aspects of American policy towards Greece, 
particularly its overbearing sense of self-righteousness, its obsession with the 
Communist threat and its tacit toleration of human rights abuses, its emphasis on 
fiscal orthodoxy should not be regarded as a moral choice, and should not be 
portrayed in such terms. The assumption that any solution not based on the 
immediate containment of inflation would have been preferable cannot be 
sustained. If the outcome was both deeply unsatisfactory and socially inequitable, 
this was the result not so much of anti-inflationary policies per se, as of the failure 
to apply the full range of such policies.
Although AMAG was theoretically equipped to overcome the twin restraints 
which had defeated British efforts in Greece, the relative modesty of the American 
achievements during 1947-48 suggests that the real solution to the Greek problem 
was far more complex. Possessing powers and resources beyond the dreams of the 
BEM, AMAG was still unable to make meaningful progress in several key areas, 
and was forced into many uncomfortable compromises reminiscent of the earlier 
British experience. To be fair, the scale of the continuing civil war swallowed up 
an increasingly large share of the initially handsome resources available, but even 
so AMAG's record was not especially impressive. Despite the ability to tamper 
with cabinets and to exercise various forms of leverage over government actions,
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the Mission could not effect any significant economic transformation. This clearly 
indicates that the degree of effective control wielded by the Americans was more 
apparent than real. By the middle of 1948, the fundamental problems were still far 
from resolved and would continue to defy policy makers for a long time to come.
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CONCLUSIONS
In October 1944, the returning National Unity Government inherited a colossal 
economic disaster brought about by the circumstances of the occupation. While the 
task of rescuing a devastated economy and a discredited currency was always likely 
to prove daunting, it seemed reasonable to hope that with a combination of resolute 
action from the government, material and moral support from the Allies and 
popular goodwill, it would be possible to restore a measure of normality to serve as 
a basis for future reconstruction. Nevertheless, by the time the British pulled out in 
early 1947, Greece was no nearer to economic stability. Despite a massive Allied 
relief effort and sound advice on ways to overcome the crisis, the threat of another 
hyperinfation hovered constantly in the background.
In the light of theoretical considerations and the previous historical experience of 
inflation and stabilisation, the material addressed in the thesis suggests three 
overriding conclusions. Firstly, even if the hyperinflation was caused by the 
external factor of Axis occupation, the mediocre results of successive attempts to 
stabilise the economy were almost entirely due to internal factors such as the fiscal 
ineptitude of the government and the ignorance of, and hostility towards any form 
of economic management. Secondly, while many authors have chosen to blame 
foreign intervention for the prolongation of the crisis, it is clear that the decisions of 
successive Greek governments were a far more significant factor. Although the 
British made several mistakes in their dealings with Athens, their advice was 
invariably orthodox, enshrining the only known solutions to hyperinflation. Such 
orthodoxy would have involved painful decisions, which Greek governments, 
determined to hold out for massive foreign aid, successfully managed to avoid. 
Finally, the thesis demonstrates how strongly many aspects of post-liberation 
Greece were firmly rooted in the country's political, economic and social 
experience since liberation.
While economists and economic historians continue to debate the precise 
combination of measures needed to achieve stabilisation, what is most striking in 
the Greek case was not the relative efficacy of individual policies but the reluctance 
on the part of Greek authorities to take any decisive action at all. In the absence of a 
broad attack on inflation, the currency reform of November 1944 achieved little in 
itself beyond a return to more manageable numbers. The tax system was never 
overhauled, and indirect duties continued to provide a significant share of public 
revenue while corporate profits and most real wealth were left lightly taxed. This 
cavalier attitude towards revenue was accompanied by an equally reckless disregard
252
of the need to keep a check on expenditure. As a result, chronic budget deficits 
necessitated continuous recourse to the printing press. Despite the existence of a 
nominally independent central bank, issues to the government were made on a 
regular basis with little regard for agreed limits. The abandonment of exchange 
controls in 1946 had the serious consequence of dissipating a large part of Greece’s 
foreign currency reserves. No controls over wages were ever seriously enforced, 
and price controls were attempted only by Varvaressos, but in circumstances 
almost guaranteed to ensure failure. Such progress as was achieved was the result 
of incessant pressure from the British rather than deliberate policy of any 
government in Athens. Some improvements in revenue collection and a degree of 
discipline in public spending were pushed through not by officials of the finance 
ministry but by accountants from the BEM. Controls over note circulation and 
foreign exchange were imposed and administered not by the Bank of Greece but by 
the Currency Committee.
While seeking to avoid acting on the advice received from the British (and later 
the Americans), Greek governments preferred their own solutions to the crisis - the 
sale of gold, the lifting of all restrictions on imports, and the pursuit of the 
maximum amount of assistance from abroad. All three seemed to offer the 
advantage of removing the need to fight inflation with painful and unpopular 
policies. Nevertheless, not one of the measures addressed the fundamental 
problems of an insolvent government seeking to avoid responsibility for 
rejuvenating a devastated economy.
Stabilisation M easures Enacted in Greece 1944-47
Measures Application
Budget reforms
Government hostility to insistence on balanced budget 
unwillingness to reform taxes or curb expenditure 
modest improvement thanks to BEM and AMAG pressure
Central bank
No real control over note issues -
role eventually enforced by Currency Committee
Foreign loans
persistently sought by Greek side 
large sums reluctantly granted by Allies
New Currency issued November 1944
Price controls
Brief episode in 1945 defeated by powerful interest groups 
little popular compliance
not accompanied by rationing or state controls over supply and distribution
Wage Controls not enforced until after 1947
Greek governments were usually quick to point out the impossibility, irrelevance or 
impracticality of policies advocated by the British, and preferred to emphasise the 
need for substantial economic help from the Allies. By such means, it was possible 
to blame the foreign advisors for the impasse. Many subsequent authors have 
chosen to take up this theme, suggesting that foreign interference rather than 
internal factors compounded the crisis.
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It would clearly be naive to accept the assumption that British actions in Greece 
were simply an act of disinterested benevolence towards a wartime ally. The British 
were as much guided by political self-interest as any other player in the crisis, and 
their political stance often did little to help matters. Nevertheless, both theoretical 
considerations and the historical experience demonstrate that the recommendations 
they gave to the Greeks were largely correct. The insistence on sound public 
finances, proper taxation and supervision of imports, prices and wages, so 
strenuously resented by successive governments in Athens, offered the sole reliable 
basis for recovery. Even if British advisors sometimes found themselves trapped in 
a cul-de-sac in their haste to tackle inflation - as in their preaching the 'gospel of 
control' in a country demonstrably unable to implement controls, or in their serious 
lapse of judgement during the imports episode of 1946, their basic advice contained 
the only feasible long-term solution to the crisis.
Unfortunately for the British, they found themselves with neither carrot nor 
stick to persuade the Greeks to adopt orthodox fiscal and monetary policies. While 
the apparent degree of British control was resented by Greek politicians, who 
complained of interference and affronts to national sovereignty - a concept which 
has received some acceptance from later historians - the record shows that such 
control was entirely illusory. The advice offered by the British was either 
consistently ignored or circumvented in a variety of ways, while the imposition of 
foreign sponsored institutions achieved little in itself. The work of the BEM and 
Currency Committee was persistently undermined by the withholding of 
information and the creation of alternative channels to fund additional public 
spending, while attempts to create such bodies as the Commercial Corporation to 
oversee imports came to nothing. The total hollowness of any effective control by 
the British is demonstrated by the long running clash on gold sales during 1946- 
47. Despite considerable hostility towards the policy, the British were forced to 
cave in time and time again in the face of Greek intransigence. The real failure of 
British involvement in Greece was the commitment of so much time, effort and 
prestige without the means to guarantee the outcome. However, the later experience 
of AMAG suggests that even with powers and resources, the imposition of 
meaningful supervision over Greek governments was far from straightforward.
While the fragile provisional governments of the Centre could be partially 
excused for their reluctance to undertake unpopular measures, the same could 
hardly be said of the elected governments of the Right after March 1946. Any 
unwillingness to cooperate with solutions suggested by British advisors would be 
understandable if Greek governments had possessed their own definite plans to 
overcome the crisis. However, this was never the case. Only Varvaressos was 
prepared to implement a coherent programme, but his reforms failed to attract any
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support from the rest of the Greek political establishment. Instead, politicians 
preferred the easy options by mopping up surplus purchasing power via gold sales 
and unrestricted imports, while hoping that Greece would be bailed out by massive 
financial aid from the Allies. It is not impossible that a more generous aid package 
from the British might have produced a more enthusiastic response from the Greek 
side, particularly during the euphoric period immediately following liberation, and 
could have created an atmosphere more conducive to the acceptance of unwelcome 
advice. However, the reverse seems more compelling - it seems barely credible that 
large sums would have been simply handed over to governments in Athens given 
the complete absence of any concrete programme. In any case, without appropriate 
action on the budget, large-scale injections of capital into Greece might have 
temporarily alleviated some problems, but would have made little difference in the 
long run.
While bemoaning foreign interference, the refusal of Greek governments to act 
inevitably prolonged the dependency on foreign capital, and was to prove costly in 
many ways. Many historians have chosen to blame foreign advisers for foisting 
socially inequitable policies on Greece, but it is worth remembering that successive 
governments in Athens chose to ignore persistent British strictures on the need to 
tax higher incomes, and thus helped to create a laissezfaire haven in which the rich 
and powerful could exploit the crisis on a scale scarcely imaginable anywhere else 
in post-war Europe. It is possible to follow Varvaressos and castigate the blatant 
pursuit of self-interest by wealthy Greeks, who compounded many of the 
country's problems and alienated both British and American observers, but the 
blame has to lie with the politicians for allowing such excesses to continue 
unhindered. Greek ministers had once pointed out that the country's universal 
impoverishment ruled out any increases in taxation, and had argued that anything 
more than a token income tax amounted to political suicide, but were willing to 
sanction measures which allowed the rich to protect their wealth via investment in 
gold and foreign currency. The purchase of over two million sovereigns and the 
considerable imports of luxuries testify to the untaxed wealth forsaken by the 
government in its greatest hour of need. By leaving the fundamental causes of 
inflation untouched, the crisis was dragged out unnecessarily, prolonging the 
hardship of the poorer sections of society - those with barely enough drachmae to 
survive, let alone convert into gold or resaleable commodities. If the militancy of 
hard-pressed civil servants and industrial workers was customarily defused by 
frequent wage concessions, this was an empty gesture given that pay rises were 
inevitably swallowed up by rapid price increases.
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Perhaps the events of 1944-47 should not be seen as too surprising given the 
general attitudes of Greek politicians over the previous century. Most of the central 
features - the preoccupation with political squabbling, a reluctance to move beyond 
laissez faire, the apparent lack of concern over chronic budget and balance of 
payments deficits, the consistent pandering to powerful interest groups, and the 
frequent reliance on foreign capital coupled with a total resentment of any 
conditions which foreign Loans could entail - simply repeated many previous 
episodes in the country's history. The colossal economic disaster inherited from the 
Nazis demanded a decisive break with long established patterns of behaviour, and a 
willingness to take heed of the experience of other countries. The technocrat 
Varvaressos seemed to be virtually alone in grasping this necessity, while the rest, 
burdened with attitudes so firmly rooted in the past, ensured that Greece was 
hopelessly ill-equipped to deal with the demands of the post-liberation realities.
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